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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States and the Barbary Pirates:  Adventures in Sexuality, State-Building, and 
Nationalism, 1784-1815 
by 
 
Jason Raphael Zeledon 
 
Throughout the first three decades of its independence, the United States constantly 
experienced conflicts with the Barbary pirates.  Indeed, weathering a hostage crisis or waging 
war against Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, or Tunis was commonplace from 1784 to 1815.  Of 
these thirty-two years, twenty-five of them featured a serious conflict with the Barbary 
States.  The majority of works about the Barbary conflicts focus on events in North Africa:  
the experiences of the American captives, the frustrations of the diplomats, the excitement of 
battles, and the courageous actions of naval and military officers.  This manuscript reorients 
our attention to the United States and reveals the greater significance of the Barbary 
conflicts.  They powerfully shaped the cultural and political development of the early U.S. 
republic and changed the way policymakers, newspaper editors, and the public saw their 
country’s place in the world. 
In the 1780s, problems with the Barbary pirates contributed to the movement to 
abolish the Articles of Confederation and create the Constitution.  Also, American 
perceptions of North African men changed from the 1780s to 1790s:  from fierce adversaries 
to effeminate pushovers.  During the Tripolitan War of 1801-1805, both political parties 
(Federalists and Democratic-Republicans) believed that much was at stake for themselves—
they were fighting for the public’s trust in their vision for keeping Americans safe from 
Barbary piracy.  When the navy did win battles, Federalist and Democratic-Republican 
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newspaper editors alike claimed credit for their party while denigrating their rivals as 
unpatriotic and not concerned with the public good.  Also, although fought 5,000 miles away 
in the Mediterranean, the Tripolitan War was enormously popular and made a sizable cultural 
impact.  After negligently running the war against Tripoli, President Thomas Jefferson 
mishandled another conflict, with Tunis.  He controversially used federal funds to cover the 
travel and living expenses of Tunisian Ambassador Sidi Soliman Mellimelli and was 
ultimately outmatched in negotiations for peace and a new treaty.  Another war in the 
Mediterranean (against Algiers) occurred during the presidency of James Madison, who 
learned from Jefferson’s mistakes and accomplished what policymakers had striven for since 
the 1780s:  the subjugation of the Barbary pirates.  By obtaining congressional support at the 
outset and by sending an overwhelming force to the Mediterranean, Madison obtained a fast 
and decisive victory and prevented Federalists from raising any viable challenge to his 
leadership.  This manuscript concludes with an examination of the historical memory of the 
Tripolitan War, Mellimelli mission, and Algerine War. 
In making new arguments, this manuscript examines a plethora of primary sources 
written by Americans, North Africans, and the British and especially draws upon newspapers 
found via the online databases Early American Newspapers Series I & II and Nineteenth-
Century U.S. Newspapers.  Newspapers reveal exciting new voices and information, as they 
contain editorials, letters not found in published collections, advertisements for cultural 
events, transcriptions of speeches, toasts given at public events, poems, and election 
campaign ads.  Altogether, this manuscript reveals how America’s conflicts with the Barbary 
pirates during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries affected the development of 
political parties, ideas about gender and race, and nationalism within the United States. 
1 
 
Jason Zeledon 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Throughout the first three decades of its independence, the United States constantly 
experienced conflicts with the Barbary pirates.  Indeed, weathering a hostage crisis or waging 
war against Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, or Tunis was commonplace from 1784 to 1815.1  Of 
these thirty-two years, twenty-five of them featured a serious conflict with the Barbary 
States.2  How did policymakers and the public respond to these nearly perpetual problems?  
How did conflicts with North Africa (which took place 5,000 miles away in the 
Mediterranean region) shape events on American soil and affect the developing political 
party system?  To what extent did wars against Tripoli and Algiers captivate the public’s 
imagination and generate artistic endeavors and commercial opportunities?  These questions 
drive this manuscript, which breaks new ground by revealing how problems with the Barbary 
pirates fueled the growth of the political party system, shaped ideas about gender and race, 
and contributed to American nationalism. 
The majority of works about the Barbary conflicts focus on events in North Africa:  
the experiences of the American captives, the frustrations of the diplomats, the excitement of 
battles, and the courageous actions of naval and military officers.  A few works (often by 
literature scholars) have broached the cultural dynamics of America’s encounters with North 
Africa, but mostly regarding the 1785-1797 conflict with Algiers.3  Scholars have largely 
                                                          
1 Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis loosely belonged to the Ottoman Empire but made their own foreign policy 
decisions.  Morocco was fully independent. 
 
2 Morocco took some sailors captive in 1784; Algiers held hostages from 1785 to 1796; Tripoli and the United 
States were at war from 1801 to 1805; Tunis contested the U.S. Navy’s capture of three of its ships from 1805 
to 1807; and Algiers waged war against America from 1812 to 1815. 
 
3 Osman Benchérif, The Image of Algeria in Anglo-American Writings:  1785-1962 (Lanham:  University Press 
of America, 1997); Martha Rojas, “‘Insults Unpunished’:  Barbary Captives, American Slaves, and the 
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overlooked the cultural and political ramifications of the Tripolitan War of 1801-1805, of the 
diplomatic mission of Tunisian Ambassador Sidi Soliman Mellimelli during Thomas 
Jefferson’s second term, and of the war against Algiers from 1812-1815.  By primarily 
focusing on these three events, this manuscript reorients our attention to the United States 
(instead of on the Mediterranean region) and reveals the greater significance of the Barbary 
conflicts.  They powerfully shaped the cultural and political development of the early U.S. 
republic and changed the way policymakers, newspaper editors, and the public saw their 
country’s place in the world. 
The Barbary conflicts were a ubiquitous part of American culture in the early 
republic.  Because the United States rarely enjoyed periods of sustained peace with North 
Africa, policymakers, newspaper editors, and the public constantly worried about the safety 
of America’s merchant fleet and navy and hoped that their country would permanently end 
the threat of Barbary piracy.  As the political party system evolved, Federalists and 
Democratic-Republicans alike believed that much was at stake for their parties regarding the 
Barbary conflicts.  They heavily criticized each other’s North African policies and vied for 
credit for naval victories.  Barbary piracy also captivated the public’s imagination and 
generated cultural events, commercial products, and literary interpretations.  Altogether, 
                                                          
Negotiation of Liberty,” Early American Studies:  An Interdisciplinary Journal 1, no. 2 (Fall 2003); Lawrence 
Peskin, “The Lessons of Independence:  How the Algerian Crisis Shaped Early American Identity,” Diplomatic 
History 28, no. 3 (June 2004); Timothy Marr, The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Jacob Berman, “The Barbarous Voice of Democracy:  American Captivity 
in Barbary and the Multicultural Specter,” American Literature 79, no. 1 (March 2007); Lawrence Peskin, 
Captives and Countrymen:  Barbary Slavery and the American Public, 1785-1816 (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
Press, 2009); Robert Battistini, “Glimpses of the Other before Orientalism:  The Muslim World in Early 
American Periodicals, 1785–1800,” EAS 8, no. 2 (Spring 2010); Jacob Crane, “Barbary(an) Invasions:  The 
North African Figure in Print Culture,” EAS 50, no. 2 (Spring 2015).  For in-depth analyses of the experiences 
of the American captives in Algiers see H.G. Barnby, The Prisoners of Algiers:  An Account of the Forgotten 
American-Algerian War 1785-1797 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1966) and Christine Sears, American 
Slaves and African Masters:  Algiers and the Western Sahara, 1776-1820 (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012). 
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Americans believed that the Barbary conflicts constituted a litmus test for their young 
country—just how free was the United States? 
Although called “pirates” by Americans and Europeans, the Barbary pirates more 
accurately resembled privateers because the North African governments sponsored them and 
owned many of the ships.  Barbary piracy surged in the aftermath of Spain’s expulsion of the 
Moors in 1492 and, according to one recent estimate, North Africans captured and enslaved 1 
million to 1.25 million Europeans from 1530 to 1780.4  Some were sold in slave markets, 
while others were forced to work until they died or were ransomed.  Barbary piracy played a 
key economic role in North Africa by creating jobs for men and generating revenue for the 
governments through the ransom of captives, the consummation of treaties, and annual 
tribute payments.  Regarding the word “Barbary” (which Europeans and Americans used to 
refer to North Africa), scholars remain unsure of its exact origins.  It most likely derived 
from the Greek barbaros or the Latin barbarus to denote non-Greeks or non-Romans and it 
became associated with the coastal and mountainous region north of the Sahara Desert. 5  
Over time the word came to signify the notion (among Europeans and Americans) that North 
Africans were uncivilized or barbarians.  Although “Barbary” has a negative connotation I 
utilize it in this manuscript due to its ubiquity in the primary sources, but I disavow the 
notion that North Africans were inferior to Europeans or Americans. 
In making new arguments, this manuscript examines a plethora of primary sources 
written by Americans, North Africans, and the British.  It especially draws upon newspapers 
                                                          
4 Robert Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters:  White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and 
Italy, 1500-1800 (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 23. 
 
5 Paul Baepler, ed., White Slaves, African Masters:  An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1999), 2-3; Ann Thomson, Barbary and Enlightenment:  European 
Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the 18th Century (New York:  E.J. Brill, 1987), 11-14. 
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found via the online databases Early American Newspapers Series I & II and Nineteenth-
Century U.S. Newspapers.  Newspapers are the single most underutilized source in books and 
articles about the Barbary conflicts and, through digitization efforts, have become much more 
accessible over the past two decades.  Newspapers reveal exciting new voices and 
information, as they contain editorials, letters not found in published collections, 
advertisements for cultural events, transcriptions of speeches, toasts given at public events, 
poems, and election campaign ads.  Newspapers also allow us to answer several important 
questions, including:  how often did Federalist and Democratic-Republican newspapers 
publish articles about the Tripolitan War, the Mellimelli mission, and the Algerine War?6  
How did newspaper editors try to shape these events to their party’s advantage?  How did the 
public respond to the Barbary conflicts and what cultural impact did those events have?  By 
using a variety of search terms, I found thousands of newspaper articles that discuss the 
Barbary conflicts.7 
Published collections and online databases of primary sources have been enormously 
useful as well.  Several chapters draw upon the six-volume Naval Documents Related to the 
United States Wars with the Barbary Powers (which mostly covers the Tripolitan War).  This 
compilation of letters, diary entries, and ship-logs was published decades ago, but the sheer 
                                                          
6 In determining the party affiliation of newspapers I primarily relied on three sources.  Jeffrey Pasley’s “The 
Tyranny of Printers”:  Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic (Charlottesville, VA, 2001) 
discusses individual newspaper’s political views throughout the book and contains a list of Democratic-
Republican newspapers on pages 407-409.  Donald Stewart’s The Opposition Press of the Federalist Period 
(Albany, NY, 1969) lists the political slant of many newspapers on pages 868-893.  Finally, the Early American 
Newspapers database states the party affiliation of various newspapers at 
http://www.readex.com/sites/default/files/EANMicro%20 Selected%20Descriptions.pdf. 
 
7 Newspapers regularly republished material from other newspapers.  As a leading scholar has described, 
reprinted articles constituted “the source of most American newspaper content” and “there were no copyright 
fees, required permissions, or even well-established canons of giving credit.”  The federal government 
encouraged the widespread circulation of newspapers:  the Post Office Act of 1792 allowed printers to mail 
newspapers to subscribers at a reduced rate and to other printers for free.  See Pasley, 8-9, 48, 173. 
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amount of material in it has resulted in many interesting documents being overlooked.  
Correspondence and government records available in the Papers of James Madison, Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson, The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, the 
American State Papers series, microfilm reels, the Library of Congress’s website, 
archive.org, Google Books, and the HathiTrust Digital Library have been used as well.  
Archival trips to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Huntington Library, and the Library 
of Congress in Washington, D.C. yielded a trove of unpublished correspondence.  
Additionally, I have drawn upon captivity narratives, memoirs, and contemporaneous 
literature.  Altogether, this manuscript incorporates the perspectives of several groups:  
artists, businessmen, diplomats, foreign visitors to the United States, government officials, 
merchants, naval officers and seamen, newspaper editors, North African policymakers, and 
sailors in the merchant fleet. 
Chapter 2 examines the origins of the United States’ conflicts with North Africa and 
early efforts by policymakers to resolve them.  It also explores the evolution of American 
perceptions of the Barbary pirates from the mid-1780s to mid-1790s:  from powerful 
marauders to effeminate weaklings.  In the 1780s most commentators preferred to pay 
tribute, arguing that the Barbary States were too strong to fight and that reviving the U.S. 
navy (dismantled after the Revolutionary War) would be too expensive.  As efforts to make 
treaties faltered and a hostage situation with Algiers dragged on, some diplomats, merchants, 
and statesmen called for revising the Articles of Confederation and creating a stronger central 
government in order to deal more effectively with Barbary piracy.  Scholars have generally 
neglected the contributions of the Barbary conflicts to U.S. state-building, as key works on 
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the creation of the Constitution scarcely mention (or entirely omit) them.8  Further, the 
language used to describe the Barbary pirates changed in the mid-1790s by taking on a new 
gendered edge.  Reports of shameful sexual abuse of hostages emerged in newspapers and 
books, with commentators seeking to put pressure on the federal government to free the 
captives and to protect the merchant fleet in the Mediterranean.  A growing consensus 
favored fighting the Barbary pirates over paying tribute, but the United States was not ready 
to fight until Thomas Jefferson’s Administration. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 feature a fresh look at the Tripolitan War of 1801-1805 and its 
impact on American politics and culture.  Most books about the conflict emphasize the naval 
battles, William Eaton’s coup attempt, and the experiences of the Philadelphia captives.9  
                                                          
8 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York:  Norton, 1969); Frederick 
Marks III, “Foreign Affairs: A Winning Issue in the Campaign for Ratification of the United States 
Constitution” Political Science Quarterly 86, no. 3 (September 1971); Jack Rakove, The Beginnings of National 
Politics:  An Interpretative History of the Continental Congress (New York:  Knopf, 1979); Walter LaFeber, 
“The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy:  An Interpretation,” The Journal of American History 74, 
no. 3 (December 1987); Roger Brown, Redeeming the Republic:  Federalists, Taxation, and the Origins of the 
Constitution (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Max Edling, A Revolution in Favor of 
Government:  Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2003); Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York:  
Hill & Wang, 2007); Richard Beeman, Plain Honest Men:  The Making of the American Constitution (New 
York:  Random House, 2009); Pauline Maier, Ratification. The People Debate the Constitution: 1787-1788 
(New York:  Simon & Schuster, 2010).  By far the most extensive incorporation of the Barbary conflicts occurs 
in Frederick Marks’s Independence on Trial:  Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution (Baton 
Rouge:  Louisiana State Press, 1973). 
 
9 Gardner Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York:  Houghton, 1905); Ray Irwin, The Diplomatic 
Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina 
Press, 1931); Glenn Tucker, Dawn like Thunder:  The Barbary Wars and the Birth of the U.S. Navy 
(Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill, 1963); Louis Wright and Julia Macleod, The First Americans in North Africa:  
William Eaton’s Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805 (New York:  
Greenwood University Press, 1969); Donald Chidsey, The Wars in Barbary:  Arab Piracy and the Birth of the 
United States Navy (New York:  Crown, 1971);  A.B.C. Whipple,  To the Shores of Tripoli:  The Birth of the 
U.S. Navy and Marines (New York:  William Morrow, 1991); Michael Kitzen, Tripoli and the United States at 
War:  A History of American Relations with the Barbary States, 1785-1805 (New York:  McFarland, 1993); 
Michael Kitzen, “Money Bags or Cannon Balls:  The Origins of the Tripolitan War, 1795-1801,” Journal of the 
Early Republic 16, no. 4 (Winter 1996);  Joseph Wheelan, Jefferson’s War:  America’s First War on Terror, 
1801-1805 (New York:  Carroll & Graf, 2004); Richard Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary:  A Diplomatic History 
(Gainesville:  University of Florida Press, 2004), 133-147; Joshua London, Victory in Tripoli:  How America’s 
War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Built a Nation (Hoboken:  Wiley, 2005); Richard 
Zacks, The Pirate Coast:  Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission of 1805 (New York:  
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Only a few authors have taken a more nuanced look at Jefferson’s leadership or broached the 
cultural construction of the Barbary pirates.10   Overall, these chapters argue that historians 
have erred in viewing the Tripolitan War as a sideshow.11  Even scholars of U.S. foreign 
relations have shockingly deemed it inconsequential—for instance, Bradford Perkins’s 
touchstone The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1815 entirely omits the Tripolitan 
War!12  Although Jefferson himself considered the conflict relatively insignificant, 
newspaper editors and the public at large deemed it enormously important to national 
identity.  Newspapers constantly printed articles about the Tripolitan War, including 
editorials, details about battles and the captives in Tripoli, and letters from Mediterranean 
personnel.  Since the United States was not at war with any other country during the 
                                                          
Hyperion, 2005); Brian Kilmeade and Don Yaeger, Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates:  The Forgotten 
War that Changed American History (New York:  Sentinel, 2015). 
 
10 Robert Allison, The Crescent Obscured:  The United States and the Muslim World, 1776-1815 (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1995); Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars:  American Independence in the Atlantic 
World (New York:  Hill and Wang, 2005); Peskin, Captives and Countrymen, 143-162; Francis Cogliano, 
Emperor of Liberty:  Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2014), 144-171. 
 
11 Lawrence Kaplan, Thomas Jefferson:  Westward the Course of Empire (Wilmington:  Scholarly Resources 
Inc., 1999), 130; Lambert, 7; Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx:  The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York:  
Vintage Books, 1998), 242; Gordon Wood, Empire of Liberty (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2009), 
639.  Dumas Malone’s six-volume biography of Thomas Jefferson provides a brief overview of the Tripolitan 
War; Jefferson the President:  First Term, 1801-1805, vol. 4 of Jefferson and His Time (Boston:  Little, Brown, 
1970), 97-99, 262-263 and Jefferson the President:  Second Term, 1805-1809, vol. 5 of Jefferson and His Time 
(Boston:  Little, Brown, 1974), 37-44.  Irving Brant’s six-volume biography of James Madison scarcely covers 
it; Secretary of State, 1800-1809, vol. 4 of James Madison (Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), 60, 308-309.  
Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg’s 800+ page Madison and Jefferson (New York:  Random House, 2010), 
only devotes a handful of pages to the Tripolitan War (403-407). 
 
12 Bradford Perkins, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865, vol. 1 of The Cambridge History of 
American Foreign Relations (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1993).  Robert Tucker and David 
Hendrickson’s Empire of Liberty:  The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1990) relegates the Tripolitan War to the endnotes (294-299) and deems it “a police action” (295) instead of a 
real war.  Kaplan’s Thomas Jefferson:  Westward the Course of Empire spends only four pages on the 
Tripolitan War (127-130), while Howard Jones’s Crucible of Power:  A History of American Foreign Relations 
to 1913, 2nd ed. (Lanham:  Rowman & Littlefield, 2009) covers it in just two paragraphs (54-55).  More 
positively, a recent issue of Passport (the magazine of the Society for Historians of American Foreign 
Relations) featured a roundtable discussion about Cogliano’s Emperor of Liberty that broached the Tripolitan 
War; Passport 45, no.3 (January 2015), 7-16. 
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Tripolitan War, newspaper editors and the public gave it their full attention.  Paradoxically, 
the conflict enjoyed nearly unanimous pubic support even though it exacerbated political 
divisions between the Democratic-Republican and Federalist parties.  In contrast to earlier 
wars against Britain and France, no anti-war movement existed—all Americans despised the 
Barbary pirates.  Newspapers affiliated with both parties endorsed the use of force against 
Tripoli, yet Jefferson eventually alienated Federalists (who wanted many more warships sent 
to the Mediterranean) with his half-hearted commitment to the Tripolitan War.  When the 
navy did win battles, Federalist and Democratic-Republican newspaper editors alike claimed 
credit for their party while denigrating their rivals as unpatriotic and not concerned with the 
public good.  Both parties believed that much was at stake for themselves during the 
Tripolitan War—they were fighting for the public’s trust in their vision for keeping 
Americans safe from Barbary piracy. 
Moreover, the Tripolitan War had vibrant cultural and commercial aspects that have 
gone unnoticed.  Artists used their creative talents to interpret the conflict in many ways and 
the public eagerly spent money on Tripolitan War-themed art shows, books, musicals, 
pictures, and plays.  Americans viewed the Tripolitan War as an extension of the 
Revolutionary War and Quasi-War:  all three conflicts entailed defending freedom from 
foreign oppressors.  Newspaper articles and toasts utilized rhetoric from the earlier wars 
against Britain and France in vocalizing support for fighting Tripoli.  Although fought 5,000 
miles away in the Mediterranean, the Tripolitan War was enormously popular and made a 
sizable cultural impact.  Previous works about the Tripolitan War have focused on 
developments in the Mediterranean, but these chapters (and the manuscript as a whole) 
redirects attention to North America.   
9 
 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 also provide a reevaluation of Jefferson’s leadership during the 
Tripolitan War by arguing that he managed it very poorly.13  In the 1780s, Jefferson had been 
a naval hawk and had supported building a navy powerful enough to protect itself from the 
Barbary States and Europe.  By the time he became president in 1801, however, his views 
had drastically changed.  Appalled by the growth of the armed forces during the Quasi-War 
of the late 1790s, he became both distrustful of military figures and committed to reducing 
naval expenses.  In doing so, he recklessly created the potential for catastrophe, endangered 
the lives of sailors, and emboldened the Barbary States to treat the United States 
contemptuously.  North African policymakers were not intimidated by a token U.S. fleet in 
the Mediterranean.  Also, Jefferson squandered early Federalist support and foolishly 
disregarded the advice given by diplomats and naval officers to send more ships.  Instead, the 
president repeatedly tried to end the Tripolitan War by offering to pay off the bashaw of 
Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli, who rejected such overtures and preferred to fight the United 
States.  Ultimately, Jefferson deemed the Federalists a bigger threat to national security than 
Tripoli and made the United States look weak instead of powerful.  Moreover, Jefferson 
greatly misunderstood public sentiment.  Newspaper editors, naval officers, diplomats, and 
the public desired unequivocal victory over Tripoli, but Jefferson was willing to settle for 
much less.  Additionally, the public did not share Jefferson’s distrust of naval officers—
                                                          
13 My work stands in contrast to other scholars.  Wright and Macleod contend that “Jefferson did the best he 
could with the pitiful navy that Congress allowed him” and view him as an ardent proponent of using “force, 
vigorously and intelligently applied”; First Americans in North Africa, vi, 206.  Malone argues that Jefferson 
“deserves credit for a minor success”; Jefferson the President:  Second Term, 1805-1809, 44.  Allison praises 
Jefferson for promoting successful naval strategies while keeping the navy “strictly subservient to civil power” 
and avoiding running up the national debt (25, 32).  Wheelan lionizes Jefferson for “prov[ing]” that “facing 
down terror worked” and for being the “most passionate advocate” of “American’s revolution against the 
established order” (365-366).  Cogliano deems the Tripolitan War “a qualified success for Thomas Jefferson” 
(170).  More recently, Henry Nau bizarrely claims that Jefferson “defended America vigorously, perhaps too 
vigorously, against the Barbary pirates”; Conservative Internationalism:  Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, 
Polk, Truman, and Reagan (Princeton:  Princeton University press, 2013), 83. 
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newspaper opinion pieces and toasts brimmed with praise for them and lamented their deaths.  
Far from praising Jefferson’s leadership, we should recognize its myriad shortcomings and 
instead better appreciate the efforts of Federalists.  They led the charge to reestablish the U.S. 
Navy in the 1790s and throughout the Tripolitan War they called for bolder attacks and more 
warships to be sent to the Mediterranean. 
After negligently running the war against Tripoli, Jefferson mishandled another 
conflict with a different Barbary State, Tunis.  Chapter 6 discusses the controversial visit of 
Tunisian Ambassador Sidi Soliman Mellimelli to the United States from November 1805 to 
September 1806—an event that has received little attention from historians.14  The Mellimelli 
mission fell through the cracks for so long because most of the primary sources that shed 
light on the trip were underutilized.  This chapter rests on research done via the “Early 
American Newspapers, Series 1 & II” and “Nineteenth Century U.S. Newspapers” online 
databases, which yield abundant evidence about Mellimelli’s visit.15  Newspapers throughout 
the country constantly ran stories about it.  Federalist newspaper editors portrayed Jefferson 
as an unfaithful steward of the public trust since he used federal funds to cover the travel and 
living expenses of the diplomat and his entourage.  Some Democratic-Republican editors 
                                                          
14 Allen, 269-272; Irwin, 164-166; Louis Wright and Julia Macleod, “Mellimelli:  A Problem for President 
Jefferson in North African Diplomacy,” Virginia Quarterly Review 20, no. 4 (1944), 555-565; Whipple, 259, 
335-336; Robert Allison, The Crescent Obscured, 183-184; Wheelan, 319-320; Parker, 152-155, 260; Marr, 66-
67; Denise Spellberg, Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an:  Islam and the Founders (New York:  Knopf, 2013), 8, 218-
222, 225-226.  Three recent books that omit Mellimelli’s trip are Lambert’s The Barbary Wars, Peskin’s 
Captives and Countrymen, and Cogliano’s Emperor of Liberty.  Annette Gordon-Reed briefly mentions it in 
Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings:  An American Controversy (Charlottesville:  University of Virginia Press, 
1997), 231-232, as does Catherine Allgor in Dolley Madison:  The Problem of National Unity (Boulder:  
Westview Press, 2013), 48.  Dumas Malone spends merely one paragraph on it; Jefferson the President:  
Second Term, 1805-1809, 43-44.  Also see Brant, Secretary of State, 1800-1809, 305-310. 
 
15 Few newspaper articles mentioned Mellimelli by name; they most commonly referred to him as the Tunisian 
Ambassador or the ambassador or minister from Tunis.  Searching these databases with the terms “Tunis” or 
“Tunisian” elicited far more results than did various spellings of the diplomat’s name.  Altogether, I found more 
than 650 instances of a newspaper printing an article about the Mellimelli mission from November 11, 1805 to 
December, 31 1806. 
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joined in the disparagement, but over time they published fewer critical pieces and preferred 
to ignore it.  The public at large, however, was fascinated with Mellimelli, viewing him as a 
glamorous and exotic celebrity whose foreignness and flashy clothing provided entertainment 
value.  Further, this chapter draws on memoirs left by American elites and British visitors 
that discuss Mellimelli.  Some admired the ambassador and felt a class-based kinship with 
him, while others considered him a barbarian.  Collectively, these new sources reveal a 
spectrum of opinions about the Tunisian Ambassador and a consensus that his trip had 
enormous political and diplomatic significance.  Moreover, Mellimelli and the Bey of Tunis 
ultimately outmatched Jefferson in negotiations for peace and a new treaty.  Coming on the 
heels of the divisive Tripolitan War treaty, the Mellimelli mission underscored Jefferson’s 
failure to subdue the Barbary pirates.16 
Chapter 7 discusses the unanticipated Second Barbary War, waged against Algiers 
from 1812 to 1815.  Although Americans at the time saw a strong correlation between it and 
the monumental war against Britain, scholars of the War of 1812 have inexplicably ignored 
the Algerine War.17  Even biographies of James Madison devote scant attention to it (or 
                                                          
16 This chapter expands upon my article in Diplomatic History by incorporating new correspondence and 
newspaper articles.  Jason Zeledon, “‘As Proud as Lucifer’:  A Tunisian Diplomat in Thomas Jefferson’s 
America,” Diplomatic History, Advance Access published October 8, 2015, material reprinted by permission of 
Oxford University Press, http://dh.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/recent. 
 
17 The following books omit the Algerine War:  Francis Beirne, The War of 1812 (New York:  E.P. Dutton, 
1949); Harry Coles, The War of 1812 (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1965); Reginald Horsman, The 
War of 1812 (New York:  Knopf, 1969); James Ripley Jacobs and Glenn Tucker, The War of 1812:  A Compact 
History (New York:  Hawthorn Books, 1969); Walter Lord, The Dawn’s Early Light (New York:  Norton, 
1972); Kate Caffrey, The Twilight’s Last Gleaming:  Britain vs. America 1812-1815 (New York:  Stein and 
Day, 1977); J.C.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War:  Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American 
Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983); Walter Borneman, 1812:  The War that 
Forged a Nation (New York:  HarperCollins, 2004); Jon Latimer, 1812:  War with America (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 2007);  
Nicole Eustace, 1812:  War and the Passions of Patriotism (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2012); J.C.A. Stagg, The War of 1812:  Conflict for a Continent (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 
2012); Donald Hickey, The War of 1812:  A Forgotten Conflict 2nd ed. (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 
2012); Troy Bickham, The Weight of Vengeance:  The United States, the British Empire, and the War of 1812 
(New York:  Oxford University Press, 2012); Robert Watson, America’s First Crisis:  The War of 1812 
12 
 
entirely omit it).18  The vast majority of books that spend substantial time on the Algerine 
War stress naval battles and Commodore Stephen Decatur’s triumphant negotiations with 
Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis.19  James Madison, now president, learned from Jefferson’s 
mistakes and accomplished what policymakers had striven for since the 1780s:  the 
subjugation of the Barbary pirates.  By obtaining congressional support at the outset and by 
sending an overwhelming force to the Mediterranean, Madison obtained a fast and decisive 
victory and prevented Federalists from raising any viable challenge to his leadership.  Indeed, 
an odd reversal of political roles occurred during the Algerine War as compared with the 
Tripolitan War.  Democratic-Republicans became outspoken champions of having a strong 
navy, while some Federalists complained about naval expenses.  The public at large 
welcomed another war in the Mediterranean, seeing it as an opportunity to create a new batch 
of naval heroes and set an example to Europe about how to deal with Barbary piracy.  
Altogether, the United States triumphed over Algiers in 1815 because policymakers and the 
                                                          
(Albany:  Excelsior Editions, 2014).  Two books that very briefly mention the Algerine War are David Heidler 
and Jeanne Heidler’s The War of 1812 (Westport:  Greenwood Press, 2002), 148; and A.J. Langguth’s Union 
1812:  The Americans who Fought the Second War of Independence (New York:  Simon & Schuster, 2006), 
382. 
 
18 Irving Brant, James Madison:  Commander in Chief, 1812-1826, vol. 6 of James Madison (Indianapolis:  
Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), 381, 385, 387, 395, 398, 407; Robert Rutland, The Presidency of James Madison 
(Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1990), 190-193; Lynne Cheney, James Madison:  A Life Reconsidered 
(New York:  Penguin, 2015), 422-423.  Ralph Ketcham’s 700+ page James Madison:  A Biography (New York:  
Macmillan, 1971) has one sentence about it (599) and several other books omit it:  Gaillard Hunt, The Life of 
James Madison (New York:  Russell & Russell, 1902); Burstein and Isenberg, Madison and Jefferson; Richard 
Brookhiser, James Madison (New York:  Basic Books, 2011). 
19 Allen, 275-301; Irwin, 171-186; Charles Lewis, The Romantic Decatur (Freeport:  Books for Libraries Press, 
1937 [1971]), 156-178; James Tertius de Kay, A Rage for Glory:  The Life of Commodore Stephen Decatur 
(New York:  Free Press, 2004), 153-168; Lambert, 179-202; Spencer Tucker, Stephen Decatur:  A Life Most 
Bold and Daring (Annapolis:  Naval Institute Press, 2005), 153-174; Robert Allison, Stephen Decatur:  
American Naval Hero, 1779-1820 (Amherst:  University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 160-185; Frederick 
Leiner, The End of Barbary Terror:  America’s 1815 War against the Pirates of North Africa (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2006).  Peskin’s Captives and Countrymen is an exception, providing a solid (if 
limited) survey of domestic attitudes towards the Algerine War (187-202). 
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public rejected Jefferson’s preference for limited force and his skepticism towards the navy 
as an institution. 
The final chapter examines the historical memory of the Tripolitan War, Mellimelli 
mission, and Algerine War in nineteenth-century history books and schoolbooks (found 
primarily through the online databases Google Books and 19th Century Schoolbooks).  
Authors especially deemed the Tripolitan War a vital part of American history, while less 
frequently discussing the conflicts with Tunis and Algiers.  Prior to the Civil War, authors 
fiercely contested the Tripolitan’s War legacy and the merit of the treaty that ended the 
conflict.  After the Civil War, however, they increasingly urged readers to view the 
Tripolitan War as an unambiguous triumph for the United States and deemphasized the 
important land operation led by William Eaton.  As calls for building a powerful navy grew 
in the late nineteenth century, authors created a usable past by pointing to the Tripolitan War 
and Algerine War as examples of successful naval operations.  This chapter also explores the 
creation of the six-volume Naval Documents collection in the 1930s and 1940s, a story which 
has yet to be told. 
Today, America’s conflicts with North Africa regrettably remain little understood 
because high school and college history classes seldom teach them (even after 9/11).  I hope 
that this dissertation persuades readers that the Tripolitan War is the most important 
overlooked event in U.S. history.  It demonstrates that domestic and foreign policies were 
thoroughly intertwined in the United States’ early years and, given our country’s current 
involvement in the Middle East, it offers valuable perspective about America’s early 
relations with the Islamic World. 
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Chapter 2:  State-building and Sexuality during the 1780s and 1790s 
  
In early 1786, John Adams, then serving as the U.S. minister to Britain, attended 
several dramatic meetings in London with the elderly Tripolitan ambassador.  For the past 
few years, the United States had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain treaties with the Barbary 
States of Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunis.  America also currently faced a crisis with 
Algiers, which had captured two American ships the previous July, then enslaved their 
twenty-one sailors.  Adams hoped that he could reason with the Tripolitan ambassador, 
Abdurrahman, and learn why these North African countries apparently viewed America with 
disdain. 
However, Adams left the meetings more uncertain than before.  Reporting to John 
Jay, who was Secretary of Foreign Affairs for much of the Articles of Confederation period, 
he noted that “It would scarcely be reconcilable to the dignity of congress to read a detail of 
the ceremonies which attended the conference; it would be more proper to write them to the 
harlequin, for the amusement of the gay at the New York theatre.”  Regrettably, Adams did 
not describe the unusual protocol.  Over the course of a few meetings, he learned that 
purchasing peace treaties with the Barbary States would cost far more than anticipated.  
Abdurrahman told Adams that the Barbary States considered themselves the “sovereigns of 
the Mediterranean; and that no nation could navigate that sea without a treaty of peace with 
them.”  The Tripolitan Ambassador offered a “perpetual” peace to the United States for 
30,000 guineas and stated that Morocco and Tunis would accept the same terms.  Algiers 
would likely demand more.  Adams, though, did not know whether to trust Aga.  As he also 
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wrote to Jay, “This man is either a consummate politician in art and address, or he is a 
benevolent and wise man.”20 
Indeed, America’s encounters with the Barbary States in the 1780s through the end of 
the 1790s typically featured confusion, embarrassment, and frustration resulting from the 
sense of vulnerability to non-white peoples deemed barbaric, corrupt, and degenerate.  
Perceptions about the Barbary pirates also underwent a mammoth shift during this time.  In 
the 1780s merchants and policymakers generally deemed them powerful adversaries, with 
some urging the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation and the adoption of the 
Constitution in order to deal more effectively with the threat of Barbary piracy.  Following 
Algiers’s capture of more than 100 Americans in 1793, however, a new narrative began to 
emerge that viewed the Barbary pirates as sexual predators who relished raping captives and 
lacked any military skill.  North African men were recast as effeminate and inept, more 
interested in gratifying their insatiable sexual appetites than in bearing arms.  Further, new 
attitudes towards North African women emerged in print, with American authors denigrating 
them as promiscuous and accusing them of jeopardizing captives’ lives by seducing them.  
Commenting on gender roles in the Barbary States allowed (male) authors to express their 
support of patriarchy in American society.  Of course, American perceptions of the Barbary 
States should not be taken at face value.  This “Othering” of North African peoples and 
society tells us far more about American values and fears than it does about actual behavior.  
The Barbary conflicts of the late-eighteenth century had an important cultural dynamic that 
                                                          
20 I have retained the original italics, punctuation, and spelling for all quotes.  John Adams to John Jay, 
February 17, 1786, Charles Adams, ed., The Works of John Adams:   Second President of the United States; 
with a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, 10 vols. (Boston:  Little, Brown, and Co., 1856), 8: 372; 
Adams to Jay, February 20, 1786, Ibid., 8: 374-376; Adams to Jay, February 22, 1786, Ibid., 8: 377-378. 
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tapped into American concerns about their country’s place in the world, the morality of 
slavery, and patriarchal control over women. 
 
In the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, American merchants, diplomats, and sailors felt 
very vulnerable to the Barbary States and lamented America’s inability to prevent the 
abduction of sailors who participated in valuable overseas trade.  In his 1790 “Report on 
American Trade in the Mediterranean,” Thomas Jefferson estimated that “about one Sixth of 
[America’s] Wheat and Flour…and about one Fourth in Value of their dried and pickled 
Fish, and some Rice, found their best Markets in the Mediterranean Ports.”21  He suggested 
that eighty to one-hundred ships with 1,200 sailors annually participated in this commerce.  
Why these estimates and not more concrete facts?  Jefferson noted that many customs house 
records were lost or destroyed during the course of the Revolutionary War.   He 
acknowledged, too, that declaring independence from Britain meant that American ships no 
longer received passports that ensured safe passage in the Mediterranean, rendering them 
attractive targets for North African navies.22  As his report observed, “it was obvious to our 
Merchants that their Adventures into that Sea would be exposed to the Depredations of the 
piratical States on the Coast of Barbary.”  Following the Revolutionary War, the United 
States dismantled its military apparatus in an effort to protect civil liberties and reduce 
government spending.  George Washington resigned his commission as Commander-in-Chief 
and dissolved the Continental Army in December 1783, while the sale of the warship 
                                                          
21 Thomas Jefferson, December 28, 1790, “Report on American Trade in The Mediterranean,” 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-18-02-0139-0004 (accessed February 7, 2015).  The value 
of the Mediterranean trade increased to $10 million by 1800; Cogliano, 171. 
 
22 For details on the passport system, see Parker, 7. 
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Alliance in 1785 marked the end of the Continental Navy.  Consequently, the United States 
could not defend itself against the Barbary pirates. 
Instead, America looked to Europe for protection.  Back in July 1776 the Continental 
Congress had drafted a template for a treaty with France that included a clause stipulating 
that the French would “protect, defend, and secure” Americans “against all Attacks, Assaults, 
Violences, Injuries, Depredations or Plunderings by or from the King or Emperor of 
Morocco, or Fez, and the States of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli” just as Britain had done.23  
Article eight of the February 1778 Franco-American treaty included a guarantee of French 
mediation.  So, too, in 1779 the Continental Congress drafted a U.S.-Netherlands treaty that 
contained a pledge of Dutch intercession with the Barbary rulers on behalf of the United 
States, a provision ultimately included in the treaty signed in 1782.24  The Barbary States 
were a real—not a theoretical—threat.  Ralph Izard, the American Commissioner to the 
Court of Tuscany, had warned John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee that since 
U.S. merchants feared “the danger” of Barbary pirates abducting them, they would likely 
avoid “entering into the Mediterranean trade.”25  Similarly, Maryland merchant Richard 
Harrison admonished Congress to gain “the friendship of the Barbary States — Our 
Commerce to Lisbon, this port & the Medeterranian must become very important, & these 
Freebooters will have it in their power … to molest it greatly.”26  Richard Henry Lee hoped 
                                                          
23 July 18, 1776, Worthington Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 34 vols. (Washington D.C.:  
Government Printing Office, 1904-1937), V: 578. 
 
24 Plan of a Treaty of Commerce, February 22, 1779, Ibid., XIII: 223-224. 
 
25 Ralph Izard to the Commissioners at Paris, August 8, 1778, Francis Wharton, ed., The Revolutionary 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 6 vols. (Washington D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 
1889), II: 693. 
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that treaties would be made as to “give future security to our Commerce with the South of 
Europe.”27  Statesmen and businessmen alike recognized Barbary piracy as a serious issue, 
one that threatened trade in the Mediterranean region and with European nations.  The future 
prosperity of the United States and the lives of sailors were at stake. 
France, however, was not eager to provide support.  After a series of exchanges, 
French Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes replied that his country 
would not help America make treaties until the commissioners received explicit authorization 
to negotiate from Congress and sufficient funds to purchase the customary presents for the 
Barbary rulers.28  Shrewd American commentators recognized that European countries (even 
those allied with the United States) wanted to keep the lucrative Mediterranean trade to 
themselves.  A Maryland merchant warned Secretary of Foreign Affairs Robert Livingston 
that America could not count on European allies for mediation since “it is not [in] their 
Interest that our Navigation should become so extensive & free.”29  John Jay (Livingston’s 
successor to that post) concurred in this assessment, acknowledging that European countries 
wanted “the mediterranean Trade divided between as few as possible.”30  After all, France 
had allied with the United States during the Revolutionary War not because it endorsed the 
                                                          
26 Richard Harrison to Robert Livingston, May 13, 1783, Mary Guinta, ed., The Emerging Nation:  A 
Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 1780-
1789, 3 vols. (Washington D.C.:  National Historical Publications and Records Commission, 1996), II: 115.   
 
27 Richard Henry Lee to Jefferson, May 16, 1784, Julian Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 41 vols. 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1950- ), 8: 154. 
 
28 Comte de Vergennes to the Commissioners at Paris, October 30, 1778, Revolutionary Diplomatic 
Correspondence, 2: 817. 
 
29 Harrison to Livingston, May 13, 1783, Emerging Nation, II: 115. 
 
30 Jay’s Report on John Lamb’s Memorial and Petition, February 10, 1785, Ibid., II: 548. 
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country’s anti-colonial ideology, but from a desire to hurt England, its chief rival.31 
Remarkably, American diplomats even tried to persuade England to protect U.S. 
shipping from the Barbary pirates.  The proposals submitted by the U.S. peace 
commissioners to their British counterparts in June 1783 included a stipulation that the King 
would “employ his good Offices and Interposition” with Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, and 
Tunis in order to protect Americans and their ships “against all violence, insults, attacks or 
depredations.”32  Naively, Adams, Franklin, and Jay thought that even after a long, violent 
war Britain would willingly resume protecting U.S. commerce.  The final treaty omitted this 
provision since England had no desire to share the Mediterranean trade with its former 
colonies.  As Lord Sheffield declared in his 1783 pamphlet Observations on the Commerce 
of the American States, “it is not probable that the American States will have a very free trade 
in the Mediterranean; it will not be in the interest of any of the great maritime powers to 
protect them from the Barbary States….that the Barbary States are advantageous to the 
maritime powers is obvious.  If they were suppressed, the little states of Italy, etc., would 
have much more of the carrying trade….The Americans cannot protect themselves…they 
cannot pretend to a navy.”33  Franklin, Adams, and Jay must have felt very strongly about 
America’s vulnerability to the Barbary pirates (and perhaps frustrated with the lack of 
success with French and Dutch mediation) to have requested British protection. 
                                                          
31 Jonathan Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1985), 
94-95. 
32 The American Peace Commissioners to David Hartley:  Proposals, June 29, 1783, Ellen Cohn, ed., The 
Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 41 vols. (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1959- ), 40: 257. 
33 As quoted in Parker, 35.  Also see Lambert, 19. 
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A torrent of anti-British sentiment emerged, with Americans accusing Britain of 
actively encouraging Barbary attacks on U.S. ships.  Franklin remarked in July that North 
African “rovers may be Privately encouraged by the English to fall upon us; and to prevent 
our Interference in the carrying Trade; for I have in London heard it as a Maxim among the 
Merchants, that if there were no Algiers it would be worth Englands while to build one.”34  
George Mason surmised that rumors of Barbary pirates prowling for American ships 
stemmed from “British Intrigue, to discourage our trade.”35  American newspapers likewise 
blamed England.  Publications in Pennsylvania and Maine printed a letter from an American 
residing in London who claimed that the British both “appear[ed] much pleased that the 
Algerines make captures of Americans ships” and rejoiced in America’s weakness:  “the 
poor devils feel the want of a British fleet to protect them, and their property, from 
plunder.”36  Other newspapers reprinted an article from a Halifax publication that celebrated 
Algiers’s harassment of “the high and mighty” United States:  “they are thunderstruck” since 
their “ships can neither procure freight nor hands to navigate them, and if they could, the 
insurance alone would annihilate their trade.”37  Americans correctly deduced that Britain 
viewed the Barbary pirates as allies in suppressing their overseas commerce, and resentment 
towards their former mother country continued into the next decade. 
                                                          
34 Benjamin Franklin to Livingston, July 25, 1783, Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 40: 369. 
 
35 George Mason to Messrs. Hunter, Allison & Company, August 27, 1783, Robert Rutland, ed., The Papers of 
George Mason, 1725-1792, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 2: 789. 
 
36 The Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), May 11, 1785; The Falmouth Gazette and 
Weekly Advertiser (Falmouth, ME), May 14, 1785. 
 
37 The Pennsylvania Evening Herald and the American Monitor (Philadelphia, PA), May 14, 1785; The Salem 
Gazette (Salem, MA), May 17, 1785; The New-Haven Gazette (New Haven, CT), May 26, 1785; The Norwich-
Packet or, The Country Journal (Norwich, CT), June 2, 1785. 
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The lack of progress in obtaining treaties and protection led one frustrated merchant, 
Robert Montgomery, to undertake unilateral action.  While residing in Spain, he met with a 
Moroccan diplomat and lied about having a commission from Congress to negotiate.  He 
wanted to bolster his and other American merchants’ commercial opportunities by ensuring 
that Moroccan corsairs would not seize their ships.  Montgomery emphasized his 
commitment to “the freedom of Navigation for our flag in the Medeterranian.”38  The 
emperor of Morocco responded by designating a diplomat, Giacomo Crocco, to deal with the 
Americans.  Crocco contacted Franklin, demanding $1,500 for travel and lodging expenses 
and warning him that the emperor could become “forever indispose[d]…against the United 
Provinces” if America did not agree to a treaty.39  Franklin decided against meeting with the 
“absurd and extravagant” Crocco.40  Instead, he would await orders from Congress. 
Franklin’s choice to spurn Crocco prompted the United States’ first crisis with the 
Barbary pirates.  On October 11, 1784, a Moroccan corsair captured the American merchant 
ship Betsey off the coast of Spain and hauled the vessel and its crew of thirteen to Morocco.  
This action greatly alarmed the American diplomats.  Jefferson feared that the emperor 
captured the Betsey in order have the United States join “the number of his tributaries.”41  He 
expressed concern that “the embarassments on our commerce from the Pyratical states are 
likely to be serious.  The dangers from them are no longer confined to the Mediterranean or 
vicinities of the straights but extend considerably further.”42  Similarly, William Carmichael, 
                                                          
38 Montgomery to Adams, May 27, 1783, Robert Taylor, ed., Papers of John Adams, 17 vols. (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1977- ), 14: 502. 
39 Giacomo Crocco to Franklin, November 25, 1783, Emerging Nation, II: 252-253. 
40 Franklin to William Carmichael, December 15, 1783, Ibid., II: 256-257. 
 
41 Jefferson to John Page, August 20, 1785, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 8: 418. 
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the chargé d’affaires in Spain, feared that Barbary piracy “will be fatal to our Commerce in 
these Seas, If not soon terminated.”43  A December report by Adams, Franklin, and Jefferson 
to Congress described the capture, warned that five Moroccan ships currently patrolled the 
Mediterranean, and insisted that “immediate measures be taken with the piratical states for 
the preservation of our trade to the Mediterranean, to Spain & to Portugal, and perhaps to 
countries still more distant as their vessels may extend their cruizing grounds.”44  Diplomats 
feared that Morocco’s behavior was but the opening act of a Barbary pirate onslaught that 
would extend into the Atlantic Ocean to hunt American vessels and cripple the country’s 
commerce. 
American diplomats frantically tried to ascertain the cost of treaties with Algiers, 
Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunis.  They were troubled by the information that the Marquis de 
Lafayette provided regarding European payments.  France had recently paid 367,000 livres to 
Morocco, Denmark paid 1,000,000 livres to Algiers in 1773, and Venice paid 222,000 livres 
to Algiers in 1783.45  Newspapers spread the same pessimism.  An article that ran in multiple 
American states humorously remarked that “the Spaniards, Portuguese, Venetians, and 
Maltese, are preparing for the annual drubbing which they go to receive before Algiers.”46  
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This brief but evocative line clearly grasped that second-rate European powers routinely got 
defeated by Algiers.  And America did not even boast the same naval power as those 
countries.  The message was clear:  pay tribute or lose battles and have your countrymen get 
enslaved. 
In the aftermath of the Betsey’s capture, American merchants became angry over the 
increase in insurance rates and many began to use British ships.  One of Jefferson’s 
correspondents reported that the prominent insurance broker Lloyd’s of London charged at 
least 25 percent to insure American ships, but only 1¼ percent to 1½ percent for British 
ones.47  Consequently, as Jefferson learned from a Philadelphia correspondent, “the 
diffirence of Insurance is such that every Merchant Orders their Goods Shipd in British 
Bottoms.”48  The public knew of this practice as well.  Newspapers in several states 
published an article stating that “captains are afraid to carry the Thirteen Stripes, even in the 
Atlantic, and have purchased lately many British ships to carry goods from London.”49  
Another widely published article spread a sense of fear, portraying foreign trade as 
enormously dangerous.  According to a letter from Gibraltar, the Algerines had “sworn 
eternal enmity” against the United States and were “indefatigable in making preparations to 
cruize against the Americans, both in the Mediterranean and Atlantic.”50  The risk of attacks 
                                                          
Connecticut Journal (New Haven, CT), June 8, 1785; South Carolina State Gazette and Daily Advertiser 
(Charleston, SC), June 29, 1785. 
 
47 Lambert, 16. 
 
48 Samuel House to Jefferson, May 28, 1785, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 8: 169. 
 
49 The Pennsylvania Evening Herald and the American Monitor (Philadelphia, PA), April 12, 1785; The 
Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser (New York, NY), April 13, 1785; The Maryland Journal and 
Baltimore Advertiser (Baltimore, MD), April 15, 1785; The Columbia Herald, or the Patriotic Courier of 
North-America (Charleston, SC), April 18, 1785 and April 28, 1785; The New Haven Gazette (New Haven, 
CT), April 21, 1785.  The Boston Gazette, and the Country Journal (Boston, MA) ran this article on May 2, 
1785, but claimed it was inaccurate:  “This is not a fact, as all Factors can testify.” 
 
24 
 
by Barbary pirates had raised the cost of insurance so high that American merchants 
preferred to pay British ships to transport goods since those vessels had passports that would 
prevent crews from being captured and goods from being seized.  Only one safe option 
existed:  depending upon Britain for protection, just as American merchants had done prior to 
the Revolutionary War. 
Concerns about the ramifications of Barbary piracy were not limited to business 
interests—parents feared that their children would be abducted.  Thomas Coombe Jr, writing 
from London to his father in Philadelphia, asked him not to send “my dear little boy in any 
American vessel, till such time as you shall be convinced that those monsters have ceased 
from their depredations.”  Anxiety over the safety of his son kept him up at night.  He wrote 
this letter by candlelight and stated that he had finished a previous letter and did not intend to 
write another, but “an anxious apprehension has arisen in my mind, from seeing accounts in 
the public papers, that the Algerine cruisers make captures of the American vesels.”51  
Similarly, Jefferson wrote from Paris to a family member, Francis Eppes, instructing him not 
to send Jefferson’s daughter, Polly, to Europe in an American ship.  Jefferson abhorred the 
thought of his child being abducted:  “my mind revolts at the possibility of a capture; so that 
unless you hear from myself (not trusting the information of any other person on earth) that 
peace is made with the Algerines, do not send her but in a vessel of French or English 
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property:  for these vessels alone are safe from prize by the barbarians.”52  Both Coombe and 
Jefferson viewed the Barbary pirates as destroyers of families, able to inflict deep personal 
wounds by depriving them of beloved children. 
Fortunately for the United States, Barbary relations temporarily improved when the 
emperor of Morocco surprisingly freed the Betsey hostages.  He evidently harbored no ill will 
and had simply sought to get America’s attention.  As Morocco’s Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs explained in a letter to Franklin, the emperor resented the United States for not 
sending an ambassador to Morocco to make a treaty.53  The hostages were released in July 
1785 and Jefferson and Adams appointed Thomas Barclay to negotiate a treaty, which was 
finalized in 1786.  Remarkably, it did not require the United States to pay annual tribute—
only a one-time gift of about $20,000 in presents.54  Barclay described the emperor’s 
fascination with America in a July 1786 report to Adams and Jefferson.  The monarch 
“complain[ed] of the treatment he had receiv’d from the English,” reviewed a map of the 
United States and requested information about “the best ports.”  The monarch also greatly 
appreciated Barclay’s gift of “the constitutions of America and other public papers” since 
they contained “the reasons which induced the Americans to go to war with Great Britain.”  
The emperor ordered a translation of America’s grievances “as soon as possible.”55  
Although a prolific trade with Morocco never materialized, the United States had gained a 
friend.56 
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Barclay’s letter also contains a discussion of gender and sexual issues, unusual for 
American depictions of North Africans in the 1780s.  The diplomat portrayed the monarch as 
a sexual stallion with an enormous harem of one-thousand and one women.  In addition, he 
had four queens (the youngest of whom was “14 or 15”) and forty more women “who are not 
married” to him but held an equivalent rank to queen.57  The emperor also had twenty-three 
children:  sixteen sons and seven daughters.  Barclay presented the emperor as a virile lusty 
man despite being a pudgy sixty-six year old.  The diplomat did not criticize, but rather stood 
in awe.  The emperor was a man of appetites—for both women and knowledge about 
America.  Barclay respected the monarch, considering him “of great personal Courage, 
liberal to a Degree, a Lover of his People, [and] stern and rigid in distributing justice.”  Yet 
he thought poorly of the Moroccan people and society, portraying the country as decrepit.  
Barclay remarked that “all the Arts and Sciences are buried in oblivion….The Streets and 
Houses in the City of Morocco are despicable beyond belief, with there and there the remains 
of something….The people seem to be warlike, fierce, avaritious and Contemners of the 
Christians.”58  Barclay’s rhetoric resembled longstanding European descriptions of Muslims 
as backwards and degenerate.59  Yet such portrayals were irrelevant to American policy for 
the time being.  What mattered was that the Moroccan navy would cease to seize American 
ships and sailors. 
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This lull in Barbary affairs proved to be very short.  It became clear that the United 
States needed to do much more than make a treaty with Morocco to protect its merchant fleet 
when the Algerine navy, sensing an opportunity to exploit America’s vulnerability, captured 
two U.S. ships off the Spanish coast in July 1785 (the Maria from Boston and the Dauphin 
from Philadelphia) and enslaved the twenty-one sailors.  The hostage crisis with Algiers 
ultimately lasted until 1797, led to the creation of a navy in 1794, and became part of the 
ongoing national conversation about increasing the power of the federal government.  
Americans debated the extent of Algiers’s military strength and the wisdom of creating a 
naval force. 
Most commentators viewed Algiers as a formidable foe due to its impressive naval 
resources and its large population.  Newspapers in multiple American states published an 
article that claimed that Algiers had raised a 40,000 man army to repulse a Spanish attack.60  
A South Carolina newspaper printed an article that lauded Algiers’s recent victory over 
Spain:  the Dey “displayed the greatest foresight, and at the same time very powerful means; 
he not only repulsed their attacks, but…provided for every place susceptible of an 
attack….The officers of his troops have also shewn the greater skill….In whatever point of 
view we consider that Prince, either as a General or a seaman, we cannot recuse him the 
greatest encomiums.”61  This article not only portrayed the Dey as a military mastermind, but 
also noted that Algiers boasted an array of talented military leaders.  Spain failed in its 
attempt to defeat Algiers and paid about $3 million for a peace treaty and hostage ransom.62  
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Even Revolutionary War hero John Paul Jones urged caution.  He considered Algiers “a 
powerful State; that can put 200,000 Troops into the Field” and possessed several formidable 
ships.  He wanted the United States to build a navy, but warned that winning would not be 
easy.  However, he saw war as a positive good since it could “unite the People of America” 
and “rouse them from that illjudged security which the intoxication of success has produced 
since the Revolution.”63  John Adams also portrayed Algiers as very powerful.  In a July 
1786 letter, he emphasized the size of that country’s navy and the strength of its defenses:  
“they have now fifty gun-boats, which, being small objects against great ships, are very 
formidable… The harbor of Algiers, too, is fortified all round…which renders it more 
difficult and dangerous to attempt a blockade.”64  He also considered it futile for America to 
fight back.  In a letter to John Jay, he argued that even if American ships demolished 
Algerine towns, these “Unfeeling Tyrants” would “think no more of it than if We had killed 
so many CaterPillars upon an Apple Tree.”   But if the Algerine navy captured American 
ships and sailors, they would “get a rich Prize…enslave the Men and…demand most 
exorbitant Ransoms for them.”  In Adams’s mind, the United States would profit little from 
fighting Algiers, while Algiers could gain valuable warships and leverage by taking 
hostages.65  He also considered the rulers of the Barbary States as the antithesis of republican 
rulers, devoted to enriching themselves instead of pursuing the welfare of their subjects.  
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Clearly, many thought that warring against the Barbary pirates was no small matter, but 
would require a huge mobilization of resources. 
Policymakers also learned from the American captives in Algiers that the country 
boasted strong defenses.  Richard O’Brien, commander of the Dauphin and leader of the 
American prisoners, wrote Jefferson about Algiers’s “very strong” and “well fortified” 
capital city and complimented the Algerines as “a tolerable smart active people.”  As such, 
O’Brien admonished the government to “use every means to obtain a peace with the Barbary 
States, although it would cost vast sums.”66  Unlike Jones, he recommended purchasing 
peace instead of waging war.  In another letter, O’Brien claimed that Algiers had 
inexhaustible resources with which to construct warships:  “no Nation in the World can fit an 
equal Number of Cruisers half so cheap as the Algerines can.”67  A consensus had emerged 
that Americans were unprepared to fight professional warmongers such as the Barbary 
pirates. 
In addition to sober commentary about Algiers’s military strength, various 
newspapers utilized gender and the fear of an Algerine invasion to call for government 
action.  An address “From the Pennsylvania Packet, TO THE PRINTERS” ran in newspapers 
in several states.  It urged printers to publish it right away in order to draw the legislature’s 
attention to “the defenseless situation” of Philadelphia’s river.68  Following this preface, a 
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fake letter (ostensibly written by the Dey of Algiers) declared that he had decided “to let 
loose our corsairs” upon Americans since they “have not as yet submitted to our 
prerogative.”  The Dey had heard about “the riches and abilities” of Philadelphia and was 
therefore sending two ships along the Delaware river to “reduce it instantly to ashes” unless 
he received the following:  £100,000 in cash, £30,000 of “most costly manufactures,” and 
“forty of their most beautiful and virtuous damsels not under 12 nor above 18, descended 
from honest parents, free from moles, blemish, or latent imperfection.”  Evidently, the giving 
of women was non-negotiable—they would either be handed over willingly or taken by 
force.  American men, the article implied, needed to protect their daughters from abduction 
by providing for the city’s defenses.  As will be seen, over time American authors recast the 
Dey from lusting after women to lusting after men (although he always remained greedy for 
money).  Further, the letter listed the Dey as ruler of the Atlantic Ocean.  This suggests that 
many Americans feared an Algerine invasion; it was not just a creation of diplomats.  The 
article satirized the Dey for coveting riches and sexual pleasure, yet treated the Barbary 
pirates as serious threats to commerce and families. 
On a national level, Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay (replacing Livingston in 
1784) emerged as the most vocal proponent of building a navy and viewed the Algerine 
hostage crisis as the consequence of having a weak national government.  As he bluntly 
remarked to John Adams, he doubted that the captives in Algiers would be freed since “our 
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foederal Government is incompetent to its Objects.”69  Yet Jay considered the conflict with 
Algiers as a positive good in that it could create nationalism and a stronger sense of unity.  In 
a 1785 letter to the President of Congress, Jay proclaimed that “this War does not strike me 
as a great Evil—The more we are treated ill abroad, the more we shall unite and consolidate 
at Home.”70  He hoped that the conflict would “become a Nursery for Seamen, and lay the 
Foundation for a respectable Navy.”  He envisioned a force of forty-five gunboats under the 
leadership of a “Board of Admiralty.”71  In the meantime, he recommended that the 
government provide “military Stores” and reimburse ship owners for the expenses of a hiring 
a larger-than-normal crew so that, in the event of an attack, they could repulse the Algerines.  
He urged a strong sense of national pride—the United States should not dignify Algiers with 
“Overtures for Peace, or Offers of Tribute.”  Jay strongly focused on ending the structural 
conditions that facilitated America’s vulnerability and on achieving a permanent solution to 
the piracy problem. 
However, Jay recognized that many congressmen (particularly those from the South) 
were apathetic to the problem of Barbary piracy since their states lacked a large merchant 
fleet.  In a letter to John Adams he expressed his loathing of southern congressmen, blasting 
them for “throw[ing] cold Water on” proposals “for vesting Congress with Power to regulate 
Trade….Having few or no Ships of their own, they are averse to such Duties on foreign ones 
as will greatly advance the Price of Freight; nor do they seem much disposed to sacrifice any 
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present Profits for the Sake of their Neighbors who have Ships and wish to have more.” 72  
Only congressmen from the Eastern and Middle States generally supported building a navy.  
Jay despised regionalism and the breakdown of a belief in a greater national good.  Resolving 
conflicts with the Barbary pirates remained impossible as long as leaders lacked a belief in 
communal prosperity. 
Whereas other commentators dreaded an Algerine invasion, Jay actually welcomed 
one!  Open war, he hoped, would forge national unity.  Louis-Guillaume Otto, the French 
chargé d’affaires in New York, wrote the Comte de Vergennes on Christmas Day 1785 to 
share an account of a conversation he had with Jay.   
“I would not be angry,” he told me among other things, “if the Algerians came to 
burn some of our maritime Towns, in order to restore to the United States their 
former energy, which peace and Commerce have almost destroyed.  War alone can 
bring together the various States, and give a new importance to Congress; we will not 
lack means, but we lack that republican and national spirit which alone can give vigor 
to our operations.… Commerce has already separated the interests of the various 
States, war will give them identity. I want the New Englanders to fight for the wheat, 
tobacco, and rice of the Southern people, and the Carolinians to shed the last drop of 
their blood for the fisheries of Massachusetts.73 
As Jay saw it, desperate situations would force Americans to trust each other and work 
together.  His rhetoric resembled that of jingoes during the War of 1898; both shared a sense 
of war as a positive good that would restore a powerful national identity.74  Now that peace 
with Britain had been made, each state looked out for its own economic interests.  Only 
violence could shock Americans into unity. 
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 Similar to Jay, Jefferson urged that the United States build a powerful navy.  Unlike 
most commentators, though, he believed that America could easily obliterate the Barbary 
pirates.  He endorsed a program of ship-building in a November 1784 letter to James 
Monroe:  “can we begin it on a more honourable occasion, or with a weaker foe?  I am of 
opinion, Paul Jones, with half a dozen frigates, would totally destroy their commerce.”75  
Clearly, Jefferson was ignorant of Jones’s real thoughts on the matter.  Jones would have 
considered Jefferson’s notion that the United States could annihilate the Algerine navy with 
only a handful of ship as foolhardy.  Jefferson outlandishly proposed that the United States 
could fund its navy by “turn[ing] pyrate” itself through demanding an annual tribute from 
foreign countries whose ships participated in the West Indies trade.76  He did not broach the 
issue of confronting the ultra-powerful British navy, but indulged in triumphant victory 
fantasies over both England and Algiers.  Jefferson also made clear his belief that a naval 
force, unlike a standing army, did not constitute a threat to civil liberties.  In another letter to 
Monroe, he remarked that “every rational citizen must wish to see an effective instrument of 
coercion, & should fear to see it on any other element but the water.  A naval force can never 
endanger our liberties, nor occassion bloodshed:  a land force would do both.”77  Jefferson’s 
ideas complicate our understanding of the compatibility of a navy within republican 
thought.78  Logistically, a navy strongly differed from an army.  A navy was inherently 
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bound to waters (whether the ocean or lakes) and therefore could not attack or harm inland 
areas.  By contrast, members of an army were trained to track and kill on land. 
Jefferson also explored the idea of transforming North African societies into agrarian 
republics.  His plan was short on logistics, but the goal was to “suppress their marine & trade 
totally…till the present race of seamen” got old or died.  Then “the younger people” would 
adopt “husbandry for which their soil & climate is well fitted” and then “these nests of 
banditti might be reformed.”79  Jefferson’s Barbary vision paralleled his notion of reforming 
Native American societies into agrarian communities.80  Yet Jefferson did not take this idea 
too seriously since he never tried to implement it during the Tripolitan War. 
But not all Americans supported having a navy; others believed that purchasing peace 
constituted a less expensive and preferable alternative to war.  Ralph Izard, a South Carolina 
politician, believed that rearming was a financial impossibility.  He warned Jefferson that “it 
is a melancholy fact that we are not in a condition to go to War, with anybody….The 
Revenues of America, under the present management do not appear to be adequate to the 
discharge of the public Debt.  Where then shall we find resources to carry on War?”  Izard 
took a realistic look at U.S. finances and stressed the paucity of funds to build a navy.  Since 
the United States had not yet paid off its Revolutionary War debt, how could it even consider 
rearming?  He also hinted at a structural problem within the Articles of Confederation.  Even 
if the United States chose to pay tribute, it still needed the power to tax in order to raise 
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revenues.81  Similarly, John Adams thought that paying tribute would ultimately cost less 
than waging war and that Algiers would not easily be defeated.  In a July 1786 letter to 
Jefferson, Adams expressed his fear that war would cost millions—and the U.S. government 
would still have to provide expensive presents.  Adams recognized that America could 
“obtain the Glory of finally breaking up these nests of Banditti,” but recognized that “the 
Southern States” opposed war and cautioned that fighting could last years.  Hence, “we ought 
not to fight them at all, unless we determine to fight them forever.  This thought is I fear, too 
rugged for our People to bear.”82  Instead, he urged that treaties be made without delay.  
Abigail Adams expressed a similar concern, noting that since England, France, and Holland 
“treat and pay, would it not be folly and madness in America to Wage War?”  If mighty 
Europe purchased peace, then the United States should follow suit.83 
Meanwhile, what was happening in Congress?  The Journals of the Continental 
Congress reveal that members seldom discussed the Barbary conflicts.  A May 1784 debate 
underscored how Congress sought to sidestep paying tribute.  Elbridge Gerry introduced a 
motion calling for the U.S. government to issue its own passports that would request the 
Barbary pirates not to “molest” American vessels.84  Given the enormous difficulty the 
federal government had trying to raise money under the Articles of Confederation via state 
requisitions, his proposal constituted a desperate attempt to find a solution.  Gerry foolishly 
assumed that the Barbary States would abide by this request.  For centuries, they had 
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successfully pressured European countries to pay tribute.  Why would they exempt the 
United States?  Congress delegated Gerry’s proposal to a committee, but on July 29th decided 
that “further consideration of the ordinance be postponed.” Finally, in February 1785, 
Congress passed a resolution empowering the ministers to borrow up to $80,000 from 
Holland for treaties.85  This amount would prove vastly insufficient.  Resolving the conflicts 
with Algiers proved especially difficult since, in Gordon Wood’s words, “Congress had 
virtually ceased trying to govern” by the mid-1780s.86  Delegates showed up irregularly and 
considered positions in state government as more prestigious than serving in the federal 
government. 
For his part, Jefferson cared about the hostages but was ultimately unable to resolve 
the issue.  He informed O’Brien that the United States had authorized John Lamb, a 
Connecticut merchant, to negotiate a treaty, but cautioned that Congress had limited funds.  
He added that the captives would possibly have to reimburse the government for the ransom 
costs!87  Regrettably, Lamb proved to be an utter failure.  The captives considered him 
incompetent and unreliable and Congress recalled him in October 1787.  For his part, 
Jefferson deemed him “not a proper agent” and suspected him of embezzling money.88  A 
leading scholar of the Algiers conflict has concluded that while Lamb “does not seem to have 
been a very good choice for the job,” the “fatal flaw” was America’s “unwillingness as well 
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as an inability to pay what was needed.”89  Jefferson also recognized that circumstances were 
so difficult that even a more skilled diplomat would struggle.  As he conceded to Monroe, “I 
am persuaded that an Angel sent on this business, & so much limited in his terms, could have 
done nothing.”90 
Jefferson ultimately ended negotiations after learning the Dey’s high prices.  He was 
willing to pay $200 per captive, but the Dey insisted upon $3,000 each.  Jefferson then 
sought mediation from the Mathurins, an order of French priests that retained agents in North 
Africa.  They advised Jefferson to feign indifference in an attempt to induce the Dey to lower 
his demands.  This strategy failed—the Dey did not relent and the outbreak of the French 
Revolution resulted in the Mathurins returning to France.  However, Jefferson continued this 
policy of neglect, telling Adams in December 1787 that plans should remain “secret even 
from the captives themselves, lest a knolege of the interference of government should excite 
too extravagant demands.”91  Jefferson recognized that Barbary piracy was a business and 
adopted a policy of feigned indifference out of desperation. 
 
Back in the United States, Federalists drew attention to the plight of the captives and the 
continued vulnerability of American ships during the nationwide debate over whether or not 
to ratify the Constitution.92  They occasionally invoked the Algiers conflict in an effort to 
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persuade Americans to adopt the newly proposed government.  This especially happened in 
New York, a state that had a fierce debate over ratification.93  In doing so, Federalists 
appealed to the public’s sense of national honor and empathy for the prisoners suffering in 
Algerine dungeons.  “A Citizen to the Antifederalists of Columbia County” accused 
opponents of the Constitution of foolishly turning a blind eye to major problems that plagued 
the United States.  It offered a wake-up call to readers:  “you are now coerced by a set of 
petty tyrants, your countrymen enslaved, and your commerce shackeled; and you refuse the 
only permanent mode to obtain you a redress of these accumulated injuries…the 
independence of America having thrown away its staff, has begun to totter.”94  The article 
stressed three major problems stemming from unchecked Barbary piracy:  the United States 
remained vulnerable to a band of thugs, sailors languished in Algerine prisons, and America 
could not fulfill its economic potential.  Also, it nicely captured the country’s weakness with 
the image of a feeble United States unable to support itself after rejecting the crutch of the 
Constitution.  Similarly, an address “To the Farmers of the State of New-York” in the New 
York Daily Advertiser admonished readers to “endeavor to regain what we have lost, and 
make ourselves and our posterity happy for the future….How have we been insulted by the 
British?  How has our trade been restricted by every nation with whom we traffic?...Are not 
numbers of our brethren held in chains by the piratical States of Barbary, hopeless of 
relief?....For heaven’s sake, let us remain no longer stupid; let our misery awake us.”95  This 
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editorial sought to shock readers into supporting the Constitution by listing foreign affairs 
catastrophes that had befallen the United States.  It suggested that Americans had been idiotic 
to think that the Articles of Confederation could protect sailors and promote commerce.  Yet 
New Yorkers wielded the power to end these crises and rescue the captives in Algiers by 
ratifying the Constitution. 
Sometimes Federalists utilized whimsy or fantasy when invoking the Barbary 
conflicts.  Various newspapers ran poetry that skewered the Dey of Algiers as arrogant and 
bombastic.  “The News-Mongers’ Song for the Winter of 1788” ran in publications in several 
states:  “While the Dey of Algiers, sirs, so haughty is grown,/ That he swears by the prophet, 
the WORLD’s all his own.”96  “A PARODY of the NEWS-MONGERS’ SONG” reinforced 
the image of the Dey as conceited:  “The Algerine Dey struts about in his robe/ And swears 
by Mahomet he owns all the globe.”97  These lines portrayed Algiers as exceeding its proper 
place in the world and needing to be chastised.  A striking futuristic vision entitled 
“Anticipation:  1858, Sept. 13th” purported to be a memo from the future with a message for 
late-eighteenth century Americans.  It proclaimed that “yesterday arrived dispatches in this 
city for his Excellency the President of the United States, importing, that the Dey of 
Algiers…caused the 22 American captives to be delivered to the Commodre.  The 
commander had orders to lay the town of Algiers in ashes if the restitution had not instantly 
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taken place.”98  This article accepted the notion that Barbary piracy would endure and not be 
eradicated.  With a strong navy, the president could order the hostages free—a decree that the 
Dey of Algiers would eagerly comply with lest his city be destroyed.  The article also 
suggested that future generations of Americans would mock late-eighteenth century 
opponents of the Constitution.  Last week, the author wrote, someone opened an “old oaken 
chest” filled with Anti-Federalist pamphlets and papers.  Many of the authors seemed “honest 
in principle, but deficient in political wisdom” and would surely repent if they saw “the 
happy consequences” of the new federal government.  The Constitution had inaugurated a 
golden age of peace:  “accounts from every part of the empire announce the public tranquility 
never to have been more complete.”  This article promised that the United States could 
become powerful and prosperous if only the Anti-Federalists dropped their foolish 
obstruction.  The message was clear:  supporting the Constitution would allow the United 
States to dictate terms to Algiers, bring the captives home, and guarantee security now and 
forevermore. 
Similarly, Peter Markoe’s politically charged The Algerine Spy in Pennsylvania 
called for a strong federal government by playing upon fears of an Algerine invasion.  
Published in 1787, the book’s premise revolved around a bookseller discovering a large 
packet of letters from an Algerine spy named Mehemet.  The foreigner delighted in 
observing America’s weakness and gleefully concocted subversive plans to destroy the 
country.  Mehemet intended to “commence a negotiation with Shays, the Massachusetts 
insurgents, and the refractory leaders of” Rhode Island.  Ideally, Algiers could use Rhode 
Island as a base from which to raid and “plunder” America’s coastline and the United States 
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would be unable to retaliate since “disunion and faction” had impeded the development of a 
navy.  America also had a fundamentally weak federal government as well:  the Articles of 
Confederation had been “adequate to the exigences of war” but had proven “defective in 
peace.”99  Markoe used satire to issue a wake-up call to readers.  If a puny country such as 
Algiers could ostensibly plan a take-over, what could a mighty country such as Britain do?  
Markoe’s book resembled John Jay’s letters and the Federalist newspaper articles in 
admonishing Americans to realize that immediate governmental reforms needed to happen.  
Until then, the United States remained vulnerable to foreign attacks. 
Other commentators also associated Rhode Island with Algiers as an insult and as a 
way to pressure the state to ratify the Constitution (it held out until May 29, 1790).100  
Newspapers throughout the country published a letter ostensibly written by the Dey of 
Algiers in which he endorsed forming an alliance with Rhode Island.  The Dey praised the 
state’s “dispositions, modes of thinking, and disregard for the absurd tenets held by the 
Christian nations” and announced the dispatching of “our trusty and well-beloved slave, 
ABUCACAER” to form a treaty.101  Together, the Dey believed that Algiers and Rhode 
Island would make a “prompt and efficient” team in committing “devastations on the 
property of the world.”  This article satirized Rhode Island’s refusal to adopt the Constitution 
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by arguing that it had the selfishness and greed of Algiers and callously disregarded the 
interests of the United States.  Similarly, another widely published letter criticized Rhode 
Island’s refusal to send delegates to the Constitutional Convention and suggested that, 
instead of joining the United States, it would “become the Algiers of America.”102  Further, 
as in the New York debates, poetry was used to criticize opponents of the Constitution.  The 
satirical “PETITION of the ‘MAJORITY’ of RHODE-ISLAND” lampooned the state for 
embracing anarchy and creating “an Algiers in American seas” to “plunder, and murder, and 
rob as we please.”103  In blasting Rhode Island’s obstinacy, Federalists could think of no 
lower insult than comparing the rogue state to a predatory nation that sought to enrich itself 
at the expense of others. 
The newspaper articles about Rhode Island only subtly raise cultural criticisms, but 
Markoe’s The Algerine Spy overtly satirized both Algerine and American cultures.  He 
criticized Muslims for viewing women as exploitable sexual playthings:  Mehemet wanted 
Rhode Island and the Shays rebels to provide “a certain number of virgins” as tribute to the 
Sultan of the Ottoman Empire.104  The book also condemned Algiers for denying citizens the 
right to criticize the government; as Mehemet remarks, one “would suffer the severest 
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tortures” for doing so.105  Yet Markoe also made candid observations about American 
society.  He contended that Muslims were more tolerant of other religions than Christians, 
with the latter’s bigotry constituting a “disgrace to the pretended disciples of the meek and 
humble Jesus!”106  He also reflected the republican fear that Americans’ obsession with 
luxury goods would destroy their virtue.  Philadelphia’s “immense quantities of rich 
manufactures” would “injure the country by introducing a premature luxury with its 
concomitant evils.”107  Markoe implied that both societies could learn from each other since 
each had admirable and detestable attributes.  This even-handed treatment was unusual and, 
in the following decade, discourse about North Africa became very one-sided.  In a reversal 
of Markoe’s fear, American commentators in the 1790s would claim that Algerine men’s 
addiction to luxury goods sapped their work ethic and made them indolent. 
The ratification of the Constitution did not resolve the hostage crisis.  The new 
federal government came under attack for continuing to ignore the plight of the captives.  
Some commentators believed that the United States had the money to redeem the hostages 
but instead exercised bad judgment by using it to pay interest to speculators.  An opinion 
piece that ran in Pennsylvania and New Hampshire newspapers asked “whether the credit of 
the United States would not be more effectually promoted by an appropriation of 100,000 
dollars for the purpose of redeeming the brave sea captains, and others, who languish in 
slavery, in Algiers, than in the idle dispute whether 4 or 6 per cent should be paid to the 
purchasers of certificates, especially when there is great reason to believe, that many of those 
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very certificates were once the property of those very sea-captains, and forced upon them by 
Congress for not more than an eighth part of their nominal value.”108  This article stressed 
class issues and accused the government of unjustly favoring the interests of the wealthy.  It 
charged that the government immorally permitted poor sailors, who risked their lives in trade 
that benefited the economy, to rot in foreign dungeons.  Instead of ransoming them, the 
government preferred to enrich speculators who had taken advantage of sailors’ desperation 
by buying their bonds at a steep discount.  A similar article ran in a Massachusetts 
newspaper.  It denounced the federal government for paying speculators and levying the 
impost while not taking action against “the capture and slavery of our citizens, and the 
depredations committed upon our trade, by the unprincipled PIRATE of ALGIERS.”109  
Clearly, some Americans distrusted the intentions of national policymakers, seeing the new 
federal government as an instrument of elite privilege. 
One prominent critic attacked beliefs in strict constructionism of the Constitution, 
even using gendered language to shame its proponents.  In a February 3, 1791 House of 
Representatives debate regarding the legality of a national bank, Fisher Ames invoked the 
Algiers conflict in lending support for its creation:  “suppose the question of redeeming the 
prisoners in captivity at Algiers was before the house, would it be urged that nothing could 
be done in their favour by the general government, because no power was specially 
granted—no;—every person, he conceived, that felt as a man, would not think his hands tied 
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when they were to be extended to the relief of suffering fellow-citizens.”110  Ames 
emphasized that the mere absence in the Constitution of an explicit clause on ransoming 
hostages did not mean that the government lacked the power to do so.  Ames also appealed to 
representatives’ masculinity, implying that if they were truly masculine then they would 
deliver their countrymen from Algiers.  Real men did not hide behind the weak excuse of 
strict constructionism; they took rigorous and decisive action to fulfill their civic 
responsibilities. 
 
While Congress remained mired in inaction and apathy, the captives led miserable lives in 
Algiers.111  They worked in chain-gangs, faced constant whippings from task-masters, and 
worked at laborious tasks such as hauling rocks from mountains.  The hostages repeatedly 
wrote policymakers about their sufferings in an effort to expedite ransom.  Richard O’Brien, 
the captain of the Dauphin, emerged as the spokesman for the group.  He wrote letters to 
Jefferson (the diplomat who had the most involvement in Barbary affairs) that detailed their 
miseries.  O’Brien nicknamed the Dey the “King of Cruelties,” revealed that the Algerines 
had taken away their clothing, and suggested that the “Crew will certainly starve if there is 
not some immediate Relief” since they received puny rations (typically two pieces of dark 
bread each day).112  O’Brien often used emotional rhetoric in order to motivate Jefferson.  He 
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claimed that they experienced “the most poignant grief… beyond our expression or your 
Imagination….poor fellows endure the severities of slavery.”  He viewed being liberated as 
an entitlement stemming from the American Revolution:  “certainly Liberty that is the basis 
of America will never let twenty one unfortunate citizens remain slaves to the Turkish yoke.”  
He revealed a strong belief in nationalism, a sense of America as uniquely devoted to human 
freedom (at least for white men).  In using the word “slavery” O’Brien sought to drive his 
point deeply into Jefferson’s mind, surely knowing that the diplomat was a slaveholder.  All 
Americans knew what slavery was:  the state of violent, forced subjugation against one’s 
will.  O’Brien could use no stronger word with which to appeal to Jefferson.  Yet the two 
men were working at cross purposes:  O’Brien wanted immediate liberation, while Jefferson 
intended to act uninterested. 
The captives eventually realized that relying upon policymakers was a dead-end.  
They needed to make maximum effort to free themselves.  Eleven of the thirteen captives 
(O’Brien not among them) even petitioned King George III to intervene on their behalf.  
These men renounced their American citizenship, stressed that they were born in the British 
Empire, and claimed that they fought on England’s side in the Revolutionary War.  If 
redeemed by the British, the captives pledged to “exert themselves in Defense of their King 
and Country.”  The British government received the petition in April 1786 and chose not to 
help the American hostages.113  Notable among the eleven signers was James Cathcart, a 
Revolutionary War veteran who later served as U.S. consul to Tripoli.  Cathcart later wrote in 
his memoirs that “no class of men suffered in any degree so much by the consequences 
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attending the American Revolution as those were captured by the Algerines in 1785.”114  
Cathcart chose to ignore his involvement in the petition to King George III, preferring 
instead to portray himself and his peers as heroic martyrs.115 
Newspapers expressed support for the captives by printing their letters.  A letter by 
O’Brien written in December 1792 and widely published in American newspapers the 
following year urged Americans to live up to their ideals by freeing the hostages.  O’Brien 
appealed to nationalism by calling the captives “the living victims of American 
Independence” and tried shaming fellow Americans by claiming that Europeans made better 
efforts to free their countrymen held in North Africa than did Americans.116  Notably, the 
headline to this letter mentioned the “eighth year of his Captivity.”  Clearly, it wanted 
Americans to feel aghast that the hostage crisis had dragged on for so long.  Nearly 200 years 
later, television news anchor Walter Cronkite similarly ended his newscasts during the Iran 
Hostage Crisis by stating the number of days that the hostages had been held. 
O’Brien even directly addressed the U.S. population in another letter that was signed 
by twelve captives and published in newspapers throughout the country.  He deliberately 
instructed its recipient (a Philadelphia resident) to “have the inclosed Petition published in 
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the papers throughout the United States, and to be stuck up to public view; so that the 
Citizens of the United States will know the melancholy situation of the American 
Captives.”117  O’Brien invoked the bonds of nationalism and Christianity, addressing his 
petition to “Fellow-Citizens” and beginning it with “In the Name of Almighty God!”  He 
stressed the horrifying conditions of captivity:  one prisoner, James Harnett, became insane 
(“deprived of his senses by the Almighty”), five others died of the plague, and “the rest of us 
have been left destitute” and expect to die shortly (“we are on the verge of eternity.”)  
O’Brien also portrayed the captives as steadfast and loyal to the United States since they had 
declined the offer of freedom in exchange for turning renegade and “enter[ing] into 
[Algiers’s] service.”  He attacked Congress for ignoring previous petitions and for 
inconsistency:  “at first we were informed, that Mr. Lamb would redeem us; next, that the 
United States were poor, and that they were forming their government; next, that a 
subscription would be set on foot for our release; next, that the United States were rich, and 
would make a peace, and redeem us.”  The end of the petition boldly reiterated nationalist 
and explicitly Christian sentiment:  “therefore, we beg of the citizens of the United States, in 
the name of the Almighty and our Saviour, who died to redeem us all, that our country will 
adopt some plan to extricate us from this city of human misery.”  This letter underscores the 
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desperation of the captives.  With just cause they had abandoned faith in federal 
policymakers and, short of renouncing their American citizenship and converting to Islam, 
saw their last hope in fueling bottom-up social mobilization.  The letter tried every possible 
way to motivate readers:  empathy for enduring the horrid conditions in Algiers, upholding 
American ideals of justice and freedom, and fulfilling religious duties. 
Judging by the surge in private ransom efforts, the letters had an effect on the public.  
Since historian Robert Allison has provided in-depth analysis of fundraising efforts such as 
local collections of private donations and benefit performances at theaters, this section will 
provide a brief overview.118  Newspapers functioned as a medium with which to advertise 
upcoming benefit events or admonish Americans to donate on an individual level.  In 
Philadelphia, a ball raised $60.50,119 while a theater donated $1,230.120  In Boston, a “small 
society” publicized its decision to donate $15 to help ransom the captives instead of giving 
that money to “the Civic Feast”121 and women at churches donated rings and jewelry.122  
Residents in southern states participated as well—a Charleston theater raised 256 pounds two 
shillings and sixpence sterling.123  How much did the benevolence movement actually 
accomplish?  Lawrence Peskin has concluded that “what happened to the money, or even 
whether it was ever all collected, remains a mystery.”124  Ultimately, the federal government, 
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and not private charity, freed the captives.  The United States paid nearly $1 million to 
Algiers for a treaty and ransom—the surviving sixty captives arrived in Philadelphia in 
February 1797.125  Still, public efforts at least encouraged some of the captives.  As John 
Foss wrote his captivity narrative, public “generosity…was of inestimable value.  It was 
more precious from being unexpected.”126 
Not everyone thought that private fundraising was a good idea.  As Robert Allison 
has discussed, George Washington adamantly opposed benevolence efforts since he viewed 
them as inappropriately assuming the federal government’s responsibility.127  Several 
newspapers published an editorial that blasted the benevolence movement as “mis-judged 
and ill-timed” and stemming from a “misguided zeal.”  It claimed that the Dey had learned 
about these private ransom efforts and responded by raising his asking price.  The article 
argued that it was the government’s job alone to rescue the captives, not the prerogative of 
ordinary citizens, and even asserted that had people not tried to raise money “our brethren in 
Algiers might probably have been, by this time, restored to their country.”128  This claim was 
preposterous, since the federal government had failed for years, refusing to meet the Dey’s 
asking price.  The article received an impassioned response (published in a New Hampshire 
newspaper) that rejected its line of reasoning and emphasized brutal reality.  If Americans 
“wait” for the government to act the captives will die:  “worms will have seated upon their 
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bodies, and they be seen no more until the resurrection.”129  To this writer, opposing 
fundraising amounted to both a repudiation of common sense and a denial of the obvious 
failure of the government.  Still, despite the presence of some negativity, hostility to private 
ransom efforts remained atypical.   
Groups of Americans throughout the country also expressed solidarity with the 
captives by toasting them at events, especially Fourth of July ceremonies.  Newspapers 
reprinted these toasts.  Toasting accomplished nothing tangible for the captives, but 
nevertheless demonstrated that those in the United States sympathized with the hostages’ 
plight.  Some toasts urged action, including a New York group of “Patriotic Gentlemen” that 
wished:  “may the benevolent Americans soon releive their suffering brethren in Algiers.”130  
Similarly, the Revolution Society from South Carolina toasted “to our unfortunate fellow 
citizens, captives in Algiers:  a speedy redemption and happy return to their country and 
friends,”131 while celebrants at a New Hampshire tavern drank to “a speedy release to our 
brethren in slavery at Algiers.”132  One group had a transnational focus:  “All Christian 
captives in Algiers—may power either human or divine, interpose in their behalf.”133  Even a 
literary group joined in.  The Shakespearean Society of Boston announced, “in our festivity 
let us remember our Brethren in slavery and in chains—and may the public spirit of 
Americans speedily wipe off the stain of permitting their fellow countrymen so long to 
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continue captives in Algiers.”134  Others took occasion of George Washington’s birthday to 
remember the hostages:  “to our unfortunate Brother Mariners in Algiers—may the justice 
and generosity of their country speedily emancipate them from the chains & stripes of infidel 
barbarians.”135  Since Washington opposed private ransom efforts, this toast had unintended 
irony.  Another group associated captivity in Algiers as a travesty upon the goals of the 
American Revolution.  Appropriately, the toasting and drinking occurred in front of a liberty 
tree:  “to our unfortunate Brethren now held in Bondage at Algiers; may they soon breathe 
that Air of Liberty, which they nobly Fought for in 1776.”136  Cleary, the fate of the captives 
concerned Americans back in the United States.  But what was the value of these toasts?  
Few people at these events would have known the captives, meaning that the majority had no 
personal connection.  Yet they reinforced the bonds of nationalism and fueled an imagined 
community of white citizens entitled to liberty who shared a common, subhuman enemy. 
Toasts occasionally expressed anti-British sentiment and invoked a higher power to 
come to America’s aid.  A gathering of Republicans in New York wished that England would 
suffer for its support of Barbary piracy:  “our captive brethren in Algiers; may the protecting 
hand of our government be speedily extended to their relief, and may the insidious and 
persecuting government of Britain, feel the shafts of reproach more strong than the sting of 
an adder.”137  One group of citizens at a 1794 Fourth of July event in Pennsylvania declared 
“may the Savages of America, Britain and Algiers be restrained by Providence, from 
murdering, plundering and enslaving such of our innocent brethren as are exposed to their 
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depredations.”138  This toast reveals how lowly these Americans viewed the British—no 
worse insult existed than comparing them to non-white groups associated with barbarism and 
violence.  Similarly, another July 4th toast requested that “the fulminating bolt of divine 
justice speedily descend on the guilty heads of those who have been the cause of [the 
captives’] misfortunes.”139  Beyond declaring a hatred of Barbary pirates, these toasts called 
for divine intervention on behalf of the captives.  Since the federal government had 
accomplished nothing, a higher power was needed.  
As the Algerine captivity crisis dragged on, anti-slavery advocates offered a 
competing narrative.140  To them, it embodied a moral crisis.  Many of their newspaper 
articles constituted blunt attacks on American hypocrisy for lamenting over the sufferings of 
the hostages while upholding the violent enslavement of Africans within the United States.  
A 1794 address from an abolitionist convention declared that “freedom and slavery cannot 
long exist together” and stressed that the African slave trade is but “Algerine piracy in 
another form.”141  A Philadelphia newspaper reasoned that “if Pennsylvanians can, 
confidently with the great and essential principles of liberty and free government, hold in 
slavery some thousands of the human race…it cannot be wrong in the Algerines to enslave 4 
or 500 Americans for the same purposes.”142  Judging by my searches in the “Early American 
Newspaper Database, Series I,” the number of anti-slavery articles that invoked the Algiers 
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crisis surged in 1794, after news of the 1793 captures reached the United States.  Clearly, 
opponents of slavery saw an opportunity to promote their agenda.  With the abductions of 
sailors in the public spotlight, anti-slavery advocates sought to change the way white 
Americans viewed slavery. 
Sometimes antislavery articles used a heightened sense of reality that blurred the line 
between reality and fiction.  In these scenarios, Algerines appeared as characters that 
instructed Americans on their moral blindness.  A Massachusetts newspaper published a 
conversation between an Algerine captain and an American captain, in which the former 
castigated the latter for treating Africans like chattel.  The article broached religious 
hypocrisy, as the Algerine chided American Christians for ignoring Jesus’s command to “do 
unto others as you would they should do unto you.”143  Similarly, Philadelphia newspapers 
published a purported conversation between newly abducted American captives and the Dey 
of Algiers, in which the hostages chide the ruler for enslaving “the crews belonging to 
Nations who were not at war with him, nor ever gave him cause of offence” and contend that 
“depriving a man of his liberty was the most attrocious robbery that could be committed.”  
The Dey responds to these accusations by “dart[ing] a furious look at them, and then 
thunder[ing] out these words—‘Begone ye miscreants, out of my presence and if you live to 
return home tell your Fellow Citizens from me to examine their own conduct towards many 
thousands of my countrymen who are held in the vilest slavery by them before they presume 
to censure me or my people.”144  This article portrayed the Dey as having justice on his side, 
with the use of the verb “thunder” lending credibility and authority and suggesting a 
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righteous anger.  This dialogue encouraged readers to imagine the scene unfolding in their 
minds and gave the Dey the last words—the American captives were convicted of their 
hypocrisy and unable to prove him wrong. 
Other anti-slavery advocates viewed the Barbary pirates as instruments of divine 
retribution for America’s participation in the slave trade.  The Pennsylvania Society claimed 
that “the captivity and sufferings of our American brethren in Algiers…seem to be intended 
by Divine Providence to awaken us to a sense of the injustice and cruelty of dooming our 
African brethren to perpetual slavery and misery.”145  Similarly, a Rhode Island newspaper 
regarded the “unlawful depredations” committed by the Algerines as “a judgment from 
heaven” upon the United States and other nations for their participation in the slave trade.146  
These critics challenged the notion of American exceptionalism, the belief that God had 
uniquely blessed the United States.  Far from believing that Providence was always on 
America’s side, they contended that the sinful business of slavery warranted divine 
retribution.  The Barbary pirates were God’s wake-up call to America to repent from its 
wicked perpetuation of slavery. 
Some opponents of slavery even downplayed the severity of captivity in Algiers in an 
effort to focus attention on the brutality of plantation slavery.  A Massachusetts newspaper 
printed an article that declared  
the situation of a slave at Algiers is honorable; and when brought in competition with 
that of a Negro in the Westindies, will hardly bear a comparison.—The former, it is 
true, is torn from his family & friends—doomed to bondage for life—subjected to the 
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rage of a contagoeus distemper, and no other hope is left him but to spend the 
remaining part of his days in miserable dejection and servitude….And has not the 
poor Negro all these evils to encounter—with the addition of unprecedented cruel 
whippings, brandings, & numerous inventions of torture, to which the slave of algiers 
is yet a stranger.147   
Similarly, newspapers throughout the North published an anti-slavery petition to the Senate 
and House of Representatives that emphasized that “captivity at Algiers is not without a 
hope, and that the slavery of the West-Indies terminates only with existence.”148  Both 
documents portrayed captivity in Algiers as the lesser of two evils since it involved much 
less violence.  However, the first article argued that slavery in Algiers was permanent 
(perhaps suggesting that the federal government would never redeem hostages), while the 
second text acknowledged the possibility of redemption (however remote).  Notably, both 
made West Indies slavery the villain, not southern plantations.  Perhaps these authors deemed 
it less uncomfortable to demonize British slaveholders instead of American ones.  
Regardless, the similarities between southern slavery and West Indies slavery would surely 
be apparent to readers.  These documents sought to produce feelings of remorse in readers for 
supporting a labor system that dehumanized Africans and treated them with enormous 
brutality. 
Other anti-slavery advocates adamantly rejecting the widespread notion that 
American and European civilizations were morally superior to the Barbary States.  A piece in 
a Philadelphia newspaper attacked southern Congressmen for feeling offended over an 
abolitionist petition and declared that “the Algerine treats his slave with more humanity; and 
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I believe the sin of oppression on the part of the American, is greatest in the sight of the 
Father of the Family of Mankind.”149  Americans, far from being more loving human beings, 
exceeded North Africans in wickedness.  Similarly, an editorial under the name 
“Wilberforce” (almost certainly a pen name and not the actual famous British abolitionist 
since the article refers to Americans as “our countrymen”) argued that Algerines enslaved 
Christians out of “ignorance” rooted in religious ideology.150  Islam taught them “to consider 
the Christians as infidels” and “blasphemers of their prophet; and consequently, as their 
natural enemies.”  Americans should pity Algerines for their ignorance (“handed down from 
generation to generation”), but Americans lacked religious justification for hating Africans.  
Instead, Americans violated “the benign influence of the christian religion, which breathes 
mildness, and humanity to all mankind....even to our enemies.”  This article is extreme in its 
depiction of the Barbary pirates as unaware that they engaged in cruel behavior.  It 
practically absolved the Barbary pirates of blame!  This article saw them as childlike savages 
(akin to popular American perceptions of Native Americans), whereas other commentators 
portrayed North Africans as willfully wicked and full of malice. 
Books also portrayed slavery in Barbary as milder than American slavery.  Even 
Mathew Carey, who expressed great sympathy for the captives, considered the Barbary 
pirates less to blame regarding the slave trade:  “we are not entitled to charge the Algerines 
with any exclusive degree of barbarity.  The Christians of Europe and America carry on this 
commerce an hundred times more expensively than the Algerines.”151  Royall Tyler, in his 
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1797 novel The Algerine Captive, criticized white men for raping African slave women 
onboard slave ships and portrayed Muslims as more humane.  As a Muslim character points 
out, Islam prohibited the enslaving of fellow Muslims whereas southern Christian slave 
owners would “baptize the unfortunate African into your faith, and then use your brother 
Christians as brutes of the desert.”  Tyler castigated Christians for justifying slavery in God’s 
eyes by making a token effort to convert heathens before enslaving them and treating them 
with brutality.  Moreover, the protagonist in The Algerine Captive eventually becomes 
convinced of his past sins, believing that “the miseries, the insults, and cruel woundings, I 
afterwards received, when a slave myself” in Algiers were chastisement for his participation 
in the slave trade (as a surgeon who examined the bodies of slaves to ensure their good 
health).152 
Anti-slavery rhetoric could draw a heated response.  Tyler’s inflammatory prose 
generated controversy, with contemporary reviewers criticizing him for being overly 
sympathetic to Islam.153  The New York Packet published an article that attacked the Quakers 
as lacking the credibility to criticize, noting that they did not aid the American Revolution 
with their “monied or personal services.”  Further, the article portrayed them as callous 
towards the American hostages:  “has this wealthy and charitable sect ever contributed any 
sum for the release of American slaves in Algiers?”154  Philadelphia and Vermont 
newspapers blasted anti-slavery advocates by contenting that too much effort was spent on 
decrying the enslavement of blacks.  Instead, “to our eternal shame and disgrace...we suffer 
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men of the same colour, of the same blood with ourselves, to languish in captivity at 
Algiers!”  These captives were “probably” American Revolution veterans and if the United 
States refused to redeem them, then others would not risk sailing and, consequently, America 
“may bid adieu to a valuable and extensive line of commerce.”155  To this critic, the world 
was turned upside down.  White people were never meant to be enslaved by blacks and the 
American public’s resignation to the situation constituted a moral failing.  If it was “a 
hardship and a degradation” for blacks to be enslaved by a “superior” race, “how hard, then, 
must be the lot of our fellow citizens at Algiers” who were subject to “a lawless crew of 
Barbarians, the best of whom they may justly consider as their inferiors!”  If even one 
captive died, then “his name will be recorded in the page of history, in letters of blood, 
which, like the stains on the Murderesses hand, all the water of the ocean will never be able 
to wash out.”  This rhetoric resembles early twentieth-century racist language with its 
emphasis on fixed, immutable racial differences and the innate superiority of white people.156  
The article is unique for its time by not appealing to religion or empathy, but instead 
emphasizing racial pride.  It also insulted Americans by comparing them to the villainous 
Lady Macbeth (and assumed readers would understand the allusion to Shakespeare’s famous 
play).157  Racism and nationalism were intertwined in this commentator’s eyes. 
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Another narrative emerged following Algiers’s capture of an additional 119 American sailors 
in 1793, one that stressed gender and sexuality.158  Authors, captives, and diplomats recast 
the Barbary pirates as sexual predators who raped captives and depicted Algerine women as 
temptresses who sought sex with captives—an act that potentially carried the death penalty in 
Algiers.  These critics claimed, in sharp contrast to the 1780s consensus, that defeating the 
Barbary pirates would be easy since they were militarily incompetent.  Ironically, Algiers’s 
demonstration of its impressive ability to abduct U.S. sailors caused some American 
commentators to claim that North Africa was an easy target to destroy. 
In late 1794, descriptions of captivity in Barbary began to discuss a sexual danger.  
Newspapers throughout the country published the story of an American captive named John 
Burnham.159  The first paragraph provided context (he had recently returned to the United 
States after raising $4,000 and gaining help from a Dutch admiral), while the second 
paragraph portrayed the Dey of Algiers as a sexual predator who eagerly awaited the arrival 
of captives.  The monarch reportedly would have the slaves taken to his yard, where he 
selected the “boys or good looking young men” to be his palace servants.  In his palace, the 
Dey would take his favorite “boy” and with him commit “the most horrid of all crimes.”  
Although the article does not use the word “sodomy,” it clearly invites readers to imagine the 
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act.  Historian Thomas Foster has noted that when sodomy was referenced in eighteenth-
century texts, it most often appeared in satirical accounts meant to discredit outside 
groups.160  But the Burnham account is quite serious.  It forced readers to confront the 
uncomfortable notion that the American hostages were getting raped.161 
The Burnham narrative also portrayed life in the Dey’s palace as revolving around the 
bedroom and maintaining an attractive appearance.  The monarch forced his captives to be 
“very clean,” be “well dressed in the Turkish mode” and “attend on the Dey and keep clean 
their own apartments.”  Clearly, the Dey wanted his American and European house servants 
to be readily accessible for sexual rendezvous and in desirable physical condition.  The Dey 
also revealed his power over them by forcing them to adopt North African dress.  Subsequent 
sections in the Burnham article describe how other captives had laboring jobs (such as 
carpenters, coopers, blacksmiths, and rope makers), but by placing the description of sexual 
abuse at the beginning, newspaper editors wanted the public not to miss it.  The article 
concluded by calling for Americans to “leave no reasonable measure unattempted, to relieve 
as speedily as possible their unhappy brethren from slavery and the prospect of death.”  In 
sum, it argued that American men were getting raped due to the inaction of the federal 
government and wanted readers to feel so horrified that they would participate in private 
ransom efforts. 
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Books also mentioned the sexual dangers of captivity.  James Wilson Stevens’s An 
Historical and Geographical Account of Algiers, published in 1797, portrayed American 
captives as the Dey’s sexual pawns.  Stevens alleged that they underwent  
a series of misery which humanity blushes to record.  As soon as they landed in 
Algiers, they were immediately ordered to the dey’s palace, where they were drawn 
up in files, in a back court, and underwent a strick examination.  The Dey…passed 
and repassed in front of them, and was extremely pleased with their appearance.  
He selected from their number all the boys and younger men, whom he employed 
in his palace at different occupations…some were ordered to sweep the apartments, 
some to wash clothes, and others to wait upon the dey and take care of his 
wardrobe.162 
 
The scene resembles Burnham’s account, but Stevens provides more detail.  The Dey took 
this selection process very seriously:  he looked over the captives twice to ensure that he did 
not miss any attractive face.  The whole event was orchestrated with precision—the attendant 
Algerines quickly hustled the new captives to the palace and lined them up so that the Dey 
could easily see each person. As in the Burnham article, neither the word sodomy nor a 
description of sexual contact is explicitly mentioned, but both are implied.  The Dey liked to 
have his palace servants help him with the intimate acts of dressing and undressing—and 
presumably have sexual trysts. 
When describing North African culture more generally, authors and diplomats 
portrayed the men as obsessed with sodomy and open about their enjoyment of it.  Stevens 
contended that “sodomy is so extremely fashionable among [Algerines], and so little are they 
disposed to keep this foible a secret, that it is the subject of their most plaintive songs, and 
they will spare no pains in procuring the gratification of their infamous love.”163  Sodomy 
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also served a political purpose by fueling good relations between North Africa and the 
Ottoman Empire.  As Mathew Carey claimed in A Short Account of Algiers, the Dey sent 
“handsome youths” as part of his tribute to the Sultan.164  Stevens likewise observed that 
Deys used to “send an annual tribute of a number of beautiful boys to the Grand Signoirs,” 
although he thought this practice had ended (now Algiers sent Arabian horses).  Wealthy 
Algerine men also allegedly had harems of boys.  Stevens described the “famous admiral 
Pinchinin” who kept forty boys between nine and fifteen years old.165  Although he did not 
sodomize them (Stevens did not say why Pinchinin displayed this restraint), he retained them 
in order to impress his peers.  Notably, American diplomats who served in North Africa in 
the late 1790s and early 1800s also portrayed sodomy as ubiquitous.  James Cathcart claimed 
that the bashaw of Tripoli “was notoriously addicted to the unnatural and detestable sin of 
Sodomy” and promiscuously courted his captives, punishing those who rejected his advances 
with whippings and “hard labor.”166  Author Richard Parker observes that the sodomy 
descriptions were censored from the published version of Cathcart’s captivity narrative, but 
exist in the Library of Congress manuscript.  Evidently, the publisher of Cathcart’s writings 
(in 1899) deemed them too sexually explicit for the public.  Richard O’Brien, who became 
consul to Algiers after his captivity there, reported that the Dey “is in Leasure Hours friged 
by a boy…he that used to open assholes now has his own shut up.”167  William Eaton labeled 
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Tunis the “land of rapine and sodomy” and called for an attack on Algiers comparable to 
God’s “torrent upon Sodom and Gomorrow.”168  By using this biblical reference, Eaton 
portrayed America as a divine judge empowered to annihilate degenerate North Africans.  He 
also claimed that the Bey of Tunis engaged in behavior that “would excite a blush in the 
countenance of the most depraved of nature’s children”:  the monarch had a long-term sexual 
relationship with “a lusty Turk of about thirty three,” who was more important to him (“the 
first object of his passion!”) than his wife.169  These commentators turned the longstanding 
association of Muslim men with harems filled with women on its head.  Instead of desiring 
the opposite sex, North African men craved sex with other men and ardently sought 
American and European men as conquests.  But were American captives actually raped?  I 
have not found any accounts of an American hostage admitting that he was raped—he would 
probably reluctant to disclose it due to the element of shame involved.  Other authors, 
though, have concluded that North African men sexually assaulted captives. 170  Also, as a 
leading scholar of Muslim culture has discussed, Arabic literature of the sixteenth through 
eighteenth centuries “is replete with casual and sometimes sympathetic references to 
homosexual love.”  This celebration of same-sex attraction flourished even though Islamic 
law stipulates punishments for sexual intercourse between men.171 
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The notion that Algerine men allegedly considered sodomy as a positive good (not as 
a shameful behavior) strongly contrasted American attitudes towards it.  As historians of 
American sexuality have discussed, in the eighteenth century sodomy was viewed either as a 
sinful behavior or (in a non-religious sense) as a “crime against nature.”172  Yet same-sex 
intercourse certainly occurred in the United States and was tolerated in some urban areas.  As 
Clare Lyons has discussed, Pennsylvania law considered sodomy a crime but no prosecutions 
occurred in Philadelphia from 1750-1807 despite the presence of a same-sex erotic culture.173  
However, sodomy was not celebrated as honorable behavior.  Christian churches (especially 
in New England) deemed it sinful, often associating it with the biblical story of God’s 
destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah.174  Massachusetts law even called for the death penalty.  
Portraying Algerines as addicted to sodomy could function as a powerful emotional call to 
reach the public and policymakers.  For religious readers, these accusations of sodomy could 
suggest a spiritual duty to wipe libertine Algerines from the earth.  Earlier humanitarian 
attempts to free the hostages had failed, so why not try a new approach? 
Other commentators used gendered language to express support for ending the 
captives’ suffering.  A widely published article entitled “TREATMENT of the Prisoners at 
Algiers, from authentic Testimony” blamed their plight upon “the impotence of America.”175  
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The metaphor of a man’s failure to perform sexually paralleled the failure of the government 
to protect its citizens who bravely ventured to Europe and the Mediterranean to help the 
United States prosper.  Some women even took it upon themselves to mobilize ransom 
efforts and blamed American men for passively accepting Barbary piracy.  A New 
Hampshire newspaper lamented the fate of the captives forced “to eat the bread, and to drink 
the water of affliction in a strange land.”176  It urged the population to rethink gender roles in 
an effort to expedite ransom:  “Little is to be expected from the Gentlemen.—Much may be 
done by the Ladies.  Women in every age has been distinguished for sympathy of feeling and 
correspondent benignity of action.  Let the Ladies of Portsmouth set the praise-worthy 
example, whilst the rest of their lovely Sisters throughout America shall make but one 
common purse with them, and offer these united offerings of humanity on the altar of the 
finest affections.”  Sisterhood was the solution, according to this article.  Men had had years 
to resolve the conflict with Algiers and had failed.  Women could display their organizational 
skills and empathy for the captives by pooling their resources.  Yet the article also upheld 
traditional female stereotypes by stressing that women’s activism would be an offshoot of 
their inherent empathetic nature.  It upheld Republican Motherhood even as it called for a 
stronger public presence for women. 
Gendered rhetoric was also used to portray Algiers as militarily weak, with 
commentators asserting that the country’s male population neglected training and spent their 
time in indolence.  Authors argued that Algiers could easily be annihilated if only the United 
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States sent sufficient men and ships to the Mediterranean.  Newspapers in multiple states 
printed an article that portrayed the Algerine navy as exceptionally paltry:  it was a 
“contemptible force” and it would be “easy…to check and put a stop to the mischief they 
premediate, for a couple of Frigates could block them up in their ports.”177  A similar article, 
published in three states, claimed that three or four ships “would be sufficient to take every 
vessel [the Algerines] have out.”178  Such claims were a blatant misrepresentation of reality 
since Algiers had harassed European countries for centuries; sending two or three ships 
would accomplish nothing.  Mathew Carey contended that Algerines deluded themselves in 
viewing their country as powerful:  although considered “a military republic … it certainly 
can reflect no lustre on that species of government.”179  He also ridiculed the country’s 
national pledge of “we, the great, and small members of the mighty and invincible militia of 
Algiers.”  His rhetoric tried to taunt the American public into taking action.  Carey conceded 
that Algiers once had a respectable force:  during the seventeenth century it “set at defiance, 
several of the most formidable nations of Europe.”180  Yet Algiers was now a shadow of its 
former self with a “trifling” navy that fifteen to twenty U.S. frigates could easily destroy.  
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Such cavalier claims should not be taken at face value, but rather seen as propaganda that 
tried to galvanize American men into fighting the Barbary pirates. 
Authors also portrayed Algiers’s militia as a laughingstock.  Carey noted that it 
boasted 6,500 to 12,000 men.  Although this may have seemed like a daunting force to 
readers, he depicted its members as bungling and inept.  Algerine men “spen[t] a great part of 
their time in indolence ... drinking coffee and smoaking.”181  Similarly, Stevens portrayed 
Algerine men as “slaves of their sensual appetites.”182  They led leisurely lives that entailed 
“whole days at the coffee houses in smoking and sipping coffee.”  Americans who spent time 
in North Africa concurred.  John Foss, an American hostage in Algiers from 1793 to 1796 
who wrote a narrative of his captivity (published in 1798), likewise belittled the populace’s 
work ethic.  He averred that the men “spend a great part of their time in bathing, smoaking, 
and drinking coffee.”183  The consul to Algiers, William Eaton, declared that “they have 
neither tactics nor discipline.  There is not a bayonet in Barbary.  Not much should be feared 
nor expected from a people whose principal ministers, principal merchants and principal 
generals consume day after day … smoking tobacco and playin at chess.” 184  Eaton also 
despised Tunis’s capabilities, averring that its “military force…is rather imaginary than 
real.”185  Commentators at home and abroad believed that Americans had lived in fear of the 
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Barbary pirates for too long.  Far from being a serious threat, the country would easily 
crumble if the United States simply fought back.  North African men lacked discipline and 
eagerness for battle, preferring indolent lives given over to pleasure.  What was America 
waiting for? 
In addition to criticizing Algerine men as lazy, authors attacked their masculinity by 
portraying their clothing as feminine.  Foss described it as resembling “a woman’s petticoat,” 
while Stevens contended that “there is not much difference…between the dress of the men 
and women.”186  Common people wore modest “linen drawers,” while “men of fashion go 
more sumptuously clad” in “fur, silk, or cloth…garments finely embroidered with flowers of 
gold” and turbans “elegantly adored with jewels.”187  These descriptions of clothing 
complement the accusations of indolence and disinclination towards military training—
Algerine men (at least wealthy ones) preferred to spend their resources on expensive 
clothing.  As historian Susan Klepp has discussed, Americans of the early republic associated 
flowers with women’s fertility (artists often included them in portraits of women).188  They 
also considered a fixation with jewelry and luxury goods as indicative of a lack of republican 
virtue.  By drawing readers’ attention to Barbary clothing, authors represented North Africa 
as in a state of cultural corruption and ripe for chastisement from the virtuous United States. 
Joel Barlow’s letters to the federal government reinforced this image of the Barbary 
pirates as comically effeminate and militarily weak.  His dispatches reveal how gendered 
ideas shaped actual diplomacy with North Africa in the 1790s.  In a March 1796 letter to 
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Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, Barlow depicted Algiers as filled with the refuse of 
society.  He denigrated the militia (comprised of men from Turkey) as “generally ignorant & 
ferotious adventurers,” thieves, and unintelligent castoffs who gave rise to the regional 
proverb “no honest man goes to Algiers.”189  Barlow added that respectable women wanted 
nothing to do with militia members since the typical soldier “is too poor to bring a Wife with 
him, and a Turkish single Woman rarely comes to Algiers to get a Husband.”  Like Carey, 
Foss, and Stevens, Barlow portrayed the Algerine militia as pathetic and laughable.  They not 
only lacked military ability, but masculine sexual charm.  Lower still in Barlow’s opinion 
were the native Algerine people, whom he deemed too dimwitted to resist rule by the ruling 
class of Turks.  The Algerines regarded them “as a superior race of beings” and “the 
favourites of the prophet & the Lords of the Country.”190  The Algerines contributed to their 
own subjugation by holding religious superstitions.  In a May 1796 letter to his wife, Barlow 
described the Algerines as “the lowest debasement of the human species.”191  These passages 
portrayed an imperial relationship that sharply contrasted America’s recent rebellion against 
Britain.  Barlow’s letters affirmed U.S. greatness by implicitly celebrating valorous 
American men who had cast off British imperialism, while depicting the Algerines as 
paralyzed with fear of Turkish power. 
In discussing the Dey of Algiers, Barlow found him as pathetic as the populace he 
ruled over.  He portrayed him as emotional and unreliable, emphasizing that his “most 
ungovernable temper, passionate, changeable & Unjust” prevented diplomats from 
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“calculating his policy from one moment to another.”192  The Dey would proclaim friendship 
only to later reverse course and spew invectives.  In particular, the Dey frequently 
complained about the tardiness of U.S. tribute.  While Barlow recognized that the monarch 
had a legitimate grievance, he nevertheless presented him as a spoiled brat who threw 
temper-tantrums.  In letters to the Secretary of State, Barlow described the Dey as being “in 
too great a rage to listen to any thing” and exhibiting “the impatience of a petulant child.”193  
Barlow portrayed himself as a pacifying babysitter, tactfully tending to the complaints and 
cries of the Dey. 
Barlow noted, too, that he had to think in gendered terms in order to succeed.  He 
sought to create a tough masculine image that would mask his personal discomfort.  As part 
of this strategy, he grew a moustache.  In an August 1797 letter to his wife, Barlow cited a 
maxim:  “who makes himself the lamb, the wolf eats” and added that “no part of this proverb 
is so useful as in Barbary.”194   Since he considered himself a “lamb at heart” surrounded by 
savage Algerines he grew facial hair in order to acquire “the air of a tiger, beast that the wolf 
does not eat.”  He believed that his outward appearance mattered.  Since the Dey ignored 
reasoned arguments, Barlow had to appear hyper-masculine in order to command respect.  
One gets the sense that Barlow was only half-joking when he said that the moustache had 
“been very useful in my affairs.” 
 Most public commentators about North Africa (whether authors, captives, or 
diplomats) were men.  A welcome contrast to this male perspective is Susanna Rowson’s 
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1794 play Slaves in Algiers; or, A Struggle for Freedom, which was performed in Baltimore, 
Charleston, Hartford, New York, and Philadelphia.195  As did male authors, Rowson often 
employed gendered rhetoric, but she did so with a different intention:  to denounce 
patriarchy.  Early in the play, a member of the Dey’s harem named Fetnah condemns 
patriarchy:  “is the poor bird that is confined in a cage (because a favourite with its enslaver) 
consoled for the loss of freedom.  No!  tho’ its prison is of golden wire, its food delicious, 
and it is overwhelm’d with caresses, its little heart still pants for liberty.”196  Rowson rejected 
the notion that men best demonstrated their love for women by showering them with 
affection and striving to make domestic life comfortable for them.  In another scene, Fetnah 
tells of a past encounter with a foreign woman, who “nourished in my mind the love of 
liberty, and taught me, woman was never formed to be the abject slave of man.  Nature made 
us equal with them, and gave us the power to render ourselves superior.”197  Rowson hoped 
that socially constructed gender roles would change in America if women demanded rights as 
an entitlement rooted in natural rights ideology. 
Rowson also used gendered rhetoric to mock male characters as sexual predators who 
sought to confine women instead of treating them as their intellectual and moral equals.  
Another character, a Spanish captive named Sebastian, makes romantic advances on a person 
whom he thinks is an attractive young woman, but who really is an Algerine man in woman’s 
clothing.  Sebastian proclaims his love in highly sentimental terms, declaring that “women 
were never made, with all their prettiness and softness, and bewitching ways, to be hid from 
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us men, who came into the world for no other purpose, than to see, admire, love, and protect 
them.”  Even after part of the Algerine man’s disguise falls off, Sebastian still does not 
recognize his correct sex.  Rowson suggested that men such as Sebastian, who insisted on 
viewing women as sexual objects intended for male gratification, were clueless.  They 
deceived themselves about the true nature of women just as Sebastian’s eyes misled him 
about the identity of the Algerine man. 
Rowson also discussed the sexual abuse of captives, but accused the Dey of Algiers 
of targeting women, not men.  The play uses the monarch as comic relief by portraying him 
as an elderly fool, in contrast to how Burnham’s captivity account depicts him as calculating 
and precise.  The character Fetnah mocks the Dey for being “grave and stately” during sex, 
but still respects his “huge scymetar.”198  With this penis joke, American audiences were 
invited to laugh at the Dey’s sexual excesses while also acknowledging his power.  Despite 
being “old and ugly,” he nevertheless enjoys intercourse with nubile young women.  The Dey 
even proposes marriage to a female American captive (although no American women were 
ever enslaved in Algiers).  Rowson’s depiction of the Dey differs from Burnham’s and 
Stevens’s in that hers makes no mention of sodomy and portrays the Dey as only interested in 
having relations with the opposite sex.  Yet all three of them characterized the Dey as a 
sexual predator who always sought more sexual conquests. 
Women also made appearances in the accounts of Carey, Foss, and Stevens.  These 
authors addressed women’s status in North African society and their sexual behavior.  Like 
Rowson, they observed that men treated women badly.  Unlike Rowson, they did not use this 
information as a means to attack patriarchy.  Instead, in portraying North African gender 
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roles as barbaric, they implicitly praised the treatment of American women by American 
men.  Stevens remarked that Algerine men prohibited their wives from eating with them 
since they “regard women as an inferior order in creation, and consequently not entitled to 
similar distinctions.”199  This harsh treatment on earth had religious foundations since 
Muslim men believed that women had no souls and that God viewed them as “brutes” and 
would not “reward [them] in the next life.”200  This worldview also legitimized brutality and 
violence against women.  Stevens observed that the Dey upheld “the right of the Turks to put 
their wives to death; they being considered as merely the property of their husbands.”201  
Stevens clearly disapproved of such beliefs and practices, implying that Christianity opposed 
misogyny and commanded men to treat women courteously.  Carey and Foss discussed 
polygamy.  Islamic law permitted a man to have up to four wives, but, according to these two 
authors, most Algerine men had two or three.202  American authors portrayed Algerine 
gender standards as heinous and exploitative.  Men treated their women like chattel and used 
religion and law to reinforce female inferiority.  These male authors argued that North Africa 
had a perverse patriarchy that glorified the dehumanization of women.  Presumably, 
American men and women reading these books about Barbary would feel good about the 
treatment of women in the United States.203 
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Some publications addressed the topic of Muslim women’s sexuality, portraying them 
as seductresses who jeopardized the lives of Christian captives.204  The October 1795 issue of 
The Massachusetts Magazine; or, Monthly Museum characterized Middle Eastern women as 
sexual predators in an article entitled “DESCRIPTION of the MOORISH WOMEN.”  It 
claimed that Muslim women “are not in general very reserved” and that “licentiousness is 
there more general and less restrained,” in part because the warm climate supposedly made 
sexually transmitted diseases more tolerable.  Young Algerine women would boldly venture 
out of their homes to interact with foreign men, with their veils aiding their clandestine 
pursuits since their husbands could not recognize their faces.205  Similarly, Royall Tyler’s 
The Algerine Captive stated that American hostages believed that Algerine women had a 
reputation for immodesty; the extensive clothing that women had to wear when outdoors 
allowed them to “take great liberties in this general disguise.”206  As with the discussions of 
sodomy in Barbary, no hard evidence of American captives having sex with Algerine women 
has been found.  It is possible that such relations did happen and, if so, the Americans 
succeeded in not getting caught.  Ultimately, the value of descriptions of North African 
women’s sexuality lies in their use as propaganda and in suggesting fears that American men 
had regarding women’s sexuality being beyond patriarchal control. 
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Accounts of the sexual escapades of North African women were sometimes raunchy 
and pseudo-pornographic.  An article entitled “Arabian Women” appeared in Connecticut 
and Massachusetts newspapers in summer 1794.207  It was an excerpt from Abbe Poiret’s 
Travels in Barbary that portrayed Muslim women as harboring intense sexual desires that 
their husbands did not fulfill.  During the day they endured “perpetual imprisonment” in their 
house, but during the evening when their husband went to the mosque, they would seek “the 
cool air on their terraces” and flirt with Christian captives that passed by.  Indeed, they were 
“very fond of the Christians” and would “readily expose to their view every thing that the 
jealousy of their husbands obliges them to hide.”  In other words, Poiret’s claim was that the 
women enjoyed arousing sexual desire among Christian captives by exposing their faces (or, 
perhaps, their breasts or other hidden body parts).  Sex was the end goal, but any Christian 
caught having intercourse with a Barbary woman faced the death penalty unless he converted 
to Islam and married her.  If the woman was married, though, both would be killed.  This 
newspaper could have printed anything from Poiret’s book, but chose to publish a titillating 
segment that described the sexual dangers that Christian captives faced.  Would readers 
wonder if the American captives had the moral fortitude to resist these professional 
temptresses?  Were readers supposed to be horrified at North African women’s sexuality or 
envy the captives for having easy access to sex?  These texts are ambiguous, hinting at both 
possibilities.208 
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Stevens’s An Historical and Geographical Account of Algiers similarly portrayed 
Algerine women as sexual predators.  It described them as “remarkably amorous” and 
claimed that many “rove the streets every night for the purpose of intrigue” with European 
and American slaves, “for whom they have a remarkable attachment.”209  These women 
blatantly disregarded the consequences of illicit sex with a non-Muslim:  the death penalty.  
Yet one did not need to walk about the streets to find a sexually available Algerine woman, 
as Stevens depicted them as equally “lascivious” at home.210  There they roamed about in a 
nearly naked state, wearing only a cloth that spanned the stomach to the knees.  Stevens 
recounted a bawdy tale of an American captive delivering wine to a house only to see an 
Algerine woman without a veil covering her face.  Surprised, she quickly pulled up her 
petticoat to conceal her face which then “disclosed those parts which were much more the 
object of the American’s risibility.”211  This sexually charged scene straddled the line 
between repulsion and titillation since it ostensibly condemned Algerine women for their 
lack of virtue while also inviting readers to fantasize about having sex with them. 
Altogether, these authors argued that North African men could not control their 
women’s sexuality and depicted captivity in Barbary as saturated with sexual temptations 
that promised pleasure, but carried the risk of death.  Despite being mostly homebound and 
forced to wear restrictive dress when outdoors, North African women cleverly found 
opportunities to explore their sexuality.  Would reading these articles trouble American men?  
Would they wonder if their wives or daughters were being sexually active outside their 
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patriarchal control?  These accounts of Muslim women’s sexual behavior implicitly contain 
warnings about leaving women alone without male chaperones.  Women would abuse their 
freedom by seeking sexual fulfillment outside of marriage.  Even if they had to endure dress 
and mobility restrictions, they would find a way to gratify their allegedly insatiable sexual 
desires. 
Is it a coincidence that this surge in gendered rhetoric about the Barbary pirates and 
North African gender roles occurred in the 1790s?  To be sure, throughout American history 
white men had associated African women with illicit sexuality and often pursued intercourse 
with them in order to fulfill sexual fantasies.212  Yet this rhetoric about North African 
women, sodomy, and the military ineptitude of North African men emerged out of a specific 
context, at a time when Americans felt especially vulnerable to the Barbary pirates since the 
Algiers hostage crisis seemed to go on indefinitely.  This gendered discourse did not exist 
during the 1780s and early 1790s.  Rather, it reflected a broader discourse regarding gender 
roles, femininity, and masculinity that Americans were earnestly debating in the 1790s. 
Pubic discussions of women’s rights existed became more prominent in the United 
States in this decade.   American Judith Sargent Murray wrote her essay “On the Equality of 
the Sexes” in 1790, while Englishwoman Mary Wollstonecraft published the landmark A 
Vindication of the Rights of Women two years later.213  This latter work took the United 
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States by storm, launching conversations among the middle and upper classes about the 
application of natural rights ideology to women.  American men (and many women) 
promulgated the notion of “Republican Motherhood,” in which women would not receive 
political rights but would contribute to national greatness by inculcating moral virtues into 
their children (especially their sons).214  Moreover, as Doron Ben-Atar and Richard Brown 
have recently shown, two rare prosecutions for bestiality occurred in New England in the 
1790s.  These scholars argue that these cases occurred because elites feared social chaos and 
a decline of the traditional status-quo.215  Similarly, Clare Lyons has demonstrated that elites 
in Philadelphia effectively spearheaded efforts to suppress sexual activity that they associated 
with society’s “rabble,” while Rosemarie Zagarri has ably argued that, following the 
American Revolution, women experienced a “backlash” against applying natural rights 
ideology too strongly to their lives.216  Thus, this discourse about gender and the Barbary 
pirates reflected anxiety about changing gender roles and contested views about appropriate 
sexual behavior in the United States. 
 The mid-1790s marked a turning point in American relations with the Barbary 
pirates.  The long-lasting hostage crisis fueled American anger and a sense of national 
impotence.  The consensus about North African military strength revolved 180 degrees from 
the 1780s.  Then, most commentators deemed the Barbary pirates mighty adversaries who 
were too powerful for the United States to fight.  Merchants and policymakers saw two 
options:  pay tribute or commence a naval buildup.  During the 1790s, however, Americans 
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recast North African men as indolent, undisciplined, and easy prey for U.S. forces.  
Discussions of North Africa also began to reflect the ongoing discussions about proper 
sexual behavior and women’s place in American society.  Reports of captivity began to 
include sexual danger:  hostages could be raped by Algerine men or seduced into sleeping 
with Algerine women (and, if caught, potentially face the death penalty).  Americans were 
fed up with their vulnerability to the Barbary pirates in the 1790s and were itching for a fight.  
They would have an outlet for their rage the following decade, as the Tripolitan War offered 
a new generation of American men the opportunity to prove their manhood and end the threat 
of Barbary piracy. 
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Chapter 3:  The Beginning of the Tripolitan War 
 
 
October 9, 1800 began as an ordinary day for Captain William Bainbridge (of the 
warship George Washington) in the Mediterranean.  The Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin 
Stoddert, had dispatched him and his crew of 130 to Algiers to deliver tribute consisting of 
“some plank, some cables and a few canon, & some valuable European goods.”  Stoddert 
also ordered them to adopt the “most Warlike appearance to make the best impressions of our 
discipline & power” and to leave as “as soon as possible” in order to avoid contracting the 
plague.217  The Dey of Algiers, however, had other plans for the George Washington. 
As Bainbridge recorded in his ship’s logbook, after unloading the cargo he received a 
“command from a Dispoctic Dey of Algiers” to take that country’s tribute to “the Grand 
Seignior at Constantinople.”218  Outgunned by the Algerian navy and threatened with war if 
they did not comply, Bainbridge and the crew acquiesced and watched helplessly as “the 
pendant of the United States was struck and the Algerine Flag hoisted.”  The Americans felt 
enraged and embarrassed and “some tears fell at this Instance of national Humility.”  The 
Dey used his superior force to commandeer the U.S. warship.  Richard O’Brien, the U.S. 
consul at Algiers, reported that Bainbridge and the crew took one-hundred Algerians to 
Constantinople on the George Washington and listed the tribute:  one-hundred black slaves (a 
mix of men, women and children), one-hundred-fifty sheep, twenty-five horned cattle, twelve 
parrots, four antelopes, four horses, four lions, four tigers, and $1 million worth of cash and 
                                                          
217 Benjamin Stoddert to William Bainbridge, June 25, 1800, Naval Documents I: 361-362; Stoddert to 
Bainbridge, July 31, 1800, Ibid., I: 365-366.  The George Washington arrived in Algiers on September 17th. 
 
218 Bainbridge, George Washington log, October 9, 1800, Ibid., I: 378. 
82 
 
“Regalia.”219  Previously, the Barbary pirates had abducted American merchant vessels—but 
now they apprehended warships.  It was ironic that this warship was named after George 
Washington, the general who led his country to victory against mighty Britain (a much more 
powerful country than Algiers).  Yet perhaps it was not so ironic since, as president, 
Washington paid nearly $1 million to Algiers for a peace treaty and ransom.  The Barbary 
pirates had once again embarrassed the United States and revealed that, despite having built a 
navy, America remained vulnerable in the Mediterranean. 
Why begin a chapter about the Tripolitan War with an incident caused by Algiers?  
Americans at the time considered the conflicts rooted in the same structural problem:  an 
insufficient number of U.S. warships in the Mediterranean.  Anger at Algiers’s audacity 
generated cries for retaliation and ultimately helped to fuel the drive for war against Tripoli.  
The George Washington incident generated widespread anger and many Americans called 
for war against Algiers.  As O’Brien exclaimed to the Secretary of State, “can we be a nation 
of Independent freeman and Suffer Those indignities….war will cost us 2 — or 3 Millions of 
dollars per annum — but it should be prefered to degradation and a state of Vasalage to The 
Scruff. of Asia & affrica.”220  To this diplomat, spending vast sums on war was better than 
saving money and tolerating disgraceful treatment from North Africa.  Similarly, consul to 
Tunis William Eaton marveled that the United States readily cowered before Algiers.  In a 
letter to the Secretary of State, he wondered if his country had “yet one son whose soul 
revolts, whose nerves convulse, blood vessels burst, and heart indignant swells at thoughts of 
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such debasement!”221  Like O’Brien, Eaton believed that war against the Barbary States 
needed to happen in order to avenge the George Washington incident.  Otherwise, “history 
shall tell that The United States first volunteer’d a ship of war, equipt, a carrier for a 
pirate….Nothing but blood can blot the impression out….I would have lost the peace, and 
been empaled myself rather than yielded this concession—Will nothing rouse my country!”  
The diplomats deemed America’s vulnerability to the Barbary pirates embarrassing and even 
stupefying in light of the Revolutionary War and the Quasi-War (against superpowers Britain 
and France, respectively).  Even before Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency, these 
diplomats (whom Jefferson maintained in North Africa) ardently desired war against the 
Barbary pirates.222 
 Back in the United States, newspapers throughout the country expressed outrage 
against the George Washington incident.  The public first learned about it via newspaper 
reports in December 1800, when the ship Brutus arrived in Salem and its commander, 
William Brown, informed the public.  In an article published by thirty newspapers, Brown 
defended Bainbridge’s decision to surrender the warship since the Dey threatened to declare 
war upon the United States if refused.223  He also reported that, over the past two years, 
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Algiers had enslaved 368 Frenchmen and had seized twenty-seven Neapolitan, Sicilian, and 
Maltese ships (enslaving 215 people), seventeen Greek ships, and thirteen ships of 
“Imperialists” worth $1 million.  Brown added that Tunis had taken eleven Danish vessels 
worth $600,000 and Tripoli had captured twenty-four Swedish ships.  By printing this 
information, newspapers suggested that American merchants and sailors should expect to be 
harassed unless the government took decisive action to stop Barbary piracy.  Indeed, most of 
these publications featured editorial commentary that urged the government to “immediately” 
send “six stout frigates” to the Mediterranean “to keep Rogues in awe.”  Several of them also 
included an admonition to “Look out!” lest Americans “share the fate of the Swedes at 
Tripoli—the Danes at Tunis—and of many other Nations at Algiers!—‘Millions for 
Defence—but not a Cent for Tribute!!!’” 224  This commentary urged Americans to oppose 
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North African aggression and demands for money just as they did against France in the XYZ 
Affair and Quasi-War.  The “Millions for Defence” slogan became enormously popular 
during the late 1790s, having been spoken by Federalist congressman Robert Goodloe Harper 
at a 1798 banquet in honor of John Marshall.225  A pro-Democratic-Republican newspaper 
from Pennsylvania castigated President John Adams for leaving American ships vulnerable 
to Barbary piracy.  It viewed the George Washington affair as a new low in U.S.-Barbary 
relations:  “as if the character of the Country was not already sufficiently humbled, by paying 
a tribute to the Dey of Algiers…the frigate named George Washington, has, by a peculiarity 
of blindness and fatality, been put in the power of the Barbarians!”226  Like other newspaper 
articles, it invoked the slogan “Millions for Defence; but not a Cent for Tribute!” as a call to 
action.  Newspaper editors of both parties considered Algiers’s hijacking of the George 
Washington as an enormous affront upon national honor that necessitated a swift militaristic 
response.  Clearly, the public was not war weary from the Quasi-War and welcomed another 
fight. 
Bainbridge also urged retaliation and, at his request, newspapers throughout the 
country publicized his views.  Fearing that surrendering the George Washington would cast 
doubt upon his leadership abilities or even cost him his job, he asked The Philadelphia 
Gazette & Daily Advertiser to publish four letters in order to educate the public about “the 
facts, relative to my conduct.”  The letters (two by him, two by Richard O’Brien), discussed 
their attempts to change the Dey’s mind and the anxiety they felt over surrendering the ship.  
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In his October 9th letter to O’Brien, Bainbridge averred that he had made “every possible 
argument” to persuade the Dey to relent and had even tried to get a “British 24 gun ship” to 
take the George Washington’s place.  He emphasized that he did not “accede to this demand 
voluntarily” and thought that Algiers’s power over the U.S. Navy “makes me ponder on the 
words Independent United States.”  Clearly, Bainbridge felt tormented over yielding the ship 
and believed that this episode had great significance for his country.  Indeed, his October 10th 
letter to the Secretary of the Navy expressed his hope that the George Washington incident 
would serve as a wake-up call to his countrymen:  “the light that this Regency looks on the 
United States is exactly this; you pay me tribute, by that you become my slaves, and them I 
have a right to order as I please.  Did the United States know the easy access of this 
barbarous coast called Barbary, the weakness of their garrisons, and the effeminacy of their 
people, I am sure they would not be long tributary to so pitiful a race of infidels.”227  More 
than forty newspaper editors published the four letters; clearly, the George Washington 
incident enraged them and they wanted the public to feel livid as well.  A bipartisan 
consensus craved vengeance against the Barbary pirates.228  
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What did the Adams Administration think?  The George Washington incident 
occurred towards the end of Adams’s presidency, at time when he had lost motivation and 
had mentally distanced himself from his responsibilities.  As one scholar has discussed, by 
the end of December 1800 Adams “frequently expressed his old wish to resign” and “his 
thoughts were directed back over his administration and forward to his retirement rather than 
to the present.”229  This lackadaisical attitude affected Barbary relations since by the time 
Jefferson assumed the presidency the government had fallen two-and-a-half years behind its 
tribute payment to Algiers.230  However, even before news of the George Washington 
incident arrived, Secretary of State John Marshall suggested that the United States would 
send a fleet of ships to the Mediterranean after the Quasi-War ended.  In a July 1800 letter, 
Marshall informed John Quincy Adams, the U.S. minister to Berlin (and the president’s son), 
that the Swedish minister had proposed an alliance with the Netherlands and the United 
States against North Africa.  Marshall stated that although the president was “far from being 
pleased with the state of our affairs with the Barbary powers,” he thought that current treaties 
should be honored.  However, if the Barbary States broke them, the United States would 
pursue the alliance.  Marshall added that the president would not dispatch the Navy to the 
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Mediterranean until “actual hostilities shall cease” with France; sending ships now “would be 
a hazard, to which our infant navy ought not perhaps to be exposed.”231  Marshall also wrote 
to Richard O’Brien, asking him, Eaton, and James Cathcart (the consul to Tripoli) for “a 
perfect and complete statement” regarding America’s status with the Barbary States.  More 
significantly, the Secretary of State insisted that the Adams Administration had a limited 
tolerance for Barbary piracy:  “the burthensome caprices of the Barbary Sovereigns cannot 
always be submitted to.”232  Upon learning that Tunis demanded presents, Marshall told 
Eaton in August that the president acquiesced “with very much reluctance” to buy jewels and 
thought that “this system of heavy exaction must not be continued.”233  Also, on the eve of 
leaving office, Marshall wrote in a memorandum that “the state of our affairs with the 
Barbary powers generally & with Tripoli in particular requires immediate attention.”234  He 
knew, though, that these problems would fall to the Jefferson Administration to resolve.  
Altogether, this evidence suggests that the Adams Administration wanted to send warships to 
the Mediterranean in order to protect the merchant fleet and to discourage the Barbary States 
from demanding gifts.  Since none of the Barbary States actually declared war during his 
presidency, Adams lacked a reason to divert resources from the Quasi-War (which did not 
officially end until 1801).235  Had John Adams been reelected he likely would have taken 
more vigorous naval action against Tripoli than Jefferson ultimately did. 
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By the time Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency in March 1801, the United States had 
longstanding grievances against the Barbary pirates (especially against Algiers).  The 
Jefferson Administration recognized the public fervor over the George Washington incident; 
as Secretary of State James Madison told Richard O’Brien, “the sending to Constantinople, 
the national ship of war, the George Washington, by force, under the Algerine flag, and for 
such a purpose, has deeply affected the sensibility, not only of the President, but of the 
people of the United States….the indignity is of so serious a nature, that it is not impossible, 
that it may be deemed necessary, on a fit occasion, to revive the subject.”236  Even though 
Congress had reduced the size of the navy with the March 3, 1801 “Act providing for a Naval 
peace establishment,” it still retained thirteen frigates—more than enough to deal with the 
Barbary States.  This act mandated that “six of the frigates…shall be kept in constant service 
in time of peace” and the other seven put in storage.237  In times of war, however, the entire 
fleet could be activated.  Jefferson inherited a tumultuous situation with the Barbary 
pirates—the only question was how to respond.238 
                                                          
pact entirely ratified.  “Convention between the French Republic, and the United States of America,” The 
Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/fr1800.asp 
(accessed November 11, 2015). 
236 James Madison to O’Brien, May 20, 1801, Naval Documents I: 460-462. 
 
237 “An Act providing for a Naval peace establishment, and for other purposes,” March 3, 1801, Richard Peters, 
ed., The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, 6th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. II, (Boston:  
Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1845), 110-111. 
 
238 The outgoing Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, recommended that the government build twenty-
five new ships, but Congress (and Jefferson) rejected this advice.  Charles Paullin, Paullin’s History of Naval 
Administration, 1775-1911 (Annapolis:  U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), 118. 
 
90 
 
The bashaw of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli, had become increasingly angry with the 
United States during the Adams Administration and began to threaten war.239  Since taking 
power in 1795 (by killing his father and one of his brothers and driving his other brother into 
exile), he sought to bolster his navy and demand respect from other countries.240  He 
particularly resented what he perceived as the United States treating him as a weaker 
monarch than the Dey of Algiers or the Bey of Tunis.  In a 1799 letter to President Adams, 
Yusuf warned that peace between their two countries would last only as long as “you are 
Willing to treat us as you do the two other Regencies, without any difference being made 
between us.”241  Similarly, Cathcart reported (in a letter published by newspapers throughout 
the country) that the bashaw complained that the United States gave gifts to Algiers and 
Tunis but not to him:  “why do not the United States send me a voluntary present?  They 
have acted with me as if they had done every thing against their will” even though “I 
concluded a peace with them for almost nothing in common to what I have received from 
other nations.”242  The bashaw presented himself as an aggrieved party and warned that “I 
can hurt the commerce of any nation, as much as the Tunisians.”  Additionally, it later 
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became clear that Yusuf despised Articles I and XII of the 1797 U.S.-Tripoli treaty, which 
specified that the Dey of Algiers would mediate disputes.243  As one scholar has summed up, 
from Yusuf’s standpoint the United States had “treated Tripoli with contempt.”244 
Tensions escalated throughout Adams’s presidency, culminating in Yusuf’s 
threatening to declare war on the United States unless he received a lump sum of $225,000 
plus $25,000 annually.245  Cathcart tried to defuse the situation by offering $30,000 plus 
presents (he later increased the offer to $40,000) if the bashaw would write a letter to the 
president and wait ten months for a response.246  Yusuf declined.  He officially declared war 
on May 14, 1801 (signified by chopping down the pole bearing the U.S. flag), but provided a 
forty-day grace period before the Tripolitan navy would target American ships.247  War had 
happened whether Jefferson wanted it or not—it was out of his control. 
Although Yusuf bore responsibility for abrogating the 1797 treaty, his behavior was 
not egregious when compared to America’s earlier experiences with the Barbary States.  In 
the 1780s and 1790s, Algiers had enslaved more than one-hundred Americans (many of 
whom died in captivity) and, more recently, had commandeered the George Washington.  By 
contrast, since their 1797 treaty Tripoli had not enslaved any Americans and, when a 
Tripolitan ship captured an American vessel (the Catherine) in October 1800, the bashaw 
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quickly released it and the crew.248  Yusuf even offered a grace period so that U.S. consuls 
could warn American ships about the Tripolitan Navy.  Clearly, the bashaw had treated the 
United States much better than the Dey of Algiers had.  Furthermore, it was common 
knowledge in Europe and the United States that the Barbary rulers annulled treaties from 
time to time in order to bolster their revenue.  Yusuf’s behavior towards the United States 
was business as usual in North Africa. 
How did the public respond upon learning about Tripoli’s hostility?  Newspapers 
(mostly Federalist) directly associated the George Washington incident with the bashaw’s 
new demands.  Commentators ignored the longstanding element of Yusuf’s complaints and 
interpreted it as an unexpected outburst.  An article published in several states declared that 
“the outrageous conduct of the regency of Algiers in the case of the American frigate, George 
Washington, and the recent demands of the bashaw of Tripoli, must excite a general emotion 
of indignation in this country.”249  It condemned European countries for purchasing “peace” 
from these “petty states of barbarians and pirates on the coast of Africa” and argued that a 
turning point had arrived: 
now we find that our flag is outrageously disgraced; that new tribute 
is insolently demanded; that their unjustice is as capricious as it is 
extravagant, that our commerce is insecure and our citizens exposed 
to slavery upon every fresh wish of avarice, or new whim of almost 
unbounded insolence.  Where will this scene of extortion and 
arrogance on one side and submission and humiliation on the other 
cease?  It is easy to see that it will continue and increase until these 
villains feel our power, are impressed with some respect for our 
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strength and perceive that if they exceed a certain limit in their 
demands they shall find not tribute but chastisement.  When we first 
agreed to make them presents, we were without a ship of war; we 
have now a naval force competent to wipe away the ignominy which 
lies upon us, to repress their insolence to prevent our commerce 
becoming their prey, and at least induce them to keep within some 
bounds in their villainy. 
 
This article argued that America had permitted North Africa to disgrace it long enough and 
that new insults by Algiers and Tripoli necessitated a strong naval response that would 
permanently end Barbary piracy.  Unlike in previous decades, the United States now had a 
naval force capable of defending national honor and merchant ships.  Why not use the navy?  
What else was it for? 
Moreover, Tripoli made a more attractive target for vengeance than Algiers since it 
had a smaller navy (and, in theory, could more easily be defeated).  Cathcart reported that 
Tripoli’s force consisted of five main vessels:  a twenty-eight gun ship (that could hold two-
hundred men), a twenty-gun ship (one-hundred-fifty men), a fourteen-gun brig (one-hundred 
men), and two polaccas of fourteen- or sixteen-guns (one-hundred men each).250  Regarding 
Algiers’s fleet, Bainbridge reported that it boasted fifteen vessels plus sixty mortar and gun 
boats.251  The Jefferson Administration recognized this difference.  As Secretary of the Navy 
Robert Smith observed to Captain Richard Dale (the leader of the Mediterranean squadron), 
Algiers had “the principal strength” among the Barbary States while “the force of Tunis & 
Tripoli are contemptible, & might be crushed with any one of the Frigates under your 
command.”252  The president himself, in his First Annual Message to Congress, dismissed 
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Tripoli as “the least considerable of the Barbary States.”253  The Jefferson Administration 
also tried to reassure concerned citizens:  Smith informed the chairman of Philadelphia’s 
Chamber of Commerce that four ships were “fully adequate to the Destruction of the Naval 
Power of Tripoli & to meet the Navies of Algiers & Tripoli united.”254  Such statements are 
breathtaking in their naiveté.  Jefferson and his cabinet officials were delusional in believing 
that three frigates and a schooner could hold their own against the combined navies of 
Tripoli, Algiers, and Tunis.255  It was to the bashaw’s advantage that Jefferson was now 
president instead of Adams.  Throughout the Tripolitan War, the Jefferson Administration 
had a tendency to underestimate the capabilities of the Tripolitan Navy. 
Fortunately for the bashaw, Jefferson refused to use the U.S. navy to its fullest extent.  
Although in the 1780s he had called for a substantial naval buildup and had (in debates with 
John Adams) argued for war over paying tribute, Jefferson had rethought his position.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, in 1784 Jefferson proposed sending six ships to the 
Mediterranean under John Paul Jones and, the following year, he suggested that the United 
States generate revenue by “turn[ing] pyrate” through demanding an annual tribute from 
foreign ships that participated in the West Indies trade.256  In the late 1790s, however, 
Jefferson became appalled at Federalist policies during the Quasi-War, especially the 
repressive Alien and Sedition Acts and the soaring military and navy budgets.  He now 
thought that the problems presented by a formidable navy outweighed the good that it could 
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do.  Jefferson eagerly shared his views with correspondents.  In January 1799, for instance, 
he endorsed “a naval force only as may protect our coasts and harbours” but nothing more, 
lest its “expences and the eternal wars in which it will implicate us, will grind us with public 
burthens, & sink us under them.”257  In other letters, Jefferson stressed the astronomical costs 
of creating and maintaining a strong navy.  To Aaron Burr, he calculated that Federalist plans 
to make the United States “a great naval power” would require $10 million in building costs 
and “annual expenses between” $5 million and $6 million.258  Furthermore, Jefferson 
despised public enthusiasm for the navy and claimed that “we are running navigation-mad, & 
commerce-mad, and navy-mad, which is worst of all.”259  Clearly, Jefferson was a different 
person in 1801 than he had been in the mid-1780s.  Previously, he considered a navy as a 
protector of republican liberties.  Now, however, he deemed it a dangerous drain on financial 
resources.  Regrettably, in his enthusiasm to reduce the federal government’s expenses, he 
squandered the opportunity to decisively deal with Barbary piracy. 
What was Jefferson willing to do?  Although it would take several months before 
learning about the bashaw’s actual declaration of war, he knew about Tripoli’s longstanding 
anger and, after consulting with his cabinet, decided to send three frigates (the President, 
Philadelphia, and Essex) and a sloop (Enterprize) to the Mediterranean under Commodore 
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Richard Dale.260  They sailed in early June.261  However, Jefferson wanted to avoid war and 
find a diplomatic solution—even if that meant paying for it.  Commodore Dale’s official 
orders stipulated that if the bashaw “has conducted himself peaceably towards the United 
States” he should receive up to $10,000 as a gift (Dale could use his discretion regarding the 
exact amount).  If all the Barbary States were friendly towards America, then the squadron 
should sail for home on October 15th.  If Dale learned that Tripoli had declared war, then he 
was to implement a blockade, provide convoy to American merchant vessels, and intercept 
any ships that the Tripolitan Navy “may have captured.”  If Dale took any Tripolitans 
prisoner, he was to “treat them with humanity and attention, and land them on any part of the 
Barbary shore most convenient to you.”  Notably, Jefferson only authorized attacks in two 
scenarios:  if “all the Barbary Powers, have declared War against the United States” or if 
“Algiers alone have declared War.”  If either of these situations occurred, then the U.S. 
squadron could “sink burn, or otherwise destroy their ships & Vessels.”  Clearly, Jefferson 
harbored much more irritation towards Algiers than he did towards Tripoli (presumably from 
the George Washington incident).  Jefferson hoped that Yusuf would relent and give the 
president an opportunity to make a fresh start.  Privately, however, Jefferson feared that 
Tripoli had begun preying upon American ships.  As he wrote to James Monroe, “Tripoli has 
probably commenced depredations on us…totally without cause.”262  Yet even while sending 
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the ships to the Mediterranean, Jefferson sought to reduce tensions with Tripoli.  In a May 
letter to Yusuf, he stressed America’s “sincere desire to cultivate peace and commerce with 
your subjects” and disavowed any desire for conflict.  He described the warships as a mere 
“squadron of observation into the Mediterranean sea, to superintend the safety of our 
commerce there, and to exercise our seamen in nautical duties.”263  Clearly, Jefferson wanted 
to avoid war and to make amends with Tripoli. 
 Regarding the constitutionality of sending the fleet without first consulting Congress, 
the president reported his Cabinet’s discussion about this topic and their unanimous support 
for sending the four ships.  As Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin argued, “to declare 
war & to make war is synonimous.  The Exve [Executive] cannot put us in a state of war. but 
if we be put into that state either by the decln [declaration] of Congress or of the other nation, 
the command & direction of the public force then belongs to the Exve.”264  That is, Gallatin 
argued that since a state of war already existed (instigated by the bashaw of Tripoli), 
Jefferson had the constitutional authority (as commander-in-chief) to dispatch the navy. 
 Even though he recognized that Tripoli would probably want war (his suspicions 
would soon be confirmed), Jefferson sought to keep the navy on peacetime footing.  He 
wanted the minimum amount of force necessary to protect American shipping and generally 
concurred with the opinions of Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, who predicted that 
“there will be no fighting in the Mediterranean” since “the sight of our Frigates wil be 
sufficient to arrange matters there.”265  Time would prove Gallatin very wrong.  In any event, 
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at the same time Jefferson dispatched the four ships he told Monroe about his goal to heavily 
reduce naval expenses by “partly selling off” ships and “laying up” others and reducing the 
marines to “about 400.”266  The president also spoke more broadly about condensing the size 
of the federal government, complaining about “agencies upon agencies in every part of the 
earth, and for the most useless or mischievous purposes, & all of these opening doors for 
fraud & embezzlement….we are lopping them down silently to make as little noise as 
possible.”  To his Secretary of War, Jefferson singled out the armed forces as ripe with 
corruption and unchecked power:  “the abuses in the military & naval departments seem to 
have been so great, that it will doubtless be indispensable that we bring them in some way, 
directly or indirectly, under the eye of the legislature.”267  Jefferson suspected Federalist 
bureaucratic and financial conspiracies galore and considered the navy (which included many 
Federalist officers) to be part of the problem. 
Since Jefferson hoped to avoid a prolonged war with Tripoli in order to fulfill 
financial reform goals, it is flawed to interpret (as others have done) Jefferson’s decision to 
fight Tripoli as the fulfillment of his 1780s desire to use force against the Barbary pirates.268  
By the time he became president Jefferson did not want war against Tripoli—he preferred to 
pay a settlement and keep naval expenses low.  Jefferson’s views had changed dramatically 
since the 1780s and his obsession with reducing the navy prevented the United States from 
dealing effectively with the Barbary pirates. 
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Had Jefferson pursued it, a robust assault upon Tripoli would have been very popular 
with the public.  Fourth of July celebrations throughout the country in 1801 included toasts to 
belligerency and imagined triumph over North Africa.  In New York, a group of “officers of 
the brigade” drank to “Commodore Dale and the navy—may they pay the tribute due to 
Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, in 24 pounders instead of specie or naval stores.”269  At another 
celebration, “a very numerous and respectable assemblage of impartial Patriots” wished 
“success to the American Navy and our Expedition against the Pirates of Barbary” and 
wanted Dale to “spread terror amidst the piratical Tripolitans.”270  Connecticut celebrants 
invoked the Quasi-War in urging the Navy to “teach the pirates of Barbary, our favorite 
doctrine, ‘Millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute.’”271  At a Virginia barbeque, guests 
drank to the prestige of the Navy—“May it in peace be the wealth and pride of the country 
and in war its glory and defence”—and wished success to “Our Mediterranean fleet—May 
the tribute it carries to the Barbary powers be punctually paid.”272  From Rhode Island, a 
group celebrated “Our Naval Expedition to Barbary—Without being barbarous, may it 
chastize Barbarians.”273  The Franklin Typographical Association of New York hoped that 
the Navy would unleash its “large font of canon” and “well distributed balls” against the 
“faithless marauders” of North Africa.274  Clearly, the public was not war weary after the 
two-year conflict with France.  Americans took problems with the Barbary States seriously 
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and celebrated Jefferson’s decision to send a squadron (although they misunderstood the 
president’s intentions). 
Had Jefferson chosen to deal aggressively with Barbary piracy, he would have 
enjoyed bipartisan support.  Many Federalist publications set aside their opposition to the 
president and commended his decision to dispatch a squadron to the Mediterranean.  
Newspapers in three states published an article that defended Jefferson for sending warships 
to the Mediterranean against those who claimed that he had acted unconstitutionally:  “self-
defence is lawful….The President, by using force in this manner, performs a duty which it 
would be very culpable in him to neglect.  If war should ensue it is not his fault.”275  Other 
Federalist newspapers rejoiced that Jefferson had decided to use the navy despite previous 
Democratic-Republican hostility:  “though the party now in power opposed the raising of a 
naval force, in every stage of that business, yet it must be granted that they have beneficially 
employed…part of it…in protecting the commerce of the United States against the Barbary 
pirates.”276  To be sure, some Federalists adopted a middle ground that endorsed war while 
accusing Jefferson of acting unconstitutionally.  Newspapers in three states ran an article 
declaring that “every friend to American Commerce, approves the measure of Mr. 
JEFFERSON, in sending a squadron into the Mediterranean to prevent the depredations of 
the Tripolians on our commerce.  They, however, have a right to deem that measure an 
infringement on the Constitution of the United States, which declares that Congress alone 
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have the ‘Power to declare war’”277  Such criticism aside, Jefferson had the luxury of 
bipartisan support in waging the Tripolitan War.  It is remarkable that he eventually 
squandered it (as will be seen).  The bitterness over losing the 1800 election somewhat 
evaporated when Federalists talked about North Africa—they wanted Jefferson to succeed as 
commander-in-chief for the greater good of the country. 
Other Federalists argued that their party deserved credit for any future triumph over 
the Barbary pirates since creating a navy was their idea.  An article published in three states 
reminded readers that “the federal Administration of those ‘old tories,’ Washington and 
Adams, has furnished an American navy; and put it in the power of the United States to set a 
glorious example to Europe” by not giving “another cent in tribute to the piratical states of 
Barbary.”278  It further stressed that ‘Millions for defense but not a cent for tribute,’ has been 
a federal doctrine for years.  The jacobins, too, have at last become coverts to it.”  Similarly, 
several newspapers bitterly remarked that “no thanks are due to the democrats, that the 
United States has such a squadron to send” against Tripoli.279  Clearly, some Federalists saw 
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the Tripolitan War as a natural extension of the Quasi-War, although they felt threatened by 
the prospect of Democratic-Republicans increasing in popularity among the public. 
Other Federalist papers were overtly hostile towards their political rivals and 
portrayed them as unqualified to defend national security.  They reminded readers that 
Democratic-Republicans had tolerated France’s harassment of American merchant ships in 
the 1790s.  An article published in two states asserted that, during the debates over creating a 
navy in 1794, “the democratic members” of Congress “said all they could say against a navy, 
as useless, expensive, and dangerous to liberty.”  The article considered them hypocrites for 
now adopting the “millions for defence” rally cry because “when France demanded tribute, 
they were then as meek as whipped children.”280  Similarly, several newspapers observed that 
Democratic-Republicans “were entirely silent about their ‘independence,’ their ‘honor,’ and 
their ‘liberty,’ when Talleyrand urged his ever memorable demand of tribute from the 
American envoys!  In the present instance, therefore we may fairly suspect their sincerity.  
They are only enraged that we should be tributary to any barbarians but French 
barbarians.”281  The Washington Federalist editorialized that it was “very well, very 
laudable” to use the navy against the Barbary pirates, but contended that Democratic-
Republicans cared less about their country’s honor than increasing their political power:  
“suppose[e] this squadron had been sent to the Mediterranean under the administration of Mr. 
Adams, and a part of the object had been avowed to be instruction to our young officers; how 
had the democratic papers clamored against the inutility of the plan, the wanton mispending 
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of public money, and the base gradual attempt to nurse a growing navy.”282  Although many 
Federalist newspaper editors endorsed taking vigorous naval action against Tripoli, they 
feared that the public would bestow all the glory upon Jefferson and his party.  One senses 
that Federalists bitterly lamented the lack of a good opportunity to fight the Barbary pirates 
during Adams’s Administration and thereby increase their public appeal. 
Many Democratic-Republican newspaper editors also supported sending the navy and 
urged Jefferson to accomplish what the two Federalist presidents had not:  securing 
American commerce in the Mediterranean.  Publications in four states ran an article that 
urged Jefferson to unleash naval hero Commodore Thomas Truxton against the Barbary 
“barbarians” in order to uphold the principle behind the Quasi-War:  “Millions for 
defence—but not a cent for tribute.”283  An article in a New York newspaper utilized 
gendered rhetoric in associating belligerence with masculinity:  “it is the desire of every man 
in the United States that we be freed from the shackles of the Mediterranean powers.  And we 
hope it is reserved to Mr. Jefferson to liberate us.  It would be far better for our republican 
cannon to thunder in the ears of the barbarians than to pay them a tribute.”284  This article 
also dismissed critics who complained about naval expenses by countering that the 
government would not hesitate to repulse a land attack.  Similarly, a Philadelphia newspaper 
hoped that the U.S. Navy would “force the Barbary states to pay us tribute instead of our 
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paying them.”285  Clearly, many Democratic-Republicans felt just as strongly about national 
honor as did Federalists.  Even though that party opposed the Quasi-War against France, 
many members nevertheless found it analogous to the current situation with Tripoli—both 
involved the principle of defending free trade. 
To be sure, some newspaper editors preferred to pay Tripoli rather than fight.  An 
article published in two Federalist newspapers argued that paying tribute did not violate 
national honor since America “followed the example of the European nations” and it 
constituted “the cheapest method of securing our Mediterranean commerce.”  Moreover, it 
drew a distinction between purchasing peace from “civilized nations” and from “barbarians”:  
“buying the friendship” of the former “implies their superiority—buying the friendship of 
barbarians, implies only that they are barbarians.”286  This article sought to make readers feel 
good about paying tribute to the Barbary States, oddly suggesting that it was evidence of U.S. 
supremacy.  Clearly, though, the public at large rejected this rationalization—when had 
Americans ever viewed paying tribute as an inherently positive thing?  At best, it was 
deemed a necessary evil.  More radically, an article published in Democratic-Republican 
newspapers in five states argued for “the policy and prudence of suspending the trade to the 
Mediterranean altogether, rather than los[ing] a single life in any contest with those hordes of 
systematic savages.”  It also blamed “imbecile and corrupt” Federalists for making 
Americans “base vassals” of Tripoli (“perhaps the most contemptible” naval power “in 
existence”).287  These editorials took an extreme position and had little, if any, effect upon 
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public opinion.  As will be seen, throughout the Tripolitan War the public at large constantly 
called for total victory. 
 
Throughout the Tripolitan War, diplomats and naval officers never shied away from giving 
Jefferson and Madison advice.  They supported all-out war against Tripoli and called for a 
much more aggressive response than Jefferson was willing to implement.  As consul to 
Algiers Richard O’Brien expressed to Madison in September, “I Must repeat we want More 
frigates in This Sea, and our system with Those states at war with The U. States Should be 
Severity.  Any act of Lenity is Considered by Them as, an act of Timidity.” 288  In an August 
letter to Robert Smith, Dale discussed how diplomatic efforts with the bashaw had failed and 
recommended launching bombs into the capital city (also called Tripoli) since “the more this 
Mr. Bey is Harrassed the sooner he will be glad to make peace, and it will have a good effect 
on the other two powers they will then see America is not to be trifled with.”289  Dale urged 
the Jefferson Administration to adopt a long-term strategy:  a fierce assault on Tripoli would 
have the additional benefit of intimidating Algiers and Tunis.  Cathcart likewise admonished 
Madison to think beyond resolving problems with Tripoli and to focus on how subduing 
Barbary piracy altogether.  He advised that “to conclude an honorable & advantageous peace 
is not sufficient; no Sir, we must do more, we must harrass them untill they become sensible 
of their inferiority, we must establish a National Character in this River of theives….we must 
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have considerably greater force in the Mediterranean.”290  These officials admonished the 
Jefferson Administration to change its mentality, to go beyond a blockade, and to embrace 
the navy as a positive good that defended U.S. freedom. 
The diplomats and naval officers also argued to that more was at stake than subduing 
Tripoli:  the United States was on a worldwide stage, being observed by European powers.  
Acting strong would enhance America’s reputation and credibility, while weakness would 
invite contempt.  As Eaton admonished Madison, “we are combatting the commercial policy 
of all Europe.  It is not only then in Barbary that we are about to fix a national character—it 
is in the world!  Yield but in this instance and we are humbled perhaps for ages, and our 
European commercial rivals will exult not less in their intrigue than in our weakness.”291  
Cathcart similarly told Madison about his wish that the United States “will teach the old how 
to negociate with Tyrants”292 and he reminded Commodore Dale that “the eyes of all Europe 
is upon your little Squadron, & I am certain they will reflect honor upon the Country & 
justify the idea already formed of American valor & intrepidity.”293  David Humphreys, the 
U.S. minister to Spain, used gendered rhetoric in trying to persuade Madison of the wisdom 
of a forceful policy towards the Barbary pirates:  “the manliness of this conduct of nobly 
defending our commerce from piracy, so different from that which has been pursued by all 
the civilized nations towards these Barbarians, would raise the reputation of our nascent 
marine in our own judgment, at the same time that it would strike with astonishment those 
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who for a succession of Ages have submitted to the most humiliating indignities wantonly 
inflicted upon them by a handful of Banditti; and you may rest assured that it would form, as 
it were, a new era in the naval history of Mankind.”294  Humphreys saw an opportunity that 
paralleled the American Revolution:  Americans could blaze a new trail in the Mediterranean 
and show Europeans a better way forward.  All the diplomats believed that waging war 
against Tripoli had a deeper significance:  it would show Europe that the United States 
refused to tolerate bigger European countries subsidizing the Barbary pirates’ predatory 
behavior.   
Moreover, the consuls argued against forming an alliance with smaller European 
navies since they wanted the United States to gain all of the glory of destroying Barbary 
piracy.  Cathcart informed Commodore Dale about his opposition to forming a coalition with 
Denmark and Sweden because it would “divid[e] the honor of setting an example to all 
Europe.”295  He believed that “our aim is to establish a National character, which we must do, 
without the assistance of any of the powers of Europe.”  Eaton gave similar advice to 
Madison:  “what American can cheerfully admit the idea that the United States will think 
proper to divide with any nation whatever the honor and the advantages of chastising Tripoli:  
The object itself does not seem to require such a parade.”296  Commodore Dale, however, 
disagreed and lamented that he had to decline an offer from Sweden to launch a joint attack 
on Tripoli since the Jefferson Administration had not authorized him such an assault.”297  
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Jefferson also disagreed with the diplomats.  He lacked their concern for national glory and 
saw advantages to forming an alliance with smaller European countries.  In a November 
1801 letter, Jefferson articulated a plan of “dividing the cruising season” with three or four 
other navies in order to “keep [the Mediterranean] under constant guard.  a few years would 
destroy every vessel” belonging to the Barbary States and leave them permanently crippled 
because “they have no materials within themselves for building a single one.”298  Of course, 
Jefferson’s plan would only work if other countries did not give warships as tribute (as the 
United States had done) or provide ship-building supplies.299  Oddly, though, the Jefferson 
Administration declined an opportunity to form an official alliance.  In June 1801, John 
Quincy Adams (writing from Hamburg) told Madison about the “proposal made by the king 
of Sweden about eighteen months ago, for an arrangement between the United States, 
Sweden and Denmark, mutually to protect their commerce in the Mediterranean.”  John 
Adams had decided not to join, but the younger Adams hoped that Jefferson would:  “the 
United States have since then experienced themselves how little reliance can be placed upon 
the faith of those Treaties, even when purchased at prices unusually burdensome. The 
expence of an armament like that proposed by the king of Sweden, would probably not be 
heavier than that of the tribute we have submitted to pay. It would be a more efficacious 
protection to our navigation in the mediterranean; and I presume, an expence infinitely more 
reconcileable to the feelings of every American.”300  It is unclear why Jefferson never 
seriously pursued an alliance despite voicing rhetorical support for it.  Regardless, the 
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opportunity evaporated in October 1802, when Sweden made peace with Tripoli for 
$150,000 plus $8,000 in annual tribute.301 
Although given limited means, the diplomats and naval officers tried to make the best 
of it by attempting to capture the admiral of Tripoli’s navy.  By doing so, they hoped to deal 
a knockout blow to the bashaw, thinking he would quickly surrender.  As Cathcart 
rhapsodized, “the Capture or sinking their Admiral is of such great importance that it will not 
only ensure us a permanent Peace upon our own terms but will probably effect a revolution 
in Tripoly favorable to our interest in the whole of the Barbary States.”302  Likewise, William 
Eaton emphasized the value of capturing him in a letter to Madison:  “We must get 
possession of him….once secured a stratagem may be used to decoy the Bashaw into an 
American Frigate and thus end the war.”303  Commodore Dale hoped not only to capture the 
Tripolitan Admiral, but “take him to America” as a war trophy.304  Despite their best efforts, 
though, the Tripolitan Admiral evaded capture (although the U.S. Navy temporarily forced 
him to flee to Gibraltar). 
The diplomats dreamt not only of naval victories, but also of a powerful land assault 
that would overthrow Yusuf.  This expedition will be discussed at length in chapter 5 (it took 
four years to materialize), but in mid-1801 Cathcart and Eaton began to orchestrate plans to 
reinstall Hamet Karamanli (Yusuf’s older brother) to the Tripolitan throne.  Cathcart argued 
to Eaton that “we must establish a national character in Barbary by effecting a revolution in 
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favor of Hamet…for so long as Joseph Bashaw lives, our commerce will not be secure.”305  
Cathcart also shared his proposed plan with Madison in a July letter, contending that the 
United had nothing to lose.  Even if the coup attempt failed, it would instill “such a panic” in 
Yusuf and he would cease to threaten American ships.306  Eaton also tried to sell Madison on 
the idea.  In a December letter the consul related a conversation with the Danish 
Commodore, who claimed that the Tripolitan people “almost unanimously desire the 
restoration of their rightful sovereign, who is a mild man of peaceable dispositions; and, if he 
were offered them with the appearance of determination, they would raise in mass to receive 
him.307   Eaton added that Hamet was interested in allying with the United States, but wanted 
assurance that he could “place any reliance on the operations of the Americans in his behalf.”  
Although Eaton and Cathcart were fully committed to the coup attempt, the Jefferson 
Administration and other Mediterranean personnel were not (as will be seen). 
In the meantime, the diplomats adamantly opposed paying any money to Tripoli for 
peace since doing so would embolden the other Barbary powers to exploit the United States.  
As Richard O’Brien declared to Madison, “if we now Settle this business with Tripoli even 
with a little money, we are giveing a bounty to Algiers and Tunis to make extra demands in 
proportion as They are great & Think Themselves So above Tripoli.”308  O’Brien envisioned 
an escalation of egotism among North African rulers, with each insisting upon more tribute 
in order to reflect his perceived superiority.  Similarly, Eaton warned Madison that “the 
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moment we pay for peace again at Tripoli, Algiers will require more substantial evidence of 
the President’s veritable friendship—Tunis next.”309  The diplomats also emphasized that 
since paying money never resulted in a lasting peace, force was necessary to end the threat of 
Barbary piracy.  As Eaton observed to Madison, “the mania of piracy is so blended with the 
System of these States that it cannot be cured but by Sovereign treatment....This piratical 
enthusiasm is as obstinate as religious bigotry, which yields to no force of reason nor sense 
of humanity.”310  Cathcart admonished Dale to use force instead of diplomacy:  “I solomnly 
declare that if a peace could be procured with the Regency of Tripoli for one hundred Dollars 
that it would be contrary to the interests of the United States to pay it.”311  These diplomats 
were tired of the Barbary States exacting tribute and ransom payments and concluded that 
only overwhelming force (not a token squadron) could end this threat.  Yet their advice fell 
on deaf ears. 
Despite the Jefferson Administration’s desire to avoid conflict, a battle did occur 
between the Enterprize (the smallest of the four U.S. ships in the Mediterranean, with twelve 
guns) and a Tripolitan ship (the Tripoli, with fourteen guns) on August 1, 1801.  As 
Lieutenant Andrew Sterett described, it lasted three hours and was a clear-cut victory for the 
United States.  The Americans killed thirty Tripolitans and wounded thirty more, while, 
remarkably, none of the Americans were killed.312  Since he lacked the authority to take 
prisoners, Sterett released the Tripolitans and let them keep their ship (after “dismatl[ing] her 
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of every thing but an old sail and spar”).  The bashaw was infuriated with this loss and 
publicly shamed the Tripoli’s captain (Rais Mahomet Rous).  According to an Enterprize 
officer, the Tripolitan captain had to ride “on a mule with a halter round his neck…through 
the streets of Tripoli with a hangman by his side.  They then crowned him with thorns, gave 
him 500 lashes, and dismissed him [from] the service.  The poor fellow did not deserve it, for 
he stood firing at remarkably well.  The bashaw vows vengeance against the schooner, and is 
fitting out gallies and gunboats to attack us in all quarters.”313  The punishment strikingly 
resembles the last days of Jesus—his entrance into Jerusalem on a donkey, wearing a crown 
of thorns, and being flogged.314  It could be coincidental, or perhaps the bashaw designed the 
punishment as a parody of Christianity.  In any event, the defeat reinforced the bashaw’s 
commitment to war against the United States—he wanted revenge and was not interested in 
peace.  The Tripolitan War was just beginning. 
Upon learning of the Enterprize’s victory, the U.S. public rejoiced and Sterett became 
a national hero.  More than two dozen newspapers (from both political parties) published an 
article that acclaimed the victory and declared [falsely] that it had crippled Tripoli’s will to 
fight:  “so thunderstruck were the Tripolitans…that the sailors, then employed at Tripoli on 
board of cruisers that were fitting out by the government, all deserted them, and not a man 
could be procured to navigate them.”315  A Democratic-Republican gathering at Paterson, 
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New Jersey wished “the fate of the Tripolitan Corsair who engaged with Sterret, to all the 
enemies of the rights of the commonality of this country.”316  A year later, residents at 
Baltimore had the unique opportunity to observe, for free, a Tripolitan gun captured by the 
Enterprize.  A local newspaper promoted it as “the curious Turkish Swivel, of brass, taken out 
of the Tripolitan, captured by the U.S. schooner Enterprize, capt. Sterret, and deposited at the 
Observatory” and noted that it “will be fired at intervals throughout the day and evening.”317  
Spectators could interact with an authentic Tripolitan weapon that had been recast as an 
entertainment object and as evidence of America’s superiority over Tripoli.  No doubt 
Americans felt a surge of pride when observing it.  Sterett became the first hero of the 
Tripolitan War, leading Americans to believe that defeating Tripoli would be easy. 
The federal government also contributed to the celebratory mood.  Congress passed a 
resolution that commended “the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Sterret” and his crew, gave 
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them an extra month’s pay, and awarded Sterett a commemorative sword.318  Jefferson 
personally commended the lieutenant, writing him a warm letter that portrayed his victory as 
a watershed moment.  The president declared that “too long, for the honour of nations, have 
those barbarians been suffered to trample on the sacred faith of treaties, on the rights & laws 
of human nature.  you have shewn to your countrymen, that the enemy cannot meet bravery 
& skill united.”319  Notably, Jefferson stressed the importance of defending national honor, a 
topic he typically avoided in his private correspondence about Tripoli.  The president may 
have personally dismissed concerns about national honor, but he knew that the Enterprize’s 
victory called for a heavy dose of nationalism. 
Now that a battle had occurred, Congress stepped in to officially sanction the war 
with Tripoli.  In February 1802, it passed legislation that authorized the president to use force 
against Tripoli.320  The “Act for the protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United 
States, against the Tripolitan Cruisers” emphasized that Tripoli had initiated “a predatory 
warfare” against the United States and empowered the president “to equip, officer, man, and 
employ such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be judged requisite...for 
protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic ocean, the 
Mediterranean and adjoining seas.”  It allowed naval vessels “to subdue, seize and make 
prize of all vessels, goods and effects, belonging to the Bey of Tripoli, or to his 
subjects…and also to cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the 
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state of war will justify, and may, in his opinion, require.”  Congress acknowledged that a 
state of war already existed—thus there was no need to declare war against Tripoli—and 
delegated responsibility for decision-making to Jefferson.  The president did not need to ask 
Congress for permission, but was granted the authority to run the Tripolitan War as he saw 
fit.  The Jefferson Administration sent a circular to naval commanders informing them of this 
legislation and empowering them “to subdue, seize, and make prize, of all vessels, goods, 
and effects, belonging to the Bey of Tripoli, or to his subjects.”321 
Any lingering constitutional questions had now been resolved, but despite the 
impressive Enterprize victory the Jefferson Administration still wanted to reach an 
agreement with the bashaw.  Madison shared news of the legislation with Cathcart, but 
ordered him to broker a settlement with the bashaw as soon as possible.322  Cathcart was to 
seek “some indemnification” from Tripoli to cover U.S. naval expenses, but could drop this 
request if the bashaw resisted.  Madison also made it clear that the administration wanted to 
reduce naval expenses and avoid a protracted war in the Mediterranean.  As he explained (in 
another letter to Cathcart), “however able [the United States] may be to carry on the war with 
effect, the expence and trouble of it, and the encreased risk whilst at war with one of the 
Barbary powers, of getting into war with the others, are with the President just motives of 
solicitude for the success of your negotiation.”323  The Jefferson Administration also sent a 
replacement squadron to the Mediterranean (the Chesapeake, Constellation, and Adams) and 
appointed Richard Morris to succeed Dale as commander.324  The Enterprize would remain 
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in the Mediterranean, but the other ships were to return to the United States.325  For his part, 
Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin urged Jefferson to remain committed to shrinking 
the navy.  In an August letter, he reminded the president that “our object must clearly be to 
put a speedy end to a contest, which unavailingly wastes our resources, and which we cannot, 
for any considerable time, pursue with vigor without relinquishing the accomplishment of the 
great & beneficial objects we have in view.”326 
In the meantime, far from being cowed by the Enterprize victory the Tripolitan Navy 
continued to prowl for American merchant ships and captured the Franklin on June 17, 1802, 
taking the captain and crew of eight hostage.  The ship’s captain, Andrew Morris, expressed 
his “disappointment” in the lack of naval protection in the Mediterranean—the Tripolitan 
ship remained at sea for a month and never encountered a U.S. warship.327  The Tripolitans 
kept Morris and three crew members as hostages, but two others escaped to Malta (via a 
Greek ship) and three others were released to a British diplomat (since they were 
Irishmen).328  Americans throughout the country learned about the Franklin incident through 
a widely published circular letter written by Richard O’Brien.  It described his efforts to 
persuade the Dey of Algiers to intervene on behalf of the United States and called for a 
strong naval buildup:  “I lament we have not a few more of our frigates and light cruisers in 
this sea, to be a fleet of reserve, and give more effectual security to our commerce and 
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citizens, and to destroy this new system of the Corsairs of Tripoli, rendezvousing in the ports 
of Tunis and Algiers.”329  If the Enterprize’s victory had not persuaded Jefferson to bolster 
naval strength, then perhaps O’Brien thought that this evidence of the blockade’s inadequacy 
would.  Notably, mostly Federalist newspapers published O’Brien’s letter.  Most 
Democratic-Republican editors chose not to print it, apparently preferring to keep readers 
ignorant rather than publish a text that criticized the president’s policies.  William Eaton 
informed Philadelphia merchants (whose goods the Franklin was transporting) about the 
ship’s capture and lamented that Jefferson had disregarded advice to send more ships.  He 
warned that “except more energy be thrown into our operations, we risque to play a farce” in 
the Mediterranean.330  Clearly, the diplomats believed that the United States was not winning 
the Tripolitan War and that the government had failed to capitalize upon the momentum from 
last August’s victory. 
Fortunately for the captive crew members of the Franklin, they were released a few 
months later.  The Dey of Algiers, at Richard O’Brien’s request, asked the bashaw to set 
them free.  The Dey also sent several items, including ten-thousand “Measures of wheat, A 
Gold Sheathed Sword, A pair of pistols,” a caftan worth $125-$150, a ring worth $500, a 
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watch, and $1,000.331  But was the Dey acting altruistically?  He claimed that he was and, in 
a letter to Jefferson, described his act as “a present” to the United States.332  An Algerian 
official told Eaton that the Dey intervened out of gratitude for the George Washington 
transporting good to Constantinople two years earlier.333  However, the Dey billed the United 
States for $6,500!334  The Dey was not really being altruistic, he simply saw an opportunity 
for profit.  It was business as usual in North Africa, another example of a ruler slyly using the 
rhetoric of friendship while demanding payment.  Several months later, the Dey tried this 
approach again, telling Jefferson that if he wanted to remain “my friend” and “preserve your 
treaty with me,” he needed to give Algiers “10 Guns Brass 24 pounders with Cariages & 
allso 5 Brass Guns 18 pounders with Cariages & —Guns long for Batteries.”335  Throughout 
Jefferson’s presidency, North African policymakers outsmarted and outmaneuvered their 
American counterpoints.  They excelled in brokering good deals for themselves, having had 
centuries of experience negotiating with Europe. 
The Dey’s influence was not strictly necessary.  William Eaton and other American 
officials had requested Yusuf to honor his pledge to release any future American captives as 
recompense for Commodore Dale setting free a Tripolitan officer and twenty soldiers in 
August 1801.336  Yusuf initially refused to keep his promise (although he treated the captives 
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well), but he relented and released them in October.337  Cathcart concluded that Yusuf would 
have freed the Franklin crew even if the Dey had not intervened and he considered any 
ransom money paid as “entirely thrown away.” 338  He suggested that the Dey’s mediation 
only expedited the release by two months. 
And what about the $6,500?  The Dey insisted upon payment, which was received the 
following year.  Tobias Lear, whom Jefferson appointed in July 1803 as Consul General at 
Algiers (the highest rank among North African diplomats), paid $6,800 for the ransom.339  
Why the extra $300?  Regrettably, Lear did not provide a reason—but perhaps it was for 
tardiness.  In any event, Madison confirmed this amount in a June 1804 report that 
summarized Lear’s expenses:  “Capt Morris and his crews ransom 6,800.”340  The Franklin 
incident revealed the shortcomings of Jefferson’s naval policies and foreshadowed the more 
momentous loss of the Philadelphia (in October 1803).  The president’s flagrant dismissal of 
advice to send more ships jeopardized the lives of sailors and cost the United States ransom 
money (which directly hurt his goal of reducing naval expenses).   
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Surprisingly, many other works about the Tripolitan War have omitted the Franklin 
incident and the $6,800 payment.341  Some incorrectly state that the United States paid 
$5,000 to Tripoli.  Where did this $5,000 figure come from?  Frank Lambert’s The Barbary 
Wars is the most recent book to make this claim and he cites a secondary source (Kola 
Folayan’s Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli), which in turn cites a 
secondary source from 1945 (Louis Wright and Julia Macleod’s The First Americans in 
North Africa). 342  The latter states that O’Brien obtained the release of the captives “through 
the intercession of the Dey of Algiers and the payment of $5,000 in ransom.”  The footnote 
for this information cites an October letter from O’Brien to Madison in which the diplomat 
says that he offered $5,000 for the ransom.343  O’Brien’s letter does not say that he had 
already paid the money.  Wright and MacLeod apparently misinterpreted O’Brien’s letter 
and then Folayan perpetuated the error by citing their book and Lambert further perpetuated 
the mistake by citing Folayan. 
Other authors have erroneously claimed that the United States paid $6,500 to 
Algiers.344  These works cite a January 1803 letter from Cathcart to Madison in which the 
diplomat states that the Dey demanded $6,500 for the ransom.345  Cathcart had not yet paid 
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this sum—he wrote Madison to complain about the request.  These authors apparently 
misinterpreted Cathcart’s letter and seem unfamiliar with the Tobias Lear letter cited above 
(which is easily accessible in Naval Documents), stating that $6,800 was actually paid.  To be 
fair, many contemporary newspapers were confused about the actual amount paid and listed 
the sum as $6,500.346 
Although newspaper editors of both parties had supported Jefferson at the beginning 
of the Tripolitan War, by late 1802 this unity fractured and they debated the effectiveness of 
the president’s Barbary policies.  Several Federalist newspapers invoked the Franklin capture 
as evidence that Jefferson’s commitment to economy left the United States undermanned and 
unprepared in the Mediterranean.  An article published in two states remarked that “the poor 
fellows captured in the brig Franklin, must curse that system of economy which lays up in 
dock our ships of war, while they are dragging the chains of slavery in Tripoli.”347  Similarly, 
a New Jersey publication castigated Democratic-Republicans for letting “our innocent 
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seamen [be] carried in chains to the dungeons of Barbary—while our Navy is laid up and 
rotting within the Docks of the Potomack.”348  Although the government had available ships, 
the president refused to use them to protect the lives of sailors.  To these Federalist critics, 
the Franklin capture constituted irrefutable proof of the president’s irresponsibility.  A Maine 
newspaper depicted Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin as an evil mastermind, blaming 
him for permitting warships to “rot in the dock” while ignoring “the groans, the sweat, the 
blood, of our brave seamen who might chance to fall into the hands of the Barbary 
pirates.”349  A New Hampshire newspaper published a toast from a militia group celebration 
that criticized the government’s naval policies:  “The Navy of the U.S. May it not rot in dock 
while our brave seamen are exposed to the corsairs of Barbary.”350  Federalist newspapers in 
two states published poetry that skewered Jefferson and stressed that Tripoli did not fear the 
United States:  “The sons of Tripoli refuse/ To let our ships their ocean use,/ And Jefferson, 
that they may see/ Of how small consequence they be,/ Calls our stout battle ships away,/ In 
soft Potowmac mud to lay.”351  The bipartisan honeymoon had ended.  Federalists had given 
Jefferson a chance to prove his ability to defend commerce and the lives of sailors, but they 
were unimpressed.  From now on, Jefferson had a two-front war:  against Tripoli in the 
Mediterranean and against Federalists at home. 
Federalists made well-reasoned criticisms of the Jefferson Administration’s policies 
and questioned his decision to not send other available warships.  However, Democratic-
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Republican newspaper editors refused to actually address Federalist concerns.  Instead, they 
resorted to partisan attacks that blamed Federalists for problems with Tripoli and accused 
their rivals of exaggerating the threat of Barbary piracy.  A Massachusetts newspaper, for 
instance, insisted that “had Mr. Pickering [John Adams’s Secretary of State] regularly 
forwarded the stipulated payments to the Barbary powers, it is more than probable the 
Franklin would not have been captured.”352  This accusation ignored the root of problems 
with Tripoli—Yusuf Karamanli complained that the United States did not treat him with the 
same level of respect as it did Algiers or Tunis.  Moreover, Thomas Jefferson—not Timothy 
Pickering or John Adams—decided not to meet the bashaw’s new tribute demands.  A 
Vermont newspaper dismissed Federalist descriptions of “the horrors of Barbarian slavery” 
as “filth.”353  Another article considered the Tripolitan War a minor conflict and portrayed 
Federalists as unprincipled warmongers who threatened American liberty.  It proclaimed that 
“the petty warfare existing between the United States and the insignificant state of Tripoli 
cannot in any just view be considered an important, or a general state of war” and warned 
readers that “some restless individuals” sought to persuade Congress “to commit some rash 
act, in the hope that a war may ensue.”354  In seeking to protect the president and prevent the 
public from siding with the Federalists, these Democratic-Republican voices distorted 
history.  These articles suggest that some Democratic-Republican newspaper editors felt 
desperate and feared that the public might turn against their party. 
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Despite the capture of the Franklin, Jefferson mostly continued to discount the naval 
officers’ advice and considered them preoccupied with self-promotion and incapable of 
thinking objectively about the Barbary States.  As he remarked to Madison in March 1803, 
“every officer in the navy, & every merchant” wanted him to “send more ships…because 
they see but one object, themselves.”355  Jefferson added that he opposed Secretary of the 
Navy Robert Smith’s recommendation to send an additional ship and argued that the 
blockade would work if the naval officers offered fewer convoys.  Smith had come to agree 
with the naval officers and diplomats that a stronger war effort was needed.  In a March 17th 
letter to Jefferson, he stressed that “nothing but a formidable force will effect an honorable 
peace with Tripoli and repress the dispositions of the other Barbary powers to hostility” and 
advised sending a large warship (either the Constitution or the Philadelphia).356  The 
president, however, remained committed to reducing naval expenses and considered the 
naval officers prone to self-aggrandizement.  Frankly, he was being derelict in his duties as 
commander-in-chief.  His obstinate disregard for the advice from naval officers and 
diplomats threatened the lives of sailors. 
Jefferson was too smart a politician, though, to express his distrust of the naval 
officers in public addresses.  His December 1802 annual message acknowledged the 
stagnancy of the Tripolitan War and shortcomings of the blockade—but he blamed 
topography instead of the naval officers.  The president claimed that “the shallowness of 
[Tripoli’s] coast and the want of smaller vessels on our part has permitted some cruisers to 
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escape unobserved, and to one of these an American vessel unfortunately fell prey.”  To that 
end, Jefferson called for “procuring some smaller vessels” although he reiterated his 
commitment to using only “the smallest force competent” to “restrain the Tripoline 
cruisers.”357  The president had a fundamentally different goal from the naval officers and 
diplomats:  he sought to reduce the navy to its bare bones, but they wanted a formidable navy 
that struck fear into foreign countries.   
Jefferson persuaded Congress to think small regarding the Tripolitan War.  In mid-
January, the administration recommended that Congress pass legislation to fund the 
construction of “four small Vessels of War, not exceeding 16 guns each” and estimated the 
cost of each one at $24,000.358  A few weeks later, Smith sent another request for eight gun-
boats.359  Congress heeded these requests in late-February, authorizing the construction of 
four such vessels at a cost of $96,000 and up to fifteen gun boats at a cost of $50,000.360  The 
funds were to come from “any monies in the treasury of the United States, not otherwise 
appropriated.”  In a sense, Jefferson finally heeded the advice of the naval officers and 
diplomats to send more ships (although these new vessels lacked sufficient firepower).  But 
just how serious was Jefferson about escalating the war effort? 
Privately, Jefferson desperately wanted the Tripolitan War to end and had repudiated 
his earlier opposition to paying annual tribute.  In April 1803, Madison instructed Cathcart to 
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offer the bashaw a $20,000 lump sum plus $8,000 to $10,000 in annual tribute.361  He 
acknowledged receiving Cathcart’s earlier letters (in which the diplomat called for more 
ships in the Mediterranean), but declined to engage him on that subject.  Instead, Madison 
claimed that the window of opportunity to attack Tripoli had closed since its “domestic 
distresses” had calmed and European powers had “yielded to the customary terms of 
peace.”362  Continuing to fight would entail a “very great expence.”  The Secretary of State’s 
admissions are astonishing—Jefferson had initially chosen war with Tripoli since he despised 
Europe’s practice of paying tribute.  Now, however, the Jefferson Administration viewed 
tribute as a precedent that should be upheld.  Jefferson preferred to spend taxpayers’ money 
on tribute to the Barbary States over augmenting the navy to protect American commerce and 
lives.  In effect, he had reverted the views held by John Adams in the 1780s, when he argued 
that it was better to pay tribute than fight the Barbary States. 
Fortunately for Jefferson and Madison, this letter’s contents were not published in 
newspapers.  Cathcart’s keeping the letter private reflects highly on his character.  Had 
knowledge of Jefferson’s and Madison’s willingness to pay tribute become public, it would 
have greatly embarrassed the administration and emboldened Federalist critics.  After all, 
some Democratic-Republicans had criticized the Washington and Adams Administrations for 
paying tribute.  Throughout his presidency, Jefferson benefited from numerous lucky breaks 
in his Barbary policy (as will be seen in chapters 5 and 6).  In hindsight, it is astonishing that 
Jefferson’s obstinacy in rejecting the advice of knowledgeable diplomats and naval officers 
did not result in political ramifications. 
                                                          
361 Madison to Cathcart, April 9, 1803, Papers of James Madison Digital Edition. 
 
362 A year earlier, Madison had learned that poor harvests in Tripoli had caused a famine and that the public had 
rebuffed Yusuf’s attempt to collect taxes; Joseph Pulis to Madison, February 21, 1802, Ibid. 
127 
 
In any event, Jefferson’s offer fell well below the bashaw’s expectations.  Cathcart 
learned from the Danish consul Nicholas Nissen that Yusuf wanted $500,000 from the 
United States and was in no hurry to make peace since Tripoli had a “rich harvest…pleanty 
of European goods,” and a new influx of cash from the Sweden treaty.363  The bashaw now 
enjoyed a financial flexibility that allowed him to “maintain his people & defray his 
expences.”    Moreover, Nissen considered U.S. strategy an utter failure, calling the blockade 
“useless” and “expensive” and he expressed regret “that the moment so favorable pass’d last 
year.”  Nissen did overestimate the cost of peace, however.   On June 9th, Yusuf’s Prime 
Minister met with Commodore Richard Morris onboard the New York to present terms of 
peace:  the United States would pay a one-time sum of $200,000, pay $20,000 annual tribute, 
reimburse Tripoli for its war expenses, and provide annual presents of military and naval 
stores.364  Clearly, Yusuf was not intimidated by the U.S. Navy or President Jefferson and 
thought that he had leverage in negotiations.   
 
Two years of war had resulted in just one significant naval victory for the United States (by 
the Enterprize, in August 1801).  Tripoli could also claim one naval victory (the capture of 
the Franklin).  The Tripolitan War had stagnated into a draw.  Jefferson had provided limited 
means to fight Tripoli, which had resulted in scant triumphs.  Yet the very naval officers 
whom Jefferson distrusted helped turn around the Tripolitan War.  In May 1803, the John 
Adams captured the Moroccan ship Meshouda when it tried to sneak through the blockade of 
Tripoli.  According to Captain Morris, it carried “a considerable number of Guns Cutlashes 
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Hemp & other contraband articles that were not on Board when she left Gibralter, and not 
expressed in her Passports.”365  The ship also had twenty Tripolitans on board.  On June 22nd, 
the Enterprize dealt another blow to Tripoli by destroying its “finest Cruizer” after a forty-
five minute battle.  Captain John Rodgers considered watching the ship explode as a sublime 
experience: “one of the Grandest Spectacles I ever beheld” with “a Tremendous 
Explosion…a Huge Column of smoke” and “a Pyramid of Fire darting Vertically through its 
Centre interspersed with Masts, Yards, Sails Riggings” and other parts of the ship.366  
Notably, Rodgers called it “a very fine vessel”; typically, American observers deemed North 
African ships shoddy.367  For the first time in two years, the U.S. Navy had won a battle in 
the Mediterranean. 
Additionally, the U.S. Navy inflicted damage on Tripolitan forces with hit-and-run 
tactics.  On June 27th, a nighttime skirmish along the shoreline killed three Tripolitans and 
wounded five others (including the bashaw’s brother-in-law, who lost his right arm).  As 
Midshipman Henry Wadsworth recorded in his journal, “it was a most elegant sight.  the 
frequent flash & heavy report of the gun boats:  the still more frequent broad Sides of our 
squadron form’d the most sublime scene you can imagine.”368  He even invoked biblical 
imagery when indulging in fighting fantasies:  if there had been “anyone on board who like 
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Joshua of Old could have commanded the sun to stand still” the Americans would have taken 
all of Tripoli’s gun boats and made the Tripolitan “people our Slaves.”369  The following 
month, the Constellation destroyed two of Tripoli’s gun boats and killed twelve 
Tripolitans.370  The naval officers and tars craved opportunities to fight—Wadsworth 
described his peers as “hot for Battle…The sight of a Turban soon enrages them.”371  Had 
they known of the Jefferson Administration’s preference to pay tribute, they surely would 
have been livid.   
Yet if the Navy’s success gave the United States some leverage over Tripoli, it 
threatened to plunge the United States into a second Mediterranean war, against Morocco.  
The United States had enjoyed good relations with Morocco since the late 1780s, but 
problems arose from early 1802 to late 1803 when consul James Simpson refused to provide 
passports for Moroccan ships that wanted to deliver wheat to Tripoli.  As Simpson informed 
Madison, the emperor was concerned that Tripoli did not have enough food and had a 
“charitable disposition towards all Mussulmen in want.”372  Understandably, however, the 
Americans did not want Morocco to aid their enemy.  Being denied passports enraged the 
emperor, who kicked Simpson out of Morocco and threatened to set his ships loose on 
America’s merchant fleet.  The diplomat recognized the gravity of this situation and issued a 
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circular letter to other consuls stating that Morocco had “declared War against the United 
States of America” and asking them to warn “all Masters of our Merchant Vessels to be very 
carefull.”373  Additionally, in a letter to Madison, Simpson related how the emperor sought to 
mobilize his people through a public address in which he announced “War with the United 
States” and urged “the utmost expedition…in fitting out his Cruizers.”374  Already unable to 
defeat Tripoli, the United States now faced the prospect of a second war in the 
Mediterranean.   
Going to war against Morocco frightened many officials as well as the public.  
Commentators recognized that even though Morocco lacked a powerful navy, its strategic 
location near Gibraltar (the gateway to the Mediterranean) allowed it to prey easily upon 
American merchant ships.  As Madison observed, although the emperor’s “naval force is so 
feeble, the position of his harbours, the use that might be made of them, by enemies on the 
Coast of Barbary, and the influence of his example on Algiers and Tunis, give great value to 
his neutrality.”375  To Robert Smith, Commodore Dale had observed that the emperor “has it 
in his power to do our trade (going into & coming out the Miditerranean) more Injury than 
the other three Barbary Powers put together.”376  Due to these tensions with Morocco, the 
government sent two more frigates in October 1802 (the New York and John Adams)—but it 
also ordered two or three of the frigates currently in the Mediterranean to return to the United 
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States.377  On the home front, newspapers throughout the United States (and from both 
political parties) took the problems with Morocco seriously, running stories with headlines 
such as “Impending War”378 or “War with Morocco.”379  Despite being weaker than the other 
Barbary States, policymakers prioritized maintaining good relations with Morocco. 
Problems with Morocco temporarily got better when Simpson relented and issued 
passports for two ships in September 1802.380  He returned to Morocco and explained to 
Madison that it was necessary to yield, lest he “hazard the Emperours severest 
resentment.”381  This lull only lasted until the following spring, though, as the May 1803 
capture of the Moroccan ship Meshouda (discussed above) revived tensions.  Simpson 
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recommended returning the ship for two reasons:  the emperor “disavowed” its captain’s 
behavior and releasing it would “make a strong impression on his Majestys mind of the 
Friendly intentions of the Government of the United States towards him.”382  For now, 
though, the U.S. Navy would retain the ship.  A more severe problem erupted in August, 
when Captain William Bainbridge (of the Philadelphia) apprehended a Moroccan ship (the 
Mirboka), which had captured an American merchant ship (the Celia) and had taken the crew 
hostage.  It became clear that Morocco was actively targeting American ships.  Bainbridge 
reported that “the Moors Confess that they came out aCruising for the sole purpose of 
Capturing Americans to be sent to Tanger.  I have recd a paper from them written in Moorish 
wch they say is their authority from the Govr of Tanger for so doing...I believe the Govenour 
of Tanger is much disposed for Hostilities with the U.S., the Moorish Prisoners accuse him as 
the sole cause of their preset Cituation.”383  This confrontation raised the question of the 
emperor of Morocco’s intentions.  Were the Moroccan sailors telling the truth in blaming the 
governor of Tangier or did the emperor himself order the capture of American ships? 
To find out, Commodore Edward Preble, now the ranking officer in the 
Mediterranean (he arrived in September 1803 to replace Morris), insisted upon meeting with 
the emperor at the beach at Tangiers in October 1803.384  Doing so took courage, as the 
emperor has a military guard of 20,000 with him.  As described in in his ship’s log book, 
“between one and two this after noon the Emperour marched down on the Beach 
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accompanied By his Court several persons of the first distinction and a Numerous crowd of 
spectatores… the hole shore was crowd[ed] with the inhabitance as fair as the Ey could 
Extend.”385  The emperor presented the Americans with ten bullocks, twenty sheep, and four 
dozen fowls and his band “playd the march of Olestor/ which signifys peace and friendship.”  
Midshipman Ralph Izard had a much more negative impression of the emperor (whom he 
met that day).  He described his encounter in a letter to his mother:  “I had connected with the 
idea of Emperor of Morocco, something grand, but what was my disappointment at seeing a 
small man, wrapped up in a woollen heik or cloak sitting upon the stone steps of an old castle 
in the middle of the streets, surrounded by a guard of very ill looking blacks with their arms 
covered with cloth to prevent them rusting.”386  Izard had associated royalty with height and 
strength; the emperor’s small physique underwhelmed him.  Izard saw a man who (despite 
being in mid-thirties) seemed frail and needed protection from both inclement weather (hence 
the cloak) and potential enemies (hence the bodyguards).  Yet even his bodyguards looked 
unwell and wielded weapons in poor condition.  In any event, Izard reported that the emperor 
apologized for the conduct of the governor of Tangiers and promised to “punish him ‘more 
than to our satisfaction.’”  As for the captain of the Meshouda, Simpson later noted that he 
was “severely bastinadoed and lodged in a dungeon loaded with Irons on his Legs and 
Neck.”387   
Diplomacy worked, as the emperor declared peace and, in a letter to the U.S. 
government, officially reaffirmed the treaty made by his father.388  Preble agreed to return the 
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two Moroccan ships captured by the navy (the Meshouda and Mirboka)389 and Jefferson 
announced in December that all problems between Morocco and the United States “have 
been amicably adjusted, and the treaty of 1786… confirmed by the Emperor.”390  Fortunately 
for the United States, the emperor genuinely wanted peace.  Like the bashaw of Tripoli, he 
complained about not being respected enough (long promised gun carriages had not arrived), 
but unlike the bashaw, he preferred diplomatic resolution over war.391 
The resolution of problems with Morocco generated a surge of national pride, 
especially among Democratic-Republican newspapers.  These celebrated Jefferson’s 
leadership in Barbary affairs as superior to his Federalist predecessors’.  An article published 
in six states praised the “promptness and vigor” of “our little squadron,” commended the 
“restoration of peace” with Morocco, and argued that Jefferson had proved wrong the critics 
who had called his administration “pusylanimous and altogether unqualified.”392  It further 
lauded the president for not paying tribute (unlike “the illustrious Washington”) and for 
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reducing the navy budget to $650,000 (compared to $10,215,000 from 1797 to 1801).  This 
article hailed Jefferson as the ideal commander-in-chief:  he subdued America’s enemies at a 
fraction of the cost of the Quasi-War.  Another tribute to Jefferson waxed poetic, extolling 
him for transcending the dishonorable Barbary policies of Washington and Adams:  “In our 
infantile state under Washington’s sway,/ We indented a Barbary tribute to pay,/ Under 
Adams our tribute and taxes enlarg’d/ Yet the tribute’s withheld, and no debts are discharg’d/ 
But the æra of Jefferson beams on the sight,/ And th’ evils & burthens recede from the 
light.”393  Democratic-Republican newspaper editors wanted the public to rejoice in 
Jefferson’s accomplishment of humbling America’s enemies without spending exorbitant 
sums. 
The news of peace with Morocco engendered the opposite reaction among some 
Federalist newspaper editors—they feared that Jefferson’s popularity among the public 
would increase.  A New Hampshire publication argued that the president had nothing to do 
with pacifying the “hostility of Morocco.”394  Instead, it declared that Commodore Preble 
deserved the glory since “his decisive conduct forced the enemy to a settlement” and he 
courageously “dictated his own terms” of peace even though the emperor of Morocco had a 
formidable force of 20,000 to 30,000 men and “105 pieces of cannon.”  Another article took 
a different approach by downplaying the importance of good relations with Morocco.  It 
dismissed the country as a non-threat to the United States, calling it the “weakest of all the 
Barbary states” and “the least disposed to piracy.”  The article tried to shift readers’ attention 
to the ongoing conflict with Tripoli, condemning Jefferson for running “a pacific WAR” and 
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asking the public a question:  “but to be serious—are we sunk this low?”395  Clearly, 
Federalists greatly feared that positive news from the Mediterranean would redound to 
Jefferson’s benefit.  They countered the triumphalism of Democratic-Republican newspapers 
by arguing that the president had simply benefitted from other people’s competency or 
suggesting that obtaining peace with Morocco was not an impressive accomplishment. 
Towards the end of October 1803, Mediterranean affairs had been a mixed bag for the 
United States.  On the positive side, problems with Morocco had been permanently resolved 
(indeed, the treaty with Morocco is the United States’ longest unbroken treaty) and the U.S. 
Navy had won a handful of victories against Tripolitan forces.  However, a sense of regret 
over missed opportunities to end the Tripolitan War on American terms tempered the mood.  
After reviewing a batch of correspondence, Madison reported to Jefferson that “in general 
our affairs were considered in [the] Mediteranean as tending the wrong way.  All agree that 
peace with Tripoli was for a long time in our power & almost on our own terms; and lament 
that the crisis is probably past.”396  Indeed, Jefferson was unwise to have ignored the advice 
from diplomats and naval officers to send a powerful force to crush Tripoli.  Moreover, the 
president assumed that no further tragedies would befall American vessels and that Tripoli 
would not capture additional Americans and hold them hostage.  The naivety of Jefferson’s 
policies would soon be exposed in dramatic fashion. 
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Chapter 4:  Democratic-Republican Embarrassment, Federalist Opportunity 
 
October 21, 1803.  Bostonians finally had the chance to see the comic opera 
Tripolitan Prize; Or, American Tars Triumphant, which, according to The Independent 
Chronicle, had “never [been] Performed in Boston.”397  The advertisement promised a 
dramatic victory by an American ship over a Tripolitan vessel and a hefty dose of patriotism.  
Tripolitan Prize had been performed on multiple occasions in New York the previous fall, 
but it apparently was not very good.398  A local newspaper published a negative review, 
which stressed the play’s incoherence.  The critic had hoped to “see a few of those Tripolitan 
scoundrels spitted like monkeys for our amusement”—but nothing of the sort happened.399  
Instead, the play spent too much time on a boring group “of village masters and misses 
taking a walk” and singing and “look[ing] pitiful enough.”  The review also deemed the 
ending anticlimactic since the battle scene lacked excitement:  it was “was conducted with 
proper decency and decorum, and the Tripolitan very politely gave in.”  Despite its limited 
literary and technical skill, Tripolitan Prize offered a jolt of nationalism and suggested that 
the U.S. Navy would soon subdue the Barbary pirates.  Little did Americans on the home 
                                                          
397 The Independent Chronicle (Boston, MA), October 20, 1803. 
 
398 It played on several dates in November and December 1802, although it apparently had a slightly different 
title at first—New York newspapers call it Tripolitan Prize; Or, American Tars on an English Shore; American 
Citizen (New York, NY), November 24, 1803; The Daily Advertiser (New York, NY), November 25, 1803; 
American Citizen (New York, NY), December 2, 1802; Commercial Advertiser (New York, NY), December 3, 
1802.  Philadelphians could see a similar play—The Enterprize; Or a Wreath for American Tars offered a 
reenactment of the “engagement between the Enterprize and the Tripolitan Corsair”; Poulson’s American Daily 
Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), March 14, 1803. 
 
399 Morning Chronicle (New York, NY), December 1, 1802. 
138 
 
front know, however, that the Tripolitan War would soon start to go poorly for the United 
States.   
The second phase of the conflict began on October 31, 1803, with the crash of the 
frigate Philadelphia on a sandbar while in pursuit of a Tripolitan vessel.  Unable to free it 
and surrounded by Tripolitan ships, Captain William Bainbridge opted to surrender rather 
than fight.400  Suddenly the bashaw, Yusuf Karamanli, gained the upper hand in the 
Tripolitan War and took the 307 officers and crew members hostage.  For the first time, the 
United States was losing the conflict.  Furthermore, within a few days the wind loosened the 
Philadelphia from the sandbar, making it a powerful new addition to Tripoli’s navy. 
The loss of the Philadelphia not only affected naval operations.  It also influenced 
domestic affairs since the newspaper war between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans 
reached a new intensity.  Federalist newspaper editors often ran articles about the 
Philadelphia hostages and argued that Jefferson deserved blame for their captivity and the 
loss of the frigate—he enabled the conditions that led to the incident by not sending a 
sufficient number of ships to the Mediterranean.  They castigated the president as an 
incompetent leader and pointed to the stagnancy of the Tripolitan War as a reason for the 
public to repudiate Jefferson and support the Federalist Party (particularly in the 1804 
elections).  Democratic-Republican newspaper editors recognized the potential of the 
Philadelphia loss to hurt their party and began damage control.  They generally ignored the 
substance of Federalist critiques and instead attacked their adversaries as unprincipled 
enemies of the national good.  Moreover, Democratic-Republican newspapers printed 
pessimistic letters from the Philadelphia hostages less frequently than Federalist 
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publications.  This suggests that Democratic-Republican editors preferred to keep the public 
ignorant of news from the Mediterranean rather than risk turning voters against Jefferson. 
Although the Tripolitan War exacerbated tensions between the two political parties, it 
remained very popular among the public.  Many Americans joyfully toasted the navy at 
celebrations and flocked to cultural events that acclaimed the conflict.  In contrast to 
Jefferson, they viewed the navy as a positive good and not as a necessary evil.  They 
considered the war against Tripoli a seminal moment in their country’s history and even 
compared current naval heroes to the heroes of the Revolutionary War.  The Tripolitan War 
was seen as an extension of this earlier conflict, with the United States defending its freedom 
against a foreign aggressor. 
Meanwhile in Tripoli, Captain William Bainbridge (who had previously endured 
humiliation in North Africa when the Dey of Algiers commandeered the George 
Washington) feared that his career in the navy would end.  In a letter to Edward Preble, the 
ranking U.S. officer in the Mediterranean, he lamented having experienced an extraordinary 
amount of bad luck:  “I have zealously served my Country and strenuously endeavored to 
guard against accidents, but in spite of every effort misfortune has attended me through my 
Naval life.—Gaudaloupe and Algiers have witnessed part of them, but Tripoli strikes the 
death blow to my future Prospects.”401  Writing to his wife, Bainbridge confessed his fear 
“that I may be censured by my countrymen” and suggested that it would have been better if 
the Tripolitans had killed him in battle.  He feared being officially reprimanded by the Navy 
Department, remarking that this dishonor would “deprive me of the power of looking any of 
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my race in the face.”402  Recall (from the previous chapter) Bainbridge’s anxiety about how 
the George Washington incident would affect his reputation—he requested that The 
Philadelphia Gazette & Daily Advertiser print his correspondence.  His inner turmoil is 
evidenced by his use of racial rhetoric.  Bainbridge feared feeling unworthy to be white; 
more than a skin color, whiteness represented a high standard of conduct.  He dreaded being 
stigmatized as a failure—to him, a censure would constitute a mark of shame equivalent to 
having darker skin. 
How did the crew handle their newfound enslavement?  Placed in a putrid dungeon, 
many panicked.  Some seamen stole clothing from their fellow sailors to trade for liquor, 
while one-hundred-forty members petitioned British Admiral Lord Nelson to claim them as 
British subjects.403  Nelson, however, rejected them and reportedly stated that he would 
prefer “to have the Rascals all hung.”404  A few sailors embraced the only surefire means of 
escaping captivity:  converting to Islam and becoming a part of North African society.  By 
mid-December, four Americans had “turned Turk”:  John Wilson, Lewis Hacksener, Thomas 
Prince, and Peter West.405  In February 1805, Bainbridge wrote an updated list—a fifth sailor, 
Thomas Smith, had converted as well.406  Bainbridge also recorded the rank of each 
apostate—Hacksener was a landsman, Prince a seaman, Smith a seaman, West a carpenter 
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crewman, and Wilson a quartermaster.  None of them were officers.  Prince was apparently 
rather young—Bainbridge referred to him as a “Boy.”  Wilson was unique among the 
converts for seeking to add to the remaining Philadelphia prisoners’ miseries.  He told the 
bashaw false stories of Bainbridge throwing gold over the ship, encouraged the Tripolitans to 
treat the Americans harshly, and became the prison’s overseer (a position that allowed him to 
use violence against his former peers).407  Although converting to Islam enabled these five 
men to improve their own welfare, it jeopardized the livelihood of their family members back 
in the United States.  As Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith declared, the Jefferson 
Administration would not pay a stipend to the “wives, parents and children” of captives who 
had “turned Turks.”408  Although the apostates gained the enmity of their countrymen, they 
escaped hard labor and horrid living conditions and gained an opportunity for upward 
mobility.  Nor were they the only Westerners to follow this course; the Tripolitan Admiral 
had defected from Scotland.  Since none of these five sailors held a high rank in the U.S. 
Navy, “turning Turk” was arguably a rational decision that enabled them to create a new 
identity and to pursue new opportunities in North Africa. 
Upon learning about the Philadelphia loss, American personnel in the Mediterranean 
recognized that it greatly hurt America’s war effort.  News travelled slowly, though:  it took 
more than three weeks for Captain Edward Preble to learn about it (from a British ship).409  
Preble did not receive Bainbridge’s first batch of letters for nearly a month.410  Upon hearing 
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about the Philadelphia disaster, he told Smith that it “distresses me beyond description, and 
very much deranges my plans of operation for the present….we should have had peace with 
Tripoly in the Spring; but I have now no hopes of such an event.”411  Moreover, Preble 
wished Bainbridge had gone down fighting instead of surrendering:  “would to God, that the 
Officers and crew of the Philadelphia, had one and all, determined to prefer death to 
slavery.”  He also requested two or three more ships in order to launch a more intensive 
blockade and informed Smith of his plan to destroy the Philadelphia so that Tripoli could not 
use it against the United States.  He acknowledged that blowing it up would “undoubtedly 
cost us many lives,” but believed “it must be done.”  Preble wanted the Jefferson 
Administration to understand that a new phase of the war had begun and that the United 
States needed to have a more assertive presence in the Mediterranean. 
Although he expressed his disappointment in Bainbridge to the government, Preble 
sought to console the beleaguered captain.  In a December letter, Preble declared that “I have 
not the smallest doubt, but that you have all done everything which you conceived could be 
done, to get the ship off….You may rest assured, that in me you have a friend, whose 
exertions shall never be wanting in endeavours to relieve you.”412  Preble had either 
reassessed the situation following his letter to Smith or wanted to avoid driving Bainbridge to 
despair.  Like Preble, James Cathcart wished that Bainbridge had gone down fighting rather 
than surrendering and estimated the cost of ransom as “at least” $300,000.413  In a letter to 
Madison, the ex-diplomat exclaimed “how glorious it would have been to have perish’d with 
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the Ship…a glorious death which would transmit our names to posterity and have establish’d 
a national character.”  Cathcart apparently cared more about America’s reputation than the 
lives of the officers and crew.  Richard O’Brien also informed Madison of the situation and 
once again called for a massive naval buildup:  the United States needed to start acting like 
“a great Country” by building a powerful seventy-four gun ship, six “large” frigates, and 
twelve “light Corsairs.”414  American personnel in the Mediterranean recognized that the 
power dynamic between Tripoli and the United States had changed.  The war was no longer a 
draw—Tripoli was winning. 
Would America’s allies be of help in the hostage situation?  France and Russia 
promised to intercede, but their efforts accomplished nothing.415  The emperor of Russia had 
good intentions and asked the sultan at Constantinople to order the bashaw to release the 
captives—but the emperor’s letter had no impact.416  The French consul in Tripoli, 
Boaventure Beaussier, made a poor impression upon American officials.  Preble considered 
him (and the British and Swedish consuls) as devoted to “the Bashaw’s Interest,”417 while 
Bainbridge warned Preble not to trust any consul except Nicholas Nissen (the Danish 
consul).418  Indeed, the French consul often took a patronizing tone with Preble and urged 
him to pay ransom instead of fighting Tripoli.419  He claimed that attacks did more harm than 
                                                          
414 O’Brien to Madison, December 16, 1803, Ibid. 
 
415 Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord to Edward Livingston, January 17, 1804, Naval Documents III: 335-
336; Grand Chancellor of Russia to Levett Harris, January 25, 1804, Ibid., III: 358.  
 
416 Preble to Tobias Lear, June 19, 1804, Ibid., IV: 207. 
 
417 Preble diary, March 28, 1804, Ibid., III: 544-545. 
 
418 Bainbridge to Preble, June 14, 1804, Ibid., IV: 187. 
 
419 For instance, in a June 13, 1804 letter to Preble, Beaussier called a U.S. offer of $40,000 for ransom “truly 
ridiculous and offensive”; Ibid., IV: 184. 
 
144 
 
good since they “inflame[d] the mind of the Prince.”420 Beaussier also stressed that Yusuf 
cared deeply about his reputation and wanted to impress Europe and Africa with his “strength 
& courage.”421  Among the European diplomats in Tripoli, only Nissen provided much help 
(by procuring supplies, even with his own funds) and he earned the gratitude of the hostages 
and received official thanks from the U.S. government.422  Ultimately, the United States 
could not rely upon European nations to help end the Tripolitan War—America would have 
to solve its own problems.  
News of the Philadelphia’s capture and the enslavement of the officers and seamen 
reached the United States in spring 1804, prompting Jefferson to finally recognize the 
necessity of substantially augmenting the Mediterranean squadron.  In a March 20th message 
to Congress, he called for legislation that would “increase our force and enlarge our expenses 
in the Mediterranean beyond what the last appropriation for the naval service contemplated.  
I recommend, therefore, to the consideration of Congress such an addition to that 
appropriation as they may think the exigency requires.”423  Congress heeded Jefferson’s 
requests with a strong vote and, within a week, passed “An Act further to protect the 
commerce and seamen of the United States against the Barbary powers.”424  Known as the 
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“Mediterranean Fund,” it established a duty of 2.5% on imported goods that would expire in 
three months “unless the United States should then be at war with any other of the Barbary 
powers.”  The legislation also provided up to another $1 million for expenses and authorized 
the president “to cause to be purchased or built, officered, manned and equipped, two vessels 
of war, to carry not more than sixteen guns each, and likewise to hire or accept or loan in the 
Mediterranean sea, as many gun boats as he may think proper.”  The Jefferson 
Administration also decided to send four more frigates (the President, 44 guns; Congress, 36 
guns; Constellation, 36 guns; and Essex, 32 guns) to the Mediterranean.  As Smith explained 
to Preble, Jefferson wanted to dispatch “a force which would be able beyond the possibility 
of a doubt, to coerce the Enemy to a peace upon Terms compatible with our Honor and our 
Interest.”425  Jefferson acknowledged the need for more firepower, but did he really have a 
change of heart? 
Despite cultivating a more belligerent public image, privately the president thought 
that the significance of the Philadelphia’s loss had been exaggerated.  In an April letter to 
Madison, Jefferson asserted that “I am mortified at the consternation which most of our 
public agents abroad have manifested at the loss of the Philadelphia.  It seems as if they 
thought on the loss of one frigate, that every thing was lost.”426  Jefferson’s belief that he 
knew more about Mediterranean affairs than the naval officers and diplomats reveals that he 
had continued to largely reject their ideas.  He acted as if Tripoli was not winning the war 
and, pointedly, ignored the fate of the 300 captives in this letter.  Jefferson seemed most 
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concerned about how European countries would view the Philadelphia loss:  “this must 
humble us in the eyes of Europe, and renders it the more indispensable to inflict on Tripoli 
the same chastisement of which the two most powerful nations of Europe have given the 
world repeated examples.”  Yet despite such bold talk, Jefferson had no intention of 
authorizing an attack comparable to the abilities of the British or French fleets.427  The 
president also broached the possibility of sending a ship to Constantinople to cultivate 
goodwill with the sultan.  This idea did not materialize and, in any event, would probably not 
have worked since the emperor of Russia’s letter failed and Yusuf wanted the United States 
to take him seriously as a sovereign ruler.  Jefferson acted begrudgingly in dispatching a new 
squadron, recognizing the need for more firepower but privately remaining scornful of the 
naval officers and diplomats. 
In response, Madison concurred with the president and expressed disdain for the 
Mediterranean officials.  He deemed their concern over the Philadelphia incident 
“remarkable” and thought that they were actually hurting the war effort.  Madison believed 
that the diplomats and naval officers’ warnings “tend not only to sink us in the eyes of the 
European Govts. but may excite calculations in the Bashaw which will in some measure 
balance the advantage of the friendly interpositions with him.”428  Also like Jefferson, 
Madison did not discuss the hostage situation. Rather than reconsider how their policies had 
left the American squadron vulnerable and had emboldened Yusuf, they continued to distrust 
and denigrate officials in the Mediterranean.  The diplomats and naval officers rightly 
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worried that Jefferson’s lackluster policies would embolden the Barbary pirates against the 
United States.  A Tunisian official, for instance, bluntly told an American diplomat that the 
United States had utterly failed against Tripoli:  “you have spent Millions & done nothing—
You have lost a Frigate and her Crew.  You are tired of the War and want peace.”429  As will 
be seen in chapter 6, after the Tripolitan War ended the Bey of Tunis confidently bossed 
American personnel around and ultimately negotiated a good financial deal for himself.  
Jefferson’s policies bred contempt, not respect, among Barbary rulers.  Not even the loss of 
one of the U.S. Navy’s most formidable ships and the enslavement of its crew could motivate 
Jefferson to rethink his fundamental ideas.  He was doing a poor job as commander-in-chief. 
Federalist newspaper editors made precisely this point, arguing that the blame for the 
Philadelphia loss lay squarely with the Jefferson Administration.  An article published in 
three states boasted the headline “Loss of the Philadelphia Frigate, or, a practical lesson on 
Jefferson’s economy” and denied that the incident stemmed from “an accidental concurrence 
of circumstances.”  Instead, it identified the president as “the cause of this very serious 
national loss” due to his “miserable, starveling, niggardly species of economy” and his 
opposition to sending more ships.  It suggested that the incident would not have happened if 
a second ship had travelled with the Philadelphia and been able to evacuate the crew 
members or free the ship.430  The article also observed that the cost of ransoming the 300 
prisoners would damage Jefferson’s commitment to financial economy (it estimated at least 
                                                          
429 George Davis and Richard O’Brien’s comments concerning Tunis, April 29, 1804, Naval Documents IV: 73-
74. 
 
430 Seven Federalist newspapers published it:  New-York Evening Post (New York, NY), March 21, 1804; New-
York Herald (New York, NY), March 24, 1804; The Albany Centinel (Albany, NY), March 30, 1804; 
Newburyport Herald (Newburyport, MA), March 30, 1804; The Salem Gazette (Salem, MA), April 3, 1804.  
The Repertory (Boston, MA), April 3, 1804 and Newhampshire Sentinel (Keene, NH), April 14, 1804 ran the 
article but omitted the headline. 
 
148 
 
$1,500,000).  An article published in several New York newspapers averred that the 
Tripolitan War should not have even lasted two-and-a-half years—the United States could 
have won quickly had Jefferson, at the beginning of the conflict, sent a powerful force to 
“destroy the very nest of these robbers.”431  Doing so would have ultimately been less 
expensive and have had the additional benefit of instilling “a just terror of the American 
name” into North Africa and setting “the foundation for a permanent peace.”  An article 
printed in Federalist papers in four states condemned Jefferson’s frugality and criticized him 
for not sending more ships to the Mediterranean—the paucity required the Philadelphia to 
sail “alone, contrary to the advice of an experienced officer of the navy.”432  It also 
maliciously claimed that Jefferson perhaps preferred that the Philadelphia captives die in 
Tripoli so that the government could be spared the cost of ransom!  Other newspapers also 
contended that a second ship could have helped free the Philadelphia or at least evacuated 
the crew to safety.  A widely published article entitled “Modern Economy” condemned the 
president for forcing the Mediterranean squadron to “cruise separately” and for ignoring that 
“the chances and probabilities of losing each frigate would thereby be nearly doubled.”433  It 
also blamed Jefferson’s “niggardly policy” for “the captivity of 307 of our citizens.”  
Ironically, the article argued, the president’s commitment to frugality in the Tripolitan War 
                                                          
431 New-York Commercial Advertiser (New York, NY), April 21, 1804; New-York Spectator (New York, NY), 
April 25, 1804; The Albany Centinel (Albany, NY), May 4, 1804. 
 
432 Five Federalist newspapers ran it:  United States’ Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), March 26, 1804; The 
Connecticut Courant (Hartford, CT), April 4, 1804; THOMAS’S Massachusetts Spy, Or Worcester Gazette 
(Worcester, MA), April 4, 1804; United States Chronicle (Providence, RI), April 5, 1804; The Hive 
(Northampton, MA), April 10, 1804. 
 
433 Eight Federalist newspapers ran it:  New-York Evening Post (New York, NY), April 12, 1804; New-York 
Herald (New York, NY), April 14, 1804; United States’ Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), April 24, 1804; Boston 
Gazette (Boston, MA), May 3, 1804; The Salem Gazette (Salem, MA), May 4, 1804; Newburyport Herald 
(Newburyport, MA), May 8, 1804; The Connecticut Courant (Hartford, CT), May 9, 1804; Kennebec Gazette 
(Augusta, ME), May 23, 1804. 
 
149 
 
had resulted in Congress increasing naval expenses by $1 million (plus interest) and 
implementing a new tax (the Mediterranean Fund).  To Federalist critics, the flaws in 
Jefferson’s policies were self-evident:  he left American ships and sailors vulnerable in the 
Mediterranean and then increased taxes on citizens. 
Federalist newspapers also depicted the Philadelphia loss as a monumental setback 
for the United States.  Some articles made well-reasoned points, while others indulged in 
hyperbole.  An article published in three states proclaimed that “a more severe calamity has 
not befallen the United States since the adoption of the present Constitution; what the effects 
will be on the other piratical Barbary powers, it is not easy to calculate; nor agreeable to 
dwell upon.”434  Given the capture of hundreds of American merchant ships by France in the 
1790s and the ongoing impressment of American sailors by the British navy, it is hard to take 
such a claim seriously.  This article sought to rile up the Federalist base, not win over 
independents or Democratic-Republicans.  In a similar vein, an editorial published in four 
states deemed “the prospect of peace more distant than ever” and invoked a classical 
quotation by Horace to illustrate the folly of Jefferson’s policies:  “dum vitant stulti vitia in 
contraria currunt” (“while fools try to avoid one error, they fall into its opposite”).435  It 
defended the officers and seamen for “uniformly display[ing] a determined zeal,” while 
utilizing gendered rhetoric to castigate Jefferson.  The president needed to “act with the spirit 
of a man, and the liberality which becomes the chief magistrate of a great nation” by sending 
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a squadron powerful enough “to reduce their town to ashes.”436  To Federalists, the 
Philadelphia loss exposed what they had long suspected:  Jefferson was as clueless and 
unqualified as a woman in running foreign policy.  By prioritizing his Spartan economic 
policies, he enabled the conditions that led to the Philadelphia loss and helped Tripoli to 
obtain an advantage over the United States. 
Other critics advanced a more inflammatory charge:  accusing Jefferson of corruption 
in using federal funds intended for the Tripolitan War to pay for the Louisiana Purchase.  
Newspapers in four states took a populist approach by publishing an article with the headline 
“New Taxes,” which asserted that the “true” purpose of the Mediterranean Fund entailed 
raising money “to provide for paying interest on the Louisiana Debt…out of the pockets of 
the people without their knowing it.”437  These Federalists portrayed themselves as public 
watchdogs unmasking Democratic-Republican deceptions.  Similarly, a letter from “a 
gentleman at Washington to the Editor” asserted that although the Mediterranean Fund would 
raise $1 million annually, less than half would go to the Tripolitan War—the majority would 
“pay the accruing interest on the Louisiana stock.”438  Another widely published article 
claimed that the Mediterranean Fund really existed “to pay interest on the Louisiana debt” 
and predicted that this legislation would “reduce all merchants to poverty and ruin.”439  Even 
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some members of the public expressed concern that Jefferson’s fondness for the Louisiana 
Purchase would compromise his ability to effectively lead the Tripolitan War.  A Boston 
celebration in honor of Rufus King (the former U.S. minister to Britain) included a toast to 
“our brave tars suffering in Tripoli—Alas!  We fear that in the honeymoon of our connection 
with Louisiana, our captive brethren are forgotten.”440  Many Federalists had opposed the 
Louisiana Purchase and clearly these newspaper editors remained hostile towards it.  They 
hoped to generate public anger by arguing that Jefferson’s obsession with the Louisiana 
Purchase would jeopardize America’s ability to win the Tripolitan War. 
Was there any truth in these allegations?  Jefferson had considered how the Louisiana 
Purchase would affect the war against Tripoli.  In an October 1803 letter to Secretary of the 
Navy Robert Smith, the president expressed his desire to avoid raising taxes to pay for the 
Louisiana Purchase and proposed reducing naval expenses and transferring such savings to 
the Louisiana Purchase interest payments.  He asked Smith for advice about how best to cut 
the naval budget (including the Mediterranean squadron).441  However, the Philadelphia 
incident disrupted Jefferson’s plans and, as discussed above, he reversed course by 
supporting an increase in naval expenses.  Federalists had no evidence to prove their 
inflammatory claims.  Overall, allegations that Jefferson was using the Tripolitan War as a 
pretext to fund the Louisiana Purchase amounted to a partisan character attack designed to 
spur public distrust in the president.  
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To be sure, not all Federalist newspaper editors responded with hostility—some 
praised Jefferson for now deciding to send additional ships.  An article printed in five states 
considered it “Better late than never” and praised the president’s decision to undertake 
“measures more benefitting the character of a free and a brave people.”442  It hoped that “the 
loss of the Philadelphia” would “become the means of our future glory, greatness, and 
security” and promised “to applaud” and “to support” the Jefferson Administration if it 
maintained its newfound belligerent course.  These Federalists editors regarded partisanship 
as a necessary evil and wanted national unity as long as Jefferson appeared committed to 
victory in the Mediterranean.  Another article, published in a New York newspaper, tried to 
brighten the public mood by using humor:  it claimed that since the Tripolitans could not 
figure out how to sail the Philadelphia they “have offered to sell her to some maltese 
merchants.”443  This article sought to reassure Americans that they had nothing to fear from 
such an incompetent enemy—the loss of the ship was but a temporary setback and did not 
spell doom.  These conciliatory articles were the exception, though—most Federalist 
publications wanted to pummel Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans while they were 
vulnerable. 
Indeed, some Federalist newspaper editors viewed the Philadelphia loss as a golden 
opportunity for their party to make gains in the 1804 elections.  By stressing Tripoli’s recent 
success over the U.S. forces in the Mediterranean, they portrayed Jefferson as unfit for the 
presidency.  A New York newspaper included the Tripolitan War among the reasons why 
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Jefferson was “very unfit to be the Chief Magistrate of the United States.”  It asked readers to 
reflect upon these questions:  “is not the conduct of the war with Tripoli expensive and 
disgraceful?  Is not the nation defenceless, exposed to the insult and outrage of foreign 
vessels of war?”444  Similarly, a lengthy address “To the FARMERS of the County of 
Kennebec” listed many reasons why people should oppose Jefferson’s reelection, including 
his running the Tripolitan War “with no great energy” and permitting “three hundred and 
seven brave fellows….to languish…with labor and in ill treatment” in Tripoli.445  It called for 
a more vigorous assault upon Tripoli by “pay[ing] them in warlike stores—balls delivered 
from our cannons’ mouths, and no other way.”  A lengthy open letter “To the People of 
Massachusetts” listed many criticisms of Jefferson, including his unwillingness to spend 
more on the Tripolitan War and the human cost of his policies.  It asked voters if it was “true 
economy to attempt blockading the harbour of Tripoli with a single ship?  Ask your brethren 
now groaning under the chains of Tripolitan slavery.”446  These articles combined logical and 
emotional appeals to try to woo voters away from Jefferson.  They stressed that he had failed 
to win the Tripolitan War on a shoestring budget and had done nothing to alleviate the 
suffering of the Philadelphia captives.447  Did voters want four more years of presidential 
ineptitude? 
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Federalist newspapers not only aspired to unseat Jefferson—they also hoped that the 
lackluster state of the Tripolitan War would help their party in state and congressional 
elections.  A March 1804 article in a Massachusetts newspaper, for instance, listed a slate of 
Federalist candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, and state senators and sarcastically 
accused Democratic-Republicans of blundering the Tripolitan War:  “to what dignity have 
they raised us in the view of foreign nations—how all the Barbary powers, to whom the 
whole world has been tributary, tremble at an American frigate…in consequence of Mr. 
Jefferson’s being President.”448  Even though these elected positions would have no direct 
impact upon U.S. foreign policy, this newspaper thought that these candidates could benefit 
from public disappointment in the Tripolitan War.449  Similarly, a New York newspaper 
suggested that America’s vulnerability to Tripoli should disqualify all Democratic-
Republicans from holding statewide offices:  “how many Americans are now in Tripoli, 
loaded with the chains of bondage?  Did the ‘blessings of peace’ throw those unfortunate 
men into slavery?”450  Additionally, two New York newspapers ran an article that lampooned 
Democratic-Republican voters—a hypothetical one said:  “I like much the notion of 
economy—Had there been more than one frigate before Tripoli, more might have been 
lost.”451  Altogether, these article depicted Jefferson’s policies as catastrophic and portrayed 
Democratic-Republicans as utterly ignorant about how to win the Tripolitan War.  The loss 
of the Philadelphia created an opportunity for Federalists.  Knowing that the public 
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uniformly detested the Barbary pirates, Federalist newspaper editors hoped that voters who 
had previously voted Democratic-Republican would become disillusioned with Jefferson’s 
leadership and return the Federalists to power. 
Some Democratic-Republican newspapers responded to such attacks on their party 
and the president by portraying the Philadelphia loss as an unfortunate mishap and absolving 
Jefferson of any responsibility.  A lengthy Massachusetts article reproached Federalists for 
engaging in “party malevolence” and making “malicious” and “despicable” allegations 
against Jefferson.452  It argued that the Philadelphia loss was “a mere accident; an accident, 
which no man could possibly foresee, much less prevent.  Do [Federalists] expect the 
President to insure our navy against the dangers of the sea, against rocks and quicksands, 
storms and tempests?”  Notably, the article made it seem as if the United States was not 
actually at war with Tripoli—it described the purpose of the Mediterranean squadron as “to 
watch the harbor of Tripoli” and claimed (falsely) that one ship was “fully adequate” to do 
so.  It ignored both the Franklin capture and the advice from naval officers and diplomats to 
send more ships.  Another article made a blatantly false statement by asserting that it was 
“beyond question” that the United States had “a sufficient number of vessels…in the 
Mediterranean” because Tripoli had never captured an American ship.453  The author 
apparently forgot (or hoped readers would forget) about Tripoli’s capture of the Franklin.   
Democratic-Republicans considered any criticism of the president as illegitimate and 
tried to turn public opinion against their rivals.  An article published in two states castigated 
Federalists for making the Philadelphia loss “a party question” and “a high crime on the part 
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of the administration.”  It ridiculed the argument that a second ship would have helped the 
Philadelphia crew escape as both “fallacious” and an insult to “the courage and seamenship 
of the officers of the Philadelphia”454  A Massachusetts article likewise called the incident an 
“accident” that stemmed from poor weather and unfamiliar topography.  Jefferson “could not 
control the winds or the waves...or point out the rocks and shoals which lay concealed under 
water, and which few, if any, charts had previously designated.”455  Such flippant responses 
largely neglected the substance of Federalist criticism—that if more ships were in the 
Mediterranean, the Philadelphia could have received help and would not have needed to 
surrender.  Federalists did not blame Jefferson for inclement weather or for the existence of 
the sandbar on which the Philadelphia crashed.  They blamed him for implementing a naval 
strategy that did not provide for the possibility of disasters occurring. 
Other Democratic-Republican publications attacked the Federalists as unprincipled 
opponents who would never support Jefferson under any conditions.  These attacks ignored 
the bipartisan support that many Federalist newspapers gave Jefferson prior to the Franklin 
capture in June 1802 (as discussed in the previous chapter).  A Philadelphia newspaper 
claimed that the Federalists did not really want victory over Tripoli and would complain 
“about the heavy expence” if Jefferson sent a formidable “force” to the Mediterranean.456  
Another article accused Federalists of “rejoic[ing] that the disaster has occurred” and 
“sport[ing] wantonly with the misfortunes of our brave but unfortunate countrymen” out of 
spite for Democratic-Republicans.  Similarly, a different publication accused the Federalists 
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of hoping that Commodore Preble’s ship would crash “on the same rocks” as the 
Philadelphia so that Jefferson’s popularity would erode.457  Instead of offering intelligent 
rebuttals to Federalist criticisms, these Democratic-Republican newspapers resorted to 
slander and name-calling.  Their virulence suggests that they feared that the Philadelphia 
incident would boost the Federalists’ popularity. 
Some Democratic-Republican newspapers took an alternate approach by either 
downplaying the importance of the Philadelphia loss or redirecting readers’ attention to the 
Jefferson Administration’s accomplishments.  An article printed in eight states utilized the 
Quasi-War slogan ‘Millions for Defence, but not a Cent for Tribute’ as a headline and 
celebrated the Mediterranean Fund as evidence of the Jefferson Administration’s 
“patriotism.”  It predicted that this legislation would “show the world, that while the wish of 
the American nation is peace, she will not hesitate for a moment, to make that power feel the 
vengeance of her arms, that dares, in violation of justice, to invade her.”458  Another article, 
published in two states, urged public confidence in Jefferson and reminded readers of the 
successful resolution of problems with Morocco.  It promised that the president would take 
“prompt and vigorous” action in order “to make as forcible an impression on the barbarians 
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of Tripoli and their neighbours, as we lately made on those of Morocco.”459  More 
audaciously, an editorial reassured Democratic-Republicans that the Tripolitan War would 
benefit their party instead of the Federalists:  “the energy of our government to correct the 
procedure of the pirates of Tripoli, will make a more brilliant appearance, from its contrast 
with the black malignity, which issues from the presses falsely stiled Federal.”  It also lauded 
the growth of the Democratic-Republican Party in Massachusetts and Connecticut and 
claimed that, in New Hampshire, Federalism was in “a swift decline.”460  Altogether, these 
articles stubbornly defended Jefferson’s Barbary policies and urged Democratic-Republican 
readers not to concede any ground to Federalists.  In their opinion, the Philadelphia loss 
amounted to a small speed bump on the road to the ultimate dominance of the Democratic-
Republican Party. 
In addition to either attacking or defending the Jefferson Administration, newspapers 
(most often Federalist) published letters written by Philadelphia captives that detailed their 
physical suffering and mental anguish.  These sources combined factual material with 
emotional appeals and, by printing them, newspaper editors raised public awareness and 
pressured the government to free the hostages.  In a widely published letter, one officer 
described the hectic boarding of the Philadelphia by the Tripolitans.  He remarked that “I 
never saw or heard of such plunder as they made, they drove us into their boats without any 
clothes, but what we had on.  I had to fight with two of them some time to secure my great 
coat, and by scuffling I saved my money and watch....Before we got on shore, we were 
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treated most brutally.”461  Another pessimistic letter, written by a midshipman, only appeared 
in Federalist newspapers.  It stressed that the officers and crew had all “suffer[ed] the most 
horrid degradation—strip’d of Clothes, Money, Watches, and every thing valuable.”462 By 
printing these letters, Federalist editors demonstrated humanitarian support and also 
implicitly reminded readers that the Philadelphia crew members and officers became 
hostages under a Democratic-Republican administration. 
 Other widely published letters described the difficulties of daily life in Tripoli for the 
ordinary seamen—they experienced both psychological torment and physical pain.  One 
midshipman complained that the bashaw’s “subjects, as they pass our prison doors, mock and 
deride us; they laugh at the Christian’s sufferings, and in the most brutal manner, point the 
finger of scorn at us.  To be the sport of such villains, MADS me.”463  The captives were 
powerless to fight back and had to endure such humiliation.  When they weren’t doing hard 
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labor, they languished in a filthy dungeon.  One officer penned an especially dismal 
description of the prison that held the crew:  it was “the most dreary place imaginable...the 
walls were entirely black and dripping with unwholesome damps, and the vaulted ceiling 
hung with cobwebs—the ground broken and uneven afforded shelter to the innumerable 
vermin that infest the place…Stygian darkness reigned around….it reminded me of such as I 
have read of in old romances.  This place more fit to be the abode of demons, than of mortals, 
was the habitation of our brave crew.”464  Atypically, more Democratic-Republican 
newspapers printed it than Federalist ones.  Readers must have marveled at how the crew 
members could stomach living in this hellhole, but they surely would have been disturbed to 
learn, from another letter, that some chose to escape captivity “by embracing the Mahometan 
religion and taking up arms against their country.”465  The physical appearance of these men 
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(kept anonymous) also changed in order to reflect their new identity as Muslims:  they got 
“their heads shaved” and now wore “a Turkish habit.” More than two dozen newspapers 
(mostly Federalist) published this letter; one can understand why Democratic-Republican 
editors would want to avoid informing the public that, as a result of the Philadelphia 
incident, some sailors preferred to join the enemy and had renounced both their country and 
Christianity.  Clearly, a pattern emerges in which Federalist newspapers tended to publish 
pessimistic letters from the captives more often than Democratic-Republican ones.  This 
suggests that Democratic-Republican editors feared the potential of such letters to help the 
Federalist Party.  While Democratic-Republican editors surely sympathized with the 
Philadelphia hostages, they preferred to keep readers ignorant of the captives’ experiences 
lest the depressing news turn voters away from their party. 
In contrast to the seamen, the forty-three officers received better treatment and stayed 
in the house formerly belonging to the U.S. consul at Tripoli, James Cathcart.466  The bashaw 
exempted them from hard labor, but Bainbridge insisted that the officers use their time 
productively by “study[ing] navigation, and read[ing] such books, as in our possession, 
which will improve their minds.”467  Indeed, Bainbridge described their confinement as “a 
College of Students.”468  The officers also enjoyed limited mobility around the capital city 
and found some things praiseworthy.  One officer, for instance, rhapsodized about a beautiful 
garden owned by the bashaw:  he visited “two or three times a week” and especially loved 
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the orange orchard—“it is delightful beyond what you can imagine and where we loll two or 
three hours under the shade; enjoying the cheerful fresh air and feasting upon the most 
delicious fruits.”469  Another letter from an officer spoke positively about captivity, 
describing daily life as leisurely and delightful.  He praised the house as “large, airy and 
commodious, with lengthy piazzas, in which we walk a great deal” and lauded the food as 
“extremely palatable and wholesome.  Eggs and muffins, for breakfast and supper, and boiled 
beef, or mutton, with soup, for dinner and occasionally we indulge ourselves with tea....Altho 
this mode of living is so very different from what I have been accustomed to, yet it agrees 
with me extremely well.  I never enjoyed better health in my life.”470  Americans reading 
these letters might actually envy the officers’ living conditions and wonder if they really 
wanted to be rescued!  Captivity seemed like a restful and restorative vacation.  To be sure, 
not all the officers were happy.  Midshipman James Renshaw complained that house arrest 
made him stir-crazy “beyond comprehension”—he referred to it as “Solitary imprisonment” 
and wished he could “have been put to hard labour” so that he “could feel the fresh air, which 
is so essential to human nature.”471  Nevertheless, the officers had an entirely different 
captivity experience from the ordinary seamen because the bashaw honored European 
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standards for the treatment of officers.  Renshaw, for one, was surprised at the lack of 
brutality shown the officers; he did not anticipate “lenity…from a Barbary Prince.”  Readers 
of the officers’ letters back in the United States must have been surprised to learn about their 
comfortable living situation since reports of captivity in Algiers in the 1780s and 1790s were 
mostly negative (as discussed in chapter 2).472 
News of the Philadelphia loss and the hostage situation cast a slight pall upon the 
public.  In Boston, a new theatrical production about the Tripolitan War lacked the 
triumphalist title of previous shows and acknowledged the vulnerability of U.S. forces in the 
Mediterranean:  it was entitled “Jack in Distress; Or, Preparations for a Cruize against the 
Tripolitans.”473  Toasts also changed from earlier years—now Americans seemed less 
confident about winning and ardently desired the liberation of the hostages.  For instance, a 
Pennsylvania militia group toasted “our captive brethren in Tripoli—may they support with 
republican firmness the sufferings of a barbarian prison, and their sufferings be short.”474  A 
Virginia group wished for a “speedy relief to our brethren now suffering in Tripolitan 
bondage,”475 while attendees at a public dinner in Boston played the song “Galley Slave” in 
honor of “our brethren in captivity at Tripoli:—May their hopes lighten their hearts; and their 
country’s sympathy break their chains.”476  A celebration in honor of the Louisiana Purchase 
(held in Pennsylvania) included a toast to “a speedy release to our fellow citizens prisoners at 
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Tripoli.”477  Americans throughout the country empathized with the Philadelphia captives 
and deemed their imprisonment a national calamity. 
Yet the loss of the Philadelphia and the enslavement of the crew also redoubled the 
public’s commitment to the Tripolitan War—they wanted to annihilate the enemy and rescue 
the hostages (as opposed to paying ransom).  In Charleston, a group toasted “the Navy of the 
United States—May the squadron about to be dispatched to the Mediterranean soon give the 
‘retort courteous’ to the barbarians of Tripoli, and relieve our unfortunate brethren of the 
Philadelphia from captivity.”478  A militia regiment in Pennsylvania drank to “our infant 
navy—may they convince the Bey of Tripoli, that American cannon balls, when used, are 
excellent negotiators”479  Another group in Pennsylvania wanted the U.S. Navy’s 
“thundering cannon [to] hurl destruction on the savage Tripolitans,” 480 while a celebration in 
Boston included a toast to “the pirates of Tripoli—May their hostility be rewarded with the 
Naval Stripes of American Justice.”481  These toasting Americans cared deeply about 
avenging national honor and hoped that their government would respond to the Philadelphia 
loss with overwhelming force. 
 
Meanwhile in the Mediterranean, the Tripolitan War showed no sign of ending soon.  In 
January 1804 Preble discussed terms with Yusuf, who was willing to trade the Philadelphia 
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for another ship and to sell the captives for $500 each.482  The bashaw also insisted upon 
annual tribute, however, which Preble adamantly rejected since he feared “it would stimulate 
the avarice of the other Barbary Powers and probably induce them to make War upon us.”  
Preble did gain some negotiating leverage, though, when he captured a Tripolitan ship 
carrying soldiers, slaves, and tribute to Constantinople.  Preble kept the vessel as a prize 
(renaming it the Intrepid) and dropped off the forty-three black slaves and the rest of the 
crew (except for “Eight of the Principal Officers, who are of too much consequence to be 
trusted out of our sight”) at Syracuse.483  Preble then received word from the bashaw’s agent 
at Malta that peace could be made if the he traded a ship for the Philadelphia, exchanged the 
sixty Tripolitan hostages for an equal amount of Philadelphia captives, and paid $100,000 in 
ransom for the rest of them.484  No deal was made, though, and Preble feared that victory 
would only become more difficult to achieve.  As he warned Smith, “the Barbary Powers are 
daily increasing their Naval force, and will soon become powerful, if not seasonably 
checked.”485 
Since Yusuf was in no hurry to make peace, Preble and his Lieutenant Stephen 
Decatur conceived of a bold plan to rattle him:  U.S. forces would destroy the Philadelphia in 
order to prevent the Tripolitans from outfitting it for their navy.  Under the cover of night, 
Decatur and a crew of sixty would use the Intrepid to sail next to the Philadelphia, board the 
ship and light it on fire, and then escape.   One officer who participated, Ralph Izard, wrote to 
                                                          
482 Preble to Smith, January 17, 1804, Naval Documents III: 337-338. 
 
483 Preble diary, January 28, 1804, Ibid., III: 371; Preble diary, January 30, 1804, Ibid., III: 374; Preble log 
book, January 30, 1804, Ibid., III: 374; Preble to Smith, March 11, 1804, Ibid., III: 485. 
 
484 Preble to Smith, February 3, 1804, Ibid., III: 385. 
 
485 Preble to Smith, March 11, 1804, Ibid., III: 487. 
166 
 
his mother shortly before the mission to express his hope that Yusuf would even die in the 
attack:  “we shall astonish the Bashaws weak mind with the noise of shot falling about his 
ears.  Perhaps some shot ‘more lucky than the rest may reach his heart’ & free our 
countrymen from Slavery.”486   Notably, Izard quoted a line from Joseph Addison’s 1713 
play Cato that was spoken by a character (Sempronius) who supports using military force 
against Caesar.  Sempronius reflects upon the advantages of killing the leader:  “Perhaps 
some arm, more lucky than the rest,/ May reach his heart, and free the world from 
bondage.”487  Unless Izard took a copy of the play with him to the Mediterranean, he had 
memorized this quotation.  Cato, as other scholars have discussed, was a popular play during 
the American Revolution and a personal favorite of George Washington’s.488  American 
patriots celebrated its theme of resisting tyranny in order to defend republican values.  Izard 
considered Cato’s message applicable to the Tripolitan War since the United States was 
opposing a ruler who held power over the lives of 300 American men and who rejected the 
notion of free trade in the Mediterranean. 
U.S. forces had high hopes for the attack and it succeeded marvelously—the 
Philadelphia was set on fire and burned beyond repair.  In a letter to his mother, Izard 
discussed the use of deception to gain the trust of the Tripolitan watchmen on board the 
Philadelphia:  the Intrepid “hoisted English colors” and the Americans claimed they were 
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“from Malta & had been in a gale of wind & had lost our anchors.”489  Once close enough, 
they boarded the Philadelphia and attacked:  “about 20 [Tripolitans] were cut to pieces & the 
rest jumped overboard….We have taken one poor creature who I am affraid will not 
recover.”  Izard considered it “astonishing” that no Americans were hurt and a “miracle” that 
the Intrepid did not catch on fire.  Preble, in a letter to a U.S. diplomat, mentioned that some 
of the Tripolitans “ran below & perished in the flames, but the greatest part jumped 
overboard.”490  Both Izard and Preble depicted the Tripolitans as cowardly for preferring to 
try to swim to safety or to die by self-immolation.  Izard pitied his enemies (viewing the 
hostage as a harmless “poor creature”) and both officers considered Tripolitans easily 
overmatched by superior American warriors. 
Although the mission succeeded, the destruction of the Philadelphia failed to turn the 
tide of the war.  Yusuf resolved to keep fighting and Preble vowed to oppose Tripoli to the 
best of his ability.  As he declared to Robert Smith, “my heart is fixed on obliging [the 
bashaw] to sue for Peace….I had rather spend my life in the Mediterranean than we should 
ever consent” to pay “a cent for Peace or Tribute.”491  The U.S. Navy continued to target 
Tripolitan ships and, in April 1804, captured vessels that had attempted to sneak through the 
blockade.  The Nautilus seized a ship with building supplies and eight Tripolitans, while the 
Syren took two vessels:  a Greek ship with weapons, ammunition, and seventy-five Turkish 
soldiers and a Tripolitan ship with military supplies and 6,000 gallons of oil.  Despite these 
accomplishments, though, Preble felt pessimistic about the state of the Tripolitan War.  He 
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warned the Jefferson Administration that “the Bashaw is daily gaining strength—he has now 
14 Gun-Boats—and a Gang of Carpenters from Spain are building him several more—He is 
also building several new Batteries to the East and West of the Town on which he employs 
all the Crew of the Philadelphia.”492 
Despite the limited impact of the Philadelphia’s destruction, the American public 
deemed it a monumental accomplishment and one of their country’s finest victories.  News 
of it reached the United States in May and more than four dozen newspapers printed Preble’s 
ecstatic February 7th letter that described the attack.  The commodore stressed that it “was 
impossible” to have tried to tow the Philadelphia away and he showered praise upon 
Decatur—“in a gallant and officer-like manner, [he] boarded and carried her against all 
opposition....He had NONE killed, and only one wounded.  The Tripolitans had between 
twenty and thirty men killed on the deck.493  Clearly, Democratic-Republican newspaper 
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editors would publish letters from the Mediterranean if they bore good news—they just 
preferred to ignore ones that could potentially make the Jefferson Administration look bad.  
Another letter (from an anonymous Philadelphia midshipman) that was published by 
newspapers in five states depicted the burning as “a grand, an awful sight….She burned a 
long time with great fury.”494  He added that this bold action uplifted the Philadelphia crew’s 
spirits:  it was “viewed by us with infinite delight, as it destroyed the hopes the Bashaw 
entertained, of [the Philadelphia] being a valuable acquisition to the navy.—Thank heaven, 
he has been disappointed!—Thus perish the hopes of the tyrant of Tripoli.”  These first-hand 
accounts stressed extraordinary heroism and drama—the Americans had outsmarted and 
outfought their adversaries.  Moreover, since newspapers from both parties published them, 
Americans throughout the country could easily learn about naval triumphs and rejoice in the 
navy. 
Such reports led to an outpouring of patriotic sentiment in newspapers and at 
celebrations.  A Maryland newspaper argued that the current batch of naval officers and 
seamen had proved themselves the equals of Revolutionary War soldiers.  It exclaimed that 
“we feel a glow of pride to find that the sons of the heroes of our revolutionary war have 
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proved themselves worthy of their sires.”495  Newspapers in three states published an article 
that celebrated the Philadelphia burning and called for an extensive naval recruitment effort:  
the United States could cut “a splendid figure” and be “formidable…to the world” since “we 
have a host of brave DECATURS walking our streets, or shooting partridges, or idle and 
unemployed who would in a few years erect an insuperable barrier between us and the 
violence and injustice of the old world.”496  This article suggested that Decatur was not 
unique, that other young men had the potential to achieve greatness if given the opportunity.  
In contrast to Jefferson’s views, these articles celebrated the navy as a positive good.  Far 
from being a threat to civil liberties, it served as an ideal training ground for young men. 
At Fourth of July celebrations, Americans hailed Decatur as the country’s greatest 
living naval hero while also remembering the suffering of the Philadelphia hostages.  The 
Society of Cincinnati in Philadelphia prioritized the captives in their toasts, first drinking to 
“our brethren in Tripoli—A speedy deliverance to them from captivity upon honourable 
terms” and then to “Lieut. Decatur and his brave companions.—May their gallant conduct be 
duly appreciated.”497  Similarly, a Philadelphia artillery group hoped that the hostages would 
“soon breathe the genial air of freedom” and hailed “Stephen Decatur, junr. and his brave 
companions” as “American heroes of the Tripolitan harbor.”498  A party in Keene, New 
Hampshire first toasted “our brethren, prisoners in Tripoli—may they speedily be released 
from their captivity to painful to themselves, and so disgraceful to our country” before 
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drinking to “the Navy—too small even for economy—may it become powerful enough to 
protect our Commerce and Navigation.”499  A gathering of mechanics in Baltimore offered a 
brief toast to “the army and navy of the United States” but gave a more elaborate one to “our 
unfortunate countrymen in captivity in Tripoli—may they soon be restored to their country 
and friends.”500  A group of young men in Trenton, New Jersey waxed poetic in their toasts, 
drinking both to “Capt. Bainbridge and his captured crew—‘Your country’s gratitude shall 
twine around/ Your suffering brows bright honor’s laurel wreath,/ And make your 
recompence a glorious name’” and to “Liuet. Decatur and his gallant comrades—‘Our 
country calls,/We’ll plunge into the bosom of the deep,/ Or rush through fire, or face the 
hungry lion.’”  This group also paused to remember a local man who was among the 
hostages:  “our Townsman, Lieutenant Theodore Hunt—a captive in Tripoli—May he soon 
be restored to the arms of his Family and Country.”501  Although overjoyed at the navy’s 
heroism, the public did not lose perspective—they bitterly lamented that Tripoli held 300 of 
their countrymen prisoner.  Unlike most Democratic-Republican newspapers, participants at 
Fourth of July celebrations readily acknowledged the hostage situation. 
A new surge of patriotic entertainments followed news of the Philadelphia’s 
destruction, which allowed audiences to vicariously experience the thrill of victory.  A New 
York production entitled “HARLEQUIN VOLUNTEER, or, Valor Rewarded” offered a 
heavy dose of nationalism.  It featured “preparations for the Re-Capture of the Frigate 
PHILADELPHIA,” a “procession in honor of the VICTORY gained by the American 
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Seamen, under the command of Capt. DECATUR, over the Tripolitan Corsairs,” and a finale 
consisting of “a new PATRIOTIC SONG and Chorus, By the gallant crew, bearing the 
American Flag Triumphant.”502  Another show, in Boston, promised a visual extravaganza.  
Entitled “AMERICAN HEROISM, or—Burning the Philadelphia Frigate” and dedicated to 
“Captain DECATUR, and his Gallant Crew,” it featured “a distant view of Tripoli, and its 
Rocky Coast,” the “Bashaw’s Battery, Row Boats,” and other sites.  It also reenacted “the 
Action of Boarding in the Ketch intrepid” and the “burning and destroying” of the 
Philadelphia “with Marches, Songs and Chorus.”503  These hyper-patriotic performances 
offered attendees the opportunity to bond with fellow citizens through a joyous veneration of 
the U.S. Navy.  Moreover, beyond commemorating the Tripolitan War, these plays 
reinforced the notion of the navy as a positive good—it brought glory to the country and did 
not threaten domestic liberties. 
Celebrations also included musical interpretations of the Tripolitan War.  In New 
York, an epic concert featured music that pondered the loss and destruction of the 
Philadelphia (figure 1).504  With twelve songs, it was a well-thought-out piece designed to 
create emotional highs and lows among listeners.  The abundance of cultural events reveals 
that public engagement with the Tripolitan War went beyond simply reading newspaper 
articles—Americans created and attended artistic representations of it.  Since Americans 
rarely (if ever) travelled to North Africa for tourism, attending these events constituted the 
best means of approximating the experience of being in Tripoli.  Paradoxically, the Tripolitan 
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War helped to bring communities together while increasing tension between the political 
parties. 
Indeed, Democratic-Republicans and Federalists both believed that much was at stake 
with news of each naval victory or setback.  
Regarding the Philadelphia destruction, 
Democratic-Republican newspapers hailed it as a 
vindication of Jefferson’s policies and evidence of 
his superiority to previous (Federalist) presidents.  
A Boston newspaper contrasted the triumphs of the 
navy under the Jefferson Administration to its 
shortcomings during the John Adams 
Administration.  “The late success” of the navy, it 
claimed, “ought to silence those restless beings, 
who are continually talking of the pusillanimity of 
our government….We might look back to the 
period when a much larger force had never effected such important enterprizes against the 
mauarduers on those seas; and contrast former with present times.”505  The paper criticized 
Adams for not sending the navy to the Mediterranean, but oddly made no mention of the 
Quasi-War with France (which occupied the navy during his presidency).  Likewise, an 
article published in three states proclaimed Jefferson a more effective commander-in-chief 
than his immediate predecessor:  “‘The Navy is crumbling to nothing’—say the federalists, 
altho’ the present government are calling more of the ships into actual service than was 
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contemplated by the naval peace establishment, adopted by Mr. Adams; are building more 
vessels and vigorously prosecuting the war against the piratical states of Barbary, thereby 
punishing their treachery, instead of rewarding of tribute.”506  Similarly, a Maryland 
newspaper reminded “the friends of the Constitution of the United States, and all concerned 
in the public welfare” that Jefferson, unlike Washington and Adams, had chosen to “send a 
force into the Mediterranean, rather than to grant…another cent for tribute.”507  An article 
published in several states claimed that although the naval officers were Federalist, they 
supported Jefferson since they “resent with indignation the calumnies cast on the 
administration” by Federalists in the United States.508  This article distorted the truth 
somewhat—although the officers obeyed the instructions of the Jefferson Administration, 
some strongly disagreed with its Tripolitan War policies (as discussed above).  Regardless, 
Democratic-Republican newspaper editors considered the Philadelphia destruction as a 
godsend—it allowed them to make positive comparisons between the leadership of Jefferson 
and his Federalist presidential predecessors and to distract the public from the ongoing 
hostage situation. 
Other Democratic-Republican newspapers indulged in grandiose claims that the 
burning of the Philadelphia would signal the end of the war and that news would soon arrive 
about Tripoli’s surrender.  A Boston newspaper exclaimed that “perhaps at this moment the 
town and harbor of Tripoli, are in our possession, and the crew of our captured frigates are 
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liberated and congratulating each other upon an important victory gained over their 
enemies.”509  A Philadelphia newspaper suggested that “the loss of the Tripolitans had been 
so great as to create hopes of an immediate termination of hostilities.”510  Similarly, multiple 
publications praised Preble for “destroying nearly one half” of Tripoli’s navy (an 
exaggeration) and remarked that “every day’s mail may be expected to bring us intelligence 
of the full infliction of an adequate punishment on the Bey, of the restoration of peace, and, 
we hope, of the liberation of our captive citizens.”511  In the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives, Nathaniel Morton gave a laudatory speech that portrayed the Tripolitan War 
as essentially over.  He praised Jefferson for “a prompt and judicious disposition of our naval 
force” in order to “dictate terms of peace to some of the Barbary powers” and “render 
harmless the hostility of others.”512  Notably, Morton omitted the troubling reality that the 
bashaw held 300 Americans hostage.  Morton’s speech drew a stern rebuke by a Federalist 
newspaper editor who called it “Barbarous” and criticized it for ignoring both “our poor 
brethren under the bastinado” and that fact that Preble (“a Federalist”) made peace with 
Morocco, not Jefferson.513  This premature celebrating by pro-Jefferson newspapers 
resembles President George W. Bush’s standing beneath a “Mission Accomplished” banner 
in May 2003 and announcing that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended.”514  
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Democratic-Republican newspaper editors tried to spin the lengthy delays in receiving news 
to their party’s advantage and encouraged Americans to celebrate as if total victory was 
imminent.  
Democratic-Republican publications also utilized the Philadelphia destruction for 
partisan purposes by declaring that Federalist newspaper editors would not celebrate this 
triumph because of their hatred for President Jefferson.  A Maryland newspaper predicted 
that Federalist publications would treat the event “with as much silence and in as much 
obscurity as a thief attempting to make his escape in the darkness of night, because the 
enterprize was atchieved under the administration of Thomas Jefferson.  Men, however, who 
are really patriotic, will not view in this naval exploit any thing of party.”515  Similarly, a 
Massachusetts newspaper claimed that Federalists rejoiced when Tripoli captured the 
Philadelphia (“they were pleased to honor [Jefferson] with their highest panegyricks, their 
most elaborate and unqualified encomiums”) but would refuse to celebrate Decatur’s 
heroism:  “not a word is uttered.  All is hush as midnight.”516  Such accusations were not 
quite true—Federalist newspapers did publish letters from the Mediterranean that celebrated 
the Philadelphia’s destruction (as discussed above).  Generally, Democratic-Republican 
newspaper editors were less concerned with accurate reporting than in wielding the 
Tripolitan War as a weapon to crush their rivals.  The destruction of the Philadelphia revived 
the confidence and cockiness of Democratic-Republican newspaper editors and they sought 
to put Federalists on the defensive. 
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Many Federalist publications refrained from printing effusive editorial commentary 
about the Philadelphia’s destruction.  Some editors struck a balance by praising the navy’s 
heroism while remaining critical of Jefferson’s overall handling of the Tripolitan War.  A 
New York newspaper acclaimed the “parcel of young intrepid federalists” in the navy for 
destroying the Philadelphia while criticizing the president for the loss of the ship in the first 
place.517  Shrewdly, the newspaper associated the heroic feat with the Federalist Party by 
asserting that the naval officers and crew members belonged to it.  Another newspaper 
defended both Federalist publications (they did not omit “any merited eulogies from the 
brave officers & tars of our little navy) and the legitimacy of criticism of Jefferson’s 
Tripolitan War policies.518  “Good ground for high censure” existed, it argued, since the 
conflict had already cost “between two and three millions of money…the Philadelphia 
Frigate is lost,” and “several hundreds of our brethren have long been in captivity.”  To be 
sure, not all Federalist newspapers applauded the navy—a Boston newspaper viewed the 
current state of the Tripolitan War pessimistically, contending that “the Barbary Rovers have 
part of our fleet….There is nothing known in the world so despicable and diminutive as our 
Navy….We rank below the Bashaw of Tripoli.  His means are not great but his spirit is.”519 
Some Federalist publications sought to counter the triumphalism in Democratic-
Republican newspapers by drawing attention to the ongoing hostage situation in Tripoli.  An 
article published in two states declared that “the voice of our country, and humanity” 
demanded the “immediate” liberation of the captives.  If it did not happen, “it is you alone 
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Mr. Jefferson who stands responsible for the miserable continuance in prisons and in chains 
of the officers and crew of the frigate Philadelphia.”520  This article resounded with righteous 
anger and portrayed Jefferson as not caring about the sailors, whose lives he put at risk in the 
Mediterranean.  A Boston publication reminded readers that the U.S. Navy had “lost one of 
[its] best frigates” and that Tripoli held hundreds of Americans hostage (it erred by giving the 
number as 400).521  Another article resembled Democratic-Republican comparisons of 
Washington, Adams, and Jefferson, but spoke highly of the Federalist presidents.  It declared 
that “it excites the sympathetic-feelings of our nature to reflect on the imprisonment of our 
citizens on the Barbary Coast.  It is now many long months since they have been detained, 
and we do not learn of any efficient measures taken by our government to have them 
liberated.  Had the policy of Washington and Adams been pursued, a navy of sufficient force 
in the Mediterranean would have prevented the capture—but a penny wise parsimony has 
brought about an event, to remedy which would perhaps defray the expense of a small but 
handsome addition to our sea forces.”522  This article presented the Federalists as realists who 
would take the necessary steps to safeguard the lives of sailors against the Barbary pirates.  It 
wanted to make readers nostalgic for the Washington and Adams years by recasting these 
presidents as devoted to robust national defense (it conveniently ignored the reality that both 
presidents paid tribute to the Barbary States). 
The federal government concurred with the public about the praiseworthiness of the 
destruction of the Philadelphia.  In November, Congress passed a resolution that authorized 
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the president to give Decatur a commemorative sword and that provided two months’ extra 
pay for Decatur and his crew.523  The bill passed nearly unanimously in the House of 
Representatives (104 to 2), as both Federalists and Democratic-Republican politicians agreed 
about the propriety of celebrating their heroism.524  The two congressmen who voted against 
the measure received the wrath of several newspaper editors—their names were printed 
(William Butler, a Democratic-Republican from South Carolina and Richard Stanford, a 
Democratic-Republican from South Carolina) and some slandered them as “democrats” or 
“Jacobins.”525  Decatur also received a promotion, becoming a captain.526  While the heroism 
of Decatur and his crew is self-evident, there was something odd about the extensive 
celebration of the Philadelphia’s destruction.  The navy’s success meant that the United 
States had permanently lost a ship from its fleet—no efforts could be made to recapture or 
trade for it. 
As for President Jefferson, his Annual Message in November 1804 touched on the 
Tripolitan War in a controversial manner.  He noted the “reenforcements” (naval ships) sent 
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to the Mediterranean and hoped that the U.S. Navy would “reduce the barbarians of Tripoli 
to the desire of peace on proper terms.”527  Notably, the president did not mention the 
ongoing hostage situation.  Speaking on the eve of the 1804 elections, Jefferson wanted to 
inspire confidence in his leadership and not give voters a reason to oppose him.  This 
omission did not pass unnoticed.  In his diary, Senator William Plumer (Federalist—NH) 
expressed his disappointment in Jefferson:  “why is the President altogether silent respecting 
our brave seamen who for a year have been close prisoners in Tripoli?  Why has the crew of 
the Philadelphia, been suffered thus long to remain, not only in a state of captivity, but of 
actual slavery, with the barbarous Tripolitans?  Not for the want of money to redeem 
them,—for we are told the treasury is full.  Why are we amused with stories of wild land 
purchased of the Indians—of building gun-boats & no care, no attention paid to these 
suffering seamen?”528  Plumer believed that Jefferson was either being dishonest with the 
public or had his priorities backwards.  Instead of focusing on his pet issues, why wasn’t he 
ending the suffering of the hostages?  If the government had the financial means, what was 
he waiting for? 
Newspapers also attacked Jefferson for neglecting the Philadelphia captives in his 
annual message.  Publications in two states deemed it “not a little extraordinary, that no 
notice is here taken of the imprisoned Americans in Tripoli” and criticized the president for 
not offering any specific “measures...to restore our enslaved brethren to the blessings of 
freedom.”529  Similarly, A Virginia newspaper lambasted Jefferson for not including “a 
                                                          
527 Thomas Jefferson, Fourth Annual Message, November 8, 1804, The American Presidency Project, 
University of California at Santa Barbara, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29446. 
 
528 Plumer, November 8, 1804, 193. 
 
529 New-York Spectator (New York, NY), November 14, 1804; United States’ Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), 
November 15, 1804.  From the New-York Evening Post (New York, NY). 
181 
 
single word respecting our unfortunate fellow-citizens, who are pining in the prisons of 
Tripoli….not a syllable is given to the sufferings of our gallant seamen, not a ray of 
comfort….They may perish in captivity and their families may languish in want, without 
exciting the sympathy of an administration…whose ingratitude and fallacious economy 
protract their bondage.”  The article depicted Jefferson as a materialist whose obsession with 
saving money made him callous to saving the hostages:  he “neither appreciates their worth, 
nor commiserates their misfortune” and only cared about putting “the political skeleton 
economy in a dress that may captivate the crowd, and deceive the superficial observer—for to 
the eye of the discerning and independent citizen, this skeleton offers nothing but 
dissatisfaction and disgust.”530  This article utilized gruesome gendered rhetoric in portraying 
the president as willfully deceiving the public—he trumpeted ideas that may sound beautiful, 
but led to a hideous reality.  A Massachusetts newspaper criticized Jefferson for claiming that 
the United States was at “‘peace with THE WORLD’” even though “many of our unfortunate 
countrymen are now held in chains of slavery by the barbarians of Tripoli.”531  Newspapers 
in two states also chided the president for giving a misleading account of Barbary relations 
since “one of our finest frigates is lost, and her officers and crew shut up in dungeons by a 
contemptible but inhuman foe!  lost to their friends and connections, and LOST IN THE 
MEMORY OF THE SYMPATHETIC JEFFERSON!”532  By not addressing the ongoing 
hostage situation (which deeply resonated with the public), Jefferson provided an easy 
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opening for Federalist attacks.  To Federalists, the president’s Annual Message constituted 
additional proof that he was insufficiently concerned with the Tripolitan War. 
Evidence suggests that Jefferson intentionally omitted the hostage situation from his 
speech.  Madison, in a “private” April 1804 letter, stated that the president wanted to avoid 
appearing too anxious to ransom the captives lest he embolden the Barbary States “to repeat 
their aggressions.”533  Being too eager to liberate the hostages would hurt “the public good.”  
Instead, the Jefferson Administration preferred to rely on France to “interpose in their 
behalf.”  Madison would begrudgingly tolerate private ransom efforts, but he disliked them 
since they “have a tendency to protract the sufferings of those unhappy men.”  As discussed 
in chapter 2, Jefferson’s strategy in the 1780s of appearing apathetic towards the captives in 
Algiers utterly failed to give the United States any leverage with the Dey of Algiers.  Further, 
relying upon France for mediation with Algiers had failed as well.  Why did Jefferson think 
that these two tactics would work now?  Had he not learned from his previous experiences?  
Regardless, none of the Philadelphia captives were freed via private ransom efforts and the 
French consul provided little help (as discussed above). 
 
Meanwhile in the Mediterranean, the U.S. Navy prepared for a large assault upon Tripoli in 
August 1804.  Preble bolstered his squadron by procuring six gun boats, two bomb vessels, 
weapons, supplies, and ninety-six seamen from the King of Naples.  These developments 
pleased Bainbridge greatly and he communicated sensitive intelligence to Preble via invisible 
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ink (lime juice) that became readable when heated over fire.534  Bainbridge loved the idea of 
bombarding the capital city, telling Preble that the populace would flee and that the bashaw 
“would be induced to come to moderate terms.”535  However, Richard O’Brien (the longtime 
diplomat in North Africa) thought that defeating Tripoli would be difficult.  In an August 1st 
letter to Madison, he listed Tripoli’s sizeable fleet (nineteen gunboats and six larger ships), 
noted that Tripoli had “very Strong and important Castles,” and warned that the bashaw 
believed that the United States would “finally get tired and give him the Extint of his 
demands.”536 
On August 3rd, the U.S. squadron dealt Tripoli’s navy a resounding defeat:  it 
captured three Tripolitan gun boats, sank a ship, killed forty-four Tripolitans, and took fifty-
two prisoners (three of whom died).537  Decatur once again excelled, taking the three gun 
boats and later remarking that “some of the Turks died like men, but much the greater 
number like women.”538  Regrettably he did not specify what constituted dying like a woman, 
but judging from other battle accounts perhaps it entailed attempting to flee rather than 
engaging the Americans.  Yet Decatur himself nearly died in hand-to-hand combat—he was 
pinned down and saved from a potentially lethal blow to his head when an American sailor 
thrust his own head forward to intercept the sword.539  Remarkably, the U.S. Navy lost no 
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ships, only thirteen Americans were wounded, and just one American died (James Decatur, 
the younger brother of Stephen).  His death greatly angered the officers and seamen due to its 
circumstances— as Preble described, James Decatur was “treacherously shot through the 
head by the captain of the boat that had surrendered.”540  In Tripoli, captive Jonathan 
Cowdery (a doctor) aided the war effort.  “Ordered to dress the wound” of an injured 
Tripolitan, Cowdery “amputated all his fingers but one, with a dull knife, and dressed them in 
a bungling manner, in hopes of losing my credit as a surgeon…for I expected to have my 
hands full of wounded Turks in consequence of the exploits of my brave countryman.”541  
Although the U.S. Navy had clearly overwhelmed Tripoli’ forces, the victory offered no 
lasting significance.  Yusuf did not surrender. 
For Preble, this victory was bittersweet since he learned of his dismissal by the 
Jefferson Administration.  As Smith explained, because only captains could command 
frigates “we of necessity have been obliged to send out two Gentlemen senior to yourself in 
Commission” in the new squadron (which arrived in September).542  In replacing Preble with 
Samuel Barron, Jefferson did a great service to Tripoli—Preble was the most aggressive of 
the American commodores who led the squadron in the Tripolitan War.543  Preble expressed 
his sorrow in his diary:  “how much my feelings are lacerated by this supercedure at the 
                                                          
540 Preble to Smith, August 3, 1804, Naval Documents IV: 295. 
 
541 Cowdery, August 5, 1804, 171. 
 
542 Smith to Preble, May 22, 1804, Naval Documents IV: 115.  The two senior captains sent to the 
Mediterranean in the new squadron were Samuel Barron and John Rodgers. 
 
543 The title of “commodore” referred to a captain who commanded two or more ships in a squadron or had 
extraordinary duties to fulfill.  According to the U.S. Navy, the designation of commodore was “an honorary 
title” and not an official rank.  Naval History and Heritage Command, http://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-
topic/organization-and-administration/ranks/naval-traditions-names-of-rank/officer/commodore.html (accessed 
December 17, 2015). 
 
185 
 
moment of Victory cannot be described and can be felt only by an Officer placed in my 
mortifying situation.”544  To Bainbridge, Preble confessed his dejection at not “liberat[ing] 
yourself, Officers & Crew while in command; be assured no exertion on my part has been 
wanting which our Government, and the forces under my command would justify.”545  Yet 
Preble was also proud of what he had accomplished, averring to a British official that “these 
Barbarians never have suffered more from any Christian power.”546  He wished, however, 
that the federal government had provided more ships.  As he told Secretary of the Navy 
Robert Smith, “our naval establishment is so limited as to deprive me of the means and glory 
of completely subduing the haughty tyrant of Tripoli.”547  Before he returned to the United 
States, Preble made a final earnest effort to negotiate a peace treaty, offering $100,000 for 
ransom, a $10,000 consular present, and a $10,000 gift for the Prime Minister and Tripolitan 
officers.548  The bashaw, however, declined.  Yusuf was fighting to prove a point:  America 
needed to show him respect.  The United States would either have to pay a larger sum or 
continue to fight. 
Preble’s recall flabbergasted observers—many wrote him to express their 
condolences and admiration.  Fifty-three U.S. naval officers signed a warm letter that 
stressed “the very high estimation in which we hold you as an officer and commander” and 
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their “deep regret” at his “supercedure.”549  Also, European officials thought very highly of 
Preble—under his leadership, the reputation of the U.S. Navy soared.  The British Governor 
of Malta, Sir Alexander Ball, expressed his personal “regret” at Preble’s recall and praised 
him for “setting so distinguished an example to your countrymen whose bravery and 
enterprize cannot fail to mark the character of a great & rising nation.”550  Pope Pius VII 
lionized Preble, proclaiming that “with a small force and in a short space of time, [he] has 
done more for the cause of Christianity than the most powerful nations of Christendom have 
done for ages!”551  The eminent British Admiral Lord Nelson lauded the burning of the 
Philadelphia as the “the most bold and daring act of the age,”552 while the governor of 
Syracuse told Preble that the Court “manifests the highest gratification…on account of your 
success.”553 
Before relinquishing command, Preble launched further attacks on Tripoli—with 
mixed success.  On August 24th, the navy sunk two Tripolitan gunboats and one galliott.554  
Four days later, the navy sunk another gunboat, although three Americans were killed and 
another severely wounded in this attack.555  Two Philadelphia captives reported that the 
August 28th attacks damaged “a grate Many houses,” “killed several” Tripolitans, and “drove 
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them entirely out of three” batteries.556  Cowdery concurred that “the damage done to the 
town was considerable….Many men were killed and wounded.”557  However, the attacks 
inflicted no lasting damage on Tripoli’s navy—a Turkish ambassador informed Preble that 
the three sunk shups had been repaired.558  Another attack failed in spectacular fashion—on 
September 4th, thirteen Americans tried to sneak into Tripoli’s harbor on the Intrepid, light 
the ship on fire (it was loaded with about one-hundred barrels of powder and one-hundred-
fifty shells), and then escape on two rowboats.559  However, the Intrepid exploded 
prematurely, killing all on board, damaging three Tripolitan gun-boats, and sinking another.  
The cause of the explosion will never be fully known.  Perhaps the explosives combusted 
accidentally, but Preble and others suspected that the crew had noticed some Tripolitan 
vessels approaching and blew themselves up deliberately since they had vowed to avoid 
being captured and enslaved.560  Although the mission technically failed, the Intrepid crew’s 
courage greatly impressed their peers (as one remarked, “What a Noble Death”561) and, as 
will be seen, the public lionized them as heroic martyrs. 
Although Preble’s attacks on the town appeared impressive, they accomplished little.  
Nicholas Nissen, the Danish consul in Tripoli, observed that “all the attacks” except those of 
August 3rd “have had very little effect & the damage done is absolutely of no 
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consequence.”562  Nissen considered bombarding the town pointless because the bashaw did 
not “care much about his Town or his Subjects’ life” and believed that Preble’s combination 
of negotiating and attacking simply made Yusuf “more obstinate.”563  Bainbridge remarked 
to Commodore Barron about the difficulty of destroying the city of Tripoli:  since the houses 
were made of “stone and mud and badly furnished… the damage in Bombarding cannot be as 
great as if it was otherwise.”564  The attacks on the town actually made life more miserable 
for the Philadelphia captives—while taking a morning walk, Cowdery saw them “chained to 
a cart loaded with stones which they were dragging through the town to repair the 
fortifications.”565  In his journal, Cowdery also discussed an August meeting with Yusuf, in 
which he mocked the U.S. Navy.  The bashaw boasted “that for two dollars he could repair 
all the damages that the bombardment did to his town; that but one man was hurt by the 
shells; that what he had been offered for the American prisoners was but fifty dollars per 
man; that he would make them earn that sum in two months.”566  Although the bashaw surely 
exaggerated to some extent and adopted an air of bravado, he clearly was not ready to 
capitulate and he slept safely in “his bomb proof room.”567  Cowdery emphasized that the 
August 24th attacks particularly emboldened Tripolitan resistance—shells fired by U.S. ships 
“all fell short of the mark.  Such attempts served rather to encourage than to intimidate the 
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Tripolitans; and the Bashaw was in high spirits on the occasion.”568  Clearly, Tripoli was 
easy to damage, but hard to defeat. 
Nevertheless, upon returning to the United States Preble received a hero’s welcome.  
In March, Philadelphians threw him “a sumptuous entertainment…at Mrs. Hardy’s hotel” 
that “upwards of sixty gentlemen” attended.  The company offered several Tripolitan War 
toasts, hailing Preble as “our gallant Guest—he reaps the grateful reward of his honorable 
services, in the esteem and affection of his country” and remembering both those “who have 
fallen in the Tripolitan War” and “our brave Tars, prisoners in Tripoli.”569  Bostonians threw 
him a dinner that featured an all-star guest list, including ex-president John Adams, John 
Quincy Adams, and Roger Dana (the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court).  A 
toast at this celebration declared Preble the shining star of the U.S. Navy:  “our Hero before 
Tripoli; may the laurels he has gained in the Old World, be long the pride of the New.”570  
Congress was equally impressed with Preble’s accomplishments, passing a resolution in 
March 1805 that awarded him a gold medal as a commendation for “the several attacks on 
the town, batteries and naval force of Tripoli.”571 
Despite Preble’s glowing reception, newspapers praised the August attacks less 
effusively than they had previous naval triumphs because Yusuf still had not surrendered.  
Since Commodore Barron would not attack during the winter (due to the roughness of the 
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marines of the squadron.” 
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Mediterranean Sea), the public knew that the Tripolitan War would drag on for at least 
another year.572  Also, the fact that several U.S. naval officers had died in the summer 1804 
attacks (unlike previous victories) tempered public enthusiasm.  Many Federalist newspapers 
published mournful tributes to the officers, including an article that appeared in five states 
which urged Americans to remember the fallen heroes of the Tripolitan War and not just the 
living ones:    
While we exult in recording the achievements of our gallant seamen, we sincerely 
sympathise with the friends and relatives of those young heroes, who have 
perished in the conflict….for them is reserved the proud, the heartfelt consolation, 
that their sons and brothers have lately done their duty, in dying for their country. 
 
The names of Decatur, Caldwell, and Dorsey, will be dear to posterity, and the 
remembrance of their worth shall excite an emulation honorable to our youth, and 
advantageous to our nation.573 
 
Similarly, the pro-Federalist Boston Gazette lamented the deaths of James Decatur and James 
Caldwell, calling them “young men of great personal merit” who “promised to become 
conspicuous characters in the naval annals of our country.”574  Another pro-Federalist 
publication “hope[d]” that “the blood of these intrepid Americans, has not been shed in vain” 
and declared that “the American public are still willing to pay millions for honorable warfare, 
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York, NY), January 19, 1805. 
 
573 Trenton Federalist (Trenton, NJ), December 10, 1804; Columbian Centinel (Boston, MA), December 12, 
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574 Boston Gazette (Boston, MA), December 10, 1804. 
 
191 
 
before a cent in tribute.”575  Notably, lamenting the deaths of these promising officers in a 
sorrowful manner was a predominantly Federalist activity.  As will be seen, Democratic-
Republican newspapers published many tributes to the fallen officers, but these generally had 
a more upbeat tone. 
 Yet newspaper editors of both parties concurred that the Intrepid incident, far from 
being a tragedy, revealed the exceptional nature of American society.  An article published in 
six states proclaimed that “the valour of our men shone so conspicuously,” praised the crew 
for “embrac[ing] so glorious a death,” and declared that “the event…was never excelled” in 
human history because, in the United States, men were not “trained from their childhood in 
the field of warfare.”576  The article had a utopian undercurrent, implying (dubiously) that 
violence and war did not constitute an important part of American culture.  It considered 
American men unique, claiming that they could summon courage to defend their country’s 
honor, yet not be dominated by violent impulses.  Similarly, a Boston newspaper proclaimed 
that the valor of the Intrepid crew exceeded anything ever achieved by Britain or France:  “in 
what period of their history could they produce…men more heroic than Israel, Somers, and 
Wadsworth?”577  A poetic tribute published in nine states portrayed the Intrepid crew as 
conquering heroes.  It urged readers to “Mourn, mourn the glorious brave!/ Who gave 
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576 Eight Democratic-Republican newspapers published it:  Aurora General Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), 
January 10, 1805; The Independent Chronicle (Boston, MA), January 17, 1805; National Aegis (Worcester, 
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577 The Democrat (Boston, MA), September 21, 1805. 
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themselves to death!” and claimed that the boat’s explosion killed one-hundred Tripolitans.  
Shortly before blowing up the Intrepid, Wadsworth exclaimed “Our countrymen will know,/ 
How merrily we died,/ T’avenge them on the foe”—and then the detonation launched “twice 
fifty pirates bold…shrieking in the air!”578  While it is impossible to determine how many 
Tripolitans died in the Intrepid explosion, the number probably was less than one-hundred.579  
Notably, Cowdery reported that the “the Bashaw and his people had a thanksgiving to 
Mahomet on the occasion”—the Tripolitans clearly interpreted the Intrepid explosion as a 
victory and not a defeat.580  Regardless, American newspapers extolled the Intrepid crew as 
martyrs to a just war and as embodiments of the finest American ideals. 
Newspapers also argued that the navy (especially the Intrepid crew) had 
demonstrated a courage on par with the heroes of the Revolutionary War.  As one New York 
newspaper editorialized, “as our revolution brought into notice many great men, whose 
characters were not before known, so did the shores of Tripoli, and so will every time of 
difficulty and danger.”  It also portrayed the Tripolitan War as breaking new military ground 
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579 Midshipman Robert Spence stated that one-hundred Tripolitans were killed (“two Gun Boats, 50 men each”) 
in a November 12, 1804 letter to his mother; Naval Documents IV: 353.  Neither Dr. Jonathan Cowdery (in his 
journal) nor Preble (in his report to the Jefferson Administration) estimated the number of Tripolitans killed; 
Preble to Smith, September 4, 1804, Ibid., IV: 306-307. 
 
580 Cowdery, September 3, 1804, 176. 
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for American men:  “it is the first time they conducted a war in a foreign country, and the 
first time, since the revolution, that they had an opportunity of signalizing themselves in so 
great an undertaking.”581  A Connecticut group of Fourth of July revelers linked Tripolitan 
War heroics to the Revolutionary War:  they drank to “American Bravery—Its birth was 
honorable at Bunkers hill.  Its manhood Glorious in the Mediterranean.”582  Some 
publications glorified the Intrepid crew by associating them with Patrick Henry’s popular 
American Revolution speech “Give me liberty, or give me death!”  An article in three 
newspapers ruminated that “perhaps the blood of their fathers was at that moment rushing 
through their veins, crying LIBERTY or DEATH.  Heroic Somers, Wadsworth Izard and 
crew, though your forms may be blown to atoms, still shall your actions live, and your 
bravery be instilled in the hearts of your countrymen.  It is for all men to die!  you have died!  
and this shall be your motto:  DEATH BEFORE SLAVERY!—To mourn your loss is 
natural, but it is for the surviving world to imitate your firmness.”583  Similarly, a poem 
published in six states indulged in creative license in recreating the Intrepid mission.  Among 
its thirteen stanzas (one for each of the thirteen martyred crew members) was one that 
imagined the crew’s decision to commit suicide:  “And now, behold the match apply’d,/ The 
mingled foe the welkin ride:/ Whirling aloft, brave SOMERS cry’d/ A glorious death or 
liberty!”584  Clearly, many Americans viewed the Tripolitan War as a seminal event in their 
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583 It appeared in two Democratic-Republican newspapers [The Democrat (Boston, MA), January 23, 1805 and 
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584 Eight Democratic-Republican newspapers published it:  Plebian (New York, NY), March 18, 1805; 
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young country’s history and as a coda to the American Revolution.  It provided a training 
ground for young American men and allowed them to join the pantheon of American military 
and naval heroes.  The public refused to see the Intrepid mission as a failure.  Instead, they 
widely celebrated it as a defining moment of the early republic. 
The public at large also lionized those who died in the Intrepid explosion, especially 
the three officers (Captain Richard Somers, Lieutenant Henry Wadsworth, and Lieutenant 
Joseph Israel).  Toasts hailed them as martyrs who courageously chose death over 
enslavement.  A gathering in Richmond drank to “Israel, Somers, and Wadsworth—their 
memories dear to their country; their examples stimulative of the noblest deeds of 
heroism.”585  In Philadelphia, a Democratic-Republican group remembered “Somers, 
Wadsworth and Israel, who with more than Spartan heroism sacrificed their lives for their 
country—may glory and gratitude, sanctify their names till time shall be no more.”586  A 
Boston group toasted “the Memory of Somers, Wadsworth, Israel, and their brave 
companions, self devoted victims to patriotism; their glory is precious to their country.”587  
Several groups invoked Roman history.  A Charleston assembly, for instance, drank to “the 
Memory of the gallant Somers and his brave associates, the American Decii, who voluntarily 
sacrificed themselves to promote the cause of liberty and their country.”588  The Decii were a 
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Roman clan known for their willingness to sacrifice their lives in battle.589  Americans could 
even purchase artwork that commemorated the Intrepid explosion.  In late 1805, a New York 
newspaper ran an advertisement for “a handsome Engraving, of the blowing up of the 
fireship Intrepid, capt. Somers, in the harbor of Tripoli.”590  An adoring public could relive 
the experience of the Intrepid again and again in their own homes with this conversation 
piece.  Clearly, the public at large deemed the Intrepid crew extraordinarily heroic and cast 
their death in an overwhelmingly positive light.  In holding them up as ideal role models, the 
public reflected a genuine reverence for the navy—an attitude that President Jefferson surely 
would have found disconcerting. 
Even congressmen considered the officers of the Intrepid crew remarkable, passing a 
resolution instructing President Jefferson “to communicate to the parents or other near 
relatives of Captain Richard Somers, lieutenants Henry Wadsworth, James Decatur, James R. 
Caldwell, Joseph Israel, and midshipman John Sword Dorsey, the deep regret which 
Congress feel for the loss of those gallant men, whose names ought to live in the recollection 
and affection of a grateful country, and whose conduct ought to be regarded as an example to 
future generations.”591  Americans ignored the fact that the Intrepid mission failed and 
instead transformed it into evidence of American exceptionalism. 
However, the massive public glorification of the Intrepid crew for choosing death 
over captivity angered one commentator.  An article published in six states argued that 
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590 The Bee (Hudson, NY), October 8, 1805. 
 
591 “Resolution expressive of the sense of Congress of the gallant conduct of Commodore Edward Preble, the 
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Americans should condemn them for transgressing God’s laws by committing suicide.592  
Instead of viewing Somers as a role model, it urged Americans to “deplore” his decision to 
blow the Intrepid up and argued that “religion and humanity forbid his example to be 
emulated.”  The article conceded that dying in battle is “a less heroic death,” but stressed that 
Somers violated “divine commandments” in his desire to avoid capture by the Tripolitans.  
Although widely published, this article apparently had little impact since the vast majority of 
commentary about the Intrepid crew was positive. 
The public also celebrated the August 1804 attacks with new plays and songs.  In 
March 1805, Philadelphians could hear “a new patriotic song in praise of the GALLANT 
COMMODORE PREBLE, AND HIS BRAVE TARS, Who so gloriously distinguished 
themselves in the different attacks on Tripoli.”593  Philadelphians could also watch “a new 
farce called AMERICAN TARS IN TRIPOLI” that featured “A Grand Panorama of the 
exact situation of the engagement with the Tripolitans,” based on information provided by 
naval officers.594  This play evidently had impressive set pieces—an article stressed their 
lifelike character:  “we become spectators of the combat; we join in the shout of victory, or 
mingle our groans with those of the heroes who nobly offer up their lives in the service of 
their country, What American can view scenes like these without interest?  Who is there, that 
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can witness the glorious struggles of his gallant countrymen without emotion?”595  On July 
4th, residents of northern Virginia could attend “a Grand Representation of the Bombarding 
of Tripoli being in Honor of the Brave Columbian Tars who Fell in that GLORIOUS 
ACTION.”596  This extravaganza promised “an exact movement of the sea…The approach of 
the AMERICAN FRIGATES AND GUNBOATS” and “on the Back Ground A rich Piece of 
Machinery, Representing the TOWN OF TRIPOLI.”  The advertisement proudly billed it as 
“the most brilliant spectacle of the kind ever displayed in this country.”  Similarly, an August 
event in New York promised that “no expense has been spared” to recreate “the Nautical 
Exploits of the AMERICAN SQUADRON in the Mediterranean.”  This show took place on a 
sixty-five foot long stage in the New Vauxhall gardens and theater and featured a “VIEW OF 
THE BASHAW’S CASTLE, And part of the Fortifications of the city of TRIPOLI…in front 
the FRIGATE PHILADELPHIA at anchor, partly dismantled.”597  On top of all this, the show 
also included fireworks.  The revelry of sound and sight surely captivated audiences and 
would simulate the noise and sights of battle.  Altogether, these elaborate productions offered 
patrons the opportunity to vicariously experience participating in the Tripolitan War.  The 
conflict inspired American artists to create entertainment extravaganzas that pushed the 
boundaries of technological ingenuity and offered immersive experiences to attendees. 
Another exhibit (in Boston’s Columbian Museum) offered a unique interactive 
experience.  Called the “The Fantasmagora,” it featured more than “SIXTY MOVING 
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FIGURES, large as life,” including the Dey of Algiers and the Bashaw of Tripoli.598  
Showtimes were at 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday.  One wonders 
what attendees felt when they looked upon these reproductions of America’s Barbary foes.  
Disgust?  Anger?  Triumph?  One also wonders what the representations of the Dey and the 
bashaw looked like.  Were they dark or light skinned?  Were they bearing weapons?  Did 
they appear menacing or friendly?  Were they overweight or lean?   Regardless, the exhibit’s 
creators clearly considered the Barbary conflicts as a crucial part of American history and 
anticipated good profits due to strong public interest in the Tripolitan War. 
 While the public reveled in a plethora of entertainment options and joyously toasted 
the latest batch of naval heroes, newspaper editors waged fierce editorial battles over the 
current state of the Tripolitan War.  Democratic-Republican newspapers adamantly defended 
the Jefferson Administration’s policies and revived their earlier predictions (made after the 
burning of the Philadelphia) that the war would end imminently.  A Vermont newspaper 
hailed the Tripolitan War as an unquestionable triumph for the United States:  “on the 
tripolitan coast, the terror of her arms is exemplified, and the tyranny of Barbarian pirates 
humbled.”  It predicted that the recent attacks would “probably soon induce them to seek for 
peace on equal terms, and bow to justice from enforced chastisement.”599  Another article 
(published in two states) portrayed Tripoli as tittering on the precipice of self-destruction.  It 
alleged that “the commerce of Tripoli is almost annihilated,” the bashaw’s “town is falling 
into ruins besides him; and the shrieks of its dying inhabitants assail his ears.”600  It also 
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predicted (falsely as it would turn out) that the squadron would free “our captive countrymen 
without a ransom” and “mak[e] a peace on our own terms.”  A New York newspaper 
admonished Americans to feel “the liveliest emotions of joy and pride” towards the Navy and 
“hope[d] soon to hear that this piratical enemy is brought to a sense of his insignificance, and 
the American flag liberated from the degrading exertions to which it has been so long 
subject.”601  Unlike Jefferson, these Democratic-Republicans viewed the navy as an 
inherently positive institution—they encouraged public trust in naval officials.  Some 
newspapers also wanted to give Jefferson equal credit for the summer 1804 attacks.  An 
article published in five states mocked European nations for “tamely submitt[ing] to…the 
petty powers of Barbary” and vaunted that “the American flag is now proudly triumphant in 
the Mediterranean, and the thunder of the American cannon has proclaimed on the shores of 
Africa, that a free people will not suffer themselves to be insulted with impunity.  The names 
of Preble, Sterrett and Decatur, will not soon be forgotten by the Tripolines....Much credit is 
due to our wise and just administration, for the prudent and energetic measures pursued by it 
on this occasion.”602  In their eagerness to praise the navy and/or to give credit to Jefferson, 
these articles overlooked the limitations of Preble’s attacks and downplayed (or omitted) the 
ongoing hostage crisis.  These articles are best understood as propaganda that expressed the 
Democratic-Republicans’ fondest hopes for the war—they undervalued Yusuf’s tenacity and 
determination to resist the United States. 
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 By contrast, some Federalist newspaper editors viewed the latest developments in the 
Mediterranean more realistically and reminded readers that, despite the navy’s valiant efforts, 
Tripoli had yet to surrender.  One lengthy criticism combined humor with sober political 
analysis in contrasting the naval policies of the Adams and Jefferson Administrations.  In 
“nearly four years,” it argued, the United Stated lacked even “one solitary instance of 
advantage.”  The navy had acted bravely, but the bombardments simply “frightened some of 
the eunuchs and women of the seraglios, damaged some of their vessels, lost some of our 
own, and sacrificed the lives of several of our gallant officers and seamen.”  It contrasted 
John Adams’s effective naval policies in the Quasi-War against a powerful enemy (France) 
to the Jefferson Administration’s stumbling against the “poor dependency” of Tripoli.  
Jefferson, it argued, only knew how “to conduct a domestic war between parties” and could 
not run foreign affairs.603  Another article, published in two states, lamented that the “poor 
fellows” of the Philadelphia would continue to “drag out a miserable existence, in the worst 
of slavery” and regretted that “before another season for active operations arrives, the 
Tripolitans will prepare themselves for any force; and we may ultimately be obliged to buy 
peace on their own terms.”604  This article implicitly questioned why the public was acting so 
triumphantly—looking at the big picture, what exactly was worth celebrating?  Similarly, a 
Massachusetts newspaper bitterly observed “that disasters have taken place which are likely 
to protract this disgraceful war to an incalculable period” and declared that the Jefferson 
Administration faced a choice:  it “must either relinquish the war, or relinquish that 
economical system which has hitherto prevented them from employing the proper means to 
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bring it to an end.”605  Although these articles had a partisan axe to grind, they made 
legitimate criticisms.  The Tripolitan War was becoming increasingly expensive, naval 
personnel were dying in battle, and the Philadelphia crew remained in captivity. 
 Other Federalist publications utilized poetry in order to make emotional appeals to the 
public regarding the captives’ sufferings and to critique Democratic-Republican policies.  An 
especially morbid poem entitled “The Tripoline Captive” appeared in four states and 
explored themes of isolation and despair.606  About an individual “son of Columbia” held 
hostage in Tripoli, it stressed his unhealthy appearance (a “countenance hollow and pale”) 
and his anger at the United States for allowing him to rot in captivity.  He angrily cried out:  
“At a distance, you hear not our cries,/ You know not the anguish we bear;/ Or else when our 
death-shrieks arise,/ Columbia would sure drop a tear.”  The poem ends with the captive’s 
suicide:  “Then quickly the poniard he drew,/ And plunging it deep in his side,/ Like the lily 
depress’d by the dew,/ He sunk on his mantle and died.”  This poem sought to temper public 
infatuation with naval heroics by reminding readers that that the Philadelphia crew suffered 
in Tripoli.  It also implied that the public would bear some responsibility for any of their 
deaths unless they made efforts to free them.  Similarly, in a poem entitled “The American 
Captive” (published in three states), a hostage expressed his disappointment in his 
countrymen and doubted that he would ever return to the United States.  “‘Sleeps my 
country?’ he cried, ‘shall I ne’er visit it more/ The land of my fathers and freedom 
enjoy?...Where now are those heroes that led the bold fight;/ And the eagle and stars bore to 
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Tripoli’s wall?”607  These poems argued that succumbing to despair constituted a bigger 
threat to the captives’ lives than the Tripolitans.  They made emotional appeals to the public 
(and to the government) to prioritize the restoration of the hostages over defeating Tripoli. 
Another poem about captivity in Tripoli took a much more inflammatory approach by 
stressing sectional issues—it blamed southern elites for the perpetuation of the Philadelphia 
crew’s captivity.  It castigated “The proud Virginian, who by slaves grows great;/ The 
Carolinian, rich in ricy fields;/ [and] The Georgan too that rides in ample state” for caring 
more about increasing their own wealth than the welfare of naval personnel (who “bravely 
fought” to ensure “trade’s support”).608  The poem argued that rich southern men’s apathy 
should be unsurprising because they considered slavery an acceptable state of existence for 
some peoples—they were “despots” who suppressed the voices of sympathetic New 
Englanders and New Yorkers.  It declared:  “But from New-England’s sons who slav’ry 
dread,/ Who fear nor Tripoli’s or Barbary’s shore;/ From these you’d have relief, if they were 
heard,/ You’d then behold your native land once more….Fair Hudson’s stream would 
likewise pour her sons,/ To free their brethren from their sad disgrace.”  This poem has 
abolitionist undertones and waxes conspiratorial by suggesting that southern elites had an 
iron grip upon the federal government and drowned out voices from other regions (perhaps 
the “proud Virginian” line refers to Jefferson).  It resembles John Jay’s and John Adams’s 
anger at southern elites in the 1780s for not caring about protecting American trade in the 
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(New York, NY), August 9, 1805; New-York Spectator (New York, NY), August 14, 1805; Boston Gazette 
(Boston, MA), August 15, 1805; Newburyport Herald (Newburyport, MA), August 16, 1805. 
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Mediterranean (discussed in chapter 2) and foreshadows northern fears of a “Slave Power 
Conspiracy” that developed in the antebellum era. 
 Federalist pieces on the suffering of the captives concerned many Democratic-
Republican newspaper editors—they feared the issue’s potential to generate negative 
attitudes towards Jefferson and their party.  A widely published article made a bizarre 
assertion (based on an anonymous source) that the Philadelphia captives adamantly refused 
to allow Preble to ransom them.  Instead, they supported “the independent and manly course” 
of the government and wanted “to obtain their liberty at the hands of their brother soldiers off 
Tripoli.”609  This claim is entirely false.  As we have seen, the captives (especially the non-
officers) craved their freedom and wanted to be ransomed.  Would any readers actually 
believe this article?  It lacks a credible source and is best viewed as propaganda intended to 
reassure Democratic-Republican supporters that Jefferson did not deserve censure for the 
ongoing hostage situation. 
Another strategy of deflecting blame from the Jefferson Administration involved 
attacking Federalists as hypocrites and as not genuinely concerned about the welfare of the 
Philadelphia crew.  Some newspapers asked why Federalists were unconcerned with the 
ongoing British impressment of American sailors.  An article printed in two states blasted 
“federal prints” for “deploring the captivity of the crew of the Philadelphia frigate” while 
                                                          
609 Nine Democratic-Republican newspapers printed it:  The Enquirer (Richmond, VA), March 8, 1805; 
Republican Star or Eastern Shore General Advertiser (Easton, MD), April 2, 1805; Providence Phoenix 
(Providence, RI), April 6, 1805; Plebian (Kingston, NY), April 8, 1805; Republican Spy (Easton, MD), April 9, 
1805; Otsego Herald; or, Western Advertiser (Cooperstown, NY), April 11, 1805; The Independent Chronicle 
(Boston, MA), April 18, 1805; Suffolk Gazette (Sag Harbor, NY), May 6, 1805; Eastern Argus (Portland, ME), 
May 17, 1805.  Three Federalist newspapers ran it:  The Albany Gazette (Albany, NY), April 1, 1805; The 
Northern Post (Salem, NY), April 4, 1805.  The Post-Boy, and Vermont & New-Hampshire Federal Courier 
(Windsor, VT), April 16, 1805 ran an abridged version of this article.  It also appeared in the politically neutral 
The Farmer’s Cabinet (Amherst, NH), April 30, 1805. 
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ignoring the “fifteen hundred men forcibly detained in British ships.”610  Similarly, another 
article denied that Federalist concern about “the miserable situation of our fellow-citizens in 
Tripoli” stemmed “from laudable motives.”  It accused Federalists of simply wanting “to 
calumniate the President in any and every possible shape as the cause of their sufferings” and 
challenged them to show some “sympathy…for our seamen impressed by the British, whose 
situation…is equally deplorable with Tripolitan captivity.”611  Some Democratic-Republican 
newspapers lashed out at the public for not expressing more outrage over Britain’s treatment 
of Americans.  An editorial published in three states observed that “‘Freedom and health to 
the captives in Tripoli’ has recently been drank as a toast in all parts of the continent—but 
not one sympathetic sentiment expressed, of eight times the number of captives on board the 
British navy.”612  These Democratic-Republican newspapers made valid counterpoints:  the 
Federalists were selective in drawing public attention to the plight of Americans held captive 
by a foreign power and were generally unwilling to confront Britain over impressment.613 
By the beginning of 1805, the Tripolitan War showed no sign of ending.  Preble had 
attacked Tripoli more aggressively than his predecessors, but his efforts were not enough to 
compel the bashaw to surrender.  Yusuf believed warring against the United States had great 
significance for his country—he wanted to impress Europe and Africa with his power.  
                                                          
610 American Mercury (Hartford, CT), February 14, 1805.  From the Aurora General Advertiser (Philadelphia, 
PA). 
 
611 The Bee (Hudson, NY), September 3, 1805; Hornet (Fredericktown, MD), September 17, 1805. 
 
612 Aurora General Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), July 30, 1805; Providence Phoenix (Providence, RI), August 
10, 1805; City Gazette (Charleston, SC), August 16, 1805. 
 
613 A rare Federalist exception was the New-Hampshire Gazette (Portsmouth, NH).  On November 26, 1805 it 
criticized Federalist printers for drawing “daily” attention to “the distresses and hardships” of the Philadelphia 
crew while ignoring “another class of our citizens whose sufferings have been equally great…for whom federal 
sympathy but seldom drops the tear.—We allude to about 2000 of our citizens who have been impressed on 
board British prison ships, or vessels of war.” 
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Unless the United States met his financial demands, it would have to find another way to win 
the conflict.  Naval officers and seamen were anxious to resume attacks in the spring, but 
ultimately naval efforts would not end the conflict.614  Instead, a bold plan led by William 
Eaton (a former diplomat in North Africa, a Revolutionary War veteran, and a Federalist) 
would cause Yusuf to tremble for the first time in the Tripolitan War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
614 In November, Captain John Rodgers observed that “a General Enthusiasm appears to pervade among all 
ranks, and nothing that the Bashaw can do, will, I concieve, prevent his destruction in the most complete 
manner, without he offers Terms the most humiliating to himself.”  John Rodgers to Smith, November 6, 1804, 
Naval Documents V: 124. 
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Chapter 5:  The Unexpected End of the Tripolitan War 
 
 As the Tripolitan War entered its fourth year, who knew what to expect?  What 
Americans had hoped would be a swift, decisive victory over Barbary piracy had turned into 
a stalemate even though the Mediterranean squadron had expanded substantially.  Americans 
had conceived of the Tripolitan War as a naval affair and kept hoping that the fleet would 
bombard the bashaw into submission.  However, the conflict ended very differently than 
anyone had anticipated, with an unexpectedly robust land assault that sought to overthrow 
Yusuf and replace him with his brother, Hamet.  What began as a naval conflict intended to 
safeguard U.S. commerce in the Mediterranean threatened to become something much 
bigger:  a war to bring regime change in Tripoli. 
  And when the war finally did end, in June 1805, government officials, editors, and the 
public at large were left to ponder several important questions.  Despite spending millions of 
dollars on the Tripolitan War, what had the United States accomplished?  Had Tripoli been 
subdued?  Were the other Barbary States impressed by America’s performance in the 
Tripolitan War?  Would the Federalist Party be able to gain politically?  What was the legacy 
of Jefferson’s Barbary policies?  After fighting ended in the Mediterranean, the Tripolitan 
War generated intense debate on the home front.  Federalist and Democratic-Republicans 
both believed that the conflict had big implications for U.S. foreign policy, but disagreed 
about whether these were positive or negative. 
 American diplomats proposed regime change at the beginning of the Tripolitan War, 
after learning that Yusuf had seized power from middle brother, Hamet, in 1795 (Yusuf 
killed his eldest brother and his father in his quest for power).  Hamet remained the rightful 
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heir to the Tripolitan throne, but lived in exile in Tunis.  James Cathcart, the consul to 
Tripoli, wrote Madison in July 1801 to propose a plan to “obtain a permanent & honorable 
peace” through “dethroning the present Bashaw & effecting a revolution in favor of his 
Brother.”615  He stressed that success would “insure the United States the gratitude of 
[Hamet] & his Successors” and warned that “for so long as Juseph the Bashaw lives our 
commerce will not be secure.”  Cathcart emphasized that only a regime change could 
guarantee lasting peace with Tripoli and, in another letter, claimed that the Tripolitan public 
“held [Yusuf] in the greatest degree of horror imaginable” and “great[ly] desire[d] that 
Hamet…should again assume the reigns of government.”616  More grandly, consul to Tunis 
William Eaton promised Madison that the coup not only would ensure “perpetual peace,” but 
would “save the United States more than a million of dollars and many lives.”617  Surely he 
calculatingly appealed to the Jefferson Administration’s desire to reduce government 
expenses.  Eaton also contended that the Tripolitan people would help the United States 
restore Hamet to power:  they “are very discontented and ripe for revolt; they want nothing 
but confidence in the prospect of success.”618  A few months later Eaton reiterated his belief 
in the potential for an indigenous uprising, claiming that the public “almost unanimously 
desire the restoration of their rightful sovereign, who is a mild man of peaceable dispositions; 
and, if he were offered them with the appearance of determination, they would raise in mass 
                                                          
615 Cathcart to Madison, July 2, 1801, Papers of James Madison Digital Edition. 
 
616 Cathcart to Madison, August 25, 1802, Ibid. 
 
617 Eaton to Madison, June 8, 1802, Ibid. 
 
618 Eaton to Madison, September 5, 1801, Ibid. 
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to receive him.”619  Eaton made the coup attempt seem like a cakewalk and, together with 
Cathcart, suggested that restoring Hamet would serve the best interests of both the United 
States and the Tripolitan public.620 
What did the Jefferson Administration think of the coup attempt?  Madison responded 
at length to Eaton in an August 1802 letter, observing that “altho’ it does not accord with the 
general sentiments or views of the United States to intermeddle in the domestic contests of 
other countries,” in this instance the Jefferson Administration would support restoring Hamet 
to power because the Tripolitan War was “a just war.”621  If the coup attempt failed, Madison 
promised that the government would “treat [Hamet’s] misfortune with the utmost tenderness” 
and “restore him as nearly as may be to the situation from which he was drawn.”  The 
Secretary of State expressed a humanitarian concern for the ex-bashaw and would not 
abandon him to his brother’s vengeance, promising that instructions “will be conveyed to 
Commodore Morris, and Mr. Cathcart, with a suggestion that in the event of a peace with the 
ruling Bashaw, an attempt should be made to insert some provision favourable to his 
Brother.”   Madison acknowledged that the distance between North Africa and Washington 
D.C. rendered it difficult to give and receive instructions, but the Jefferson Administration 
saw potential in the coup attempt and encouraged its undertaking.  By no means, however, 
did they consider success inevitable and they still retained the right to make peace with 
Yusuf.  That same month, Secretary of the Navy Smith sent a more cautious letter to Captain 
                                                          
619 Eaton to Madison, December 13, 1801, Ibid.  Hamet had only been in power for five months before being 
overthrown.  He then went to Tunis for seven years before returning to Tripoli in April 1802; see Hamet 
Karamanli to Thomas Jefferson, January 20, 1803, Naval Documents II: 347. 
 
620 For a negative assessment of Hamet’s leadership abilities, see Folayan, 21.  Folayan also contends, in 
contrast to Cathcart’s and Eaton’s claims, that the Tripolitan public preferred Yusuf to Hamet. 
 
621 Madison to Eaton, August 22, 1802, Papers of James Madison Digital Edition. 
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Richard Morris which emphasized that making peace with Yusuf remained the top priority.  
He declared that Hamet’s welfare “is not to be considered by you of sufficient magnitude to 
prevent or even to retard a final settlement” with Yusuf.622  Moreover, Smith stated that 
Eaton “in this affair cannot be considered an authorized agent of the Government.”  The 
Jefferson Administration viewed Hamet as a means to ending the Tripolitan War—restoring 
him to power was not the main goal.  Eaton would err in reading too much into Madison’s 
letter, but Madison should have been more forthcoming by including the unequivocal 
directives found in the letter to Morris. 
Despite the qualified confidence from the Jefferson Administration, the coup attempt 
stalled for two years due to Hamet’s unwillingness to commit to it.   He even temporarily 
made amends with his brother in April 1802 by accepting an offer to become the governor of 
Tripoli’s Derne province.623  Yet Hamet continued to express interest in overthrowing Yusuf, 
personally soliciting help from President Jefferson in a January 1803 letter.  In it, he 
complained that his brother had not fulfilled a promise to release his family (Hamet’s wife 
and five children were being held hostage) and requested “Forty thousand Spanish Dollars” 
and weapons in order to raise an army of 100,000 men (he promised to reimburse the United 
States).624  Jefferson apparently never responded to Hamet’s letter because several months 
later he received another one that repeated the request.625  In any event, Hamet fled to 
Alexandria in late 1803 out of fear that his brother would kill him.626 
                                                          
622 Smith to Morris, August 27, 1802, Naval Documents II: 257. 
 
623 Cathcart to Madison, August 25, 1802, Papers of James Madison Digital Edition. 
 
624 Hamet Karamanli to Jefferson, January 20, 1803, Naval Documents II: 347. 
 
625 Richard Farquhar to Jefferson, November 15, 1803, Ibid., III: 222. 
 
626 Joseph Pulis to Preble, November 26, 1803, Ibid., III: 236. 
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Meanwhile, Eaton and Cathcart’s efforts received a vital boost with the September 
1803 arrival of Edward Preble.  The new commander of the Mediterranean squadron 
enthusiastically supported the proposed expedition and thought it could meet with success 
within two months.  He also informed the Jefferson Administration in January 1804 that he 
had met with a representative of Hamet’s and he “wish[ed] earlier notice had been taken of 
[Hamet] and his views.”627  However, Preble thought that he could not afford to spare a ship 
to retrieve Hamet and chided the Jefferson Administration for being “too economical with 
our Naval force.”628  Still, Preble arranged for letter of introductions for Eaton, who had been 
appointed U.S. Navy Agent for the Barbary Regencies and now headed to Egypt to find 
Hamet.629   In February 1805, Eaton and Hamet made a formal agreement, called the 
“Convention between the United States of America and his Highness, Hamet, Caramanly, 
Bashaw of Tripoli.”  It proclaimed “a firm and perpetual Peace and free intercourse between 
the Government of the United States of America and his Highness Hamet Caramanly” and 
promised that the U.S. government “shall use their utmost exertions, so far as comports with 
their own honor and interest…to reestablish the said Hamet Bashaw in the possession of his 
Sovereignty of Tripoli.”630  Clearly, this treaty went beyond Madison’s instructions—Eaton 
considered anything less than reinstalling Hamet a failure.  Yet Eaton did not expect the 
                                                          
627 Preble to Smith, January 17, 1804, Ibid., III: 339. 
 
628 Preble to Smith, March 11, 1804, Ibid., III: 486. 
 
629 Preble asked the British Governor of Malta, Sir Alexander Ball, for letters of introduction on behalf of Eaton.  
Ball happily complied and sent Eaton letters of introduction to the British Pro Consul at Alexandria and the 
British Resident at Cairo.  Preble to Ball, November 13, 1804, Ibid., V: 140; Ball to Eaton, November 16, 1804, 
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630 Convention between the United States of America and his Highness, Hamet, Caramanly, Bashaw of Tripoli, 
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United States to lose money on this alliance.  In exchange for being restored to power, Hamet 
promised to free “without ransom, all American prisoners” held by Yusuf and to reimburse 
the American government the cost of the expedition’s expenses through tribute money 
exacted from Denmark, Sweden, and the Batavian Republic.  Notably, Eaton did not want to 
end Tripolitan piracy altogether—he just wanted it stopped against the United States and the 
subjects of the King of the Two Sicilies.  Article VII of the Convention stipulated that Tripoli 
would neither require tribute from nor attack Sicilian ships—this exemption was Eaton’s way 
of thanking the King of the Two Sicilies for contributing gunboats and men to the U.S. 
Navy’s August 1804 attacks.  However, Eaton apparently was unaware (or unappreciative) of 
all the help provided by the Danish consul Nicholas Nissen—Eaton still expected Denmark 
to pay tribute.  Because of Eaton’s persistence, the coup attempt had become a reality.  But 
how aware were Americans on the home front? 
The expedition eventually dominated discussion about the Tripolitan War, but the 
public knew little about it until after it happened.  Newspapers rarely discussed it and 
Americans did not raise toasts to Eaton at parties.  Prior to fall 1805, newspapers 
occasionally broached the potential benefits and morality of launching a coup attempt in 
Tripoli.  An editorial published in two Federalist newspapers in summer 1803 endorsed the 
coup attempt as the quickest way to end the Tripolitan War, to reduce expenses, and to 
ensure lasting peace.  Had it been implemented earlier, the editorial argued, “we should then 
have had a friend upon the throne of Tripoli, bound to us by the ties of gratitude.”631  The 
United States could have guaranteed Hamet’s good behavior by holding Yusuf and his family 
hostage and threatening to release them if Hamet mistreated the United States.  Moreover, 
                                                          
631 Republican or, Anti-Democrat (Baltimore, MD), August 10, 1803.  A slightly abridged version ran in the 
New-England Palladium (Boston, MA), August 19, 1803. 
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America would have saved a tremendous amount of money:  “the expence of all this would 
have been a mere trifle when compared with that of maintaining an inactive navy; and 
supporting a nominal war, which may probably end in a tribute...if our navy is to be always 
managed as it has been.”  Not all press was so positive, though, as the public circulation of 
Madison’s and Smith’s August 1802 letters (which offered limited support for the coup 
attempt) generated some backlash.  A lengthy letter to the editor (written by “An American”) 
published in four Federalist newspapers condemned the coup attempt as “immoral” and 
suspected that Hamet was “play[ing] a double game” against America—he planned to get 
Morocco and Tunis to declare war against the United States.632  Similarly, an article in the 
Washington Federalist accused Madison of creating a “new morality” and (falsely) 
castigated Hamet as “a Pretender to his Brother’s throne” instead of the rightful heir.633  
Notably, these critical pieces only appeared in Federalist newspapers.  At this stage, some 
Federalists supported the coup attempt while others derided it as foolhardy.  Eventually (and 
hypocritically), though, some of these negative Federalist publications would embrace it and 
lambast Democratic-Republicans for not appreciating it enough. 
Some Democratic-Republican newspapers defended the coup attempt against 
Federalist critics.  The National Intelligencer, and Washington Advertiser responded to the 
“An American” letter, stressing that because Hamet was “the elder brother, and was expelled 
from the throne by fraud,” helping him regain power would “restore rights founded in 
justice.”634  Nevertheless, it considered the expedition “comparatively so unimportant” and 
                                                          
632 New-York Evening Post (New York, NY), November 21, 1805; New-York Herald (New York, NY), 
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predicted (falsely) that “the public will trouble themselves little about it.”  Another article, 
printed by two New York newspapers, defended the coup attempt as just because a state of 
war already existed between the United States and Tripoli.  America “had a right to embrace 
whatever favorable circumstances might offer.”635  These newspapers did not want 
Federalists to shape the public’s understanding of the coup attempt, yet they doubted that it 
would actually make an impact.  Overall, prior to fall 1805, newspapers and the public 
conceived of the Tripolitan War as fundamentally a naval affair and, at best, considered 
Eaton’s expedition a quixotic endeavor. 
The Jefferson Administration shared this view as well, as evidenced by instructions to 
diplomat Tobias Lear and Commodore Samuel Barron (who would relieve Preble of 
command of the Mediterranean squadron).  Madison’s June 1804 letter to Lear, who had 
been appointed to broker a treaty with Yusuf, urged “less reliance” upon Hamet and 
authorized only $20,000 for the expedition.636  Madison considered the enlarged U.S. fleet 
(following to the Philadelphia loss) “sufficient for any exercise of coercion” against Tripoli.  
As for Barron, Smith stated that he was expected to “coerc[e] Tripoli to a Treaty upon our 
own Terms” and that the decision to support the coup attempt “is committed entirely to your 
discretion.”637  The Jefferson Administration had not learned the shortcomings of their 
strategy—naval bombardments against Tripoli were ineffective. 
Eaton would become very frustrated with Lear and Barron, as they lacked Preble’s 
enthusiasm for the coup attempt.  Lear despised it, belittling Hamet as “a man [lacking] any 
                                                          
635 American Citizen (New York, NY), December 13, 1804; Republican Watch-Tower (New York, NY), 
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636 Madison to Lear, June 6, 1804, Papers of James Madison Digital Edition. 
 
637 Smith to Barron, June 6, 1804, Naval Documents IV: 152-154. 
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force or influence” and deeming it “very doubtful whether he has it in his power, with any 
reasonable pecuniary assistance we might give, to render us service.”638  Like Eaton, Lear 
wanted to achieve long-term peace with Tripoli, but he thought it more likely with a 
chastised Yusuf than with a restored Hamet:  “Indeed I shd. place much more confidence in 
the continuance of a peace with the present Bashaw, if he is well beaten into it, than I shd. 
have with the other, if he should be placed on the throne by our means.”  As for Barron, he 
initially promised full support for the coup attempt.  In September 1804, he instructed the 
captain of the Argus, Isaac Hull, to tell Hamet that he could trust Barron to provide “the most 
effectual measures with the forces under my Command for co-operating with him against the 
usurper, his brother; and for re-establishing him in the regency of Tripoli.”639  Barron’s 
orders fulfilled Eaton’s wishes, but would the Commodore follow through on his promises? 
Meanwhile, Eaton and Hamet created an attack plan.  They decided to capture the 
town of Derne (in the northeastern part of Tripoli along the Mediterranean Sea) and began 
the five-hundred mile march from Egypt in early March.640  In a March 8th diary entry, Eaton 
estimated that they had four-hundred men—mostly followers of Hamet, but also thirty-eight 
Greeks, twenty-five cannoniers, and nine Americans.641  By early April, the force had 
increased to six-hundred to seven-hundred fighting men (with 1,200 other followers and 
Bedouin family members).642  Eaton detailed the many hardships experienced by the group in 
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his journal.  For instance, in late March he wrote that some fled after a report circulated that 
hundreds of cavalry and footmen loyal to Yusuf would arrive at Derne before the rebels.643  
Also, at one point they went twenty-five days without meat, fifteen without bread, and were 
living off rice.644  Further, in mid-April, Hamet perceptively began to doubt the reliability of 
America’s commitment to him.  As Eaton reported, he suspected that “we aim only to use 
him for the purpose of obtaining a peace with his brother.”645  Some of Hamet’s followers 
also began to doubt Eaton’s promise of U.S. naval support and became mutinous.  
Thankfully, in mid-April they saw the Argus and the Hornet.646  Reassured of American 
support and restocked with fresh supplies, the expedition continued.  Although the group 
bravely overcame many excruciating physical and mental trials, Eaton nevertheless 
expressed Orientalist contempt for his Arab allies—he did not appreciate that they risked 
their lives in trying to overthrow their country’s ruler.  For instance, in one diary entry he 
averred that the Arabs “have no sense of patriotism, truth nor honor; and no attachment 
where they have no prospect of gain, except to their religion…Poverty makes them thieves; 
and practice renders them adroit in stealing.”647  Eaton clearly inspired Hamet and his 
followers (they trusted him with their lives), but the American adventurer privately viewed 
them with contempt. 
Perhaps because he doubted the maturity his Arab allies, Eaton took his leadership 
role very seriously.  In an apparent nod to George Washington, he assumed the rank of 
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“General, and Commander in Chief” and insisted that Hamet’s followers “shall respect and 
obey him as such.”648  This self-aggrandizement was especially audacious because Eaton had 
only risen to the rank of captain in the U.S. Army.649  A contemporaneous woodcut (figure 2) 
captures Eaton’s invocation of Washington:  his extended sword, confident pose, and focused 
stare all convey the impression of a man of action.650  Moreover, it captures the power 
balance of the Eaton-Hamet relationship:  the aspiring bashaw glances toward the American 
as if seeking guidance.  Altogether, the woodcut portrays the coup attempt very favorably 
and argues that just as Washington led the American army to victory over Britian, so Eaton 
was guiding the Tripolitans to their own glorious destiny. 
                
                                                          
648 Convention, Ibid., V: 368. 
 
649 A sergeant in the Revolutionary War, Eaton became a Captain in the U.S. Army in 1792. 
 
650 Gen. William Eaton and Hamet Caramelli, On the Desert of Barca, Approaching Derne; woodcut from 
Memories of a Hundred Years, by Edward Everett Hale, 1902; pg. 60; call #E173 .H16 v. 1; Collection of the 
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United States Marine Corps, 1970), 9. 
Figure 2:  Gen. William Eaton and Hamet Caramelli, On the Desert of Barca, 
Approaching Derne.  Courtesy New-York Historical Society. 
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Eaton also tried to mobilize a popular uprising by issuing a proclamation in late 
March that portrayed Christians and Muslims as natural allies with a shared religious 
heritage.  He emphasized “that the God of the Americans and of the Mahometans is the 
same; the one true and omnipotent God” and that Americans accepted “the revelations which 
he made through Abraham and Israel and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes.”651  Further, Eaton 
stressed that the United States was not at war with the Tripolitan people, but only with the 
bashaw, whom he called “the traitor, usurper of the throne of Tripoli, a bloodthirsty 
scoundrel.”  Yet Eaton also appealed to baser instincts by invoking anti-Semitism.  In an 
attempt to discredit Yusuf, he claimed that the bashaw favored the livelihoods of various 
Jewish political and economic figures over the welfare of (Muslim) Tripolitans.  As he 
declared, Yusuf has “all[ied] himself with infidel Jews to despoil you of your possessions” 
and “turned over to them all the trade and commerce of your country, thereby depriving you 
of all honest means whereby you could earn money.”  Evidently, Eaton thought that 
appealing to the public’s sense of justice (to restore Hamet) would not suffice—he wanted to 
generate outrage against Yusuf by fanning the flames of religious bigotry.  He also urged the 
public to put their trust in him, ending the proclamation with “and I shall be always with you 
until the end of the war.”  This statement probably alludes to the final verse in the Gospel of 
Matthew, in which Jesus reassures the disciples by saying “and, lo, I am with you always, 
even unto the end of the world.”652  While the Tripolitans likely would not have understood 
this reference, it gives excellent insight into Eaton’s mentality.  This self-anointed vessel of 
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the Almighty saw himself as a divinely inspired prophet who would overthrow an oppressive 
ruler and lead Hamet to the promised land of the Tripolitan throne. 
The group completed the first step of the expedition on April 25th by arriving outside 
the city of Derne.  Its governor had about 800 troops, rejected Hamet and Eaton’s request for 
safe passage, and dismissed Hamet’s promise that he could retain his position if the coup 
attempt succeeded.653  The governor welcomed battle, succinctly replying to Eaton’s letter 
with “My head or yours.”654  Fighting began the next day at 2:00 p.m.  Three American ships 
(the Argus, Hornet, and Nautilus) fired upon the town and gun batteries, which returned fire 
for an hour.  At 3:30 p.m., a group led by marine Presley O’Bannon and Midshipman George 
Mann stormed Derne, overtook the battery guns (turning them upon the town), and raised the 
American flag.  With Hamet and his forces attacking from the rear, the battle ended by 4:00 
p.m.655  Master Commandant Isaac Hull of the Argus listed the causalities for the American 
and European fighters:  one death (John Wilton, a U.S. Marine) and thirteen wounded 
(including Eaton, a bullet hit his left wrist).  Altogether, the battle of Derne was an enormous 
success for Eaton and Hamet’s forces—they took full control of the city and demonstrated 
that their revolt needed to be taken seriously. 
However, shortly after victory Eaton inadvertently crippled the expedition’s ability to 
press on to the capital city.  In a letter to Commodore Barron, Eaton portrayed his Arab allies 
as unreliable.  Although their number had increased to 2,000, they were more like “a rabble 
than an Army” and needed more “military talent & firmness.”656  Eaton also criticized their 
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fighting style.  Instead of boldly attacking the enemy, they took “safe positions…until the 
doors of the Enemy were open’d for plunder”—only then were they “brave, & impetuous.”  
While Eaton believed that the coup would work with further U.S. support, Hull doubted that 
it could succeed.  In his journal, he observed that Hamet “appeared very much distressed” 
and needed money to purchase the loyalty of “arab chiefs that were daily coming over to his 
side.”657  Hull also contacted Barron, estimating that 300 to 400 more Americans or 
Europeans were needed to march to the capital city and attempt to overthrow Yusuf.658  Hull 
did not offer any suggestions about how to procure such a large amount of men.  Where 
would they be found?  How much would it cost and how long would it take to procure 
European mercenaries?  Was it wise to send American sailors on shore to fight?  What if they 
died in battle?  Would ships with small crews be vulnerable to capture by the Tripolitan 
Navy?   
Without reinforcements, the coup attempt stalled following the victory at Derne.  
Although able to repulse occasional counterattacks by forces loyal to Yusuf (which had 
grown to 550-600 cavalry and 300 footmen), Eaton conceded to Barron that his group was 
“too weak” to initiate attacks.659  In order to march on to Tripoli and topple the bashaw, 
Hamet and Eaton needed a massive popular uprising to materialize.  But Derne was isolated, 
about 800 miles from the capital city.  No mass exodus of Tripolitan men arrived to help 
Hamet carry on his fight.  And how could they?  They would have to march across the desert 
to Derne and overcome the hundreds of troops loyal to Yusuf that encamped around that city.  
                                                          
657 Hull journal, May 19, 1805, Ibid., VI: 27; Hull journal, May 20, 1805, Ibid., VI: 28. 
 
658 Hull to Barron, April 29, 1805, Ibid., V: 556. 
 
659 Eaton to Barron, May 15, 1805, Ibid., VI: 15. 
220 
 
Essentially, unless Barron ordered naval personnel to fight on land or hired hundreds of 
European mercenaries, it was logistically impossible for Eaton and Hamet to continue.  They 
had conquered Derne, but were now trapped in it.660 
Even prior to Derne, Commodore Barron had increasingly questioned the capabilities 
of the coup attempt and wanted Eaton to lower his expectations for assistance.  In a March 
22, 1805 letter, Barron praised his “energy and perseverance,” but confessed to having 
“feelings of doubt and uneasiness.”661  He warned Eaton that “I must withhold my sanction to 
any convention or agreement committing the United States or tending to impress upon Hamet 
Bashaw a conviction that we have bound ourselves to place him on the throne.”  Further, the 
Commodore asserted that if Hamet was “found deficient” in “energy, courage & talent…he 
must be held as an unfit subject for further support or co-operation.”  Eaton eventually 
received this letter—he referenced it in his April 29th and May 1st letter to Barron (discussed 
above).  Since Eaton had candidly discussed the expedition’s weaknesses, he should not have 
been surprised when Barron withdrew support after Derne. 
Barron correctly ascertained that Derne had turned into a stalemate situation.  He 
informed Lear that Eaton’s letters had caused him to reassess the coup attempt’s prospects 
for success—Hamet was “no longer a fit subject for our support and Cooperation” because he 
lacked “sufficient energy address & Courage, and cannot command sufficient means to move 
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on.”662  Barron also expressed concern about the cost to complete the coup attempt—“a Sum 
far exceeding both the recourses placed at my disposal and the powers Vested in me” 
(Madison had authorized spending up to $20,000).663  The Commodore (correctly) viewed 
his decision as reflecting the Jefferson Administration’s wishes.  Still, he did not consider the 
coup attempt a failure.  Barron thought that “it has had a powerful effect upon the reigning 
Bashaw” and would “dispose him to moderate his pretensions and to think seriously of 
Peace.”  He urged Lear to use Yusuf’s fears of Hamet regaining power to America’s 
advantage in negotiations.664  Although Barron resigned due to poor health (John Rodgers 
would take over as the head of the Mediterranean squadron), his judgment was not adversely 
affected.665  He made a rational decision to withdraw support from the coup attempt based on 
reports from Eaton and Hull. 
Eaton, however, was livid with Barron’s decision.  In an irate letter, he accused the 
Commodore of violating “principles of honor and justice,” defended Hamet’s character, and 
argued that “to abandon him here is not to cooperate with him, but with his rival!”666  
Eaton’s defensiveness is understandable—he had been planning the coup attempt for years 
and had risked his life on the desert trek and in battle against Yusuf’s forces.  Yet his zeal for 
fame and glory overrode his rationality.  Eaton had criticized Hamet’s forces to Barron—
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what did he expect would happen?  Further, if Eaton and Hamet could not defeat the 
bashaw’s forces encamped outside Derne how could he realistically expect to capture the 
fortified capital city and overthrow Yusuf?  He also obstinately refused to acknowledge the 
Jefferson Administration’s position that the coup attempt was simply “a means” of obtaining 
peace with Tripoli and not “an end” unto itself.667  Frankly, Eaton did not have the right to 
feel betrayed. 
As for Yusuf, the prospect of being overthrown terrified him much more than did any 
naval attacks on his fleet or capital city.  The diary of Jonathan Cowdery, the Philadelphia 
captive and doctor who had close access to the bashaw, depicts a nervous ruler and a city 
vulnerable to conquest.  According to Cowdery, Yusuf learned about Eaton and Hamet’s 
expedition in mid-March, although he had an exaggerated sense of its size and misunderstood 
its location.  He thought that U.S. forces, together with Hamet and four thousand Egyptians, 
had gone to Syracuse and intended to attack Tripoli’s capital.668  Cowdery “perceived many 
private councils and long faces amongst the Turks” and noted that the bashaw took the 
precaution of holding “the sons and nearest relations of [his] officers…whom it appears, he 
was afraid to trust, least [sic] they might join the rebellion.”  Yusuf also took “several of the 
sons and dearest friends of his chiefs in the country…as hostages for their fidelity.”669  
Clearly, the bashaw feared for his safety and deemed it likely that some of Tripoli’s leaders 
would defect and support Hamet.  Yusuf struggled to raise adequate defenses as well.  
Cowdery reported that Yusuf’s son-in-law “had been sent into the country to collect troops to 
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protect Tripoli” but “returned without success.  The people refused to fight for the Bashaw, 
because he had made unusual demands for money, and even had stripped their wives of their 
jewels.”670  Cowdery also suggested that Yusuf bluffed regarding the size of his forces.  
Rumors that 10,000 of them would gather on the beach proved hollow—“I prepared myself 
to see these troops; but to my disappointment not one of them appeared.”671  Cowdery tried 
to help the expedition by greatly exaggerating the size of America’s armed forces—he told 
Yusuf that the United States had 10,000 marines, 80,000 troops, and 1 million militia 
members “ready to fight for the liberty and rights of their countrymen!  At this, his highness 
assumed a very serious look.”672  Surely Yusuf would have expected some embellishment, 
but this report could only add to his unease. 
Despite his growing anxiety, Yusuf recognized that he held some leverage over the 
Americans—the Philadelphia officers and crew remained his prisoners.  He began to 
threaten to execute them if the coup attempt continued.  In mid-April, for instance, Cowdery 
reported that the “the Bashaw declared, that if the Americans drove him to extremities, or 
attacked his town, he would put every American prisoner to death.”673  Yusuf reiterated this 
threat the following month, vowing “by the prophet of Mecca, that if the Americans brought 
his brother against him, he would burn to death all the American prisoners except Cowdery” 
(because he “saved the life” of one of Yusuf’s children).674  According to Cowdery, the 
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bashaw learned about the loss of Derne on May 22nd through a letter and “did not wish to let 
his people know it.”675  That same day, he “called a council of his chiefs, and proposed to put 
all the American prisoners to death” (but they decided “to postpone this measure”).  Despite 
the seriousness of the situation, Cowdery refrained from sharing his personal thoughts about 
the matter.  Did he view Yusuf’s threats as bluster and not take them seriously? 
The Derne loss made Yusuf even more anxious—he genuinely feared being 
overthrown.  On May 24th, he proclaimed that “if it was in his power now to make peace and 
give up the American prisoners, he would gladly do it, without the consideration of 
money.”676  Cowdery also noted that the bashaw was running out of funds (the steward had 
to borrow money to procure food), that rations for the bashaw’s court had been cut to one 
meal per day, and that Yusuf “heartedly repented for not accepting the terms of peace last 
offered by our country.”   His diary portrays the capital city as very vulnerable:   Yusuf was 
disliked by much of his populace, growing weaker by the day, and consumed with fear.  The 
bashaw likely thought that his rule would come to an end when American ships appeared 
before Tripoli on May 28th.  According to Cowdery, Yusuf “shewed the greatest anxiety for 
peace.  He was sensible of the danger he was in from the lowness of his funds and the 
disaffection of his people.”677  Imagine the bashaw’s immense relief when he learned that, far 
from seeking to overthrow him, diplomat Tobias Lear had come to make peace and pay 
ransom money! 
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Just how serious was Yusuf’s threat to kill the Philadelphia captives?  This question 
eventually became heavily debated by policymakers and the public, but only Cowdery (and 
perhaps Bainbridge) had ever broached it while the coup attempt was underway.  Bainbridge 
made a cryptic statement in a January letter, condemning Eaton’s expedition as “very vaste” 
and claiming that it would “sacrifice [the Philadelphia] prisoners in case of success.”678  
Bainbridge did not define what “sacrifice” meant—possibly it referred to putting the captives 
in harm’s way by leaving them exposed to American fire, or perhaps he warned about a mass 
execution.  Regardless, it is noteworthy that Bainbridge’s many letters to U.S. diplomats and 
naval officers did not broach the possibility of being executed.  Since Bainbridge constantly 
wrote letters, surely he would have urged the abandonment of the coup attempt (especially 
since he thought poorly of Hamet) if its continuance jeopardized the American hostages’ 
lives.679  As for other personnel in the Mediterranean, Commodore Barron never expressed 
any concern that Yusuf would execute the Philadelphia captives, even in his letters to Lear 
and Eaton that explained his reasons for withdrawing support from the coup attempt.  
Similarly, in his lengthy recap of the negotiations, Dutch consul Nicholas Nissen never 
mentioned any threat of execution.680  Commodore John Rodgers (Barron’s successor as 
commander of the Mediterranean squadron) declared that “I never thought myself that the 
Lives of the American Prisoners were in any danger.”681  Moreover, the Jefferson 
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Administration never even considered the possibility that Yusuf would execute the 
captives—the June 1804 instructions to Barron and Lear did not broach this scenario. 
However, other naval officers evidently took the bashaw’s threats seriously.  In 
September 1805, Secretary of the Navy Smith reported to Jefferson that several of the 
Philadelphia officers had told him “that if Lear had persisted in not giving a Ransom for 
them, peace would not have been made at all and that the Bashaw had made up his mind to 
massacre them while our forces were laying waste his town.”682  Yusuf feared being 
“murdered by his own people…[if] he deliver[ed] up the prisoners without ransom” and 
“again & again was heard to say that having killed his father and a brother he would not have 
any scruples in killing a few infidels.”683  Regrettably, Smith did not identify the naval 
officers who spoke with him.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, senators and 
newspaper editors later debated the seriousness of Yusuf’s threat to kill the captives.  We will 
never know the bashaw’s true intentions, but I am inclined to doubt that he would have 
actually executed the hostages.  A shrewd ruler, Yusuf surely recognized that if he murdered 
the Philadelphia captives the United States would have retaliated by overthrowing and 
killing him.  Even Jefferson would not have allowed the bashaw to get away with mass 
murder.  Massacring the Philadelphia captives would have been tantamount to Yusuf signing 
his own death warrant—and Yusuf was too smart for that. 
Regardless, the bashaw regained his composure and outwitted Lear (they negotiated 
via letters).  The American diplomat acted unprofessionally and against the best interests of 
his country by allowing his personal animosity towards Eaton and Hamet’s expedition to 
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affect his negotiating.  Lear rebuffed Barron’s instructions to use the coup attempt as 
leverage, telling him that it would not make “any impression favourable” on Yusuf.  What 
made Lear so sure about this assessment?684  As we know from Cowdery’s journal, Lear was 
gravely mistaken—Yusuf was terrified at the prospect of being overthrown.  Back in April, 
Yusuf had offered peace and ransom for $200,000 (with the United States freeing its 
Tripolitan hostages and “mak[ing] full restitution of the[ir] property”).685  Now Yusuf sought 
$130,000 for ransom—a high figure, given that in February 1804 Yusuf was willing to make 
peace with Preble for $100,000 in ransom, a consular present, and a schooner to trade for the 
Philadelphia.686  Then, the United States only had sixty Tripolitan prisoners as leverage.  
Now, the United States held a Tripolitan city, had 100 Tripolitan prisoners, and could 
threaten to continue the coup attempt.  Lear perhaps felt overawed by Yusuf’s demand and 
countered with $60,000 for ransom.  Why this sum?  After exchanging captives on a one-for-
one basis, a balance of 200 Americans was left.  At the rate of $300 per man, the total came 
to $60,000.  Unfathomably, Lear did not use the United States’ capture of Derne as leverage.  
Surely he could have insisted that the United States would not relinquish the town until 
Yusuf released all of the Philadelphia hostages (recall Cowdery’s report that Yusuf was 
willing to free them without ransom).  The bashaw also apparently prohibited Cowdery from 
communicating with Lear, as the former’s diary contains no details about negotiations and 
Lear’s letters do not mention the doctor.  Yusuf was shrewd to prevent Cowdery from 
sharing his valuable intelligence.  Lear did not push hard enough in negotiations and acted as 
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if Yusuf held most of the leverage.  His job was to obtain the best possible terms for the 
United States and he failed at this task by not using Derne as leverage.  Yusuf skillfully 
exacted $60,000 and a small consular present from the United States even though he faced 
popular unrest, a desperate financial situation, and had lost one of principal cities.687 
As for Hamet, Lear shamefully made but a token effort to ensure his welfare.  The 
third article of the peace treaty appeared to provide for Hamet by requiring Yusuf to return 
his wife and children after U.S. forces withdrew and Hamet left Tripoli.688  However, Lear 
and Yusuf made a secret alteration to the treaty (which Lear concealed and Jefferson and 
Madison did not learn about until 1807).689  This clause granted the bashaw up to four years 
to return Hamet’s family—this window of time ensured that Hamet would “give evident 
proofs of his peaceful disposition towards the Bashaw, and of his determination not to disturb 
the internal tranquility of his dominions.”690  Lear claimed to Eaton that demanding better 
treatment for Hamet would have endangered the Philadelphia captives by pushing Yusuf to 
adopt “measures which might prove fatal to our countrymen in his power.”691  Lear also lied 
about the treaty’s provision for Hamet, claiming that if he “withdraws himself quietly” from 
Tripoli “his wife and family should be restored to him.  To Lear, Hamet’s welfare was 
irrelevant—what mattered was brokering a lasting peace with Yusuf.   
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Moreover, Lear’s letters to Eaton and Madison suggest that he worried about how the 
treaty would be received—he crafted different versions of events.  The diplomat insincerely 
flattered Eaton by declaring that “the heroic bravery…at Derne and the idea that we had a 
large force and immense supplies at that place, had made a deep impression on the 
Bashaw.”692  To Madison, however, Lear reiterated his opposition to the coup attempt instead 
of crediting it:  “I have always been opposed to the Egyptian & Derne expedition” and “shall 
say nothing on that subject.”693  Instead, Lear suggested that Commodore Rodgers’s “manly 
firmness and evident wish to continue the war” helped during negotiations.694  Lear further 
embellished Rodgers’s role in a subsequent letter to Madison, contending that the naval 
officer “made so powerfull an impression on the mind of the Bashaw, that the negotiation 
afterwards became easy and unembarrassed.”695  Claiming that Yusuf feared further naval 
battles against the United States was preposterous.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Bainbridge, Cowdery, and Nissen believed that Preble’s August 1804 bombardments of the 
capital city accomplished little and Yusuf himself simply took refuge in a bomb-proof 
shelter.  Lear’s personal animosity towards the coup attempt (and perhaps to Eaton 
personally) led him to craft a narrative about the treaty that made him and Rodgers appear 
heroic and made Eaton and Hamet appear irrelevant. 
Among U.S. officials in the Mediterranean, the reaction towards the treaty was 
favorable.  Commodore Rodgers issued a circular letter that hailed it as “most honorable & 
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advantageous to the U. States.”696  The long-sought release of the Philadelphia hostages had 
finally happened and they celebrated with a drunken revelry.  Lear remarked that “the 
intoxication of Liberty & Liquor has deranged the faculties as well as the dresses of many of 
the Sailors” so much that they would not be ready to board U.S. ships until the afternoon 
(Bainbridge insisted that everyone needed to be “quite clean”).697  Surprisingly, even Eaton 
initially praised the treaty, calling it “certainly more favorable” and “more honorable than 
any peace obtained by any Christian nation” with a Barbary State over the past 100 years.698  
Within a week, however, he became more critical.  To a domestic correspondent, Eaton 
called the treaty “honorable but…not to be boasted of” and claimed that the $60,000 paid to 
Yusuf would have been sufficient to continue the expedition, overthrow “the usurper from 
his Capital,” and “wrest our captives from his chains.”699  Eaton’s August letter to Smith was 
downright livid.  He depicted Lear as a villain who made “needless concessions” and knew 
less about military matters “than a spinster.”700  Eaton found it unfathomable that Lear paid 
ransom money when the United States held Derne and its population of 12,000-15,000—why 
not trade them for the Philadelphia captives?  The adventurer contended that “Tripoli was in 
our power” and lamented that Hamet’s “cause of Liberty” had been abandoned.  
Hamet took the news of the peace treaty and the abandonment of the coup attempt 
well.  He, thirty-six of his followers, Eaton, and the American marines fled Derne the night 
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of June 12th and went to Syracuse.701  The ex-bashaw thanked Eaton for his “generous and 
many exertions in my behalf” and acknowledged his personal shortcomings—“my own 
means were small” and “did not answer your reasonable expectations.”702  He declared 
himself resigned “to the will of God” and simply wanted his family and a “small” stipend so 
that he could retire to another country and “spend the residue of my Days in Peace.”  
Hamet’s plight attracted the pity of Rodgers, who called him an “unfortunate and helpless 
Man” and arranged for a stipend of two-hundred Spanish dollars per month.703  Rodgers also 
tried to persuade Hamet to come to the United States, but he declined.  Hamet soon became 
unhappy, though, and appealed to Jefferson for help.  In August, he complained that Yusuf 
refused to return his family and described his current state as immensely depressing:  “I find 
myself in this country [Syracuse], with the small pension of two hundred dollars per 
month…to support myself with a number of people....the weight of my misfortune has only 
increased, and for the first time, am completely abandoned, and by a great nation; I therefore 
fling myself on the mercy of your excellency, who, under the influence of just laws, will not 
fail to render me that justice which oppression and misfortune entitle me to.”704  As will be 
seen, the question of America’s obligations to Hamet would become hotly contested in 
newspapers and in Congress over the next year. 
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In the United States, the conclusion of the Tripolitan War took everyone by surprise.  
Jefferson had expected the Tripolitan War to last at least until the summer and perhaps drag 
on indefinitely.  In a March letter about the conflict’s status, the president did not even 
mention the coup attempt—he apparently thought so little about its potential that it did not 
factor into his decision-making.  Instead, he expressed his weariness with the war and his 
preference to deescalate the conflict.  In a letter to Judge John Tyler, Jefferson remarked that 
if the navy “cannot produce peace” by the end of this summer “we shall recall our force, 
except one frigate and two small vessels, which will keep up a perpetual blockade.  Such a 
blockade will cost us no more than a state of peace, and will save us from increased tributes, 
and the disgrace attached to them.”705  Jefferson had tired of the Tripolitan War’s cost and 
did not care about permanently ending the threat of Barbary piracy.  If implemented, his 
plans would have meant that his administration would have spent millions of dollars fighting 
Tripoli for nothing.  What about the Philadelphia captives?  The letter to Tyler was silent 
about their fate, but earlier in the year Jefferson reported that if the navy could not win peace, 
then he would “ransom them.”706  Notably, Jefferson ignored the political repercussions to 
abandoning the war effort against Tripoli.  Unquestionably it would have helped the 
Federalist Party by providing them with powerful criticisms of his presidency:  a failed war 
and an enormous waste of money.  A protracted hostage situation played a significant role in 
dooming Jimmy Carter’s presidency in the late twentieth century; perhaps a loss against 
Tripoli and a large ransom payment would have prevented Secretary of State Madison from 
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being elected in 1808.  Fortunately for Jefferson, news of the peace treaty arrived in August, 
which prevented him from quitting the war and inflicting a devastating blow upon his 
political party. 
As news about the treaty trickled in to the United States in summer and fall 1805 
(through letters from the Mediterranean) and Federalist and Democratic-Republican 
newspaper editors began to interpret the Tripolitan War’s end, they found little common 
ground except in rejoicing in the Philadelphia captives’ freedom.  Newspapers battled over 
shaping public opinion and crafted different narratives that diverged over the appropriateness 
of paying $60,000 ransom and the abandonment of the coup attempt.  As for the Jefferson 
Administration, it bided its time and waited months before issuing a statement—not until 
January 1806 did the public finally learn the full details of the treaty.  Fighting in the 
Mediterranean had ended, but it was just beginning in the United States. 
Democratic-Republican newspapers realized that much was at stake regarding public 
perceptions of the Tripolitan War—they did not want the Federalist Party to regain 
popularity.  In order to bolster their own party, Democratic-Republicans constructed a 
triumphalist narrative in which the United States crushed Tripoli thanks to Jefferson’s 
resolute leadership.  Newspapers in six states ran an article that presented the Tripolitan War 
as the capstone of Jefferson’s presidency:  “no event that has happened during the present 
administration, confers upon it greater lustre than the recent success of our arms against 
Tripoli.  While other nations have disgracefully crouched before the powers of Barbary, the 
United States….has yet bravely defied, opposed, and conquered them.  Our infant nation has 
set a bright example to European powers, and the world will perhaps be indebted to her for a 
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generous spirit of independence.”707  As for the Jefferson Administration, it boldly 
“procur[ed] a large and powerful army to invade the Tripoline territory.”  This article 
distorted actual events in order to elevate Jefferson’s reputation—he had nothing to do with 
planning the coup attempt.  Moreover, the United States had hardly conquered the whole of 
Tripoli—Hamet and Eaton’s forces held but one town and could not overcome Yusuf’s 
reinforcements.  Other newspaper articles hoped that the end of the Tripolitan War would 
further turn the public against the Federalist Party.  A Maine newspaper praised Jefferson for 
winning the war with frugality and claimed that, had John Adams’s policies been continued, 
“we might have exhausted the whole national treasury in annual tribute,” the Barbary States 
“would have exacted our property or plunder,” and “we should have been the butt and 
ridicule of all Europe.”708  Similarly, a New Hampshire newspaper praised Jefferson for 
making peace with Tripoli and Morocco “on our own terms” and predicted that the treaty 
would “put a stop to the shameful defamation of our government by federalists.”709  In their 
over-the-top fawning over Jefferson, these articles served as propaganda.  Their 
characterization of the president as a strategic mastermind lacked any basis in reality and 
distorted his tepid commitment to the Tripolitan War. 
By contrast, Federalists readily celebrated the end of the Philadelphia crew’s 
enslavement but expressed reservations about the treaty.  Several newspapers demonstrated 
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their patriotism and enthusiasm for the captives’ liberation by utilizing capital letters:  for 
instance, “the EMANCIPATION OF OUR LATE CAPTIVE BRETHREN FROM THE 
CHAINS OF TRIPOLINE SLAVERY”710 and “OUR CAPTIVE BRETHREN ARE 
RELEASED!”711  Newspapers in two states called their freedom “a highly welcome and 
joyful event” and exulted that they would no longer “suffer hunger and thirst, cold and 
nakedness.”712  Other Federalist publications offered criticism about the Tripolitan War’s 
end.  Multiple newspapers published an editorial stating that “that our countrymen are free is 
true; and we cordially rejoice—so far we are certain is good.  If in all other respects, the 
treaty has strictly preserved the faith and honour of the country, it is good; if not, it is 
certainly bad.”713  More harshly, an article that ran in two states argued that Lear prematurely 
made peace—the expedition could have easily liberated the captives within three weeks “and 
at the same time had the satisfaction of seeing their tyrant hurled from the throne; and the 
friend and ally of the United States established in his stead!”714  It also predicted (correctly) 
that Democratic-Republican newspapers would obstinately defend the Jefferson 
Administration “right or wrong, through thick and thin” and “attempt to justify, if they cannot 
applaud, the haste of Mr. LEAR.”  Moreover, a Boston newspaper mocked a Democratic-
Republican publication that credited Jefferson’s gunboats for liberating the Philadelphia 
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captives—it suggested that newspaper “might as well have attributed it to the famous 
whirling armed chair at Monticello.”715  Federalist newspaper editors sought an elusive 
middle ground:  rejoicing at the freedom of the captives while disliking the war’s abrupt end. 
Democratic-Republican newspapers barely engaged the substance of Federalist 
criticisms and mostly blasted their rivals as reprehensive people.  A widely published article 
claimed (falsely) that Federalist newspapers contained “not a word of pleasing congratulation 
on the release of the captives—not a word of the happy state of our country by restoration of 
peace.”716  It also criticized Federalists for making Hamet “the object of their sympathy” and 
wondered when Federalists will cease “paying hirelings for lying.”  A Boston publication 
waxed poetic about alleged Federalist indifference to the captives’ freedom:  “Yet some there 
really are, we find/ So harden’d and deprav’d in mind,/ On whom this news has no effect,/ 
But cold indifference or neglect.”717  These articles either remained ignorant of—or, more 
likely, ignored—Federalist publications that rejoiced over the return of the Philadelphia 
hostages.  Other Democratic-Republican newspapers attacked Federalists as unpatriotic and 
motivated solely by the prospect of partisan gain.  Publications in two states, for instance, 
mocked Federalists’ anger at the ransom payment by rhetorically asking “can it be possible” 
that they “are actuated by patriotic movies?  Can it be possible that they are not governed by 
envy, and enmity to the happiness of their country?”718  Several newspapers spewed a more 
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spiteful insult, remarking that it would have given Federalists “pleasure [to] hear that the 
dead corps of our unhappy captives were enriching the soil of Tripoli” because they would 
have another reason to oppose Jefferson.719  Another newspaper vaunted that the Tripolitan 
War “has conferred greater glory on our country” than any event “since the adoption of our 
constitution” and accused Federalists of lacking “the magnanimity to approve what was done 
by their opponents....It grieves them sorely to think, that that administration which they had 
so often represented as weak, pusillanimous and cowardly should display more effective 
energy, and accomplish greater undertakings than their predecessors.  They therefore employ 
every art in their power to sully the glory which it has acquired and to detract from the merits 
of the treaty.”720  Why would Democratic-Republican newspaper editors get so defensive 
about any criticism of Jefferson or the treaty?  They knew that public opinion was at stake 
and wanted Americans to view Jefferson’s leadership favorably—and forget that he bore 
some responsibility for the Philadelphia crew being held hostage in the first place.  
Dehumanizing Federalists and distorting their actual views comprised a vital part of the 
Democratic-Republican triumphalist narrative.  They wanted to persuade the public that 
Jefferson’s Barbary policies had clearly trumped those of his Federalist predecessors. 
Democratic-Republicans also wielded Christianity as a weapon by claiming that some 
Federalists had offended God by not publicly thanking Him for the restoration of the 
Philadelphia captives.  Democratic-Republican publications revolved their attack around 
Governor Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, lambasting him for ignoring the liberation of the 
hostages in his Thanksgiving proclamation.  Two newspapers published a hostile open letter 
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to the governor that called him a “cold-hearted, impious wretch, whose conscious is so seared 
with the hot iron of party prejudice.”721  This insult alludes to 1 Timothy 4:2, which claims 
that people professing to be Christians will abandon the faith—“having their conscience 
seared with a hot iron,” they lack true knowledge and fortitude.722  By contrast, the article 
emphasized that other governors had properly thanked God and that the public at large 
expressed gratitude “in Christian assembles” as well as in “in the morning and evening 
devotions of Christian families.”  Similarly, an article published in four states condemned 
Strong for not “mention[ing] one word of the release” of the Philadelphia captives “which 
every real American must consider as a subject of joy and congratulation; and especially of 
gratitude to the Supreme Being.”723 Additionally, two Massachusetts newspapers accused 
Boston clergymen of allowing “party spirit” to “overleap the boundary of religious decency” 
by following Governor Strong’s “irreligious example.”724  It claimed that they were “more 
inclined to affront Jehovah than the Governor” and considered them more reprobate than the 
atheistic French.  This tactic of invoking religion for partisan means resembled Federalist 
efforts in the 1800 election that portrayed Jefferson as unqualified for the presidency due to 
his unorthodox religious beliefs.725  Massachusetts made a particularly attractive target since 
it was the last stronghold of Federalism.  These Democratic-Republican newspapers turned 
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the liberation of the Philadelphia crew into a religious test for public leadership and sought 
to portray Federalists as dangerous to the welfare of the United States—they tempted the 
wrath of God with their ingratitude. 
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans also disagreed over whether Yusuf would 
have executed the Philadelphia captives if the coup attempt had continued.  The former 
tended to deny that the threat was real, while the latter took it seriously.  A Federalist 
newspaper from Boston printed Cowdery’s May 24th diary entry about the bashaw’s 
eagerness to make peace and willingness to free the prisoners without ransom.726  Below this 
excerpt, the editor wrote:  “six days after peace was agreed on, and 60,000 dollars ransom 
money paid.”  Several Federalist publications castigated Lear, portraying him as consumed 
with envy over the prospect of Eaton gaining all the glory from conquering Tripoli.  A 
widely published (anonymous) letter asserted that Lear “from the moment of Eaton’s arrival, 
conceived a jealousy and formed a plan to defeat his hopes to reinstate Hamet.”727  It added 
that Yusuf “was ready to submit to any terms whatever” and emphasized that Cowdery 
personally told the writer that “there never was the smallest danger of the lives of a single 
individual.”  Similarly, several Federalist publications averred that “nothing can be more 
ridiculous” than the notion that Yusuf would have massacred the hostages.728  If he were 
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serious about killing them, they asked, why had he not done so during Preble’s summer 1804 
attacks?  The bashaw was smart and “knew our captive countrymen were the best guarantee 
for his life.”  The article argued, in bold letters so that no one could possibly miss it, that the 
negotiators sabotaged an honorable ending:  “OUR COUNTRYMEN WOULD HAVE 
BEEN RELEASED WITHOUT RANSOM;—THE RIGHTFUL PRINCE WOULD HAVE 
BEEN RESTORED TO THE THRONE OF TRIPOLY;— AND THE AMERICAN FLAG 
WOULD BE NOW TRIUMPHANTLY FLYING OVER THAT CITY.”  These Federalist 
newspapers believed that the Tripolitan War could have been a glorious triumph for the 
United States—victory was at hand, but the envious Lear betrayed Eaton, Hamet, and their 
forces by cutting a shameful deal with Yusuf. 
 By contrast, Democratic-Republican newspapers defended Lear’s decision to pay 
ransom as a prudent choice.  Eleven publications printed an essay that conceded that Eaton’s 
victory at Derne “no doubt contributed to induce [Yusuf] to make overtures for peace,” but 
argued that the effect was minimal:  “it is chimerical to suppose that the capture of a small 
town, several hundred miles from Tripoli, would have compelled the Bashaw to have 
submitted (as some suppose) to whatever terms Col. Lear may have thought to prescribe.”729  
It contended that Lear saved the prisoners’ lives by paying ransom—had the expedition 
continued on to the capital city, Yusuf would have “satiated his fury and vengeance by the 
massacre” of the captives.  An article printed in three states asked, “what man of sympathy 
would wish to place the lives of 300 prisoners, (immured within the cells of an enraged 
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barbarian) at hazard, having wives, children, brethren and relations anxious for their destiny, 
merely for the sake of trying how far the threats of such a barbarian would have been carried 
into execution?...If we had suffered one man to have fallen a sacrifice, the world would have 
reprobated our conduct.”730  This article made an emotional appeal to readers in attempting to 
persuade them that paying ransom was the right choice.  Families needed their patriarchs to 
return—it would be cruel to risk their breadwinner’s life.  By killing the Philadelphia 
captives, the bashaw would also be destroying American families.  Other newspapers 
celebrated the treaty because it avoided further bloodshed by sparing the lives of Tripolitan 
civilians and “our brave tars.”  “For this,” it argued, “we have paid the paltry sum of 60,000 
dollars, a sum which, divided among the people of the United States, does not exceed a cent a 
head.”731  These Democratic-Republican newspaper editors defended paying ransom as the 
absolutely correct choice that ensured that the Philadelphia captives would return home 
alive. 
Eaton eventually become a polarizing figure, but initially newspaper editors of both 
political parties hailed him as a military genius worthy of the highest accolades.  More than 
two dozen newspapers published a celebratory biography that hailed him as the “MODERN 
AFRICANUS” (a reference to the eminent Roman General Publius Cornelius Scipio 
Africanus).732  It depicted Eaton as a larger-than-life warrior, with “a countenance bold and 
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undaunted; a constitution robust and confirmed by exercises and fatigues, and courage of that 
determined and invincible kind.”  This hagiographic piece also included an anecdote 
(probably apocryphal) of a failed assassination attempt against Eaton in 1801—the bashaw 
and prime minister of Tripoli wanted to kill Eaton, but the American remained cool with a 
“countenance terrible as Mars, and his eyes glaring as living coals” and reached for his 
sword.  The prime minister relented, being “too effeminate to withstand…the awful 
appearance of an angry veteran.”  Similarly, newspapers in three states printed a letter written 
by midshipman Henry Martin that portrayed Eaton as being on the cusp of complete victory:  
“if gen. Eaton could have marched to Tripoli, no doubt remains but that we should have 
taken that place.”  Further, Martin heralded him as a superhuman talent:  “the name of 
‘EATON’ among the Barbarians was a good as ten thousand Turks.”733  Altogether, 
newspaper editors deemed Eaton an extraordinary figure who boasted courage and talent 
unseen since the days of ancient Rome.  Since no one blamed Eaton for the abandonment of 
the coup attempt (everyone recognized that Lear and Barron made the decision), he was 
frozen in the public’s mind as a legendary adventurer.734 
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Despite bipartisan acclaim for Eaton among newspaper editors, the extent to which the 
government should recognize his accomplishments generated fervent debate in the House of 
Representatives.  It began with a December 11th motion made by Barnabas Bidwell 
(Democratic-Republican—MA) to have President Jefferson present Eaton with a 
commemorative sword “as a testimony” of Congress’s “approbation of his gallant and good 
conduct, in leading his army through the desert of Lybia…and taking the city of Derne; 
contributing thereby, to the successful termination of the war, and to the release of our fellow 
citizens from slavery.”735  The following day, Bidwell moved to modify his resolution by 
replacing the sword with a gold medal (a more prestigious honor).736  This alteration 
prompted a heated month-long debate.  Joseph Clay (Democratic-Republican—PA) stated 
that he “was very willing to vote for presenting a sword,” but opposed a medal on the 
grounds that the Derne victory did not constitute “an extraordinary occasion.”  However, 
many congressmen supported Bidwell’s motion.  James Elliot (Democratic-Republican—
VT) and John Smilie (Democratic-Republican—PA) argued that Eaton had accomplished as 
much or more than Preble (who had received a gold medal from Congress) and therefore he 
deserved a medal as well.  Elliot added that the multinational character of Eaton and Hamet’s 
forces (“collected from the four quarters of the globe”) constituted “a phenomenon in 
military history, calculated to attract the attention of the world, and not only by its novelty, 
but by its real influence and consequence.”  Josiah Quincy (Federalist—MA) argued that 
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Eaton’s seamless execution of his expedition revealed a “great and superior mind” and 
therefore merited a medal.  No decision was made that day, but the motion was referred to a 
committee and debated again on December 26th.  Clay reiterated his opposition, contending 
that Eaton did not deserve “so high a reward.”737  John Randolph (Democratic-Republican—
VA) likewise considered the Derne expedition insufficiently important to merit a medal and 
he also expressed fiscal concerns:  “we ought to be careful of the public money, and not to 
vote it away, except upon some extraordinary occasion.”  Joseph Varnum (Democratic-
Republican—MA) defended Eaton’s accomplishments at length and contended “that in a 
very little time he would have taken Tripoli itself,” while Ebenezer Elmer (Democratic-
Republican—NJ) considered a sword far too weak an accolade, “more appropriate to the 
reward of officers serving under a commander in chief.”  Nathan Williams (Democratic-
Republican—NY) declared that Eaton “had effected more than commodore Preble” and 
therefore deserved a medal.  A vote was taken and although the motion passed 58 to 53, it 
was well below the necessary two-thirds support.738  It therefore returned to committee.  
Although many Democratic-Republicans spoke out in favor of Eaton, nearly half of the 
House of Representatives opposed giving him the higher honor of the medal.  They valued 
the capture of Derne far less than did Eaton’s champions and perhaps they feared that giving 
Eaton a gold medal would make him a formidable political threat to their own party. 
Congress debated Eaton’s accomplishments a final time on December 27th.  Clay 
offered new arguments for opposing Bidwell’s motion, claiming that he had reviewed the 
Journals of Congress and discovered (incorrectly!) that only three gold medals were given to 
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Revolutionary War heroes.739  Clay declared that he opposed awarding Eaton a medal 
because he did not “consider the taking of Derne as equal in importance to the capture of 
Cornwallis” and because Decatur had received a sword for his Tripolitan War heroics.  
Randolph reiterated his opposition as well, arguing that the capture of Derne was not a “great 
national event,” just a mere “skirmish between a few of our countrymen and a handful of 
undisciplined, half armed barbarians.”  James Jackson (Democratic-Republican—GA) 
announced that he had changed his mind—he now supported giving Eaton a sword instead of 
a medal because Decatur had only gotten a sword.  Bidwell countered such arguments by 
emphasizing that Eaton’s endeavor was “not merely military but partly military and partly 
diplomatic” and therefore worthy of a medal.  Varnum concurred, stressing that the navy was 
unable “to reduce our enemy to terms” and that “the force under Eaton had a greater effect 
than the whole fleet in producing peace.”  He challenged his colleagues:  “if we gave Preble a 
medal…shall we refuse the same reward to Eaton, who accomplished the object”?   Elmer 
noted that “I am not very friendly to things of this kind” but insisted that Eaton clearly 
deserved a medal on account of demonstrating “bravery, fortitude, and wisdom.”  James 
Kelly (Federalist—PA) similarly hailed Eaton’s expedition as one “of great magnitude and 
national importance” and, like Varnum, argued that if Preble received a medal even though 
his efforts did not defeat Tripoli, then Eaton surely deserved one.  A vote was taken and 
Bidwell’s motion again passed 58 to 53—further debate had not made a difference.  Despite 
passionate speeches on behalf of Eaton, too many congressmen remained opposed.  Had 
Bidwell stuck to his original motion for a sword, it likely would have passed.  Bidwell tried 
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to scale back his goal and, on January 8th, presented a resolution in which Congress would 
thank Eaton “and his brave associates” for their accomplishments.740  However, like the 
earlier motions it stalled in the House of Representatives and never passed.  Sadly, Eaton 
never received any official commendation from Congress, although the Massachusetts state 
legislature awarded him 10,000 acres of land and praised his “undaunted courage and 
brilliant services.”741 
 Congress’s lack of appreciation for Eaton prompted some Federalists to cry foul.  
Newspapers in two states claimed that opposition to awarding Eaton a medal stemmed from 
partisanship—“if General Eaton had been a Virginian, and a thorough democrat, he might 
have been covered with medals.”742  They also portrayed Eaton’s opponents as out-of-touch 
with public sentiment:  Americans have “already decided the question, and no man ever held 
higher rank in their esteem than the brave EATON.”  Similarly, several newspapers accused 
Clay of “pervert[ing] facts” and emphasized the importance of the Derne victory:  it “is a 
fortified city containing between twelve and fifteen thousand souls; it is the capital of the 
best province of Tripoli, and the eastern key of the kingdom.”  The article added that, in their 
opposition to Eaton, congressmen challenged President Jefferson, who had proclaimed that 
the coup attempt “gave peace to our country, and freedom to three hundred of our fellow 
citizens.”743  These Federalists felt outraged, believing that Democratic-Republican 
                                                          
740 Washington Federalist (Washington D.C.), January 11, 1806. 
 
741 Lambert, 165; Resolution of Commonwealth of Massachusetts, February 25, 1806, Naval Documents VI: 
376-377. 
 
742 Washington Federalist (Washington D.C.), December 28, 1805; New-York Herald (New York, NY), January 
4, 1806. 
 
743 United States’ Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), January 2, 1806; Alexandria Daily Advertiser (Alexandria, VA), 
January 10, 1806; New-York Spectator (New York, NY), January 11, 1806. 
247 
 
congressmen withheld a high honor from Eaton simply because he did not belong to their 
political party.  In these newspaper editors’ minds, Eaton had been betrayed twice: first by 
Lear and now by the House of Representatives.744 
 As for President Jefferson, he refrained from issuing a public statement about the 
Tripolitan War until his December 3rd Annual Message, which expressed gratitude for “the 
liberation of our fellow-citizens” from captivity and praised the coup attempt—it 
“contributed doubtless to the impression which produced peace.”745  A week later, he gave a 
copy of the Tripolitan War treaty to the Senate and, the following month, he passed along a 
plethora of correspondence and government instructions.746  Jefferson also addressed 
Congress regarding Hamet.747  He emphasized that the expedition was abandoned due to 
Hamet being “totally unable to command any resources, or to bear any part in cooperation 
with us” and stressed that his administration had never intended “to raise, pay, or subsist an 
army of Arabs to march from Derne to Tripoli and to carry on a land war at such a distance 
from our resources.”  Although Hamet had no grounds to feel betrayed by the United States, 
the president thought that Congress should provide some remuneration to him in order to 
“establish a character of liberality and magnanimity.”  Privately, Jefferson expressed 
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satisfaction with the treaty, remarking to Secretary of the Navy Smith that “considering that 
Eaton’s fire was all spent at Derne…the peace is a subject of satisfaction.”748  The president 
had long wanted to end the Tripolitan War and Eaton’s expedition served as the catalyst.  
Jefferson correctly recognized that the coup attempt was too weak to continue, but the Senate 
initially rejected this interpretation. 
Indeed, surprisingly strong opposition to the Tripolitan War treaty emerged among 
senators.  Ratification required two-thirds of their support and, with twenty-seven 
Democratic-Republicans and seven Federalists, passage should have been easy.  However, 
several senators bucked party loyalty by openly denouncing Lear and the treaty.  Much 
authority lay in a committee created to review the treaty.  Comprised of four Democratic-
Republicans and one Federalist, it was led by a retired militia officer, Stephen Bradley 
(Democratic-Republican—VT), who had aided Eaton’s military career by appointing him a 
captain in 1792.749  Bradley was clearly not impartial, telling Eaton about the “indignation” 
felt by many senators and predicting that the treaty would not be ratified.750  He solicited 
information from personnel who had been in Tripoli and received responses that made Lear 
appear guilty of exercising poor judgment.751  One of the Philadelphia captives, Second 
Lieutenant Wallace Wormeley, described the city of Tripoli as being on the precipice of 
collapse.  It was “in the most distressed situation” and filled with “the greatest terror and 
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consternation.”752  The economy was crippled due to the naval blockade, yet Yusuf would 
not raise taxes lest the populace rebel and support Hamet.  Wormeley also denied that the 
captives’ lives were in jeopardy:  “I do not believe that there was any danger to be 
apprehended for our lives, even if general Eaton and Hamet bashaw had have marched under 
the walls of Tripoli.  It would have been to the interest of every subject, (private as well as 
political) to have protected us.”  Master Commandant John Dent, who had participated in the 
attack on Derne, claimed that Commodore Barron’s poor health adversely affected his 
decision-making.  Barron’s mental state was “so much impaired as scarcely to recollect any 
thing that transpired from one day to another.”753  Dent despised Lear for being irrationally 
hostile to the coup attempt (he had always considered it “fruitless”) and accused him of 
manipulating Barron.  These negative reports from eyewitnesses reinforced Bradley’s 
suspicions and validated the Federalist press’s criticisms of the treaty. 
After two months’ deliberation, the Senate committee released a blistering report on 
March 17th.  It abhorred the abandonment of the coup attempt, declaring that Hamet “would 
have marched to the throne of Tripoli, had he been supported by the co-operation of the 
American squadron, which in honor and good faith he had a right to expect.”754  The report 
excused Barron from blame due to his “wasting sickness, and consequent mental as well as 
bodily debility” and instead tore into Lear:  he “gained a complete ascendency over the 
commodore” and “paralyzed every military operation by sea and land.”  Moreover, it accused 
the diplomat of violating his instructions by paying $60,000 to Yusuf and rebuked him for 
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not obtaining the restoration of Hamet’s family.  The committee suspected (correctly, as time 
would reveal) that Lear and Yusuf “never intended” to return Hamet’s family.  Further, the 
committee rejected Lear’s contentions that the Philadelphia prisoners would have been 
executed and that the United States lacked the “means to prosecute the war.”  The report 
declared that these excuses “have no foundation in fact, and are used rather as a veil to cover 
an inglorious deed, than solid reasons to justify the negotiator’s conduct.”  The committee 
wished that the $60,000 had instead been used to support the restoration of “the rightful 
sovereign of Tripoli, on his throne” so that the United States would have freed the captives 
“without the payment of a cent” and obtained “a peace with the Barbary powers, that would 
have been secure and permanent, and which would have dignified the name and character of 
the American people.”  As for Hamet, the committee viewed him as “a victim to his 
unbounded confidence in [American] integrity and honor” and presented a bill that would 
authorize the president to pay him compensation (the committee left the amount blank).  The 
committee saw a larger principle at stake than simply doing right by Hamet:  they hoped that 
“the legislature of a free and christian country, can never leave it in the power of a 
mahometan to say that they violate their faith, or withhold the operations of justice.”  
Clearly, the committee considered Lear untrustworthy and deemed the treaty unacceptable.  
Notably, the report was not an instance of partisan-motivated warfare:  four of the five 
committee members were Democratic-Republican.  They took the concept of national honor 
very seriously and were livid that the quest to restore the rightful bashaw to power had been 
abandoned. 
The credibility and clout of the Senate report allowed Federalist newspaper editors to 
present their criticisms of the treaty as reasonable and just and to attack Democratic-
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Republican publications as overtly partisan for defending Lear.  Newspapers in four states 
published an article that dared Democratic-Republican editors to renounce their support for 
the treaty.  It asked “is there a man in the United States weak enough to justify the conduct of 
the government’s agent…to tell us that the Tripolitan Treaty is a good treaty?  Will the 
Richmond Enquirer, the Aurora, the Citizen, the Boston Chronicle...persist in swearing that 
Mr. Consul Lear made a good, and a cheap, and an honest, and an honourable treaty?”755  
Moreover, a Boston newspaper took a moment to criticize all the Democratic-Republican 
editors who had slandered Federalists over the past few months.  It recalled how the Jefferson 
Administration’s allies had “exalted” the treaty “to the skies as a chef d’oeuvre of 
diplomacy” and had “abused, with their usual virulence every one who was not ready to 
shout the praises of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Lear.”756  Now, however, it was clear that 
Federalist critics had been right all along and “never before, since the United States were a 
nation, has the character of our country been so disgraced, as by this most unfortunate and 
humiliating conduct of a publick Agent.”  One can imagine Federalist newspaper editors 
publishing these articles with glee.  In their eyes, the Senate committee report constituted 
proof that Federalists were right to question Lear’s behavior and were devoted to the best 
interests of the country. 
Yet despite the report’s seething anger, the Senate ultimately supported ratification.  
John Quincy Adams emerged as the leading critic of the committee and marshalled evidence 
that challenged its inflammatory conclusions.  On April 1st he spoke at length about how the 
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report was “in many respects contradictory to the whole tenor” of the “voluminous 
documents” made available to the Senate.757  He stressed that the report had a very different 
interpretation of the “nature” of the coup attempt than did Jefferson’s message from January 
and letters from Hamet, Barron, and Lear.  Adams also cited an August 27, 1802 letter from 
Secretary of the Navy Smith to Commodore Morris as evidence that Eaton had made 
promises to Hamet that the government had “expressly disavowed.”758  In the letter, Smith 
declared that cooperating with Hamet “is not to be considered by you of sufficient magnitude 
to prevent, or even to retard a final settlement” with Yusuf.  Moreover, the senator denied 
that Eaton and Hamet would inevitably have captured the capital city had they received more 
support and he disagreed with Chairman Bradley’s depiction of Barron as being “reduced to 
a state of perfect childhood.”759  Adams, a lawyer by training, also cast doubt upon the 
testimony of John Dent (which had been used to discredit Barron) by emphasizing that it was 
taken after events happened.  The senator observed that “among the officers employed in the 
Mediterranean service, there has been a division into parties” and thus accounts “are seldom 
altogether free from a certain bias.”760  Adams thought that the committee unjustly savaged 
Lear, although he admitted that he did not believe that Yusuf “would have sacrificed the lives 
of our prisoners.”761  Overall, Adams considered the treaty a solid deal for the United States 
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and, in his diary, recorded that David Stone (Democratic-Republican—NC) and James 
Turner (Democratic-Republican—NC) thanked him afterwards.762 
In addition to Adams’s effective opposition, Eaton’s erratic behavior contributed to 
the Senate passing the treaty.  The diary of Senator William Plumer (Federalist—NH) reveals 
how he became disillusioned with Eaton over time.  The senator initially thought very highly 
of the adventurer, crediting the coup attempt for “induc[ing] the Tripolitans to make peace” 
and deeming him “a man of information & great enterprize.”763  By spring 1806, though, 
Plumer came to disliked Eaton due to his arrogance and lack of self-control.  He reported an 
incident at Steele’s Hotel that was witnessed by a fellow senator, Nicholas Gilman 
(Democratic-Republican—NJ).  “In a most boisterous manner” Eaton cursed at and attacked 
the servants for bringing in his breakfast late and vowed to “cut their throats” if anyone ate 
before him.764  Plumer and Gilman both deemed Eaton “a haughty assuming imprudent 
man.”  Moreover, Plumer despised Eaton for declaring that “‘a majority of the Senate have 
sold the honor of their country’” by postponing the bill for aid to Hamet.765  Plumer resolved 
never to eat with Eaton anymore and considered his remarks “an outrageous violation of 
good breeding.”766  In January, Plumer had distrusted “that vile wretch of a Lear,” believed 
that the coup attempt “no doubt” would have succeeded had it received more support, and 
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regretted that “we basely & ungenerously deserted the Ex Bashaw.”767  Three months later, 
however, the senator deemed the treaty “a good one,” thought Lear “deserve[d] praise, 
considered Eaton “an imposter,” and viewed the coup attempt as “trivial in its operations & 
not affording a single prospect of success.”768  Plumer once viewed Eaton as a heroic martyr, 
but now considered him egotistical and untrustworthy. 
By mid-April, most senators had determined to support ratification.  Chairman 
Bradley argued for postponing the ratification vote until the next session, but this motion was 
defeated by a vote of 20 to 10.769  On April 12th, Robert Wright (Democratic-Republican—
MD) added an amendment to ratify the treaty only if Hamet’s family members were released, 
but the Senate rejected it 20 to 9.  Later that day another vote was taken to ratify without any 
stipulations—it passed 21 to 8.  Adams characterized the debate as “very warm, zealous, and 
vehement—General Sumter and myself in favor…Messrs. Wright, Adair, White, Smith of 
Ohio, Tracy, and Pickering against it.”770  Ultimately, the Senate wanted to resolve the 
Tripolitan War business and to prevent the United States from being indefinitely bound to 
Hamet’s welfare.  Later that month, Congress granted him a one-time sum of $2,400 and 
expected him to survive on his own.771 
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Despite the heated debates in Congress and bitter partisan fighting among newspaper editors, 
the public at large overwhelmingly rejoiced in the Tripolitan War’s end.  Celebrations and 
entertainments hailed the liberation of the Philadelphia captives, showered the naval officers 
and Eaton with accolades, and did not mind the ransom payment.  Any doubts about the 
honorableness of the treaty or the controversy surrounding the abandonment of the coup 
attempt did not dampen the public spirit—people wanted to party.  Indeed, many Americans 
celebrated the end of the conflict with public dinners, toasts, and cultural events.  The 
Tripolitan War was clearly not a sideshow to Americans—they considered it a pivotal 
moment in their young country’s history with international ramifications.  
As they had throughout the conflict, attendees at parties and gatherings celebrated the 
Tripolitan War with toasts.  In contrast to views held by many congressmen and newspaper 
editors, toasts portrayed the Tripolitan War as a clear-cut victory for the United States.  
Attendees at a dinner in Trenton, NJ, for instance, rejoiced in “the War of Tripoli, which 
alone displays feats of heroism splendid as those which adorn the ages of both Greece and 
Rome.”772  A Massachusetts group in West Springfield drank to “no Tribute, but such as 
Eaton and Preble paid to the Bashaw of Tripoli,”773 while Charleston partygoers wished that 
“all pirates and tyrants of the ocean, [would] be brought to speedy humiliation and 
confusion.”774  In New York, a gathering of the General Society of Mechanics and 
Tradesmen remembered “the American tars, who nobly fought, bled, conquered, and 
obtained a glorious ransom of our countrymen.”775  Some toasts exaggerated the role played 
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by the Navy in ending the Tripolitan War, inaccurately crediting it with subduing the bashaw.  
For instance, a Connecticut group of “Gentlemen and Ladies” in Columbia hailed “our infant 
Navy—Large enough to keep in awe the pirates of Barbary.”776  Similarly, committee 
members at a Richmond dinner in honor of Stephen Decatur declared that “our infant navy 
has already displayed Herculean strength, and taught the world to respect the efforts which a 
free and enlightened people can make, to vindicate their violated rights.”777  A rare moment 
of public opposition to the treaty, though, occurred at a Fourth of July celebration in 
Massachusetts.  The speaker urged the audience to despise it, rhetorically asking “where is 
our national honor, till then unstained and a name respected by all nations?  Betrayed at 
Tripoli.”778  Overall, however, the vast majority of public celebrations hailed the Tripolitan 
War as an exceptional victory.  These toasts do not accurately describe the conflict’s limited 
gains, but rather reflect the deep nationalism felt by Americans.  They ignored the war’s 
unpleasant ambiguities such as the ransom payment and the abandonment of Hamet and 
instead argued that the United States had crushed its adversaries and made an honorable 
treaty. 
Americans also lionized the naval officers and seamen as noble guardians of 
republicanism who defended (and did not threaten) domestic liberty.  An Irish-Catholic 
fraternal society from Charleston drank to “the Navy of the United States—May it, as before 
the walls of Tripoli, humble the proudest of her enemies.”779  An Albany group of 
Democratic-Republicans celebrated the Fourth of July with a toast to “Commodore Preble 
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and the officers and crews of the American Navy—they have immortalized the name of 
American sailors,” while a Boston group of Democratic-Republicans celebrated “Com. 
Preble, Stephen Decatur, and the heroes who fought in the Mediterranean.  Theirs is the boast 
of humbling the Tripolitan tyrant—and their country’s gratitude the laurels which they 
earn.”780  The Lieutenant Governor of New York exalted the naval officers and seamen for 
embodying the finest masculine standards, raising a toast to “the sons of America—May they 
emulate the spirit of our brethren at Tripoli, when called upon to defend their country’s 
sacred rights.”781 Likewise, a Charleston group saluted “the Memory of our heroes who fell 
before the walls of Tripoli—May the records of their valor be handed down to posterity, and 
stimulate future generations to deeds of glory.”782  President Jefferson viewed the navy as a 
threat to America’s freedom, but the public clearly rejected such fears.  To them, the officers 
and tars had demonstrated their importance to the country’s welfare, merited the highest 
praise, and served as role models for American men. 
Additionally, toasts expressed gratitude at the return of the captives and depicted 
them as martyrs who suffered and not as cowards who shamefully surrendered their ship to 
the enemy.  A Fourth of July group of Boston Democratic-Republicans drank to “the 
liberation of our countrymen from Tripolitan captivity—While in confinement we wept with 
them—and now they are liberated, we rejoice with them.”783  In Albany, “a party of young 
gentlemen” hoped that “the animating smiles of their countrymen, [would] erase the sad 
impressions of a gloomy dungeon,” while a Trenton gathering celebrated “our brethren lately 
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captive in Tripoli—May the twining of the laurel efface the impressions of the fetter.”784  The 
Philadelphia Typographical Society similarly drank to “our brethren lately in captivity in 
Tripoli—May they forget their past sufferings in the pleasing recollection that they were 
restored to their country by the cannon balls of freedom.”785  Although surrendering the 
Philadelphia greatly hurt the U.S. war effort, the public did not hold a grudge against Captain 
Bainbridge and the ship’s officers and crew.  Americans had read about their sufferings in 
Tripoli and were relieved that their ordeal had ended. 
Yet even while hailing the Tripolitan War’s end, Americans somberly remembered 
those who died during the conflict.  The public believed that their deaths (especially the 
Intrepid officers and crew) had not been in vain, but contributed to the defense of American 
freedom and commerce.  Celebrants at a Martha’s Vineyard Fourth of July celebration, for 
instance, drank to the Intrepid crew:  those “young Heroes—Who, at the siege of Tripoli, 
preferred death to slavery.”786  A group of Boston Democratic-Republicans likewise 
remembered “Somers, Israel, and Wadsworth—Their bravery and becoming death shall be 
remembered by their countrymen, ‘until nature sinks in years,’” while a New York dinner 
party praised “the memory of Wadsworth, Summers, and Israel—Like the phoenix of 
antiquity, they rise more resplendent from the flame which destroyed them.”787  An infantry 
company from Trenton offered a broader remembrance that honored all “the heroes who fell 
before Tripoli—May their bravery and patriotism be as generally imitated as it is 
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admired.”788  The public did not take these deaths for granted, but rather genuinely 
appreciated what the navy had accomplished.  They expected future generations of 
Americans to remember the Tripolitan War and to revere the deceased as heroes. 
In addition to remembering the dead, the public relished the living heroes of the 
Tripolitan War.  The naval officers became highly valued dinner guests and Americans 
wanted to bask in their presence and express their admiration and gratitude.  For instance, 
Bainbridge received a thunderous reception while in Fredericksburg, Virginia to attend a 
dinner in his honor.  As a local newspaper described, many “citizens and other civil and 
military officers” greeted him and “the streets were crowded and the houses handsomely 
illuminated.”789  Recall Bainbridge’s anxiety in his November 1803 correspondence—he 
feared that his career would be over and that he would become a pariah.  Surely he felt 
immense relief that the public viewed him as a hero who bravely endured captivity and not as 
a coward who tarnished his honor by surrendering a warship.  Additionally, “a party of 
young gentlemen” of Philadelphia threw a January 1806 dinner attended for Bainbridge, 
Decatur, Lieutenant Charles Stewart, and Lieutenant John Shaw.  As a newspaper described, 
it featured dazzling art work:  “a splendid transparency” of the “the frigate Philadelphia 
wrapt in flames, and the ketch Intrepid...bearing off from the scene of glory.  On the opposite 
side of the painting was seen, Gun boat No. 1, with her Tripolitan prize in tow, coming out of 
the harbour of Tripoli, with a distant view of the Castle and Fortifications of the town.  In the 
front ground appeared, a full length likeness of Capt. Decatur…Its effect on the company 
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was delightful.”790  This dinner also featured a song performed by an theater member—the 
lyrics included the lines “The carnage is past, but our honours remain/ Pure, bright, and 
exalted, untouch’d by a stain:/ The heroes return’d, with delight we receive,/ And those that 
are gone, shall in gratitude live.”  Even New Orleans residents threw a gala that featured 
military officers, government officials, and the governor.  A Catholic priest even invited 
people to a service at the Ursuline Convent “in celebration of the happy deliverance of our 
American christian brethren” from Tripoli.791  As a notable scholar has discussed, following 
the Louisiana Purchase, Louisianans sought to dispel any doubts about their loyalty to the 
United States.792  By celebrating the return of the Philadelphia captives, they clearly 
demonstrated their nationalism and solidarity with Americans on the East Coast. 
The public likewise heaped acclaim upon Eaton, deeply appreciating his heroic 
expedition and viewing it as a highlight of the Tripolitan War.  Prior to August 1805 
Americans knew little about him, but now he was deemed the preeminent military genius of 
his time.  Notably, the public accepted his self-appointed designation of “general” even 
though, officially speaking, he was not.  A group of Democratic-Republicans from New York 
proclaimed “Gen. Eaton—the best negotiator we ever sent to Tripoli,” while a New Jersey 
infantry group drank to “Gen. EATON—May the laurels gathered in the African desert, 
never be withered.”793  In Salem, a group drank to “Commodore PREBLE and Gen 
EATON—Heroes of the first stamp—May they continue the lesson to the foes of our country 
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they taught the Bashaw of Tripoli,” while an Albany assembly praised “General Eaton—The 
hero who nobly stepped forward for the rights of humanity and justice.”794  “Merchants and 
other citizens” at a New York dinner hinted at a promising future political career for the 
Derne hero, toasting “General Eaton—The Statesman and Soldier.”795  The public did not 
care about Eaton’s actual military credentials or that Hamet was not actually restored to 
power.  They revered Eaton for leading an arduous march and winning a thrilling, 
unexpected victory.  In their minds, he had earned the title “General.”  However, the public’s 
lionization of Eaton galled at least one policymaker.  Senator Plumer considered it 
“improper” that people called Eaton a general.796  Notably, although the public revered Eaton 
they did not embrace his negative interpretation of the end of the Tripolitan War.  Toasts did 
not condemn Lear or blast the treaty as dishonorable.  The public did not deem praising both 
Eaton and the treaty as mutually exclusive. 
As with the naval officers, the public vied to host Eaton at social events.  Shortly after 
his arrival in the United States (at Hampton Roads, VA) on November 10th, he stopped in 
Richmond for a dinner in his honor at the Eagle Tavern.797  One-hundred gentlemen attended 
(including Chief Justice John Marshall and other judges) and they raised several Tripolitan 
War-themed toasts, including multiple to Eaton and one to “the Bashaw of Tripoli—whose 
ruined fortifications have furnished him with a new lecture on the law of nations.”  Eaton 
also attended a dinner at in his honor at Stelle’s Hotel in Washington, at which celebrants 
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toasted his “heroism [which] supplied the place of legions, in routing the mercenary bands, 
and appalling the corrupt councils of Tripoli.”798  In Philadelphia, Eaton joined many naval 
and marine corps officers at a public dinner that featured a lengthy and laudatory toast to 
him:  “the hero who had the wisdom and enterprise to surmount the many obstacles opposed 
to him in Egypt, collect and conduct through the Libyan desert an army of undisciplined 
barbarians, subdue the city of Derne by storm, carry terror to the heart of the bashaw of 
Tripoli, rescue three hundred citizens from slavery, and secure an honourable peace to his 
country.”799  Attendees at a Springfield, MA celebration took umbrage at Eaton’s treatment 
by the House of Representatives, condemning the “base men and cowards” who “would 
withhold from him a crown of glory” and proclaiming that “the voice of his country has 
raised him a monument more durable than the envied medal, and more glorious than the 
sword.”800  To the public, Eaton constituted the greatest military mind since George 
Washington and they credited him with ending the Tripolitan War honorably for the United 
States. 
Tripolitan War celebrations extended beyond public dinners, as a new array of 
artwork, entertainments, literature, music, and exhibits emerged.  Although the conflict had 
dragged on for four years, public enthusiasm had not grown cold and businessmen and artists 
still saw commercial potential.  Americans could purchase Tripolitan War-themed artwork 
for their homes or as gifts.  A Richmond newspaper, for instance, promoted two different 
“elegantly Engraved & Coloured” plates (20” x 14”) of Tripoli.  The first image depicted the 
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loss of the Philadelphia and the second portrayed “Commodore Preble’s Squadron” as it 
appeared on August 3, 1804 (“when they captured three of the Tripolitan boats, and greatly 
damaged the Bashaw’s fortifications”).801  The artist (Charles Denoon) had an unusual 
degree of credibility—he had been a hostage in Tripoli and his artwork reportedly “received 
the approbation of the capt. and officers of the Philadelphia, of Commodore Barron,” and 
others who had been at Tripoli.  Denoon hoped to turn his dreary captivity experience into a 
financial positive, charging $2 per engraving.  The ad also urged the wealthy to demonstrate 
their patriotism by patronizing the arts so that the United States would no longer “be 
continually indebted to the schools of Europe.”  Additionally, another artist, one Mr. Binnse, 
produced a high-quality print of the Intrepid as it prepared to burn the Philadelphia in 
Tripoli’s harbor.802  He painted the image and then had engravings of it made in Paris.  
Measuring 17” x 22” and in color, this artwork was considerably more expensive than 
Denoon’s:  $5 for subscribers or $6 for non-subscribers.  Clearly, these artists thought that 
the Tripolitan War would endure in public memory and that Americans would want to 
possess images of key events and show them off to family and friends.  
In addition to privately owning Tripolitan War artwork, Americans could 
communally view pieces at museums and shows.  For instance, a wax museum in Litchfield, 
Connecticut ran advertisements vaunting about their “large and elegant collection” of life-
size wax figures, including “an elegant Figure of the GRAND BASHAW of Tripoli.”803  This 
wax museum provided inexpensive entertainment for the masses—admission cost only 
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twenty-five cents for adults and twelve and a half cents for kids.  Atypically, the ad referred 
to Yusuf as “GRAND”—other publications and commentators did not use this word when 
describing his position.  Likely this designation was sarcastic or implied oriental decadence.  
Similarly, the Columbian Museum in Boston promoted the “PHANTASMAGORIA,” which 
featured “upwards of 60 Moving Figures” including the “Bashaw of Tripoli.804 At fifty cents 
per person, it was considerably more expensive than the Connecticut museum.  One wonders 
how people felt when they gazed upon reproductions of Yusuf.  Did they feel superior and 
triumphant?  Did they feel disgust or anger?  Did they find him attractive or grotesque?  Was 
Yusuf scowling, looking smug, or did he appear afraid?  Did these pieces make observers 
fear or ridicule the Barbary pirates? 
Additionally, several entertainments tried to recreate the feeling of being in Tripoli 
and witnessing the U.S. Navy’s triumphs.  A Philadelphia play featured several large pieces 
of art, including a 924 ft2 representation of the battle of Derne on canvas.  It depicted Eaton 
on a grey horse, “the Ex-Bashaw receiving his instructions” (note the power dynamic—Eaton 
is in charge), Presley O’Bannon, Hamet’s cavalry, French artillery (apparently an error—the 
expedition had a Greek company), and the Argus, Nautilus, and Hornet.  Further, this show 
contained a 636 ft2 canvas depicting “THE BLOWING UP OF A GUN BOAT,” a 
transparency of many ships (including the “Philadelphia wrapt in flames”), and a dance 
inspired by Decatur, Preble, and Eaton.805  What an extravaganza!  Patrons would be 
overwhelmed with the onslaught of visual images, which seemed designed to stir up 
nationalistic frenzy.  The show was apparently profitable and popular—advertisements 
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spanned a full year.  In New York, a fireworks show included reenactments of the burning of 
the Philadelphia and the August 1804 bombardments of Tripoli.806  Another Tripolitan War 
spectacular, called the Panorama, embarked on a tour of northern cities.  It visited Boston, 
Portland, Portsmouth, and Salem, and featured depictions of “the Bombardment of Tripoli” 
and the “Burning of the Philadelphia Frigate” that “had the approbation” of Preble, Decatur, 
“and other Officers.”807  Painted by “that celebrated Italian Artist” Mr. Corne, it promised an 
immersive patriotic experience and claimed that “a real American may with satisfaction 
behold and contemplate the achievements of his brave countrymen in an unequal contest with 
those semi-barbarians of Africa.”808 
Some performances went beyond merely having Tripolitan War-themed imagery by 
incorporating iconic American symbols.  In doing so, these shows argued that the Tripolitan 
War was one of the most important events in U.S. history.  A New York newspaper 
promoted a play called The Tars from Tripoli:  Or, a Tribute of Respect to the Mediterranean 
Heroes, the finale of which featured actors (portraying Tripolitans) yielding before the 
presence of Columbia, Liberty, and Justice.809  This production ignored the fact that the 
United States paid $60,000 to Tripoli and instead implied that Tripoli begged the United 
States to stop attacking.  In Philadelphia, the end of one play featured “an Allegorical 
Transparency…called AMERICAN HEROES; Or, the Naval Garland, in honor of the 
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Officers who fell in the engagements off Tripoli.”810  Alongside the busts of several officers 
who died (“[James] Decatur, Summers, Wadsworth, Caldwell, Israel and Dorsey”) were “the 
Goddess of America,” Preble, and the Constitution.  Similarly, a Rhode Island newspaper ran 
an advertisement for a “Musical Farce” entitled “THE RELEASE OF THE CAPTIVES 
FROM TRIPOLI, or A TRIBUTE OF RESPECT TO OUR BRAVE COMMANDERS,” the 
final scene of which featured “a View of the Horizon and Sea, a Monument erected to the 
Memory of our illustrious WASHINGTON in Transparency, and our NAVAL 
COMMANDERS adorned with Wreaths of Flowers.”811  No higher compliment could be 
given to the naval officers than to compare them to George Washington, the most preeminent 
American war hero of all.  Altogether, these immersive visuals created bonds of nationalism 
by encouraging audience members to imagine themselves present at the Tripolitan War’s 
triumphant moments.  As very few Americans actually went to Tripoli, these shows offered 
the best simulation—and carried no risk of being enslaved! 
Other miscellaneous items included poems, songs, and even a children’s 
performance.  A Philadelphia newspaper advertised “A HEROIC POEM, In celebration of 
the bravery displayed by the American Tars in the contest with Tripoli.”812  It cost eighteen 
and three-quarters cents and covered the Tripolitan War’s highlights and lowlights:  the 
capture of a Tripolitan corsair by the Enterprize, the loss and destruction of the Philadelphia, 
Preble’s bombardment of Tripoli, the Intrepid explosion, Eaton’s desert march and victory at 
Derne, and “the sufferings of the American captives.”  Its author echoed toasts at public 
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celebrations that admonished young men to emulate the character of the naval officers and 
tars, calling his poem “a work of such public utility” and claiming that it “will teach the 
youth to admire merit, to pity misfortune; and be enamored with…dignified qualities.”813  
Children in Philadelphia could go beyond reading about the Tripolitan War by demonstrating 
their patriotism in public—a local newspaper advertised a play that featured “a Pantomimical 
Dance, (performed by children) called the SAILOR’S RETURN FROM TRIPOLI.”814  
Songs appeared as well, including “THE SIEGE OF TRIPOLI, An Historical Naval Sonata, 
for the Piano Forte,” “The Overture and Songs in the Tars from Tripoli,” and the “Conquest 
of Tripoli.”815  The public truly had a voracious appetite for Tripolitan War-themed 
entertainment and artists and businessmen had a seemingly endless supply of ideas. 
In contrast to the festive performances, Americans could read books that offered more 
serious reflections about the Tripolitan War.  Two captives quickly published accounts of 
their experiences:  Jonathan Cowdery and William Ray.  Cowdery’s journal has been cited 
several times in this chapter—it discussed his (privileged) life in Tripoli and contains 
observations about the bashaw and Tripolitan society.  Newspapers throughout the country 
had previously published excerpts of the journal, but now it was available in its entirety for 
twenty-five cents.816  One of the advertisements made an emotional appeal to readers by 
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including three lines of poetry that referenced the Philadelphia captives:  “O, hear their 
groans!/ O, see their tears!—/Then—learn their joy.”817  These words were especially 
misleading because they do not accurately describe the material in Cowdery’s journal—he 
lived comfortably with the officers and was exempt from hard labor.  Readers seeking tales 
of suffering were better served by perusing William Ray’s The Horrors of Slavery, or the 
American Tars in Tripoli.  An ordinary seaman who did hard labor and slept in a prison, Ray 
despised Cowdery and accused him of deceiving the American public about the nature of 
captivity in Tripoli.  Ray warned readers “that when the Doctor says we, it is the very same 
as if he had said we officers only; for he does not think proper to descend to the task of 
relating how the crew were provided for, or whether they were but half alive or all dead.”818  
A publisher from Albany solicited subscribers in early 1807 and Ray’s narrative went 
through three editions from 1808 to 1811.819  Other general histories appeared as well, 
including A History of the War between the United States and Tripoli and History of the 
Tripoline War.820  Given the minimalist nature of these ads (no author was given, for 
instance), it seems that the publishers deemed these works less impressive than ones written 
by former captives in Tripoli.  Altogether, artists and businessmen saw enormous commercial 
potential in the Tripolitan War and offered a plethora of entertainment options to the public.  
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Because no anti-war movement existed (unlike in the earlier wars against Britain and 
France), no segment of American society was offended by dehumanizing depictions of 
Tripolitans or uber-nationalistic celebrations of victory over Tripoli. 
 
What did the Tripolitan War ultimately accomplish?  Was there a consensus about its 
significance?  At the war’s beginning, diplomats, naval officers, and newspaper editors 
relished the opportunity to avenge two decade’s worth of embarrassments in North Africa.  
They wanted to create a new type of relationship with the Barbary States, one in which the 
United States demonstrated its naval superiority and freed itself from tribute obligations.  
Jefferson’s insistence on using limited naval force fragmented this unity, with Federalist 
editors turning critical after Tripoli’s capture of the Franklin.  Democratic-Republican 
newspaper editors, though, continued to support the president.  Federalists wanted to crush 
the Tripolitans and achieve a decisive victory, but Democratic-Republicans would settle for 
implementing a blockade and paying ransom. 
Paradoxically, even while the Tripolitan War increased partisanship, the public at 
large overwhelmingly celebrated it.  Unlike earlier conflicts with Britain and France, the 
Tripolitan War did not generate any public backlash.  No leaders were burned in effigy (as 
John Jay was after negotiating the 1795 treaty with Britain) and no pro-Tripoli associations 
existed to encourage harmonious relations (as Democratic-Republican Societies did 
regarding France in the 1790s).  Federalist newspaper editors and some politicians contended 
that the treaty was dishonorable and that the Lear had shamefully abandoned Hamet, but 
these two issues did not deeply resonate with the public.  Instead, Americans believed that 
the United States had taught the Tripolitans a lesson and expressed little concern for Hamet’s 
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welfare.  Artists and businessmen offered an abundance of live performances and 
commercial products, which allowed Americans to feel good about the war against Tripoli 
and reinforced a shared national identity uncontaminated by party politics. 
Regarding Jefferson, as commander-in-chief he deserves enormous criticism for his 
handling of the Tripolitan War.  It dragged on for far too long because he repeatedly ignored 
advice from naval officers and diplomats to send more ships.  Jefferson’s commitment to 
using limited force endangered the lives of American sailors (by depriving them of backup), 
indirectly caused the deaths of five of the Philadelphia hostages in Tripoli (and led five to 
“Turk turk”), and emboldened the Bey of Tunis to defy the United States (as will be seen in 
the next chapter).821  Jefferson’s strategy made America appear weak in the Mediterranean 
and did not intimidate the Barbary Powers.  He could probably have achieved a quick and 
decisive victory had he sent more ships to the Mediterranean in 1801 and authorized a joint 
attack with Sweden (which had proposed an alliance) against Tripoli’s navy.  By destroying 
the Tripolitan fleet, the U.S. would have forced Yusuf to capitulate. 
Moreover, one must remember contingency—it was not inevitable that Jefferson (or 
Madison) would emerge unscathed from the Tripolitan War.  Despite having spent more than 
$3,630,000 on naval operations during the Tripolitan War, Jefferson decided to withdraw 
most of the force in summer 1805 and to ransom the surviving Philadelphia captives.822  
Essentially, the president had concluded that the U.S. Navy could probably not defeat 
Tripoli.  Ironically, Jefferson was spared from carrying out this potentially devastating 
decision by a Federalist:  William Eaton.  His expedition scared the bashaw far more than did 
                                                          
821 For a list of the dead, see Smith to George Harrison, August 2, 1805, Naval Documents VI: 203. 
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Hornet, sixteen-guns) is blank.  The average expenses of the four other vessels with sixteen guns is $34,975.03.  
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naval bombardments and prompted the end of the Tripolitan War.  If Eaton had given up or 
had the coup attempt imploded during the grueling desert march, Yusuf would not have been 
anxious to broker a deal with Lear.  In this scenario, unless the United States met the 
bashaw’s financial demands, the Tripolitan War would have dragged on indefinitely.   
Had Jefferson followed through on his plans to recall most of the Mediterranean 
squadron and to ransom the Philadelphia hostages, the public surely would have responded 
with outrage instead of joy.  Further, Federalists would have exploited Jefferson’s 
capitulation by lambasting him for squandering millions of dollars and arguing that he had 
deeply embarrassed the United States.  A failed war against Tripoli would have slowed 
Democratic-Republican ascendency.  Since the public deeply cared about the Tripolitan War, 
Federalist candidates could have made significant political gains in the 1806 congressional 
elections and perhaps the party could have recaptured the presidency in 1808.  Indeed, 
Madison’s career would likely have suffered as well since, as Secretary of State, he bore 
some responsibility for the Jefferson Administration’s decisions.  Perhaps opposition to him 
would have materialized and prevented him from becoming president in 1808—either losing 
to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (a Revolutionary War veteran) or not even receiving the 
Democratic-Republican nomination (losing it to James Monroe).  Ironically, the Federalist 
Party would have been better off if the coup attempt had either never materialized or had 
failed.  Eaton’s resilience ultimately prevented the Federalist Party from capitalizing upon 
the Tripolitan War.823 
Instead, Eaton accomplished far more than the Jefferson Administration had thought 
possible.  Without his unwavering determination to restore Hamet, the Tripolitan War would 
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have been the United States’ first loss.  Because of Eaton, it was a small victory.  Both sides 
gained and lost something.  Yusuf stayed in power, demonstrated that he could withstand the 
U.S. Navy’s strongest attacks, held 300 American prisoners for much of the war, and 
received ransom money.  He did agree to cease requiring tribute from America, though.  The 
United States gained a treaty that did not require tribute, inflicted many defeats upon the 
Tripolitan Navy, and captured a prominent city.  However, 300 Americans became hostages 
in Tripoli and the United States paid $60,000 to get them back (thereby validating the 
practice of hostage-taking).  By no means was the Tripolitan War the clear-cut victory that 
the public claimed it was.  After spending nearly four million dollars on naval expenses, the 
coup attempt, ransom, and Hamet’s stipend, the United States only achieved a controversial 
peace.824  A messy and often frustrating conflict, the Tripolitan War revealed both the 
limitations of America’s naval strength and Yusuf’s staunch resilience.  The United States 
repeatedly used the wrong strategy (naval bombardments) to try to win. 
What about the aftermath?  The Jefferson Administration recalled the Mediterranean 
squadron in summer 1807 due to increasing tensions with Britain (the Chesapeake-Leopard 
affair had happened in June).825  Tripoli never again presented a serious threat to the United 
States, but was that because Yusuf had been taught a lesson or because the Tripolitan Navy 
had fewer opportunities to seize American ships and enslave the crews?  Over the next 
decade, Britain and France increasingly preyed upon American vessels:  from 1803 to 1812 
Britain captured more than 900 U.S. ships, while France seized 560.826  Further, Jefferson’s 
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embargo of 1807 crippled the U.S. economy and prevented American ships from sailing to 
the Mediterranean, while the War of 1812 devastated U.S. trade (in part because of an 
effective British blockade of the Atlantic coastline).827  Far from being subdued by the 
United States, Tripoli simply had fewer occasions to capture American ships.  Moreover, 
Algiers seized three ships in 1807 due to the Jefferson Administration being two years late in 
delivering tribute.  Not only did Tobias Lear have to borrow money to free two of the vessels 
and their crew members, but he paid $18,000 as compensation for the deaths of eight 
Algerine men (who died when the crew of the third ship fought and successfully recaptured 
their ship).828  By no means did the Tripolitan War treaty represent a triumph over the 
Barbary pirates—they remained a threat to U.S. commerce.  In 1812 the Dey of Algiers 
declared war upon the United States, which forced Madison to send the U.S. Navy back to 
the Mediterranean. 
Altogether, Jefferson failed in his role as commander-in-chief during the Tripolitan 
War and deserves no credit for the conflict’s limited accomplishments.  He obstinately 
disregarded advice from knowledgeable diplomats and naval officers, jeopardized the lives of 
American sailors, and had decided to withdraw most of the Mediterranean squadron.  Only 
the unexpected success of Eaton and Hamet’s expedition prevented the Tripolitan War from 
adversely affecting the Democratic-Republican Party.  Without the coup attempt, the 
Tripolitan War would have ended in failure for the United States.  Yet Jefferson did not 
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realize the shortcomings of his policies, but instead believed that the United States had 
triumphed over Tripoli.  In a September 1805 letter to a domestic correspondent, he 
celebrated “the happy termination of our Tripoline war” and claimed that “tho a small war in 
fact, it is big in principle” because “it has shewn that when necessary we can be respectable 
at sea, & has taught to Europe a lesson of honor & of justice to the Barbarians.”829  The U.S. 
Navy, however, had not subdued Tripoli—only Eaton’s expedition struck fear into the heart 
of the bashaw.  And even though some European commentators applauded America’s war 
effort, the Tripolitan War hardly heralded a new age of relations with the Barbary States—
that would not happen until the following decade.  Also, Jefferson claimed that the Tripolitan 
War validated an important “principle” (apparently not paying tribute), but the United States 
still paid ransom money.  Despite the president’s wish for peace with North Africa, the 
Tripolitan War did not end his troubles with the Barbary pirates.  A serious conflict with 
Tunis emerged during Jefferson’s second term that necessitated a nearly year-long visit by a 
Tunisian diplomat and his entourage to the United States.  The action of the Tripolitan War 
took place five thousand miles away in the Mediterranean, but this time Barbary pirates 
would come to America as honored guests. 
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Chapter 6:  The Mellimelli Mission 
 
 
In March and April 1805, throngs of New Yorkers jammed into the theater for some 
very special performances.  They came, however, not just to see plays, but real-life Barbary 
pirates.  Up in the stage box sat seven Tripolitans, captured by the frigate John Adams in 
August of the preceding year.  Moreover, these were not just any Barbary pirates.  According 
to New York newspapers, their ranks included the Tripolitan captain who “robbed capt. 
Bainbridge of his epaulets and valuables when the frigate Philadelphia was taken.”830  This 
detail about the Tripolitan captive’s identity may or may not be true, but its veracity matters 
less than the fact that the theater’s owners welcomed Americans to exact a sort of revenge on 
Tripoli by mocking Barbary pirates and even dressing them in American clothing.831 
Whereas these New Yorkers delighted in the parading of Tripolitan prisoners, the 
November 1805 to September 1806 visit of Tunisian Ambassador Sidi Soliman Mellimelli 
generated a diverse array of responses.  The trip constituted an exciting moment when 
Americans of all classes could interact with a high-level policymaker from a very different 
society.  This episode raised a host of questions with important cultural and diplomatic 
implications.  Should concerns about what European countries thought affect the United 
States’ treatment of Mellimelli?832  Would (at least for elites) a shared sense of class 
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superiority with the ambassador trump racial differences?833  Or would cultural, racial, and 
religious tensions overshadow President Thomas Jefferson’s efforts to build a constructive 
relationship with Tunis?834  Were Mellimelli and the Bey of Tunis even amenable to 
Jefferson’s goal of forming a treaty that would not require the United States to pay tribute? 
Mellimelli’s trip generated much more controversy than did visits by European 
diplomats.  For instance, neither Edmund Genet (from France) nor Anthony Merry (from 
Britain) experienced a barrage of derogatory racial rhetoric since both were white.  Also, 
Genet received a hero’s welcome among Democratic-Republicans when he arrived in 1793, 
while Merry enjoyed the support of many Federalists.  No pro-Tunis interest group, though, 
existed in the United States.  The missions differed in scope as well:  Mellimelli’s was 
intended to be temporary, but Genet and Merry were appointed with the expectation of 
remaining in the United States for a long period of time (Genet soon fell out of favor, but 
Merry stayed from 1803 to 1806).  Most importantly, Genet’s and Merry’s governments 
covered their living expenses, but Jefferson controversially used American funds to pay for 
Mellimelli’s.  Critics were incensed that Jefferson’s treatment of the Tunisian greatly 
deviated from normal protocol for hosting diplomats from foreign countries.835 
The Mellimelli mission more closely resembled official visits from Native American 
leaders to Washington D.C., though it differed in key ways.  The federal government paid for 
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834 Edward Said’s classic Orientalism examines how Europeans’ cultural, racial, and religious biases fueled 
negative perceptions of Muslim peoples and societies. 
 
835 Harry Ammon, The Genet Mission (New York:  Norton, 1973); Catherine Allgor Parlor Politics:  In Which 
the Ladies of Washington Help Build a City and a Government (Charlottesville:  University of Virginia Press, 
2000), 34-47. 
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these trips and members of both political parties considered hosting tribal leaders important 
for achieving peace in the frontier.  Federalist and Democratic-Republican presidents had 
welcomed such delegations, but the Washington and Adams Administrations never invited a 
representative from the Barbary States to America.  Jefferson broke new ground in hosting 
Mellimelli.  Federalists and most Democratic-Republicans did not deem the trip necessary 
for conducting diplomacy with Tunis.  Further, the cost of the mission greatly exceeded the 
amount typically spent on Native Americans.  For example, visits by tribes in 1798 and 1799 
(during the Adams Administration) totaled $15,178 and the expenses of an Osage delegation 
during Jefferson’s presidency amounted to $10,000.836  By contrast, the cost of the Mellimelli 
mission was much higher—at least double that amount.  Critics could justly accuse the 
president of unprecedented extravagance. 
Moreover, this chapter challenges a recent claim that American observers of 
Mellimelli “either failed to mention [his race] or simply affirmed that the ambassador…was 
not black.”837  As will be seen, many commentators regularly expressed contempt for 
Mellimelli by using racialized, gendered, and religious language.  They portrayed him as 
inferior to white Americans by emphasizing his different skin color (descriptions varied), 
depicting him as a sex-crazed barbarian, or associating Islam with licentiousness.  
Surprisingly, Jefferson (and various other elites) come off as liberal regarding race since they 
treated Mellimelli as the equivalent of (white) European diplomats.  Their portrayals of 
Mellimelli reveal the variability in how he was seen as a raced man.  A contrast naturally 
                                                          
836 Herman Viola, Diplomats in Buckskins:  A History of Indian Delegations in Washington City (Washington 
D.C.:  Smithsonian, 1981), 54; Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground:  Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the 
Continent (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 186. 
 
837 Spellberg, 8. 
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emerges with the Haitian Revolution.  The John Adams Administration extended diplomatic 
recognition to and encouraged trade with the (black) revolutionaries, but Jefferson supported 
(and Congress passed) a prohibition of trade in 1805.838  The key difference, of course, is that 
American slaveholders such as Jefferson feared the potential of the Haitian Revolution to 
galvanize slave rebellions in the United States.  Jefferson had no reason to fear that 
Mellimelli would inspire resistance among American slaves.  Thus, he could safely ignore 
the Tunisian’s skin color and treat him as a peer.  Altogether, the Mellimelli mission provides 
insight into white Americans’ attitudes towards race, gender, and religion, while also 
underscoring the sense of embarrassment and shame that many felt towards being vulnerable 
to the Barbary pirates. 
 
The purpose of Mellimelli’s trip was straightforward.  He sought both to resolve a dispute 
over three Tunisian ships that the U.S. Navy had captured and to obtain a new peace treaty.  
During the Tripolitan War, a Tunisian ship (along with two vessels it had recently taken as 
prizes) attempted to break the U.S. Navy’s blockade of Tripoli.  The Americans apprehended 
the ships and, citing international law, kept all three as prizes.  This angered the Bey of 
Tunis, who demanded them back.  Tensions further escalated in early August 1805 when 
Commodore John Rodgers, the ranking U.S. officer in the Mediterranean, entered Tunis’s 
harbor with his squadron and issued a hostile letter to the Bey.  In it, the naval officer 
threatened “both defensive and offensive operations” against Tunis if the Bey did not inform 
                                                          
838 Two notable recent works that discuss American perceptions of the Haitian Revolution are Ashli White’s 
Encountering Revolution:  Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2010) and Ronald Johnson’s Diplomacy in Black and White:  John Adams, Toussaint Louverture, and 
Their Atlantic World Alliance (Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 2014).  See White, 164-165, for the 1805 
ban. 
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him within thirty-six hours if Tunis wanted war or peace.839  Although the deadline passed 
and no conflict occurred, the letter infuriated the Bey and he continued to insist upon 
receiving the ships. 
Unable to resolve this issue with Rodgers, the Bey opted to send an experienced 
diplomat, the wealthy Mellimelli, to the United States.  In a warm letter to Jefferson, the Bey 
described the mission as evidence “of my good friendship for you and your nation, and of the 
high esteem in which I hold you particularly.”  He blamed tensions on Rodgers’s “too martial 
temper” and lauded Mellimelli’s credentials—he had previously been chosen for “an 
important mission to the Grand Sultan in Constantinople.”840  Tobias Lear, the diplomat who 
had brokered the controversial peace treaty with Tripoli, thought highly of Mellimelli after 
spending a delightful day with him in Tunis:  they visited “the House of one of his friends in 
the outskirts of the City, where we met with every hospitality they could bestow, and 
furnished with excellent lodgings.”841  Charmed by such cordiality, he wrote a letter of 
introduction to Secretary of State James Madison that praised the Tunisian as a veteran 
“Ambassador from this Court to Naples & Genoa” and “a man of correct observation, and 
much liberality of sentiment.”  Lear gave the envoy his “personal recommendation.”842  On 
the eve of Mellimelli’s departure, everyone expected a swift resolution. 
 Jefferson never expected that the mission would become a political landmine.  He 
anticipated a short visit, for Mellimelli to quickly accede to the United States’ positions 
regarding the justness of capturing the three ships and refusing to pay tribute.  As the 
                                                          
839 John Rodgers to Hamuda, Bey of Tunis, August 2, 1805, Naval Documents VI: 202. 
 
840 Bey of Tunis to Thomas Jefferson, August 31, 1805, Ibid., VI: 256. 
 
841 Tobias Lear to Rodgers, August 28, 1805, Ibid., VI: 253. 
 
842 Lear to James Madison, September 4, 1805, Ibid., VI: 273. 
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president remarked to Senator William Plumer (Federalist—NH) in late November, “in the 
course of the winter the minister will probably compleat his mission.”  Jefferson also told 
Plumer that the federal government would cover the trip’s expenses since “it was customary 
for the Government to whom Tunis sent a Minister to provide for his maintenance.”843  
Jefferson’s belief that European countries paid for the expenditures of North African 
diplomats was somewhat accurate.  France covered the expenses of Muslim envoys from 
countries that offered reciprocal treatment for French diplomats.844  However, British 
officials generally treated Moroccan diplomat Bentura de Zary poorly during his 1710-1716 
residency and made him pay for housing.845  Presumably, Jefferson learned about France’s 
customs during his time there as Minister Plenipotentiary from 1785-1789.  He did a very 
poor job communicating this knowledge, though, and essentially conceded public opinion to 
critics since he made no efforts to correct them.  Given the bipartisan nature of the backlash 
over Jefferson’s treatment of Mellimelli, it appears that criticism primarily stemmed from 
ignorance of French practices as opposed to a desire to score political points.  To be sure, 
Federalists tried to gain politically from the Mellimelli mission by characterizing it as a 
referendum on the president’s leadership.  Yet they never argued that Jefferson should 
discard European precedent by forcing Tunis to pay for Mellimelli’s expenditures.  For their 
part, Democratic-Republican newspapers never ran articles that explained the president’s 
rationale for covering the diplomat’s expenses.  The controversy surrounding the financing of 
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844 Mathieu Grenet, “Muslim Missions to Early Modern France, c.1610-c.1780:  Notes for a Social History of 
Cross-Cultural Diplomacy,” Journal of Early Modern History 19, no. 2-3 (2015), 237-238.   
 
845 According to Gerald MacLean and Nabil Matar, the diplomat “was regularly harassed” and “his servants 
were arrested, breaching diplomatic immunity”; Britain and the Islamic World, 1558-1713 (New York:  Oxford 
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Mellimelli’s trip reveals that Jefferson and his critics held entirely different conceptions 
about, as Eliga Gould has notably explored, how the United States should “conform to 
European norms and expectations.”846  Jefferson knew that he was following French 
precedent, but critics feared that his behavior would cause Europe to not take the United 
States seriously as an emerging world power. 
 Regardless, Jefferson earnestly sought peace with Tunis and to make Mellimelli feel 
welcome.  He did not think that the Bey’s anger over the captured ships warranted a second 
U.S. war in the Mediterranean.  In a letter to the Bey, the president emphasized his intention 
to treat “your Ambassador Soliman Mellimelli with all the cordiality and respect which a 
missionary from you so justly commands.”  Jefferson apologized for Captain Rodgers’s 
bellicosity, saying that he acted “in a manner not consisting with the respect due to your 
Excellency’s character, nor with the friendship which I bear you.”  Jefferson was polite but 
firm, insisting that even though European countries paid tribute the United States would not.  
He drew an analogy, arguing that because “the principles and the institutions of our 
Government” differed from European countries’, “their practices can therefore be no rule for 
us.”  Instead, the president desired a treaty based on “justice, equality, and mutual 
forbearance.”847  Yet a contradiction ran through Jefferson’s Tunisian diplomacy.  Although 
he opposed Europe’s practice of paying tribute, he embraced France’s custom of covering the 
expenses of Barbary diplomats.  Jefferson inconsistently followed precedents.  He thought 
that paying tribute denigrated national honor, but considered covering Mellimelli’s expenses 
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847 Jefferson to Bey of Tunis, June 8, 1806.  This letter is reprinted in Parker, 239-241. 
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a courtesy.  Perhaps, too, Jefferson was being pragmatic and hoped that providing first-class 
treatment would help negotiations run smoothly.848 
 Difficulties with the trip began shortly after the Tunisians arrived in Hampton Roads, 
Virginia in November 1805.  Newspapers in nine states published an article announcing their 
arrival, which described Mellimelli as “a very large yellow man, arrayed in the richest purple 
and gold.  His right hand man is still larger, and black as Afric’s sootiest son.”  It alerted 
readers to the non-white skin color of Mellimelli and his companions, urging Americans to 
view them as racially suspect and, in the case of the “right hand man,” akin to a black slave. 
Notably, it depicted Mellimelli as having lighter skin than his servants, suggesting an 
association of fairer skin with authority figures.  The article also highlighted Mellimelli’s 
dress, with his regal clothing indicating personal wealth and high status within his country 
(purple being associated with royalty).  Yet the article, which was published by both 
Federalist and Democratic-Republican papers, deemed Mellimelli’s mission illegitimate.  He 
came to the United States to “demand retribution” for a Tunisian ship that the U.S. Navy had 
captured according to “the authority of the laws of nations.”  The article emphasized that the 
Barbary pirates did not share the same legal standards as Americans and Europeans since 
they disregarded the corpus of precedents, treaties, and commentaries that constituted the law 
of nations.  Its hostility set the tone for Mellimelli’s nearly year-long stay in the United States 
by encouraging readers to view the diplomat with skepticism and disdain.849 
                                                          
848 Such behavior would accord with Cogliano’s argument that Jefferson “was pragmatic about the means he 
employed to protect the republic and advance its strategic interests”; 10. 
 
849 Eleven Democratic-Republican Papers published the article:  Morning Chronicle (New York, NY), 
November 15, 1805; American Citizen (New York, NY), November 16, 1805; Republican Star or Eastern 
Shore General Advertiser (Easton, MD), November 19, 1805; The Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), 
November 19, 1805; Republican Watch-Tower (New York, NY), November 20, 1805 [for this newspaper’s 
political views, see Burstein and Isenberg, Jefferson and Madison, 439]; American Mercury (Hartford, CT), 
November 21, 1805; Plebeian (Kingston, NY), November 22, 1805 [it used a slightly different wording:  “He is 
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Another widely published article painted a moderately complementary picture of 
Mellimelli while criticizing the public for fawning over him.  It described the ambassador as 
being about fifty years old and having a “grave and dignified deportment.”850  It also 
mentioned that Mellimelli toured Fort Nelson (in Virginia), after which he dined with naval 
hero Stephen Decatur “and several of his officers.”  Perhaps these gatherings served two 
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York, NY), November 16, 1805; The Connecticut Courant (Hartford, CT), November 20, 1805; Boston Gazette 
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850 Twelve Federalist newspapers published this article:  Alexandria Daily Advertiser (Alexandria, VA), 
November 15, 1805 [see James Broussard, The Southern Federalists:  1800-1816 (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana 
State University Press, 1978), 281]; New-York Commercial Advertiser (New York, NY), November 18, 1805; 
New-York Evening Post (New York, NY), November 18, 1805; The New-York Gazette & General Advertiser 
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Turkish style”];  THOMAS’s Massachusetts Spy, OR Worcester Gazette (Worcester, MA), November 27, 1805; 
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and Washington Advertiser (Washington D.C.), November 18, 1805; National Aegis (Worcester, MA), 
November 27, 1805; Otsego Herald (Cooperstown, NY), November 28, 1805; Eastern Argus (Portland, ME), 
November 29, 1805; and Suffolk Gazette (Sag Harbor, NY), December 2, 1805 [the Library of Congress 
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The Mississippi Territory and the Southwest Frontier, 1795-1817 (Lexington:  University Press of Kentucky, 
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purposes.  They would not only demonstrate polite hospitality, but could also serve as 
opportunities to pressure the diplomat to drop his tribute demands.  Surely in the course of 
the day’s events Mellimelli heard about Decatur’s naval triumphs during the Tripolitan War.  
Such conversation could suggest to Mellimelli that the United States would potentially send 
this warrior back to the Mediterranean to fight against Tunis.  Regardless, the article 
criticized public fascination with the Tunisians:  “the novelty of their appearance, and their 
magnificent costume in the true Turkish style, attracted more attention than comported with 
good breeding.”  It expressed a tension between political commentators and the public that 
would increase throughout Mellimelli’s visit.  Whereas newspaper editors and politicians 
often condemned him as a disreputable barbarian, the public showered him with attention. 
Some newspapers expressed hope that the mission would benefit both the United 
States and Tunis.  Publications from six states ran an article that endorsed Jefferson’s goals.  
It suggested that Mellimelli’s trip would result in Tunis obtaining “very correct information 
respecting our vast resources, and our ability to protect the American commerce; and we may 
safely calculate on a firm peace with that regency.”851  The Federalist Salem Register 
similarly opined that Mellimelli’s mission would “result in the increasing security of 
Commerce.”852  However, the article based this expectation upon “the spirited proceedings of 
                                                          
851 This article ran in eight Democratic-Republican newspapers:  Morning Chronicle (New York, NY), 
November 23, 1805; American Citizen (New York, NY), November 25, 1805; Republican Watch-Tower (New 
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852 Salem Register (Salem, MA), November 28, 1805.  
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the American naval force” and not through any brilliant diplomacy by Jefferson.  Such 
moderate-to-positive opinions quickly faded, though, as criticism of the diplomat and the 
president intensified as the trip’s length increased. 
Other newspapers aspired to arouse public opposition by stressing that an 
inconsequential country such as Tunis did not merit respect.  Such articles used italics in 
order to maximize the sarcasm.  Newspapers affiliated with both parties published an article 
that remarked that Mellimelli “no doubt, will be received with distinguished honors” and 
informed readers that the Tunisians were staying at Mr. Stelle’s house in Washington.853  For 
residents in the Washington area, perhaps this information served as a tacit invitation to 
hound or harass the foreigners.  Similarly, four newspapers broadcast the arrival of the 
“illustrious... Representative of his Tunisian Majesty.”854  The Carolina Gazette, a 
Democratic-Republican newspaper, announced the “novel sight…of His Excellency SIDI 
                                                          
853 Sixteen Democratic-Republican newspapers ran this article:  National Intelligencer, and Washington 
Advertiser (Washington D.C.), November 18, 1805; The Expositor (Alexandria, VA), November 21, 1805; The 
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Gazette (Charleston, SC), December 6, 1805 [it did not use italics]; Political Observatory (Walpole, NH), 
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New-York Gazette & General Advertiser (New York, NY), November 22, 1805; New-York Spectator (New 
York, NY), November 23, 1805; New-York Herald (New York, NY), November 23, 1805; The Northern Post 
(Salem, NY), November 28, 1805; The Balance, and Columbian Repository (Hudson, NY), December 3, 1805; 
THOMAS’s Massachusetts Spy, OR Worcester Gazette (Worcester, MA), December 4, 1805; The Maryland 
Gazette (Annapolis, MD), December 5, 1805.  It also ran in the December 17, 1805 Mississippi Herald & 
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854 Boston Gazette (Federalist; Boston, MA), November 21, 1805; The Salem Gazette (Federalist; Salem, MA), 
November 22, 1805; Portland Gazette and Maine Advertiser (Federalist; Portland, ME), November 25, 1805; 
Political Observatory (Democratic-Republican; Walpole, NH), November 29, 1805.  The Weekly Wanderer 
(Federalist; Randolph, VT) of December 2, 1805 used italics for “illustrious” but not for “Tunisian Majesty.” 
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SOLYMAN MELIMELI, Ambassador Extraordinary from the BEY of TUNIS to the United 
States” in its November 22nd issue.855  These critics, which included newspaper editors from 
Jefferson’s party, believed that Mellimelli did not merit a distinguished reception.  They 
considered his credentials a laughingstock and encouraged readers to do the same. 
 Federalist newspaper editors offered harsher criticism by accusing Jefferson of 
transgressing racial boundaries and squandering taxpayers’ money on the trip.  The Portland 
Gazette and Maine Advertiser ran an editorial sarcastically entitled “Economy of Mr. 
Jefferson” that raised class and racial issues.  In claiming that Jefferson stole from the “mouth 
of labor” to host the Tunisians, it subtly invoked Jefferson’s sexual relationship with his 
slave Sally Hemings:  the president’s lavish treatment of the North Africans stemmed from 
“his attachment for the color.”856  The newspaper suggested that Jefferson’s unnatural 
attraction to black people compromised his ability to effectively govern the country.  The 
president made bad decisions in both his personal life (by having a sexual relationship with 
his slave) and in his public life (by doing a “disgraceful, humiliating thing” in providing an 
all-expenses paid trip for the Tunisians).  The article also stressed that Tunis did not offer 
reciprocal hospitality to American diplomats.  Its government did not pay for the upkeep of 
Tobias Lear—“the pockets of the people of the United States” did.  This newspaper sought to 
galvanize grassroots opposition to Jefferson by describing the president as profligate with 
federal funds.  It deemed him unfit for the presidency since his character flaws and sexual 
transgressions resulted in awful foreign policy decisions. 
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Other Federalist newspapers charged the Jefferson Administration with financial 
incompetence.  The Salem Gazette pessimistically portrayed the Mellimelli mission as 
doomed from the start since “whether or not we give up the vessel, I believe we shall be 
losers by the visit:  for the embassy will be supported at our expence.”857  The New-England 
Palladium characterized the president as a financial hypocrite:  “how it must torture our 
economical rulers to see the U.S. put to these extra expenses!”858  It also warned readers that 
Jefferson had set a troubling (and costly) precedent:  he had now obligated the United States 
to pay for all future diplomatic missions from the Ottoman Empire or Morocco.  The 
newspaper feared an incessant drain on the treasury on account of these diplomats taking 
advantage of Jefferson’s opulent hospitality. 
 Federalist newspapers in New York and Rhode Island portrayed Jefferson as 
unqualified to serve as Commander-in-Chief.  They used the Mellimelli mission to remind 
readers about Jefferson’s controversial behavior during the Revolutionary War as Virginia’s 
governor.  They ran an article that discussed Mellimelli’s gift of “some Arabian Horses for 
the President.  The Bey, having heard of Mr. Jefferson’s military exploits, undoubtedly 
concluded that at this particular crisis, when dangerous times are approaching, he could not 
furnish a more suitable present than fleet horses.”859  Jefferson had fled from Monticello on 
horseback in June 1781 upon hearing that British troops were approaching his home.  His 
political enemies accused him of cowardice, although an official hearing cleared him of any 
wrongdoing.  Nevertheless, the charge stuck.  This article argued that Jefferson had a 
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worldwide reputation for timidity and mockingly suggested that the Bey of Tunis provided 
him with fast horses in order to enable him to escape future military engagements.  Federalist 
newspapers used the Mellimelli mission to depict Jefferson as unfit for the presidency and 
invite readers to laugh at his ineptitude. 
Newspapers also lambasted Jefferson for treating Mellimelli better than diplomats 
from European countries.  THOMAS’s Massachusetts Spy (pro-Federalist) attacked Jefferson 
for paying for Mellimelli’s trip even though European governments did not cover North 
African diplomats’ expenses.  It claimed (incorrectly) that European nations “have never 
permitted Ministers from the Petty Barbary States to reside among them, they not being 
sufficiently independent to be allowed Ministers.”  This article underscored both the 
perception of the Barbary Powers as trifling nations not worthy of first-class treatment and 
the sense of national embarrassment at paying for the Mellimelli trip.  It recommended that 
Americans not even consider North Africa autonomous since those countries had a “Master”:  
the sultan of the Ottoman Empire.  In fact, Morocco was independent and Algiers, Tripoli, 
and Tunis were only nominally part of the Ottoman Empire (they conducted their own affairs 
of state).  Nevertheless, the article used humor to suggest the absurdity of treating the 
Barbary States as sovereign:  Tunis had “no more right to send a Minister, than the State of 
Delaware has a right to send one to France.”860  A Federalist newspaper in Boston similarly 
believed that Jefferson acted inappropriately in providing such lavish hospitality.  Its 
December 24th issue complained that Jefferson treated “the representative of this petty 
Affrican power…in a style and with an attention far exceeding any thing manifested towards 
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the most respectable nations of Europe.”861  A New York newspaper railed that the 
government regarded Mellimelli with a “respect never granted by this country to the Minister 
of any Christian power” by providing him and his entourage with housing, paying for his 
living expenses, and even giving him “a military guard of honor.”862  To critics, Jefferson had 
his priorities backwards and dishonored his country by treating Mellimelli so well.  He 
needed to concentrate on building constructive relationships with important European 
countries and not waste time appeasing irrelevant North African ones. 
 Some critics contended that, in treating Mellimelli as a favored guest, Jefferson both 
undermined his entire rationale for waging the Tripolitan War and maligned Christianity.  
Federalist newspapers in three states ran an article that asked readers:  “have we humbled 
Tripoli to suffer all this, from a more insignificant barbarous power?”863  These papers 
rejoiced in military resistance against North Africa and accused Jefferson of appeasing 
Barbary pirates.  To them, Jefferson had repudiated the purpose of the Tripolitan War by 
essentially paying tribute to Tunis— a weaker military power than Tripoli—in covering the 
costs of Mellimelli’s mission.  Further, the article sought to spread religious hysteria among 
readers by asserting that Jefferson insulted American and European Christians in showering 
lavish hospitality upon a Muslim.  It expressed outrage that the president gave “one of the 
best houses near the capitol” to this “infidel Ambassadour” and “son of Mahomet, [who] is as 
proud as Lucifer….Is not this an indirect affront to Christian ambassadours?”  In comparing 
Mellimelli to Satan, the article raised questions about Jefferson’s controversial religious 
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beliefs and his ability to effectively govern the country.  Since the president welcomed 
heretics to American soil, how could the public trust his judgment?  Since he offended 
European diplomats, with whom Americans shared a common religious heritage, how could 
he build constructive relationships with their countries? 
 Moreover, critics characterized Mellimelli as farcical and unworthy of respect by 
discussing the ambassador’s sex life.  Federalist newspapers throughout the country 
summarized Democratic-Republican John Randolph’s March 1806 speech in the House of 
Representatives, which rebuked Jefferson “for supporting the Tunisian Ambassador, in his 
beastiality.”864  Since no record of allegations of Mellimelli engaging in intercourse with an 
animal exists, Randolph most likely referred to the concubines that the federal government 
provided the diplomat.  Senator William Plumer remarked upon this matter in his diary, 
noting that “our government has, on his application, provided him with one or more women, 
with whom he spends a portion of the night.”865  He stressed that Mellimelli took the 
initiative in asking for sexual companionship and that the Tunisian enjoyed the company of 
multiple women.  Plumer did not specify, however, if Mellimelli rotated sexual partners or 
enjoyed them simultaneously.  Also, he suggested that the women did not live with the 
ambassador or even stay for the entire night.  Rather, they arrived for sex and left afterwards.  
A British traveler, Charles William Janson, also reported that Mellimelli had asked the 
government for “a few female domestics” since he missed his “seraglio” back in Tunis.  He 
                                                          
864 Washington Federalist (Washington D.C.), March 8, 1806; New-York Gazette & General Advertiser (New 
York, NY), March 13, 1806; Connecticut Herald (New Haven, CT), March 18, 1806 [see Richard Purcell, 
Connecticut in Transition, 1775-1818 (London:  Oxford University Press, 1918), 421]; Connecticut Gazette 
(New London, CT), March 19, 1806; New Hampshire Sentinel (Keene, NH), March 22, 1806; Portsmouth 
Oracle (Portsmouth, NH), March 22, 1806; Portland Gazette, and Maine Advertiser (Portland, ME), March 24, 
1806; and The Post-Boy (Windsor, VT), March 25, 1806 [see Lewis Aldrich and Frank Holmes, eds., History of 
Windsor County, Vermont (Syracuse:  D. Mason & Co., 1891), 213]. 
 
865 Plumer, December 23, 1805, 359. 
291 
 
eventually “formed a tender connection with a frail Christian of the softer sex.”  Neither 
Plumer nor Janson implied that the government provided women for Mellimelli’s servants.   
In contrast to Plumer, Janson thought that Mellimelli had a primary relationship with one 
woman.  Madison recorded a concubine by name (“Georgia a Greek”) in an expense report; 
perhaps this was the woman that Janson described?866  Regardless, such behavior repulsed 
Janson since he found the ambassador physically repugnant:  “a more disgusting figure, 
bending too under the weight of years, can scarcely be conceived.”867  If the Jefferson 
Administration had tried to keep its provision of sexual partners a secret, it clearly failed 
(Janson even mentioned Randolph’s speech, demonstrating that discussions of Mellimelli’s 
sexual behavior circulated throughout Washington D.C.).  Randolph criticized the president 
for turning the government into a pimping service, Plumer seemed nonchalant over the 
matter, and Janson deemed the situation grotesque. 
Other representations of the Tunisian Ambassador as obsessed with gratifying his 
enormous sex drive circulated in print.  On one hand, they echo longstanding stereotypes that 
associated Islam with harems and polygamy.  Yet they also appear to allude to the 
government’s provision of sexual companionship for Mellimelli.  Newspaper editors of both 
parties published a humorous negotiation between Mellimelli and the Secretary of State 
regarding the diplomat’s sexual needs.  The diplomat had allegedly issued “a formal demand 
of seven wives for the use of his seraglio.”  He mentioned that a man could have fourteen 
wives in Tunis, but “to shew his respect for the religious prejudices of the people of the 
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United States” he would compromise at “half that number.”  Madison countered that the 
United States disallowed polygamy, to which Mellimelli replied that he would “further 
evince his extreme moderation by reducing his demand to four; that ‘GOD IS INFINITE;’ 
and that no less a number will be accepted.”  Even if this story was rooted in fact, it 
nevertheless satirized the diplomat for prioritizing the quenching of his lusts over resolving 
outstanding issues between Tunis and the United States.  It also portrayed him as having the 
gall to criticize Americans for religious intolerance, as if deeming polygamy immoral made 
one a bigot.  This article admonished Americans to view Mellimelli as a degenerate, not as a 
respectable official.868  Similarly, The Connecticut Courant (pro-Federalist) condemned 
Jefferson for “supporting the sable ambassador of his Moorish majesty, and his seven wives, 
in Washington.”  The newspaper reinforced the notion of Mellimelli as a racial and sexual 
Other since it emphasized his non-white skin (sable means “black”) and his openly 
polygamous lifestyle.869  Mellimelli’s reputation as a sex-crazed man continued through the 
end of his trip.  A Federalist newspaper from New York emitted a sarcastic sigh of relief in 
September 1806:  “we do not learn that any number of Christian wives make up his 
assortment of presents.”870  Critics did not take Mellimelli seriously since they viewed him as 
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obsessed with sex and they criticized Jefferson for enabling his licentiousness.  Mellimelli 
made headlines for his alleged sexual escapades, not for resolving problems between the 
United States and Tunis. 
 Mellimelli faced opposition from politicians as well as from newspaper editors.  
Many senators considered him a barbarian, not a reputable policymaker.  Conflict occurred 
when Mellimelli visited the Senate on January 2, 1806.  As William Plumer recounted in his 
diary, Samuel Smith (Democratic-Republican—MD) proposed that the diplomat be granted 
“a seat in the Chamber.”  Several senators, including John Quincy Adams (Federalist—MA), 
adamantly opposed such an honor on the grounds that “it would be establishing a 
precedent—That Ambassadors from the greatest nations had never received this mark of 
notice—that they would demand— & we must grant it or give umbrage.”  Samuel Mitchill 
(Democratic-Republican—NY) likewise expressed incredulity that the United States had 
“given this half-savage the dignified title of Ambassador in common with the Ministers from 
nations of the first rank—That we have thus established a new precedent in diplomacy” since 
European countries “never recognize them as Ministers or Ambassadors.”  James Hillhouse 
(Federalist—CT) concurred with Mitchell, proclaiming “I consider this Tunisian in the same 
character as I do the Indian Chiefs— & I would treat him accordingly.”  In response to 
steadfast opposition, Senator Smith withdrew his motion.  Fifteen senators then walked out 
of Congress, refusing to stay for Mellimelli’s visit.  They believed that treating the Tunisian 
the same way as a European diplomat transgressed a cultural, and perhaps racial, boundary.  
Hostility towards Mellimelli was bipartisan, demonstrating that Jefferson had overreached 
and had failed to build a base of support for his Tunisian diplomacy.871 
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Despite the animosity expressed towards Mellimelli in newspapers and by congressmen, the 
public often treated him as a celebrity.  Rumors that “the newly arrived sons of Mahomet” 
would visit a Washington theater “set curiosity on the very edge,” according to The Balance, 
and Columbian Repository (pro-Federalist).872   Upper-class locals were especially excited:  
“preparations were made—carriages prepared; and away drove our belles and beaux to the 
Theatre.”  Yet Mellimelli and his entourage never showed up.  Evidently the ambassador 
preferred to enjoy an afternoon nap and then walk around town.  The article depicted the 
Tunisians as lazy and as religious Others, while also decrying the public’s fascination with 
Mellimelli.  Notably, commentary regarding the aborted coup attempt in Tripoli immediately 
followed this anecdote.  The author roundly condemned the Jefferson Administration for 
“deserting [Hamet Karamanli] and his followers in the very moment of success.”  The back-
to-back placement of these two subjects suggests that the article criticized the public for 
prioritizing the wrong Barbary issue.  Instead of lavishing attention on Mellimelli, Americans 
should focus on doing right by Hamet. 
Senator Plumer also attested to the Tunisian Ambassador’s popularity.  He noted in 
his diary that “a great collection of people” attended Mellimelli’s landing at the Navy Yard 
and that meeting him became something of an obsession.   Due to children breaking into his 
residence to see him, the government temporarily provided a guard for his door.873  Plumer 
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described his own visit to Mellimelli’s lodging as sensual and hypnotic.  The Tunisian’s 
“elegant & rich” clothing was “of fine scarlet colour inwrought with much gold” and he 
wore “white silk hose— yellow Morocco shoes” and “a turban made of fine white muslin.”  
Mellimelli dressed to impress his visitors by stressing his—and by extension his country’s—
wealth.  Plumer was awestruck, as the diplomat seemed to cast a spell on him.  Mellimelli 
“gave me his hand— & directed me to be seated.  He then came up & bowed to me— He 
opened his elegant gold dimond snuff box, & gave me some very excellent snuff.  He took 
his pipe which was more than four feet long & very elegant & smoked.— His room was 
perfumed with the essence of roses— which to me was very agreeable.”  Mellimelli also 
ordered his servants to play music on the drums and fife, “which they did very well indeed.  
He said he had ordered this in honor of me who had deigned to visit him.”  Plumer described 
himself as caught up in a reverie of sight, smell, and sound.  He loved the proffered tobacco, 
savored the aromatics of the perfume, and relished the live music.  It was as if he had been 
transported into another world.  Caught up in the moment, he began to read positive character 
attributes into Mellimelli’s appearance:  “his countenance is good— it bespeaks intelligence 
& integrity.”  Plumer wanted to believe that he was in the presence of greatness.874  For his 
part, Mellimelli perhaps used ceremony in an attempt to build trust with American 
policymakers and have them take him seriously.  He seduced his guests with sensual delights. 
 Yet the spell did not last.  At the end of the evening Plumer still viewed Mellimelli as 
culturally and racially inferior.  He was “a man, between the Savage & civilized state” whose 
“complezion is about as dark as that of a Molatto,” while his servants “were all large black 
men.” Plumer may have been temporarily transfixed by Mellimelli’s appearance and the 
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luxurious environment, but he did not disavow his preexisting racial biases.  Like various 
newspaper editors, Plumer remained fixated on racial issues.  When discussing the Tunisian 
Ambassador, many white Americans clung to the notion that white skin indicated 
superiority.875 
 Other elite Americans and foreign observers met Mellimelli as well.  Their memoirs 
reflect a variety of impressions about the Tunisian, spanning from contempt to adoration.  
John Quincy Adams’s diary reveals that he became more critical of Mellimelli over time.  At 
a December 1805 dinner party hosted by Jefferson, Adams found Mellimelli “courteous” but 
noted that he arrived half an hour late and “immediately after greeting the President and the 
company, proposed to retire and smoke his pipe” instead of socializing with everyone else.  
Jefferson had courteously planned for dinner to begin “precisely at sunset” because it was “in 
the midst of Ramadan,” but Mellimelli’s tardiness kept the other guests hungry and 
waiting.876  To his credit, though, Adams acknowledged that conversing with Mellimelli was 
difficult since it required an interpreter.  By the following spring, though, Adams viewed him 
with disgust.  Upon reviewing the correspondence between the diplomat and Madison (which 
Jefferson had lent to the Senate), Adams remarked that “Tunis was as insolent and 
overbearing in the negotiation as France had been.”  He adamantly opposed paying tribute 
and praised Madison for “maintain[ing] a tone of proper firmness.”877  Notably, Adams did 
not record his harangue against receiving Mellimelli in the Senate that Plumer described in 
his diary.  Adams discussed Mellimelli’s January visit, but did not specify his own feelings 
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about it.  Instead, he portrayed the diplomat as unable to understand the nature of the United 
States’ republican government.  Mellimelli commented that “it must take one, two, or three 
years [for senators] to finish any business...but in his country they could always finish any 
business in half an hour.”  Buckner Thruston (Democratic-Republican—KY) “endeavored to 
explain to him the difference between our legislative assemblies and courts of justice” but 
Mellimelli “could not understand it.  He soon withdrew.”878  Adams was altogether 
unimpressed with Mellimelli.  His initial ambivalence towards the diplomat turned into 
contempt. 
Dolley Madison similarly despised Mellimelli.  Her memoirs contain a brief 
derogatory passage about him that broached racial and sexual issues.  At a party, she 
described him as apathetic towards “the open admiration about him.”879  Madison attested to 
Mellimelli’s popularity among elites, but claimed that he only came to life upon “spying a 
large, fat negress.”  He “rushed to her, and with much enthusiasm threw his arms around her, 
saying she reminded him of home and his best and most expensive wife.’”  Madison created 
a farcical scene by using two adjectives to characterize the maid as overweight and by 
depicting Mellimelli as burning with lust.  The trope of polygamy appeared as well, with 
Madison claiming that Mellimelli had several wives.  Her description resembled the 
newspaper articles that portrayed him as sex-crazed.  Mellimelli allegedly showed no interest 
in making polite conversation or building constructive relationships with Washington 
residents—he only wanted to have sex.  Also, as did many other commentators, Madison 
associated him with dark-skinned people of African origin in order to stress his racial 
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inferiority.  It is possible that this incident never occurred and Madison simply recorded an 
off-color joke.  Regardless of this story’s veracity, Madison joined newspaper critics in 
viewing Mellimelli as a disreputable barbarian obsessed with gratifying his sexual needs. 
By contrast, prominent socialite Margaret Bayard Smith spoke highly of Mellimelli in 
both her memoirs and in her novel A Winter in Washington.  In the former, Smith praised the 
diplomat’s generosity:  he gave the “most sumptuous presents for the officers of government 
and likewise their wives.”  Regrettably, though, these “rich cashmere shawls, and robes, a 
superb silver dressing-case, rare essences and other splendid articles for female use” had to 
be sold since federal law prohibited government officials from accepting gifts.  Smith 
portrayed Mellimelli as an ideal guest who showered his hosts with elegant, luxurious 
presents.  She also emphasized that having Mellimelli attend one’s event was considered an 
asset, with elite families vying for the opportunity.  She recounted that “the Tunisian minister 
was the lion of the season and during the winter, he and his splendid suite were invited to all 
the fashionable parties.”880  Clearly, fawning over the diplomat was not just a plebian 
activity—some upper-class Americans engaged in it as well.  Elites such as Smith evidently 
felt a class-based kinship with Mellimelli that superseded the perception of him as a racial 
inferior (and therefore underserving of respect).881  Further, by hosting Mellimelli, American 
elites could assert an identity as powerbrokers who influenced foreign policy.882 
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 The Tunisian Ambassador also made multiple appearances in Smith’s 1824 novel, 
which she stated was based on actual events.  Again, she depicted him in a positive manner, 
in sharp contrast to Dolley Madison.  At a party, the diplomat looked “noble and imposing, 
his face full of intelligence, and his large black eyes had an expression peculiarly soft and 
tender.  His dress was in the Turkish costume, of the richest materials…splendidly 
embroidered with gold, with buttons of precious stones…and was so highly scented with the 
otto of roses, as to perfume the whole room.”883  Mellimelli appeared dignified, yet 
somewhat feminine.  Indeed, Smith’s descriptions of him resembled her portrayal (in her 
memoirs) of Thomas Jefferson after their first meeting.  She depicted the president as having 
“a voice so soft and low, with a countenance so benignant and intelligent.”  Indeed, Smith 
used two of the exact same words in describing the men.  Doing so suggests that she thought 
very highly of Mellimelli—what better complement could she give than to describe him as 
having a Jeffersonian appearance?884 
Additionally, Smith envisioned Mellimelli as sexually non-threatening by 
characterizing his clothing as ambiguously gendered.  In a different scene in the novel, one of 
the main female characters, Emily, fantasized about Mellimelli’s clothes.  She “twist[ed] a 
handkerchief around her cousin’s head, in imitation of a Turkish turban; and after discussing 
the dress of Meley Meley,” said that “her cousin Harriet must borrow his turban, his tunic, 
and his slippers, and try how she would look in them.”  Indeed, later in the novel one of the 
female characters seized the opportunity at a party to wear Mellimelli’s turban.  After putting 
it on, she “declared it was not only the most becoming, but most convenient head-dress.”  
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Mellimelli represented oriental exotica to these characters, who desired, if only temporarily, 
to look like him.  Yet these ladies did not fantasize about Mellimelli himself, but rather his 
clothing and the mysterious culture he represented.  Smith’s positive portrayals of Mellimelli 
sharply contrast the negative representations of his sexuality by other critics.  Smith viewed 
him as an exotic charmer of women, not as a sexual predator.  She was not repulsed by him, 
but rather found him alluring and enchanting.885 
 However, A Winter in Washington offered some criticism of Mellimelli regarding his 
views on gender roles.  At a party, the ambassador and others discussed the role of women in 
society.  Mellimelli marveled at the sight of “very young and unmarried women” walking 
about without male chaperones and suggested that he would not grant women in his family 
such liberty:  “all those feelings, and these thoughts, and these pretty looks, if they were 
mine, I should not like to see given to others.”  A female character, Mrs. Seymour, responded 
that American women acted virtuously because they believed God would judge them in the 
next life.  Mellimelli, though, remained unconvinced:  “the old gentlemen shook his head, as 
if such doctrines were far beyond his comprehension.”  Smith tempered her enthusiasm for 
Mellimelli in this scene.  Instead of using his name she referred to him as “the old 
gentleman,” as if to suggest that he stubbornly clung to antiquated ideas about gender roles.  
Other critics portrayed Mellimelli as threatening women by pursuing sex with them, but 
Smith critiqued him for upholding a rigid patriarchy that limited women’s mobility.886 
Another political spouse, Catharine Mitchill, mostly expressed admiration for 
Mellimelli.  The wife of Senator Samuel Latham Mitchill (Democratic-Republican—NY), 
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she discussed her delightful visit to the Tunisian Ambassador’s residence in an April 1806 
letter to her sister.  “Mellimelli treated us very politely,” she wrote, and “showed us his robes 
and Bernooses.”887  Like Smith, she considered his clothing attractive and luxurious, calling 
them “more superb & brilliant than any thing of the kind I ever saw.”  Characters in Smith’s 
novel fantasize about trying on Mellimelli’s clothes, but Mitchill thought that actually 
wearing them would be painful:  “they were so heavy with gold and silver that I could 
scarcely support myself under the weight of them.”  Also, the diplomat apparently staged 
different ceremonies for guests of different sexes.  Senator Plumer described a smoking 
ritual, while Mitchill discussed how “upon taking leave of [Mellimelli] he sprinkled us very 
profusely with rose water, which he says, is the custom in his land.”  Like Smith, Mitchill 
considered the Tunisian Ambassador a fascinating charmer of women and not a sexual 
predator.  She even found herself somewhat attracted to him, remarking that “he would really 
be a tolerably handsome Man, if that nasty beard was taken off, but such is the effect of habit 
and custom, that his face in its present condition is to me very disgusting.”   
Additionally, Senator Mitchill sought Mellimelli’s help in trying to get his wife 
pregnant.  At a dinner party with the Madisons, Mellimelli claimed that “he had a magical 
cloak, which if thrown over a woman, would remove the impediments to pregnancy, and 
make her as fruitful as she wished….he proceeded with great gravity and ceremony to 
[Dolley Madison]. and adjusting it round her neck and shoulders, pronounced these words.  
‘Madam, I am a Saint; and what woman so ever is covered by my Bernoos, shall bring forth a 
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male child.’”888  Mitchill reported that the guests laughed at this demonstration, but he took 
the diplomat seriously.  He requested (and received) a piece of the cloak from Mellimelli and 
sent it to Catharine.  Regrettably, though, they remained unable to conceive a child.  Perhaps 
this incident sheds light on Dolley Madison’s hostility towards Mellimelli—surely she would 
have felt humiliated and livid that he made a spectacle of her inability to have a child with 
her husband.889 
Two British visitors also left disparate accounts of the Mellimelli mission.  Sir 
Augustus John Foster, secretary to Anthony Merry (the British Minister to the United States), 
deemed the diplomat shrewd and believed he got the best of his American hosts.  For 
instance, Mellimelli requested that the government allow him to handle his own expenses so 
that he could maintain himself “in the true Turkish style.”  He refused bank notes in favor of 
gold, which he then sold for a profit to Baltimore merchants!  Foster also argued that 
Americans underestimated Mellimelli.  During the voyage from Tunis, for instance, 
American sailors convinced themselves that the Tunisian believed their “stories of floating 
islands, of trees of monstrous size overshadowing the waters, of krakens and sea serpents and 
flying fish.”  But Foster thought otherwise.  He believed that Mellimelli “played the part” of 
a “fool” on occasion, but retained mastery of situations.  Additionally, Foster considered the 
Tunisian “very entertaining” company and evidently earned Mellimelli’s trust since his 
memoirs contain details of the diplomat’s life that American accounts lack.  Over dinner, the 
Tunisian “told me he had married a girl of fifteen and that he had built himself a house in the 
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country in his own village at about six hours’ ride from Tunis eight years ago which cost him 
$130,000.  He was a Turk by birth and a soldier by profession, tho’ latterly more of a 
diplomat.  The Bey had given him the post of banker for Mecca and Medina as a reward for 
his services.”  Foster’s regard for Mellimelli reflects Cannadine’s concept of 
“ornamentalism”:  the Englishman viewed the Tunisian as similar to British aristocracy, with 
a luxurious country house, a military background, and the trust of his sovereign.  Like Smith, 
Foster considered the diplomat an honorable man who provided good companionship.890 
 By contrast, the British traveler Charles William Janson detested Mellimelli.  His 
descriptions resemble the contemptuous, racialized rhetoric used in various American 
newspapers.  To Janson, Mellimelli embodied “the pompous forms of Turkish 
despotism….his appetite only increased with indulgence.  He soon became importunate in his 
demands for personal gratification and public homage.”  Janson deemed Mellimelli 
extraordinarily lazy, being “in no hurry to enter upon the subject of his credentials” and 
preferring to “‘nurs[e] the job.’”  Unlike Foster, Janson never claimed to have met 
Mellimelli—although he observed three of the other Tunisians at a hotel bar getting drunk on 
gin and engaging in “trials of personal strength, such as wrestling” with other patrons.  Foster 
considered the Tunisian delegation “a train of barbarians” and believed that the United States 
deserved the “contempt of civilized nations” for treating them with undeserved respect.891  
His loathing of the Tunisians lent credence to Federalist claims that the Jefferson 
Administration’s lavish treatment of the delegation resulted in Europeans viewing the United 
States with contempt and derision.  Like Dolley Madison and many congressmen, he deemed 
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Mellimelli a savage and believed that the United States debased itself by hosting him.  
Mellimelli clearly was a controversial figure who generated a variety of responses about 
himself and the Jefferson Administration. 
In addition to enjoying a vibrant social life, Mellimelli clashed with the Jefferson 
Administration during negotiations.  In a letter to Madison, he conceded that the value of the 
three captured ships “is really trifling (not being more than 4000 dollars)” yet he rejected any 
cash settlement as “an insult to [the Bey’s] dignity.”892  He insisted that either the United 
States return them or provide “another Cruiser” as compensation.  Mellimelli underscored his 
point by stressing that “a substitute in cash cannot be admited in a case that involves the 
honor of the Tunisian Flag.”  He clearly had a sense of nationalism just as pronounced as any 
American’s, but his vehemence aggravated the Jefferson Administration.  As the president 
observed in March, Mellimelli’s “vague demands and threatening war in direct terms” 
offended his cabinet officials—they “unanimous[ly]” agreed that Jefferson should concede 
nothing until the diplomat “take back his threats.”893  Although Mellimelli remained 
unyielding, Jefferson ultimately agreed to relinquish the ships, explaining to Congress that 
they were of “trifling value” and that returning them would provide “proof of friendship to 
the Bey.”894  However, upon learning from Madison that “the Xebec for which we are 
pledged has been sold at Malta,” the president offered an American vessel (the Franklin) 
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893 March 14, 1806, ANAS, 235. 
 
894 Jefferson, Special Message to Congress, April 14, 1806, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65710. 
305 
 
instead.895  Thus one half of Mellimelli’s mission was ostensibly completed, but tensions 
arose over the diplomat’s insistence that the United States must pay tribute as part of a new 
peace treaty. 
Negotiations soon fell apart over this issue of tribute.  Mellimelli offered a peace 
treaty of “at least three years” in exchange for the United States providing naval stores.  The 
ambassador suggested that the cost of such supplies would be minimal since it “may be done 
from the superfluities of the American Squadron with little expense or inconvenience.”  He 
emphasized that since European countries paid tribute, the United States needed to do so as 
well.  France, for instance, had recently provided “an arm’d Xebeque” and “two cargoes of 
naval stores timber.”896  Mellimelli stressed that paying tribute was normal and threatened 
war if the United States refused to pay.  He warned that “no peace…can be ever permanent” 
unless it would “conform to the custom practised by other christian powers of the same 
magnitude, & occasionally make presents of military stores.”  Additionally, he dismissed any 
attempt to circumvent his authority by claiming that it would be “superfluous” for Jefferson 
to write the Bey since Tunis’s ruler had authorized Mellimelli to negotiate on his behalf.897   
Mellimelli rebuffed the principle upon which the president waged the Tripolitan War:  a 
rejection of paying tribute.   
One cannot fault Mellimelli for defending a centuries-long practice of paying tribute.  
From his perspective, since European countries purchased peace treaties why should the 
United States be exempt?  Since Jefferson and Mellimelli firmly stuck to their positions, talks 
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reached a standstill.  Jefferson, in an April 14th message to Congress, described the mission 
as a failure.  Mellimelli had issued “a threat of war” that could only be averted if the United 
States provided naval stores, so the president requested an extension of the Mediterranean 
Fund—the 2.5% tax on various goods that Congress had established in March 1804 in order 
to fund the Tripolitan War.898  Four days later, Jefferson provided the Senate with the “entire 
correspondence between” Madison and the Tunisian and emphasized that the ultimatum for 
naval stores had “been pressed in verbal conferences much more explicitly and pertinaciously 
than appears in the written correspondence.”899  Regrettably, no voice recording technology 
existed at the time which could have preserved these conversations for posterity.  Still, the 
Jefferson Administration had clearly become fatigued with Mellimelli.900 
 
Since talks had stalled, the president decided upon a fresh approach by sending the Tunisians 
on a tour of prominent American cities.  He hoped that Mellimelli would be overawed by the 
country’s large population and drop his tribute demands upon realizing that Tunis could 
never win a war against the United States.  Madison sent a circular letter to Democratic-
Republican leaders in Baltimore, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, asking for their 
cooperation.  He emphasized that Jefferson wanted Mellimelli to “see our principal Cities & 
the most populous parts of our Country” in order to rectify the Tunisian’s “erronious 
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impressions” about American “Strength.”901  James Cathcart, a former captive in Algiers 
from 1785-1796 and subsequent consul to Tripoli, served as the Tunisians’ guide.  He could 
communicate with them in a lingua franca and he handled the expedition’s expenses.  
Mellimelli received $200 a week in “Salary,” while his entourage got one-time gifts of 
varying amounts.902  Madison instructed Cathcart to withdraw money from the Boston 
branch of the First Bank of the United States in a June 21st letter and Cathcart presumably 
could also draw funds from the Baltimore and New York branches.  Ultimately, Madison 
listed the multi-city tour’s expenses (which included Cathcart’s salary, lodging, supplies, and 
presents for the Tunisians and the Bey) at $18,416.91.903  Indeed, this was a large sum and 
justified critics who accused the administration of profligate spending.  The president had 
hoped to cover the entire mission’s cost by selling the four Arabian horses that Mellimelli 
presented to him as a gift from the Bey.904  However, Jefferson vastly underestimated the 
length of the trip and its expenses.  As costs spiraled out-of-control, critics could justly 
accuse the president of financial incompetence. 
Indeed, many newspapers lambasted the federal government’s vast spending on the 
trip.  Newspapers in Massachusetts and Vermont expressed outraged that Mellimelli (whom 
they referred to as a “coloured gentleman”) collected “TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS from 
government, every Monday morning, through the hands of Mr. CATHCART, who 
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accompanies him.  Whether this sum is considered as in part payment of the Tribute lately 
demanded by him, or not, we are unable to say.”905  These newspapers highlighted the cost of 
Mellimelli’s trip by listing it in capital letters to ensure that readers could not miss it.  Also, 
by putting Mellimelli’s darker skin color in italics the article sought to generate public 
outrage at the thought of a non-white person receiving free money from the government.  
Other Federalist newspapers stressed that Jefferson had spent a staggering sum of money by 
printing an article that claimed “this African mission has cost the U. States two hundred 
dollars per week, ever since its arrival.”906  Federalist newspapers in Boston and New York 
drew attention to the total sum; they attacked the president for spending “probably more than 
FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS” on the trip.907  Federalist newspaper editors hoped that 
readers would share their disgust with Jefferson for showering Mellimelli with money and 
respond by rejecting the Democratic-Republicans and supporting Federalist candidates.  
However, as in D.C., Americans in other cities that the ambassador visited did not 
share this same virulence towards him.  Instead, they usually treated him as a celebrity.  An 
article in the Federalist New-York Herald criticized local fascination with the Tunisian and 
dehumanized him by comparing him to a worm.  The speaker claimed that while “walking 
thro’ Wall street yesterday morning, I saw a large crowd” filled with people “standing with 
                                                          
905 Hampshire Federalist (Federalist; Springfield, MA), July 1, 1806 [see Josiah Holland, History of Western 
Massachusetts, vol. 1 (Springfield:  Samuel Bowles and Company, 1855), 438]. The article also ran in the 
politically indeterminable Middlebury Mercury (Middlebury, VT), July 9, 1806. 
 
906 Columbian Centinel (Boston, MA), September 20, 1806; Newburyport Herald (Newburyport, MA), 
September 23, 1806; The People’s Friend & Daily Advertiser (New York, NY), September 25, 1806; The 
Farmer’s Museum (Walpole, NH), September 26, 1806.  The version printed in the Albany Gazette (Albany, 
NY), September 25, 1806; Alexandria Daily Advertiser (Alexandria, VA), September 29, 1806; and The 
Northern Post (Salem, NY), October 2, 1806 lacked the italics. 
 
907 The Repertory (Boston, MA), December 30, 1806; The Balance, and Columbian Repository (Hudson, NY), 
January 20, 1807 [this newspaper italicized the cost instead of using capital letters]. 
309 
 
their mouths and eyes distended, and with their heads eagerly reaching over towards the 
centre….they had surrounded the Musselman in such a manner that he could not proceed 
until he had satisfied their curiosity.  Being, in some measure, a slave to that passion myself, 
I hastened to the spot, and…instead of beholding a Great Plenipotentiary standing with all 
the dignity of Mahomedan pride, I saw nothing but a great worm creeping with all the 
submission of reptile humility.”  This fable-like story condemned public obsession with 
Mellimelli (although the author admitted his culpability).  Far from being a distinguished 
official, the article depicted the diplomat as a grotesque worm festering in the street and 
suggested that people who fawned over him debased themselves.  It also stressed religious 
differences between Mellimelli and Americans by twice referencing the ambassador’s 
Islamic beliefs.908 
Oddly, given the vast amount of criticism of Mellimelli in Massachusetts newspapers, 
Bostonians welcomed the Tunisian and vied for the opportunity to host him at social events.   
Having Mellimelli at one’s gathering could be used as a way to attract customers or for 
political purposes.  The July 14th Boston Gazette (pro-Federalist) ran an advertisement for an 
upcoming ball at The Pantheon in Rowe’s Lane that promised the attendance of “His 
Excellency the Tunisian Ambassador and Suit.”  The ad further offered guests the 
opportunity to witness “a Turkish Dance” (it did not specify if Mellimelli or his entourage 
would participate).909  Similarly, an ad in the July 15th The Repertory (pro-Federalist) 
announced that “the publick are informed, that his Excellency the Tunisian Ambassador and 
suit, are engaged to visit the COLUMBIAN MUSEUM, THIS EVENING….The Transparent 
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Paintings of the Bashaw of Tripoli, &c. will be exhibited at half past 9 o’clock.”  The owners 
of the Columbian Museum conceived of a brilliant public relations move:  what better way to 
celebrate an exhibit about the First Barbary War than to have real-life North Africans attend?  
Their presence would create a fantasy-like atmosphere, with their bodies serving as live 
representations of the region.  Moreover, the art exhibit contained an implicit message to 
Mellimelli:  just as the United States defeated the bashaw of Tripoli, so it would crush Tunis 
if the two countries fought.910 
Bostonians also used the ambassador as a political pawn.  Federalists celebrated a 
Barbary-themed Fourth of July, as they invited Mellimelli and distinguished Tripolitan War 
veterans William Eaton and Edward Preble to attend as guests of honor.  Eaton’s toast 
celebrated marital valor and featured gendered rhetoric that feminized the Barbary pirates:  
“let not the sweat of Americans be bartered for essences to perfume a pirate’s beard, nor our 
harvests for gold to purchase humiliation.”911  To Eaton, paying tribute denigrated national 
honor and amounted to stealing from hard-working Americans since their taxes supported the 
procurement of luxury goods by North African men.  Preble’s toast heralded “our 
enterprising officers and hardy seamen engaged in the peaceful pursuit of commerce:— May 
it ever be the pride and glory of their naval brethren in arms to protect and defend them.”  He 
supported a continued U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean.  Former president John 
Adams also attended and gave a toast supporting the Navy:  “May the Trident of Neptune 
ever protect the independence of Nations, and defend the Liberty of mankind.”  Ironically, 
Adams himself preferred purchasing peace with North Africa to war during his 
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Administration, but toasting to tribute would hardly have been well-received.  Mellimelli 
gave a gracious toast that acknowledged his warm reception:  “may every foreign Agent 
return to his own country impressed with the same favorable ideas of American hospitality, 
that I will forever make a merit in cherishing.”  Once again, he demonstrated the ability to 
flatter an audience.  Despite the belligerent rhetoric contained in New England newspapers, it 
appears that Bostonians treated Mellimelli respectfully.912 
The very act of Federalists hosting Mellimelli merits further comment.  It is 
understandable that Federalists would embrace Eaton and Preble, two military veterans from 
the Tripolitan War who could lend credibility and authority to the Federalist Party.  Honoring 
Eaton and Preble could also serve as a way to present them as potential candidates for public 
office.  But why would Federalists want to associate themselves with Mellimelli?  What 
would they have to gain?  For the past several months Federalist newspapers had condemned 
Jefferson for paying for the Tunisian’s expenses and had stigmatized Mellimelli as morally 
debauched and racially inferior.  Yet by bringing Mellimelli and Tripolitan War heroes 
together, Federalists reinforced their support for martial resistance against the Barbary 
pirates. 
Mellimelli also attended the rival celebration held by Boston’s Democratic-
Republicans.  According to the Republican-Watch Tower, “officers of the infantry” walked 
Mellimelli and Cathcart to the State House.  Upon arriving “they were introduced into the 
representatives’ chamber,” where the Tunisian Ambassador sat in “a chair placed in the 
center of the room for his reception.”  This scene presents a striking contrast to Mellimelli’s 
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visit to the Senate back in January.  Then, senators from both political parties opposed the 
diplomat’s attendance and left the room in order to avoid acknowledging him.  In Boston, 
though, distinguished Democratic-Republicans treated him as a guest of honor.  The 
newspaper also portrayed the Boston public as enthralled with Mellimelli.  As he walked to 
the State House, “curiosity had excited a great number of the inhabitants to assemble in the 
streets through which they passed, to see a stranger whose customs and habits were so novel 
in our country.  The ambassador was gratified with the civility; and respect paid him, and 
expressed his warmest attachments for the citizens of Boston.”  As in other cities, the public 
relished the opportunity to see a North African in person.  This report resembles Margaret 
Bayard Smith’s portrayal of Mellimelli as a gracious guest who charmed others.  Further, the 
celebration included a toast that extolled good treatment of Mellimelli:  “The States of 
Barbary—Neither war, nor rumors of war, should be allowed to annul the sacred rights of 
national hospitality.”  This toast could refer to the Boston Democratic-Republicans’ event, 
the Jefferson Administration’s treatment of Mellimelli, or both.  Regardless, Americans of 
both political parties viewed Mellimelli as an instrument by which they could bolster their 
party’s credibility.913 
 Yet goodwill faded as Mellimelli’s stay dragged on.  Jefferson had designated the 
Franklin to return the diplomat to Tunis, but he refused to travel in this ship or receive it as 
compensation for the three Tunisian ships captured by the U.S. Navy.  As he explained to 
Jefferson in a July 26th letter, he could not accept it since “with great concern” he learned it 
was “a prize vessel captured by a Tripolitan Cruiser and sold at Tunis in the year 1803.”  
Accepting it could even result in the Bey punishing him:  “it is more than my life is worth to 
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return in a vessel that has already belong’d to my Master and was sold to Christians.”914  
From Mellimelli’s perspective, accepting the Franklin could have dire consequences for him 
and would constitute an insult to his country’s honor.  If the Bey didn’t want it before, why 
would he want it now?  Madison proposed a solution that proved acceptable to both parties:  
the government would charter a second ship (the Two Brothers) to transport Mellimelli, with 
the Franklin also making the voyage as a store ship to carry the diplomat’s goods.915   
The delays over Mellimelli’s departure strongly taxed James Cathcart’s patience.  He 
reported that the diplomat was unhappy regarding the size of the Franklin since it could not 
fit all of his goods.  Consequently, “14,000 lbs of loaf sugar, & 10 Tons of Logwood” had 
been sent to Washington D.C. “to be forwarded to Tunis in the first public vessel that sails 
for the Mediterranean.”  Mellimelli, though, feared that these items would never arrive and 
insisted that the U.S. government pay him their value ($2,643) since it had ample money to 
spare.  Cathcart described the diplomat’s rationale as such:  “there can be but little loss” to 
the United States since it is “better able to bear [the cost] than he is.”  This report suggested 
that Jefferson’s plan to overawe Mellimelli with U.S. strength had failed.  Instead of being 
intimidated, the Tunisian felt emboldened to ask for more favors.  For his part, Cathcart was 
ready to wash his hands of the matter.  He “heartily repent[ed] having accompanied the 
Ambassador,” whom he considered “a very mean, suspicious, avaricious character; bias’d by 
nothing but self interest, devoid of every sense of delicacy…the sooner we get rid of him 
entirely the better.”916 
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Mellimelli finally departed in late September, but the Jefferson Administration feared 
that the mission had failed.  The Tunisian Ambassador had been in the United States for ten 
months, but no peace treaty had been made.  Mellimelli left in a bad mood according to 
Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith, whether from “not having entirely succeeded in the 
general objects of his mission” or another issue “operating upon a jealous mind.”  Smith 
feared that he was “hostile” and would advise the Bey “to make a declaration of War.”  
Smith advised Captain Hugh Campbell to “keep a watchful Eye” on Tunis’s squadron.917  In 
turn, Campbell advised the U.S. consul at Spain to caution American captains about the 
dangers of sailing in the Mediterranean.918 
Indeed, tensions remained high after Mellimelli’s December arrival in Tunis.  Peace 
was achieved only after diplomat Tobias Lear met with the Bey and his prime minister in 
January 1807 and agreed to pay $10,000 as compensation for the three captured ships (the 
Bey would not receive the Two Brothers).919  In a May letter, Madison informed Lear that 
Jefferson “approved” the settlement and provided instructions for acquiring the money from 
the prominent British bank Baring Brothers & Company.920  Finally satisfied that the United 
States respected him, the Bey announced in a letter to Jefferson that “henceforward as 
heretofore, our previous treaty will serve as a law to be fulfilled.”  Commerce between both 
countries would be encouraged and “all our relations will be founded on principles of entire 
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and perfect reciprocity.”921  He also thanked the president for giving Mellimelli a “polite 
reception.”  Despite the tumultuousness surrounding the Mellimelli mission, Jefferson 
attained his goal of avoiding a second Mediterranean War. 
However, Jefferson completely failed regarding his second goal of not paying 
tribute—the United States only received peace upon agreeing to pay $10,000.  This sum 
ostensibly served as compensation for the three captured Tunisian ships, but Mellimelli had 
earlier told Madison that they were not worth “more than 4000 dollars.”922  The Bey 
shrewdly sensed an opportunity to extract more money from America, meaning that 
Mellimelli had erred—or bluffed—in claiming that the Bey would reject any monetary 
settlement for the ships.923  One can reasonably consider this extra $6,000 as tribute.  Clearly, 
the lavish hospitality that Jefferson showered upon Mellimelli did not buy any goodwill. 
Moreover, the Jefferson Administration concealed this payment from the American 
public in order to avoid generating further controversy.  This duplicity has never before been 
discussed by scholars.  In his October 1807 Annual Message to Congress, the president 
simply commented that “our peace with the several states on the coast of Barbary appears as 
firm as at any former period and as likely to continue as that of any other nation.”924  
Notably, he mentioned neither the $10,000 payment nor the Mellimelli mission.  Lear, in a 
March 1807 circular letter to American consuls in the Mediterranean, announced the peace—
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but omitted any mention of the payment.925  Furthermore, by printing this letter or other 
declarations of peace between Tunis and the United States, newspapers inadvertently aided 
the cover-up by spreading the (false) belief that Jefferson had achieved an honorable, tribute-
free peace.926 
It made perfect sense for Jefferson to conceal the $10,000 payment, since admitting it 
would have invited additional backlash.  Federalists would again savage his Barbary 
diplomacy and Madison could possibly appear vulnerable in the 1808 presidential election.  
Better to keep silent than create another political landmine.  Astoundingly, Jefferson dodged 
a political bullet in his handling of the Mellimelli mission.  The president unwittingly 
provided Federalists with an opportunity to revive their party’s fortunes by making 
distinguished Tripolitan War veterans Edward Preble and William Eaton appear as attractive 
candidates for political office.  Fortunately for the Democratic-Republicans, their rivals 
failed to capitalize politically since these two war heroes passed away within a few years of 
Mellimelli’s trip.927  Jefferson even lacked the support of leaders from his own party, 
weathering reproach from Democratic-Republican newspaper editors and elected officials.  
Critics from both parties opposed the president’s opulent hospitality, fearing that it would 
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perpetuate the United States’ status as a second-rate power instead of developing it into a 
mighty nation. 
Jefferson had hoped that Mellimelli would be regarded as a respectable policymaker.  
Yet the use of government funds to cover his expenses and the decision to send him on a 
multi-city tour ironically turned the diplomat into a spectacle.  Competing perceptions of 
Mellimelli existed simultaneously.  Critics considered the Tunisian a racially inferior 
reprobate, although they could not dissuade the public’s enthusiasm for Mellimelli.  
Residents showered the diplomat with attention when he visited their towns, surely aware 
that he was the only Muslim or representative of the Barbary States that they would ever see.  
Even some elites adored Mellimelli, viewing him as a peer and relishing his company at 
parties.  The president took a huge risk in providing lavish treatment to the diplomat and, 
remarkably, it did not result in any lasting repercussions.   
However, the Mellimelli mission utterly failed as an attempt to build a new type of 
relationship with Tunis.  The United States, like other countries, could not get peace without 
purchasing it.  Jefferson naively believed that he could change the way the Bey conducted 
foreign policy.  Hosting Mellimelli and his entourage at public expense amounted to a 
gargantuan waste of government funds—Jefferson could have achieved peace at a fraction of 
the cost by paying compensation for the three captured ships in the first place.  Moreover, 
coming on the heels of the controversial Tripolitan War treaty, Mellimelli’s visit tempered 
the notion that the United States had triumphed over the Barbary pirates.  Only a well-
executed cover-up, together with Mellimelli’s popularity among the public and some elites, 
prevented the trip from being a complete disaster. 
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For most of his presidency, Jefferson experienced conflict with the Barbary pirates.  
The Tripolitan War occurred from 1801 to 1805, Morocco threatened war from 1802 to 1803, 
problems with Tunis lasted from 1805 to early 1807, and Algiers held ships from late 1807 to 
early 1808.  The Democratic-Republicans had lambasted Federalists for paying tribute to the 
Barbary States, but they hardly did better during Jefferson’s presidency.  The government 
spent millions fighting Tripoli only to pay ransom money and tens of thousands of dollars to 
host Mellimelli and to resolve problems with Tunis and Algiers.  North African rulers simply 
outmatched the Jefferson Administration.  The former were experts at negotiating good terms 
for themselves—their countries had centuries of experience extorting money from European 
countries.  Jefferson entered his presidency with high hopes for reforming America’s 
relations with the Barbary States, but he largely failed.  Only the prevention of war with 
Morocco in 1803 can be considered a success—but Preble and the U.S. Navy deserve the 
credit since they (and not the president) acted quickly to resolve the conflict.  As Secretary of 
State, Madison deserves some blame for the Jefferson Administration’s ineffective Barbary 
policies.  However, over the next decade he reevaluated Jefferson’s approach.  Following the 
War of 1812, Madison would seize opportunities to wage war against Algiers and to crush 
Barbary piracy once and for all. 
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Chapter 7:  The Second Barbary War and the End of Barbary Piracy 
 
 
A decade after its war against Tripoli, the United States faced another war in the 
Mediterranean, this time against Algiers.  Although the rulers of these two Barbary States 
had economic reasons for targeting American ships, the conflicts affected the United States 
in very different ways.  Compared to the Tripolitan War, the Algerine War featured a much 
stronger naval response from the United States, far fewer Americans were enslaved, and the 
war did not benefit the waning Federalist Party.  Most importantly, the Tripolitan War had 
ended in disappointment for the United States, but the Algerine War constituted an 
unambiguous success.  President James Madison did not repeat Thomas Jefferson’s 
mistakes—he was fully committed to victory and determined to end permanently the threat 
of Barbary piracy. 
Algiers’s declaration of war upon the United States in summer 1812 came as a 
surprise to Americans, who suspected surreptitious involvement from Great Britain.  This 
perception prevented Federalists from raising meaningful challenges to Madison’s 
leadership.  Criticisms from Federalist newspaper editors often smacked of desperation and 
irrationality (like much of the Democratic-Republican press during the Tripolitan War).  By 
contrast, Britain’s alleged involvement with Algiers aided Democratic-Republicans—party 
newspapers cited it as further evidence of that country’s hostility towards the United States.  
Overall, the government, many newspaper editors, and the public considered the Algerine 
War as intertwined with the larger war against Britain and its Native American allies.  The 
U.S. Navy’s eventual victory over Algiers in June 1815 (and intimidation of Tripoli and 
Tunis) unleashed nationalistic fervor, as Americans deemed their triumphs over the Barbary 
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pirates proof of their country’s superior moral resolve compared to Europe.  By rejecting 
Jeffersonian principles of limited force and skepticism towards the navy as an institution, the 
public and the Madison Administration accomplished what American policymakers since the 
1780s had failed to do:  obtain a permanent peace with the Barbary States. 
When Congress declared war on Britain in June 1812, no one anticipated that this 
conflict would have a Mediterranean component.  In early October, however, Americans 
learned that Algiers had declared war on the United States.  A merchant ship arrived in 
Portsmouth with news that the Dey had rejected America’s most recent tribute delivery and 
had expelled the U.S. consul, Tobias Lear (who took refuge in Gibraltar).928  Lear confirmed 
this information in a July 25th letter (which newspapers throughout the United States 
published).929  The diplomat described how the American ship Allegany arrived in Algiers on 
July 17th “with a cargo of naval and military stores” as tribute.  The crew began to unload the 
                                                          
928 The Pilot (Boston, MA), October 2, 1812. 
 
929 Lear to the American consul in Gibraltar, printed in The Columbian (New York, NY), October 27, 1812; 
Mercantile Advertiser (New York, NY), October 27, 1812; New-England Palladium (Boston, MA), October 30, 
1812; Long-Island Star (Brooklyn, NY), October 28, 1812; Newburyport Herald, and Country Gazette 
(Newburyport, MA), October 30, 1812; The Repertory & General Advertiser (Boston, MA), October 30, 1812; 
The Whig Chronicle (Philadelphia, PA), October 30, 1812; The Albany Gazette (Albany, NY), November 2, 
1812; Alexandria Gazette, Commercial and Political (Alexandria, VA), November 2, 1812; Portland Gazette, 
and Maine Advertiser (Portland, ME), November 2, 1812; The Military Monitor, and American Register (New 
York, NY), November 2, 1812; Hagers-Town Gazette (Hagers-Town, MD), November 3, 1812; Orange County 
Patriot; or, the Spirit of ‘Seventy-Six (Goshen, NY), November 3, 1812; The Rhode-Island American, and 
General Advertiser (Providence, RI), November 3, 1812 [an abbreviated version]; Weekly Aurora (Philadelphia, 
PA), November 3, 1812; The Alexandria Herald (Alexandria, VA), November 4, 1812; THOMAS’S 
Massachusetts Spy, or Worcester Gazette (Worcester, MA), November 4, 1812 [an abbreviated version]; The 
Native American (Norwich, CT), November 4, 1812; American Advocate (Hallowell, ME), November 5, 1812; 
The Maryland Gazette (Annapolis, MD), November 5, 1812; Kline’s Weekly Carlisle Gazette (Carlisle, PA), 
November 6, 1812; New-Bedford Mercury (New Bedford, MA), November 6, 1812; The Yankee (Boston, MA), 
November 6, 1812; American Watchman and Delaware Republican (Wilmington, DE), November 7, 1812; City 
Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser (Charleston, SC), November 7, 1812; Merrimack Intelligencer 
(Haverhill, MA), November 7, 1812; Farmer’s Cabinet (Amherst, NH), November 9, 1812 [an abbreviated 
version]; The Bee (Hudson, NY), November 10, 1812; Concord Gazette (Concord, NH), November 10, 1812; 
Independent American (Ballston Spa, NY), November 10, 1812; Bennington News Letter (Bennington, VT), 
November 11, 1812; The Vermont Mirror (Middlebury, VT), November 11, 1812; The Supporter (Chillicothe, 
OH), November 14, 1812. 
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goods, but the Dey claimed (without justification) “that the articles were not such in quantity 
or quality as he expected” and he expelled Lear and all other Americans from Algiers.  
Moreover, the Dey declared that the United States owed an additional $27,000 in tribute 
because it needed to use the (shorter) Islamic calendar and not the (longer) Western one.930  
Lear begrudgingly paid the sum (plus a 25% surcharge!)—yet another example of his caving 
in to the demands of a North African ruler.  The diplomat also listed each ship in Algiers’s 
fleet:  “5 frigates, 3 corvvetts, 2 brigs, 1 xebeck, 1 schooner, 1 row-galley, and 6 gun-boats” 
and warned that “there is reason to apprehend that they had orders to capture American 
vessels.”  Lear disparaged the abilities of Algerine sailors in another letter, calling them “the 
lowest and most miserable order of people in Algiers” and claimed that “they know nothing 
of regular combat at sea, and if kept from boarding distance, they could not withstand one 
half their own force on board another vessel.”931  He urged an end to paying “disgraceful 
tribute” and hoped that “Algiers will be humbled to the dust.”  Despite his anger, Lear’s 
actions raise the question of why he so readily capitulated to the Dey’s demands.  Was Lear 
unwilling to be jailed by the Dey?  Was he more concerned the safety of himself and his 
family than with his country’s honor?  If the Algerine Navy was as weak as he claimed, why 
was Lear afraid to risk a rupture?  Moreover, why did Madison even retain Lear as a 
diplomat?  After brokering bad deals for the United States with Tripoli and Tunis, why did 
Madison consider him competent? 
Regardless, Lear and other commentators blamed Britain for causing the rift with 
Algiers.  Upon returning to America, Lear wrote an open letter (published by newspapers in 
                                                          
930 Lear to Madison, July 29, 1815, printed in the Weekly Aurora (Philadelphia, PA), December 15, 1812. 
 
931 Lear to Secretary of State, July 29, 1812, printed in the American Watchman and Delaware Republican 
(Wilmington, DE), December 9, 1812. 
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six states) in which he declared that “I have good grounds, for believing it true” that “the 
conduct of the Dey towards the United States, was instigated by the British.”932  Several 
newspapers (mostly Democratic-Republican) also claimed that “orders have lately been 
given in London for stores to equip the Algerine Navy to the amount of upwards of 40,000 
pounds.”933  Two of these publications included additional editorial commentary, contending 
that this intelligence “corroborat[es]…the dispatches of Consul Lear…and satisfactorily 
shows to whom we are indebted for the present Algerine War.”934  Additionally, The Western 
Star (a Democratic-Republican newspaper from New York) reprinted an article attributed to 
the London Times: “the Dey of Algiers intends to undertake a spirited war with the American 
Republic.  To fulfil this design he is provided with 6 frigates of 44 guns, two of which are 
perfectly new, and he and his vassals are equipping a swarm of smaller vessels, which are to 
be engaged in depredations on the floating property of this new enemy.  Orders have been 
                                                          
932 Lear to the Editor of The National Advocate, The National Advocate (New York, NY), April 19, 1813.  
Reprinted in the Baltimore Patriot (Baltimore, MD), April 21, 1813; The Columbian (New York, NY), April 
24, 1813; Daily National Intelligencer (Washington D.C.), April 24, 1813; American Watchman and Delaware 
Republican (Wilmington, DE), April 28, 1813; The Yankee (Boston, MA), April 30, 1813; Boston Patriot 
(Boston, MA), May 1, 1813; New-Hampshire Gazette (Portsmouth, NH), May 4, 1813; American Mercury 
(Hartford, CT), May 5, 1813; The Sun (Pittsfield, MA), May 6, 1813; New-Hampshire Patriot (Concord, NH), 
May 11, 1813; The Native American (Norwich, CT), May 12, 1813; The War (New York, NY), May 18, 1813; 
Eastern Argus (Portland, ME), May 20, 1813. 
 
933 Two Federalist newspapers published it:  The Repertory & General Advertiser (Boston, MA), December 15, 
1812 and The Rhode-Island American, and General Advertiser (Providence, RI), December 18, 1812 [see 
William Staples, Annals of the Town of Providence, from its First Settlement, to the Organization of the City 
Government (Providence:  Knowles and Vose, 1843), 549-550].  Five Democratic-Republican newspapers 
published it:  The Native American (Norwich, CT), December 23, 1812; Republican (Plattsburgh, NY), 
December 25, 1812; Green-Mountain Farmer (Bennington, VT), December 30, 1812; Democratic Republican 
(Walpole, NH), January 4, 1813; The War (New York, NY), January 9, 1813 [see “The Life of Samuel 
Woodworth” at http://www.xavier.edu/history-department/heroesofthelake/biography.html (accessed February 
17, 2016)]. 
 
934 The Native American (Norwich, CT), December 23, 1812 and Democratic Republican (Walpole, NH), 
January 4, 1813. 
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given in London for stores to equip the Algerine navy to the amount of upwards of 
40,000£.”935  But were these accusations true?   
British sources suggest that the government tacitly encouraged Algiers to harass other 
countries and reveal that many newspaper editors in England cheered the Dey’s decision to 
go to war against the United States.  Several British newspapers indeed published the article 
reprinted in The Western Star that discussed England’s provisions for Algiers.936  Yet while it 
appears that the British government did not actually give ships to Algiers, it did provide 
£6,262 worth of naval stores.937  Additionally, many British publications rejoiced that an 
Algerine-American war would increase their country’s share of the Mediterranean trade.  A 
widely printed editorial observed that this new war “is likely to have a beneficial effect on 
our trade with the Mediterranean.  In spices, and numerous other commodities, the 
Americans have carried on a successful competition in that sea with our own traders, and by 
the obstruction they will now meet with, we shall, in several articles, be enabled to supersede 
them in that extensive market.”938  Furthermore, William Shaler, the U.S. diplomat whom 
                                                          
935 The Western Star (New York, NY), January 16, 1813. 
 
936 The Morning Chronicle, October 12, 1812; Kentish Chronicle, October 13, 1812; The Public Ledger, and 
Daily Advertiser, October 13, 1812; Hereford Journal, October 14, 1812 [it omitted the last sentence]; Berrow’s 
Worcester Journal, October 15, 1812; The Derby Mercury, October 15, 1812; Chester Chronicle, October 16, 
1812; Cornwall Gazette, October 17, 1812 [it omitted the last sentence]; The Northampton Mercury, October 
17, 1812 [it omitted the last sentence]; The Leeds Mercury, October 17, 1812 [an abridged version]; The York 
Herald, October 17, 1812 [it omitted the last sentence]; The Aberdeen Journal, October 21, 1812 [it omitted the 
last sentence].  These sources were found via the online database The British Newspaper Archive. 
 
937 An Account of the Extraordinary Expenses of the Army, Incurred and Paid by the Right Honourable the 
PAYMASTER GENERAL of His MAJESTY’S FORCES, from 25 December 1811, to 24 December 1812 (House 
of Commons, 1813), lists a reimbursement for “the Right honourable George Rose, Treasurer of the Navy; for 
the value of Naval Stores, furnished by His Majesty’s Ships to the Day of Algiers (page 10).  This entry is dated 
February 28, 1812.  Found in the ProQuest online database House of Commons Parliamentary Papers. 
 
938 Kentish Gazette, August 28, 1812; Cheltenham Chronicle, September 3, 1812; The Manchester Mercury, 
September 8, 1812; The Aberdeen Journal, September 9, 1812.  Some of the newspapers slightly altered the 
Kentish Gazette’s text; for instance, “our commerce with the Mediterranean” and “rare spices, and numerous 
other rich commodities.” 
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Madison appointed to make peace with Algiers in 1815, learned about a January 1812 letter 
sent by the Prime Minister and the Prince Regent (George IV, the heir to the British throne) 
to the Dey of Algiers.  The letter pledged “the strongest friendship for the Dey,” promised 
that England would “protect [Algiers’s] capital with his fleets,” and “beg[ged] the Dey not to 
permit those who are enemies of Great Britain to lessen the harmony now subsisting between 
the two nations.”939  Although this letter does not specifically mention the United States, 
Shaler believed that the promise of British protection emboldened the Dey to target 
American ships.  The Prince Regent also met with an Algerine diplomat in early 1811.940  
Given the plethora of British sources that applauded the Dey’s aggression against the United 
States, it seems clear that a recent scholar has erred in claiming that American accusations of 
British complicity were groundless.941  Clearly, British policymakers and members of the 
press welcomed Algerine attacks upon American ships.  However, supporting Barbary piracy 
was not a new policy for Britain—the country had long encouraged it against commercial 
rivals.  Americans recognized this reality, as several newspapers reprinted Lord Sheffield’s 
infamous remarks (from the 1780s) about Barbary piracy suppressing U.S. trade (discussed 
in chapter 2).942 
                                                          
939 George IV and Lord Liverpool to the Dey of Algiers, January 4, 1812, printed in William Shaler, Sketches of 
Algiers, Political, Historical, and Civil (Boston:  Cummings, Hilliard, and Company, 1826), 118-119. 
 
940 The Morning Chronicle, March 4, 1811; Kentish Gazette, March 5, 1811; Caledonian Mercury, March 7, 
1811; Perth Courier, March 7, 1811; The Taunton Courier, and Western Advertiser, March 7, 1811; The 
Lancaster Gazette, March 9, 1811. 
 
941 Peskin, Captives and Countrymen, 195-196. 
 
942 Daily National Intelligencer (Washington D.C.), November 6, 1815; American Watchman (Wilmington, 
DE), November 8, 1815; Rhode-Island Republican (Newport, RI), November 8, 1815; The Eastern Argus 
(Portland, ME), November 15, 1815; New-Hampshire Patriot (Concord, NH), November 21, 1815; Vermont 
Republican (Windsor, VT), November 27, 1815; Orange County Patriot; or, the Spirit of Seventy-Six (Goshen, 
NY), December 5, 1815. 
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Back in the United States, Democratic-Republican newspapers responded to the 
unexpected war with Algiers by becoming even more outraged with Britain.  For instance, an 
article printed in six states featured the headline “ALGERINES AND INDIANS—worthy 
ALLIES of the world’s last hope!” and argued that Britain intended to destroy “our 
independence” by teaming with “the pirates of Africa and the savages of America” to “brew 
up such a variety of wars against and among us.”943  Similarly, another widely reprinted 
article bitterly observed that “all the independent allies of Britain are upon us.  The Algerine 
corsair, and the murderous Indian are in array against us.”  It called for a powerful naval 
attack against Algiers led by America’s foremost naval officers:  “let no tribute henceforth be 
paid to the African rover, but from the cannon’s mouth, and by ambassadors like Rodgers, 
Hull, Decatur, Porter, and Bainbridge.”944  To Democratic-Republicans, Algiers’s sudden 
anger with the United States constituted both additional proof of Britain’s ill-will towards its 
former colonies and vindication of their party’s distrust of Britain. 
                                                          
943 Independent Chronicle (Boston, MA), October 5, 1812; Rhode-Island Republican (Newport, RI), October 8, 
1812; New-Hampshire Patriot (Concord, NH), October 13, 1812 [see James Lyford, ed., History of Concord, 
New Hampshire, vol. 1 (Concord:  History Commission, 1903), 364]; American Watchman and Delaware 
Republican (Wilmington, DE), October 17, 1812 [see Thomas Scharf, History of Delaware, 1609-1888, vol. 1, 
(Philadelphia:  L.J. Richards & Co., 1888), 451]; Columbian Phenix:  Or, Providence Patriot (Providence, RI), 
October 17, 1812 [see Transactions of the Rhode Island Society for the Encouragement of Domestic Industry 
(Providence:  Knowles, Anthony & Co, 1866), 56]; Vermont Republican (Windsor, VT), October 19, 1812; 
Long-Island Star (Brooklyn, NY), October 28, 1812; Northern Centinel (Burlington, VT), October 29, 1812; 
The Bee (Hudson, NY), November 10, 1812.  John Lord Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the 
American States, rev. edition (London:  J. Debrett, 1784), 204-205. 
 
944 Eight Democratic-Republican newspapers printed it:  The Columbian (New York, NY), October 7, 1812 [see 
Frederic Hudson, Journalism in the United States, from 1690-1872 (New York:  Harper & Brothers, 1873), 
225]; New-Jersey Journal (Elizabethtown, NJ), October 13, 1812; The Yankee (Boston, MA), October 16, 1812; 
Otsego Republican Press (Cherry Valley, NY), October 23, 1812; City Gazette and Commercial Daily 
Advertiser (Charleston, SC), October 24, 1812; Republican Star or, Eastern Shore General Advertiser (Easton, 
MD), October 27, 1812; The Sun (Pittsfield, MA), October 29, 1812; Otsego Herald (Cooperstown, NY), 
October 31, 1812.  One Federalist newspaper published it:  Orange County Patriot; or, the Spirit of Seventy-Six 
(Goshen, NY), October 13, 1812 [see E.M. Ruttenber and L.H. Clark, History of Orange County, New York 
(Philadelphia:  Everts & Peck, 1881), 192]. 
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Some Federalist publications refused to blame Britain and instead accused France of 
pressuring Algiers, even though no evidence has come to light to support of this theory.  A 
New Hampshire publication declared that “the hand of Napoleon is in this thing;—the Pirate 
was probably instigated to let loose his Corsairs upon our defenceless commerce; to whip us 
into the continental system….One object of this war, doubtless, was to cut off the supplies 
going to the Peninsula.”945  Similarly, a Boston publication surmised that “it is more than 
probable that” the Dey’s hostility “was effected by the influence of France.”946  These 
articles underscore the loyalty that many Federalists felt towards Britain and their reluctance 
to criticize it.  These Federalists wanted to prevent the new conflict with Algiers from 
generating additional public anger against Britain. 
A few newspapers, however, took a different view and blamed Democratic-
Republican policymakers for causing problems with Algiers.  A pro-Federalist New 
Hampshire newspaper deemed it “disgraceful” for a “free government to pay tribute to 
Algerine Pirates” and declared that “had the voice of Prebble been regarded—had the 
exertions of Eaton been noticed, this humiliating homage would never have existed.”947  It 
argued that the Jefferson Administration blew the opportunity to permanently end Barbary 
piracy during the previous decade and that this failure of leadership had created fresh 
problems in the Mediterranean.  A Pro-Democratic-Republican newspaper from Boston 
declared that “the war with the Algerines is an evidence of the want of providence in our 
administration.  Why were not the supplies stipulated by treaty seasonably remitted?  This is 
                                                          
945 New-Bedford Mercury (New Bedford, MA), November 6, 1812. 
 
946 The Repertory & General Advertiser (Boston, MA), November 3, 1812. 
 
947 Portsmouth Oracle (Portsmouth, NH), October 3, 1812. 
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of a piece with the management of our national concerns.”948  Similarly, another Democratic-
Republican newspaper accused Madison of being “so occupied in the study of electioneering 
management” that he had “forgotten these barbarians.”   Using jeremiad-like rhetoric, it 
interpreted this new conflict with Algiers as “another solemn warning from heaven, loudly 
calling upon the nation to inquire whether our present rulers are adapted to this tremendous 
crisis….Mr. Madison is at best only half a president.”949  As discussed in chapter 3, 
Democratic-Republicans had accused the John Adams Administration of neglecting tribute 
payments to the Barbary States and thereby precipitating the Tripolitan War.  While those 
charges had some truth to them, those who blamed the Madison Administration for the Dey’s 
anger lacked any evidence—the government was not remiss in making the stipulated tribute 
payments.  The Dey sought war even though the United States had done nothing to provoke 
him. 
A few newspaper editors envisioned a positive aspect to war with Algiers—they 
hoped that the United States could permanently end Barbary piracy.  An editorial that 
appeared in Washington D.C. and four states declared that “as for the Algerines, we trust the 
renewal of hostilities on their part will be the signal for an exemption, henceforth and 
forever, from tribute to Barbarian despots.  We have always viewed it as an ignominious 
purchase of their forbearance, which half the money expended on a suitable armament would 
long ago have coerced.”950  Additionally, this article welcomed the opportunity for naval 
                                                          
948 The Yankee (Boston, MA), October 9, 1812. 
 
949 The Statesmen (New York, NY), October 9, 1812.  See Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, 
vol. 27 (Worcester:  The Society, 1917), 467. 
 
950 Four Democratic-Republican newspapers printed it:  National Intelligencer (Washington D.C.), November 7, 
1812; The Columbian (New York, NY), November 12, 1812; The Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), 
November 17, 1812; Raleigh Register and North-Carolina Gazette (Raleigh, NC), November 20, 1812.  It also 
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officers and seamen to bring glory to themselves and their country:  “and we cannot help 
wishing the war with England a speedy conclusion, (supposing England to have had no hand 
in fomenting their present hostility) if it were only to give our gallant sons of the ocean an 
opportunity to chastise the insolence of these piratical states.”  These newspaper editors 
(mostly Democratic-Republican) hoped that, under Madison, the United States could fulfill 
the longstanding goal of eradicating Barbary piracy. 
What did President Madison think of the Dey’s actions?  Judging by his lack of 
correspondence regarding it, he gave this problem little thought while the war against Britain 
was happening.  The comprehensive Papers of James Madison collection contains no letters 
written by the president regarding Algiers before 1815.  Understandably, Madison was 
occupied with waging war on U.S. soil against the ultra-powerful British army and navy.  
Moreover, he surely realized that very few merchant ships would be sailing to the 
Mediterranean on account of the War of 1812—therefore, Algiers would have few 
opportunities to attack vessels and take hostages.  Madison did, however, acknowledge 
Algiers in his November 1812 annual message:  “with the Barbary Powers, excepting that of 
Algiers, our affairs remain on the ordinary footing.  The consul-general residing with that 
Regency has suddenly and without cause been banished, together with all the American 
citizens found there.  Whether this was the transitory effect of capricious despotism or the 
first act of predetermined hostility is not ascertained.  Precautions were taken by the consul 
on the latter supposition.”951  Unlike Democratic-Republican newspapers, Madison did not 
                                                          
appeared in the pro-Federalist New-York Gazette & General Advertiser (New York, NY), November 11, 1812 
and the politically neutral Norwich Courier (Norwich, CT), November 18, 1812. 
 
951 Madison, Fourth Annual Message, November 4, 1812, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29454.  
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explicitly blame Britain.  His remarks focused on the injustice of the situation, stressing that 
the United States had done nothing wrong and did not seek conflict.  Notably, the president 
neglected Algiers in his 1813 and 1814 annual messages; he had a more important war 
against Britain to wage.  Further, it appears that Madison personally did not consider the 
United States at war yet with Algiers—he wanted to observe the Dey’s future actions before 
passing judgment. 
Algiers took advantage of America’s preoccupation with Britain by seizing the 
merchant brig Edwin (from Salem) on August 26, 1812 and enslaving its captain and ten 
crewmembers.  The public learned about the capture by January 1813 and newspapers 
throughout the country published letters written by the captives that stressed their poor 
treatment.952  For instance, George Tittle’s October 4, 1812 letter (addressed to his mother) 
discussed how “when taken, we were stript and plundered of every thing, and remain almost 
naked…we are obliged to hard labour, and every night we are confined in this prison.”953  
Fellow prisoner Daniel Glover discussed the paltry daily food rations (“2 small loaves of 
bread and water”) and the brutal work.  Each day they labored from dawn until night, “some 
to dragging rocks, and some to sail making.  I am at work at carpentering….Sometimes we 
are all dragging rocks on the mountains.  We all have a task master over us flogging us 
                                                          
952 The earliest article that I have seen that reports the Edwin capture ran in the New-York Evening Post (New 
York, NY) of January 19, 1813. 
 
953 George Tittle to his mother in Beverly, October 4, 1812.  Ten Federalist newspapers ran it:  Salem Gazette 
(Salem, MA), February 12, 1813; Commercial Advertiser (New York, NY), February 15, 1813; Mercantile 
Advertiser (New York, NY), February 16, 1813; New-England Palladium (Boston, MA), February 19, 1813; 
Alexandria Gazette, Commercial and Political (Alexandria, VA), February 23, 1813; Hagers-Town Gazette 
(Hagers-Town, MD), February 23, 1813; Orange County Patriot; or, the Spirit of ‘Seventy-Six (Goshen, NY), 
March 2, 1813; The Northern Post (Salem, NY), March 4, 1813; Bennington Newsletter (Bennington, VT), 
March 4, 1813 [see Robert Shalhope, A Tale of New England:  The Diaries of Hiram Harwood, Vermont 
Farmers, 1810-1837 (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 44]; Spooner’s Vermont Journal 
(Windsor, VT), March 8, 1813.  Four Democratic-Republican newspapers printed it:  The Columbian (New 
York, NY), February 20, 1813; The Albany Register (Albany, NY), February 23, 1813; Republican Farmer 
(Bridgeport, CT), February 24, 1813; The Enquirer (Richmond, VA), March 2, 1813. 
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nearly all the time.”954  Another Edwin crew member, Francis Garcia, complained about the 
“lice and misery” of captivity and about being “under the lash of a severe task master.”955  He 
suspected that he would not survive his enslavement and found succor in his Bible (which the 
Algerines allowed him to keep) and in his Christian faith.  Garcia mournfully told his wife 
that “as for my ever seeing you again, it will be in that eternal world, where sorrow I hope 
will be quite banished from my troubled mind.  I die in the hope of the promises of the gospel 
of Jesus Christ, and that he will present us unspotted before his Father.”  Notably, editorial 
commentary preceded the text of Garcia’s letter:  “it will excite the commiseration and 
sympathy of every reader, and we hope have its effect in prompting the government to 
provide for loosening the chains of these unfortunate captives.”  Clearly, these newspaper 
editors hoped to spark public outrage and bottom-up pressure upon the Madison 
Administration to take the necessary steps to free the Edwin crew.  Altogether, a roughly 
equal number of Federalist and Democratic-Republican newspapers published these three 
letters (the George Tittle letter excepted).  This relatively equal distribution sharply contrasts 
                                                          
954 Daniel Glover to his mother, October 1, 1812.  Four Democratic-Republican newspapers ran it:  Essex 
Register (Salem, MA), February 13, 1813; New-Bedford Mercury (New Bedford, MA), February 26, 1813; The 
Western Star, and Harp of Erin (New York, NY), March 13, 1813; Otsego Herald (Cooperstown, NY), March 
27, 1813.  Three Federalist newspapers printed it:  New-England Palladium (Boston, MA), February 19, 1813; 
Bennington Newsletter (Bennington, VT), March 4, 1813; Spooner’s Vermont Journal (Windsor, VT), March 8, 
1813.  It also appeared in the politically neutral Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), 
February 18, 1813. 
 
955 Francis Garcia to his wife, September 1, 1812.  Six Democratic-Republican newspapers printed it:  Essex 
Register (Salem, MA), March 10, 1813; Baltimore Patriot (Baltimore, MD), March 13, 1813; Daily National 
Intelligencer (Washington D.C.), March 16, 1813; The Albany Register (Albany, NY), March 16, 1813; City 
Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser (Charleston, SC), March 25, 1813; The Carolina Gazette 
(Charleston, SC), March 27, 1813.  Five Federalist newspapers ran it:  Salem Gazette (Salem, MA), March 5, 
1813; Commercial Advertiser (New York, NY), March 11, 1813; Alexandria Gazette, Commercial and Political 
(Alexandria, VA), March 16, 1813; Northern Whig (Hudson, NY), March 16, 1813 [see Natural History of New 
York (New York:  D. Appleton & Co., 1842), 28-29]; Independent American (Ballston Spa, NY), March 23, 
1813.  It also ran in the politically indeterminable Concord Gazette (Concord, NH), March 16, 1813 and in the 
politically neutral The Vermont Mirror (Middlebury, VT), March 24, 1813 and Norwich Courier (Norwich, 
CT), March 31, 1813. 
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the publication of captivity letters during the Tripolitan War.  As discussed in chapter 4, 
Democratic-Republican newspapers printed letters written by the Philadelphia captives far 
less often than did Federalists ones.  The notable difference in 1813 suggests that 
Democratic-Republican editors were confident that the public would not blame the Madison 
Administration for the capture of the Edwin (in contrast to Jefferson bearing some culpability 
for the Philadelphia loss).  Therefore, they saw little risk in publishing captivity letters. 
Over time, the lives of the Edwin crew improved slightly.  Americans who lived in 
Cadiz, Spain raised about $2,000 for their relief and, by fall 1813, the Dey permitted Captain 
Smith to live with the Swedish consul.956  As a Boston publication described (summarizing a 
June 19th letter from Smith), Smith “receives every attention and kindness” from the consul, 
while the rest of the captives “were as comfortable as circumstances would admit.”957  They 
lived in a tavern and still had to work daily.  Smith also observed that the Algerines were 
“sadly disappointed” that they had not captured more Americans.  They had hoped to make 
large amounts of money from hostage-taking, but ultimately gained only a few thousand 
dollars from the Edwin crew.958 
Prior to the end of the War of 1812, the public at large devoted little attention to the 
Algerine War.  Newspapers published few toasts that mentioned it and, notably, many of 
these came from Philadelphia events.  Attendees of an October 1812 dinner in Philadelphia 
                                                          
956 Daily National Intelligencer (Washington D.C.) May 28, 1813. 
 
957 The Repertory (Boston, MA), September 20, 1813. 
 
958 In 1814, the Dey received $6,000 for the freedom of two Edwin crewmembers and an additional $6,000 for 
four French-speaking men who claimed that they were from Louisiana (see Leiner, 35-37, 202 and Peskin, 
Captives and Countrymen, 198-199).  Mordecai Noah (the U.S. consul to Tunis) oversaw these ransom 
payments, which greatly displeased the Madison Administration.  Noah was recalled and the government did 
not publicize the liberation of the alleged Louisianans.  The public knew about the ransom of the two Edwin 
crewmembers; see the Rhode-Island Republican (Newport, RI), October 19, 1814 [from the Salem Register 
(Salem, MA)]. 
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in honor of Captain Porter and the officers of the Essex drank to “the united plagues of 
Egypt” falling upon anyone who “refuses to raise his arm and open his purse to secure gallant 
American sailors from cruel, ignominious bondage, and American property from Anglo 
Algerine depredations.”959  At a March 1813 celebration (in Philadelphia) of the Society of 
St. Patrick, attendees called for “Retaliation—may the law of nations be enforced upon the 
abettors of Algerine and American savages, and an English savage be held as hostage and at 
hard labor, for every American citizen carried into Barbary by the ally of England.”960  In 
July 1813, a group of Washington D.C. Democratic-Republicans celebrated Independence 
Day with various toasts, including one to “the Prince Regent, Tecumseh and the Dey of 
Algiers—Fit allies of British usurpations, barbarities and piracies.”961  The above toasts 
stressed British complicity in Barbary piracy, while others expressed hope that the United 
States would soon retaliate against Algiers.  A celebration of the Philadelphia Typographical 
Society included a wish that American gun boats would “sink Algerine galleys and throw 
their matter into pi with American cannon.”962  At an April 1814 public dinner and ball in 
honor of Captain Stewart and the officers of the Constitution  a toast was raised to “the 
Barbary powers—May the next tribute we pay them be in Yankee thunder.”963  While war 
raged against Britain and its Native American allies, the public deemed hostilities with 
Algiers a sideshow.  The public lamented their country’s vulnerability to the Barbary pirates, 
but knew that the government was currently unable to protect ships in the Mediterranean. 
                                                          
959 New-Jersey Journal (Elizabethtown, NJ), October 20, 1812. 
 
960 The Shamrock or, Hibernian Chronicle (New York, NY), March 27, 1813. 
 
961 Daily National Intelligencer (Washington D.C.), July 10, 1813. 
 
962 City Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser (Charleston, SC), November 27, 1812. 
 
963 Essex Register (Salem, MA), April 9, 1814. 
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Nevertheless, the paucity of public expressions of sympathy for the Edwin captives 
galled some observers.  An article published in three states voiced disappointment that efforts 
were not being made to resolve the hostage situation in Algiers.  It regretted that “our 
feelings are so lukewarm as to be insensible to the sufferings of our fellow citizens, who are 
reduced to slavery in Algiers, and who are now bending under the weight of chains, and 
smarting like the slaves in the southern democratic states, under the lash of the whip.”  The 
article also contended that the published letters of the Edwin captives “do not appear to have 
exited either our sensibility, or invited a single comment.”964  What were Americans 
supposed to do, though?  The war with Britain was occurring on U.S. soil and required the 
full attention of the government and public.  The article also risked alienating slave-owners 
by suggesting that Americans should care just as much for the plight of the Edwin crew as for 
slaves in the United States.  Another article took a different tactic by channeling anger over 
the Royal Navy’s impressment of Americans.  Published by multiple Federalist newspapers, 
it complained that “so much and so violent a sympathy is felt” for seamen impressed by the 
British and yet “not a single expression of regret is heard for the fate of the captive American 
who is doomed to wear out his days in the dungeons of Algiers.”  It made an emotional 
appeal to readers, describing how the captives “pine away a hopeless life in chains and 
slavery” and suggesting that they could be ransomed for “a small part of the money” that 
Americans spend on elections.965  To these critics, the war against Britain offered no excuse 
                                                          
964 Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), May 1, 1813; Bennington Newsletter (Bennington, 
VT), May 12, 1813; Boston Daily Advertiser (Boston, MA), May 22, 1813.  From the Pennsylvania Farmer 
(Lancaster, PA). 
 
965 New-York Evening Post (New York, NY), March 30, 1814; New-York Herald (New York, NY), April 2, 
1814.  An abbreviated version appeared in the New-England Palladium (Boston, MA), April 15, 1814 (it lacked 
the “hopeless life” and election components).  The article also appeared in the politically neutral Poulson’s 
American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), April 2, 1804. 
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for tolerating Algiers’s seizure of Americans—these men deserved to be ransomed and 
restored to their country and families.  To be sure, Federalists had a vested interest in 
championing the liberation of the Edwin captives—emphasizing their continued enslavement 
served as a way to criticize the Madison Administration. 
Not surprisingly, the conflict with Algiers initially had a minimal cultural impact.  
Only a few businesses attempted to profit from it.  In March 1813, an advertisement for a 
bookstore in Greenfield, Massachusetts listed Susanna Rowson’s 1794 play Slaves in Algiers 
for sale.  Evidently the owner hoped that a new conflict with Algiers would revive interest in 
this two-decade old play.966  A new biography of Tripolitan War hero William Eaton 
appeared (it hyped his march through “the Desert of Barca” and his “conque[st of] the City of 
Derne”),967  while a Massachusetts bookstores solicited funds for printing Eaton’s journal.968  
Additionally, a wax museum in New York had a longstanding exhibit that included a statue 
of “Barbarosso (sic), the tyrant of Algiers.”969  Barbarossa (real name Oruç Reis) was a 
prominent late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century pirate and ruler of Algiers.  By 
highlighting this particular wax figure, the museum reminded readers that Barbary piracy had 
existed for centuries.  At this point in the Algerine War, few cultural or commercial 
interpretations existed.  After the war against Britain ended many more would emerge 
(although not to the same extent as during the Tripolitan War). 
                                                          
966 Franklin Herald (Greenfield, MA), March 2, 1813. 
 
967 See, for instance, THOMAS’S Massachusetts Spy, or Worcester Gazette (Worcester, MA), June 23, 1813 and 
The Reporter (Brattleboro, VT), October 9, 1813. 
 
968 Newburyport Herald, and Country Gazette (Newburyport, MA), March 23, 1813. 
 
969 The National Advocate (New York, NY), January 25, 1813; The National Advocate (New York, NY), April 
17, 1813; New-York Evening Post (New York, NY), November 25, 1813; New-York Evening Post (New-York, 
NY), July 2, 1814. 
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After the United States and Britain made peace in December 1814, the U.S. government 
could finally devote its full attention to North Africa.  There was a strong consensus among 
policymakers to send a powerful squadron to exact retribution upon Algiers for capturing the 
Edwin and enslaving the crew.  In February 1815, the House of Representatives requested 
President Madison “to cause such information to be laid before this House, as he shall deem 
necessary” regarding Barbary affairs.970  Secretary of State James Monroe responded by 
issuing a report that castigated the Dey for “violently, and without just cause, oblig[ing] the 
Consul of the U.S. and all American citizens then in Algiers, to leave that place,” for 
capturing the Edwin and holding the crew hostage, and for enslaving an American citizen 
“on board a neutral vessel.”971  Although two Edwin crew members “ha[d] been ransomed,” 
efforts to procure the release of the others had failed.  Monroe suspected that the Dey hoped 
to use to remaining captives as leverage to wrangle “from the United States a degrading 
Treaty.”  A few days later, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Crowninshield issued a report to 
the House Ways and Means Committee that advised dispatching “a strong squadron…as 
soon as practicable” to the Mediterranean.972  He recommended sending “two seventy-fours, 
six frigates, three sloops of war, and six or eight small armed vessels” and described 
Algiers’s naval strength as consisting of “four frigates, four corvetts, four sloops of war, and 
twenty gun boats” along with “powerful batteries, which defend the harbor.” 
                                                          
970 Journal of the House of Representatives, February 15, 1815, 13th Congress, 3rd session, Library of Congress, 
American Memory, https://memory.loc.gov. 
 
971 Monroe to House of Representatives, February 20, 1815, printed in the Daily National Intelligencer 
(Washington D.C.), February 25, 1815.  A few weeks after the Edwin capture, Algiers apprehended James 
Pollard of Norfolk, VA.  He was taken at sea while on a Spanish ship; Leiner, 8. 
 
972 Benjamin Crowninshield to the Ways and Means committee, February 23, 1815, printed in the New-York 
Evening Post (New York, NY), March 13, 1815. 
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Additionally, President Madison urged Congress to pass a resolution that 
acknowledged “the existence of a state of war between the United States and the Dey and 
Regency of Algiers” and that would provide the means of “a vigorous prosecution of it to a 
successful issue.”973  In late February, the House complied and passed “An act for the 
protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine cruizers” with a vote of 
94 to 32.974  A few days later, the Senate passed it nearly unanimously (27 to 2).”975  The 
legislation stressed that Algiers had instigated war upon the United States and authorized 
Madison “to equip, officer, man and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States as 
may be judged requisite.”976  Unlike Jefferson, Madison sought congressional authorization 
to use force against the Barbary pirates before sending ships to the Mediterranean and he 
wanted the conflict to be recognized as an official war.  By requesting these things, the 
president clearly demonstrated to the public his full-fledged commitment to defeating 
Algiers.  
Also unlike Jefferson, Madison opted to unleash a truly formidable force to 
overwhelm the Barbary pirates.  His administration’s official orders to Stephen Decatur (who 
would lead the first squadron to the Mediterranean) authorized him “to subdue, seize and 
make Prize of all Vessels, goods & effects, belonging to the Dey or Subjects of Algiers” and 
                                                          
973 Madison, Special Message to Congress, February 23, 1815, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65978. 
 
974 Journal of the House of Representatives, February 28, 1815, 13th Congress, 3rd session, Library of Congress, 
American Memory, https://memory.loc.gov. 
 
975 Journal of the Senate, March 2, 1815, March 3, 1815, 13th Congress, 3rd session, Library of Congress, 
American Memory, https://memory.loc.gov. 
 
976 “An act for the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine cruisers,” Statutes at 
Large, 13th Congress, 3rd Session, March 3, 1815, 230. 
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to “capture or destroy” Algerine ships.”977  Madison clearly rejected Jefferson’s approach of 
using limited force and he avoided repeating the bizarre situation at the beginning of the 
Tripolitan War in which the U.S. Navy was not supposed to take prisoners.  The president 
wanted to crush Algiers and not have a protracted war in the Mediterranean.  Decatur’s 
squadron of ten ships would sail from New York in May, while William Bainbridge would 
command seventeen ships and leave from Boston in July.978  Monroe was also eager for total 
victory, boasting that “the largest squadron that ever sailed from this Country, is now ordered 
against Algiers, under the command of officers of great experience and talents, from whose 
judgment and gallantry the happiest result is anticipated.”979  The Madison Administration 
felt extremely confident in the U.S. Navy’s ability to overpower their adversary.  Compared 
to Great Britain, fighting Algiers would be a cakewalk.  As Monroe remarked, “the Algerine 
war, in itself, is little more than a mere training exercise for our naval force.”980 
Madison also wanted a new treaty with Algiers that would avoid generating any 
public anger or controversy (as the Tripolitan War treaty had done).  Decatur, Bainbridge, 
and William Shaler (a veteran diplomat) were appointed commissioners and Secretary of 
State Monroe instructed them that “an honorable and lasting peace is the great object of this 
expedition.  An early one would be agreeable, but none must be made, unless it be 
                                                          
977 Crowninshield to Stephen Decatur, April 15, 1815.  This letter is reprinted in Appendix 1 of Leiner, 183-186. 
 
978 For more about Bainbridge’s squadron, see Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars:  American Independence in 
the Atlantic World (New York, 2005), 190; and Robert Allison, Stephen Decatur:  American Naval Hero, 1779-
1820 (Amherst:  University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 172-173. 
 
979 Monroe to Shaler, April 10, 1815, William Shaler Papers #1172, Correspondence 1799-1820, Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
 
980 Monroe to Madison, April 30, 1815, Library of Congress, “Presidential Papers Microfilm, James Madison 
Papers,” text-fiche, Series 2, Reel 26. 
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honorable.”981  He emphasized that “no tribute will be paid, no biennial presents made” and 
forbade the commissioners from paying ransom money for the captives since doing so 
“would countenance the late unwarrantable declaration of war by the Dey, and might invite 
another war with a view to a like claim.  It is the object of the United States to put an end to 
these odious practices.”  However, if the Dey insisted upon some payment for the liberation 
of the hostages, then “after the conclusion of the Treaty, a reasonable sum may be given to 
him gratuitously.” 982  The government was unwilling to make any official payment lest it 
legitimize Barbary piracy, but understood that, as a practical matter, the Dey may need to 
receive some money.  Additionally, Madison sent an irate letter to the Dey that castigated 
him for “having declared war against the United States of America, and made captives of 
some of their citizens, and done them other injuries without cause.”  The president offered 
him the choice of “peace or war” and suspected that, upon seeing the powerful U.S. 
squadron, the Dey would “be disposed to return to those amicable relations which had so 
long subsisted between our two countries.”983  Madison’s letter to the Dey had a much more 
aggressive and angry tone than did Jefferson’s initial letter to the bashaw of Tripoli in May 
1801 (discussed in chapter 3).  Jefferson had hoped to avoid war and had authorized 
Commodore Dale to pay up to $10,000 to conciliate the bashaw.  Madison, however, 
understood that attaining an honorable peace necessitated threatening a mighty retribution. 
                                                          
981 Earlier in Madison’s Administration, Shaler undertook diplomatic missions to Mexico, Cuba, and England.  
See J.C.A. Stagg, “The Political Essays of William Shaler,” William and Mary Quarterly 59, no. 2 (2002); 
available at https://oieahc.wm.edu/wmq/Apr02/stagg.pdf (accessed January 16, 2016). 
 
982 Monroe to Shaler, April 10, 1815, William Shaler Papers #1172, Correspondence 1799-1820, Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
 
983 Madison to Dey of Algiers, April 12, 1815.  The letter is printed in Appendix D of Shaler, 274-275. 
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Many newspaper editors (mostly Democratic-Republican) were also eager for war 
against Algiers and, now that the war against Britain had ended, they devoted much more 
attention to North African affairs.984  Newspapers rejoiced at the prospect of additional naval 
triumphs and hoped that the United States would gain international renown for crushing 
Barbary piracy.  A widely published article declared that “not one moment should be lost in 
equipping our navy to attack the Pirate.  He should give up our captive countrymen, and 
relinquish his annual tribute, or his town should be battered about his ears.—We could not 
wish a finer school for our navy.  The Tripolitan war brought great talents to light.—A war 
with Algiers would be productive of the same benefits.”985  This article viewed the Algerine 
War as analogous to the Tripolitan War—another opportunity to develop naval talent and 
create national heroes.986  One editorial asserted that fighting Algiers “would be agreeable to 
our brave seamen, honorable to the nation, and raise our character in all Christendom.  It is 
fortunate that the Pirates have afforded us a fair opportunity of scourging them for the first 
offences against us.”987  Democratic-Republican and Federalist newspaper editors alike 
                                                          
984 For instance, searching for “Algiers OR Algerine OR Algerines OR Barbary” in Early American 
Newspapers, Series I & II, results in 843 hits for 1812; 1,350 hits for 1813; 440 for 1814; 3,756 for 1815; and 
6,891 for 1816. 
 
985 Five Democratic-Republican newspapers printed it:  The Enquirer (Richmond, VA), February 18, 1815; 
Daily National Intelligencer (Washington D.C.), February 22, 1815; Petersburg Daily Courier (Petersburg, 
VA), February 22, 1815; Eastern Argus (Portland, ME), March 9, 1815; Western American (Williamsburg, 
OH), March 11, 1815.  Two Federalist newspapers ran it:  Federal Republican (Washington D.C.), February 21, 
1815 [see Martin Manning and Clarence Wyatt, eds., Encyclopedia of Media and Propaganda in Wartime 
America, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara:  ABC-CLIO, 2011), 140]; Connecticut Gazette (New London, CT), March 1, 
1815.  It also appeared in the politically neutral The Star (Raleigh, NC), March 3, 1815. 
 
986 Comparisons between the Algerine War and Tripolitan War were infrequent, perhaps because commentators 
recognized that the latter conflict ended disappointingly for the United States. 
 
987 It appeared in two Democratic-Republican newspapers [Daily National Intelligencer (Washington D.C.), 
February 22, 1815; Petersburg Daily Courier (Petersburg, VA), March 2, 1815] and one Federalist newspaper 
[Farmer’s Repository (Charles Town, WV), March 2, 1815]. 
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celebrated war with Algiers as a positive good.  They felt confident in ultimate victory and 
relished the opportunity to enhance their country’s reputation with Europe. 
Many newspapers also ran a highly laudatory, uber-patriotic poem about the naval 
officers and seamen that lionized them as valiant defenders of freedom and commerce.  
Entitled “AN ADDRESS To the Officers and Seamen destined for Algiers,” it contained four 
stanzas and urged the U.S. Navy to liberate the captives and annihilate Algiers’s navy and 
capital city:  
Ye gallant tars—your country’s pride— 
Her sure defence—in combat tried!— 
Heroes of Erie and Champlain— 
Ye who have conquer’d on the Main! 
With brows entwin’d with bays so green— 
Go and chastise the Algerine. 
 
Your captive brethren in Algiers 
To you address their sighs and tears! 
Where, torn from country, friends and wives, 
They pine away their wretched lives. 
Then haste!—with arms both bright and keen 
Deal vengeance on the Algerine. 
 
Go tell the Dey, within his walls, 
You tribute pay in Cannon balls; 
And should the threat not raise his fears, 
Batter his town about his ears!— 
Your prowness being felt and seen 
‘Twell terrify the Algerine. 
 
Blockade his ports—destroy his fleet, 
And make destruction’s work complete; 
By CANNON LAW dictate a peace— 
Our captive countrymen release; 
Return with laurel’s blooming green, 
The conquerors of the Algerine!988 
                                                          
988 Seven Democratic-Republican newspapers printed it:  Essex Register (Salem, MA), April, 12, 1815; 
American Advocate, and Kennebec Advertiser (Hallowell, ME), April 22, 1815; The True American (Bedford, 
PA), May 25, 1815; Baltimore Patriot & Evening Advertiser (Baltimore, MD), May 27, 1815; The Columbian 
(New York, NY), June 22, 1815; New-Jersey Journal (Elizabeth, NJ), July 4, 1815; Otsego Herald 
(Cooperstown, NY), July 7, 1815.  Two Federalist newspapers printed it:  Salem Gazette (Salem, MA), April 
25, 1815; Independent American (Ballston Spa, NY), June 7, 1815.  It also appeared in the politically 
indeterminable Concord Gazette (Concord, NH), June 27, 1815 and in the politically neutral The Ohio Register 
(Clinton, OH), May 30, 1815 [see A. Banning Norton, A History of Knox County, Ohio, from 1779 to 1862 
341 
 
 
Unlike other pro-war newspaper articles, this poem focused solely on national glory and 
retribution for Algiers’s capture of the Edwin—it omitted any grander purpose of impressing 
Europe.  The uniformly positive tone reflected the conviction that Algiers would be easy prey 
for the U.S. Navy, especially after American officers and seamen had distinguished 
themselves against mighty Britain.  In rejecting Jefferson’s view that the navy constituted a 
threat to civil liberties, these newspaper editors extolled naval officers as the finest 
embodiments of American ideals.  However, unlike during the Tripolitan War, Federalist 
publications remained mostly silent.  They evidently preferred to withhold praise from the 
navy lest their political rivals benefit.  In a reversal of roles from the Tripolitan War, 
Federalists (not Democratic-Republicans) put politics before patriotism. 
 Americans throughout the country expressed fervent support for fighting Algiers 
through making toasts that celebrated the conflict as a just war and an opportunity to 
demonstrate the United States’ superiority to Europe.  As during the Tripolitan War, some 
viewed the Algerine War as analogous to the Quasi-War.  A New York celebration of George 
Washington’s birthday included a toast to “Our Navy—may the cannon of 
INDEPENDENCE soon proclaim to the barbarians of Algiers the watch word of our 
Constitution, ‘Millions for defence not a cent for tribute.’”989  Similarly, attendees at a South 
Carolina event commemorating the peace treaty with Britain drank to “the War with 
Algiers—‘Millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute.’”990  Clearly this slogan from the 
                                                          
Inclusive (Columbus:  Richard Nevins, 1862), 244].  The Essex Register attributed the poem to the Gleaner 
(politically indeterminable). 
 
989 New-York Gazette & General Advertiser (New York, NY), February 24, 1815. 
 
990 City Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser (Charleston, SC), April 6, 1815. 
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Quasi-War against France remained popular two decades later, as it succinctly and 
memorably encapsulated one’s commitment to defending national honor against foreign foes.  
Other toasts adamantly rejected paying any money for peace and expressed hope that U.S. 
forces would inflict severe damage upon Algiers.  Revelers at a Connecticut dinner drank to 
“The Dey of Algiers—if we must purchase peace with the barbarian, let the price be a full 
cargo of powder and ball.”991  Attendees at a toast at a Fourth of July celebration in Delaware 
wished success to “the expedition to Algiers—May the feats of Decatur, and the flames of 
the Philadelphia be remembered with terror by all tyrants.”992  A celebration of the War of 
1812’s end in Massachusetts contained a toast that called for “tribute to Algiers in seventy-
fours, powder and balls—may it be satisfactory in quantity and quality,” while attendees at a 
Fourth of July party in New Jersey drank to “the Mediterranean fleet—May they teach the 
pirates of Algiers a lesson long to be remembered, and set at liberty our brethren there 
enslaved.”993  Those who opposed the war even experienced some public backlash—a 
newspaper reported that Federalist congressman Francis White from Virginia lost his 
reelection campaign and “was tauntingly called the ‘Algerine’” on account of “voting against 
the War with the Dey of Algiers.”994  Clearly, the public at large wholeheartedly welcomed a 
second Mediterranean war against the Barbary pirates and, with full confidence in the robust 
U.S. Navy, anticipated a smashing victory over Algiers. 
                                                          
991 Norwich Courier (Norwich, CT), March 1, 1815. 
 
992 American Watchman (Wilmington, DE), July 8, 1815. 
 
993 Baltimore Patriot & Evening Advertiser (Baltimore, MD), April 27, 1815; New-Jersey Journal 
(Elizabethtown, NJ), July 11, 1815. 
 
994 The Alexandria Herald (Alexandria, VA), June 30, 1815. 
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Despite the overwhelming amount of positive press, some Federalist opposition to the 
Madison Administration’s leadership existed, which underscored their desperation to regain a 
national audience following the ill-advised Hartford Convention.  Although no one could 
accuse Madison of repeating Jefferson’s mistake of not sending a sufficient number of ships 
to the Mediterranean, critics expressed concern about the financial and human costs of 
another war.  A Connecticut newspaper contended that Madison’s “bloody-minded Cabinet” 
had become addicted to war:  “our Administration have become such fighters—they have 
grown to be such heroes, that they are about to keep up the game of war as a matter of past 
time....A brilliant war in the Mediterranean may help toward the next election—and that will 
be worth all it may cost, either in lives or money, be it more or less.”995  This article depicted 
the Madison Administration as treating wars like entertainment and accused them of seeking 
an edge in the 1816 elections at the expense of the country’s greater good.  Several 
newspapers published an opinion piece that opposed war with Algiers on the grounds that “it 
will cost at least five millions annually, and the treasury is already bankrupt,”996 while a 
Washington D.C. publication averred that Madison lacked a plan “to reduce the city of 
Algiers….A naval force cannot carry on land operations; and we therefore predict that the 
old system of peace and tribute will be adopted before next Christmas, notwithstanding all 
the vaporing of the democratic papers.”997  In their eagerness to raise apocalyptic fears and 
cast doubt upon Madison’s capabilities as commander-in-chief, these Federalist newspaper 
editors implicitly denigrated the abilities of the naval officers and seamen.  Their articles 
                                                          
995 Connecticut Mirror (Hartford, CT), March 13, 1815. 
 
996 New-York Evening Post (New York, NY), March 13, 1815; New-York Herald (New York, NY), March 15, 
1815; Orange County Patriot; or, the Spirit of ‘Seventy-Six (Goshen, NY), March 21, 1815; from the Federal 
Republican. 
 
997 Federal Republican (Washington, D.C.), March 17, 1815. 
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implied that a war against Algiers could not be won quickly, but would either take years or 
end in failure.  These cynical and blatantly partisan articles lacked any constructive criticism 
of Madison’s actions and, notably, they reversed the predominant Federalist position during 
the Tripolitan War.  Then, many Federalists lambasted Jefferson for not fighting a more 
vigorous war.  Now, these Federalist critics castigated Madison for spending too much 
money on the Algerine War.  Did these newspaper editors really expect to win new adherents 
to their party by doubting America’s ability to defeat Algiers? 
Several newspaper editors gleefully skewered Federalists as either out-of-touch with 
public sentiment or as hypocrites for endorsing war against Algiers while opposing it against 
Britain.  A Vermont newspaper observed that “some of the Federal editors express their 
disapprobation of the late declaration of war against the Algerine Pirates.  For ourselves, we 
believe that honour, policy, and humanity demand it….‘Millions for defence, but not a cent 
for tribute’ is our doctrine.’”998  In utilizing a calm, measured tone, this article coyly 
appropriated the Federalist war cry from the Quasi-War in order to portray Democratic-
Republicans as the party fully committed to national defense.  Other publications criticized 
those Federalist newspaper editors who championed war against Algiers but had adamantly 
opposed it against Britain.  A Maryland newspaper, for instance, wondered why “the 
federalists vote for a war against Algiers, who had only impressed a few of our men, and 
oppose a war with England, who had been impressing our men for more than twenty 
years?—Strange partiality!”999  Similarly, a Vermont newspaper castigated those Federalists 
who supported war against Algiers (which “had captured but two of our vessels, and 
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imprisoned but very few of our citizens”) even though they had tolerated Britain “captur[ing] 
a thousand of our vessels, and enslav[ing] many thousands of our countrymen.”1000  These 
publications emphasized that Federalists adopted logically inconsistent positions regarding 
the wars against Britain and Algiers and accused them of caring more about appeasing 
Britain than protecting American sailors. 
Decatur’s squadron left New York in mid-May with fanfare.  A local newspaper 
reported that residents gave “three hearty cheers as a farewell” and hoped that the navy 
would “effect a liberation of the captive Americans held in slavery by the Dey of Algiers, 
and chastise this savage tyrant for the cruelties he has inflicted upon our countrymen.”1001  
The fleet consisted of three frigates (the Guerrière, Macedonian, and Constellation), a sloop 
of war (the Ontario), four brigs (the Epervier, Fire-Fly, Flambeau, and Spark), and two 
schooners (the Spitfire and Torch).  Shortly after arriving in the Mediterranean in mid-June, 
Decatur encountered one of Algiers’s most powerful ships (a forty-six-gun frigate) and 
inflicted a crushing defeat.  As he recounted in a letter to Secretary of the Navy 
Crowninshield, the enemy yielded after a twenty-five minute battle.  The Algerine admiral 
died in battle and the U.S. Navy took four-hundred-six prisoners, while only four Americans 
were wounded during the fighting (although five died and thirty were wounded when one of 
the “main deck guns burst in the first discharge”).1002  Two days later (on June 19th), 
Decatur’s fleet scored another victory by capturing an Algerine brig of twenty-two guns and 
one-hundred-eighty men.  As he described, “after a chase of three hours” the brig entered 
                                                          
1000 Vermont Republican (Windsor, VT), May 29, 1815. 
 
1001 New-York Courier (New York, NY), May 19, 1815. 
 
1002 Decatur to Crowninshield, June 19, 1815, American State Papers, Class VI, Naval Affairs, vol. 1 
(Washington:  Gales and Seaton, 1834), 396. 
346 
 
“shoal water, where I did not think it advisable to follow with our large ships, but despatched 
the Epervier, Spark, Torch, and Spitfire, to whom she surrendered after a short resistance.  
Twenty-three men were found dead on board” and eighty prisoners were taken.1003  No 
Americans were killed or wounded.  Clearly, the United States and Algiers were not evenly 
matched—the former had superior naval strength and ability.  Public and government 
confidence in the Navy was entirely justified. 
These impressive victories also provided Decatur and Shaler with ample leverage in 
negotiations with the Dey.  Upon arriving in Algiers, they learned that a regime change had 
occurred:  Omar bin Mohammed was now in power.  The Dey who had declared war on the 
United States, Hadji Ali, had been assassinated back in March.1004  Nevertheless, Decatur and 
Shaler stressed (in a letter to Omar) that from henceforth U.S.-Algiers relations must be 
based on “no other principle, than that of perfect equality, and on the terms of the most 
favoured nations.  No stipulation for paying any tribute to Algiers under any form whatever, 
will be agreed to.”1005  Upon learning about Decatur’s recent victories over the Algerine 
Navy, the Dey yielded to U.S. demands by agreeing to a new treaty within twenty-four hours.  
In letters to the Secretary of the Navy, Decatur vaunted that the treaty “has been dictated at 
the mouths of our cannon” and “places the United States on higher ground than any other 
nation.”1006  Indeed, its second article stipulated “that no tribute either as biennial presents, or 
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under any other form or name whatever, shall ever be required.”1007  The commissioners 
made one concession, however.  At the Dey’s request, they returned the captured frigate and 
brig as a personal favor (technically it was not an official part of the treaty).  Restoring the 
ships constituted no real loss to the United States since, as Decatur discussed, “it will take a 
considerable time to repair them, and a considerable sum of money to make them sea 
worthy.”1008  Decatur and Shaler had achieved an honorable peace by utilizing overwhelming 
naval force.  
After concluding negotiations in Algiers, the commissioners went to Tunis and 
Tripoli and forced the rulers of those countries to pay compensation for violating their 
treaties with the United States.  The rulers of Tunis and Tripoli had recently allowed British 
vessels to take prize ships belonging to the United States out of their country’s harbor.  As 
U.S. consul to Tunis Mordecai Noah informed Decatur, in February 1815 the British brig 
Lyra “forcibly seized” two American prize ships from Tunis’s harbor.  Noah complained to 
the Bey who, “though sensible of the violation of the neutrality of his port” refused to pay a 
“settlement of this claim.”1009  The Bey’s behavior enraged Decatur, who threatened 
retribution unless he received the “immediate restitution of the property or of its value.”1010  
The Bey settled by paying 46,000 Spanish dollars as compensation.1011  Next, Decatur 
confronted the bashaw of Tripoli (still Yusuf Karamanli) for permitting the British brig 
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Paulina to take two American prize ships from Tripoli’s harbor and for declining aid to an 
American cruiser in need.1012  Decatur demanded “immediate restitution” and “compensation 
for the loss sustained by the detention of the American cruiser, in violation of the treaty.”1013  
He initially sought $30,000, but Yusuf negotiated the sum down to $25,000 by offering the 
freedom of several European captives.1014  According to a U.S. naval officer, one of them had 
been enslaved for fifteen years (and had been “very friendly and attentive” to the 
Philadelphia captives during the Tripolitan War).1015  This officer also reported that debris 
from the Philadelphia remained visible “at the entrance of the bay; its stern-post and some of 
its ribs are discovered at low water, but are somewhat dangerous when hidden, which is the 
case at high tide…..The Bashaw has a sort of box built out of the upper story of his palace, to 
represent the stern of the Philadelphia, in which we saw him repeatedly surrounded by his 
wives.”  The officer proudly noted that “the American character is highly respected here.”  
Decatur’s gunboat diplomacy succeeded fantastically—he had clearly established American 
dominance and, in a reversal of previous dealings with Tripoli and Tunis, those countries 
now paid the United States to keep the peace. 
Decatur and his squadron succeeded so well that Bainbridge and his fleet had nothing 
to do once they arrived in the Mediterranean.  His September 6th letter to Crowninshield 
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reported that, since relations with North Africa were peaceful, he would return to the United 
States.  Bainbridge, however, left three ships behind in the Mediterranean as a safeguard, lest 
one or more of the Barbary States renew hostilities.1016  Despite America’s overall triumph 
over the Barbary pirates, one tragedy did occur:  several naval personnel and the Edwin 
captives died in a shipwreck.  Decatur had sent them back to the United States along with 
documents (including the Algiers treaty) in the Epervier, but the ship was lost at sea—
presumably sunk by intense summer gales.1017  Newspaper obituaries recorded the names of 
the officers who perished, but notably omitted the names of the Edwin captives.1018  A 
lengthy poem entitled “L’EPERVIER” (published in a Massachusetts newspaper) did the 
same.1019  Clearly, newspaper editors valued the lives of the naval officers more than those 
who worked in the merchant fleet.  Moreover, Congress likewise favored the relatives of the 
naval personnel over those of the civilians (e.g. the Edwin crew members).  In March 1817, 
Congress passed legislation that granted widows or other family members “of the officers, 
seamen, and marines” lost in the Epervier “a sum equal to six months’ pay” of the deceased’s 
salary “in addition to the pay due to the said deceased” as of July 14, 1815.1020  The public 
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had expressed great concern over the Philadelphia captives during the Tripolitan War, but 
those men were members of the U.S. Navy.  Tripoli’s capture of them greatly embarrassed 
the United States and hindered its ability to attack Tripoli.  By contrast, the Edwin captives 
lacked the same military importance and their capture by Algiers did not embarrass the 
United States to the same degree. 
 
News of the U.S. Navy’s victories over Algiers arrived in mid-August and generated a 
wellspring of patriotic sentiment.  Many newspapers depicted the naval officers and seamen 
as chivalrous heroes reminiscent of medieval times.  One article, entitled “Genuine 
knighthood,” declared that “our brave tars unquestionably are true and valiant knights.  What 
many have planned, what a few have attempted, but in vain, their prowess is now 
effecting.—This is precisely the kind of tribute which ought to be paid to Algiers.”1021  A 
widely published laudatory article about Decatur declared that “the Algerines, Tunisians and 
Tripolitans have been reduced to humiliating terms by this chivalric commander.  He has 
given them such an electric shock as was never before, discharged from a christian battery.  
DECATUR may well be termed the ‘Champion of Christendom.’”1022  Similarly, another 
congratulatory article (published in two states) proclaimed that Decatur’s “deeds and his 
communications conspire to make him a finished model of chivalry.  His valour has so much 
point and decision, negotiations are so prompt, so just and so complete….Lustre awaits all 
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his movements, and he exalts his won fame in every act.”1023  Such rhetoric implied that the 
naval officers and seamen had accomplished deeds worthy of legendary eras and invited 
readers to draw upon their knowledge (or perceptions) of medieval knighthood in 
comprehending the U.S. Navy’s conquests.  This language also stressed the exotica of the 
Mediterranean region, implying that it was a fantastical, dangerous realm that only brave 
warriors could traverse safely.  To some extent, though, this rhetoric was out-of-place 
because medieval knights fought land battles, whereas the United States bested Algiers in 
naval warfare.  Nevertheless, since very few Americans had been to the Barbary States or the 
Mediterranean, newspaper editors considered the diction and imagery of knighthood as 
useful tools for readers to appreciate the significance of the Algerine War. 
Other articles vaunted that the defeat of Algiers proved America’s exceptionalism 
because the U.S. Navy crushed a foe that had long thwarted Europe.  As a Virginia 
newspaper declared regarding Decatur, “you have vanquished the Algerine pirate at 
sea….You have revived the terror of the American Nation among these piratical states, and 
compelled them once more to pay respect to our flag.  While Europe has been purchasing 
their forbearance, you have extorted it.”1024  Similarly, a New York newspaper vaunted that 
“the last news from the Mediterranean is truly exhilarating….Already has our navy canceled 
forever the tribute to Algiers; opened the dungeons of Barbary and liberated every American 
captive, and enabled the gallant Decatur, in the field of his early glory, to dictate terms of 
peace to a piratical nation which all the powers of Europe never so completely humbled.  
This contest has been short, but it has shed new lustre on the naval character of 
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Columbia.”1025  Another article boasted that “in the course of a few months [Decatur] has 
obtained for his country, from three of the Barbary Powers, more advantageous and 
honorable terms, than were ever before obtained by any christian nation on the globe.”1026  
Clearly, some commentators believed that Decatur’s victories constituted not only a national 
triumph, but irrefutable proof that the United States belonged among the highest echelon of 
world powers.  Although a young country, it had set an example for older European nations 
to emulate. 
As further evidence of America’s exceptionalism, several newspapers gleefully 
observed that, even after Decatur’s triumphs, the Netherlands and Britain paid Algiers for 
ransom and/or peace.  One widely reprinted article (entitled “Dutch Degeneracy”) discussed 
how the Dutch Admiral recently paid $400,000 for a treaty that required tribute.  Editorial 
commentary stressed a valuable lesson in the Dutch Admiral’s behavior, contending that it 
“teaches us how a people lose energy and honor, and courage, by losing liberty….Compare 
this treaty with that negotiated by DECATUR....America,—free America!  you are the sole 
hope of a degraded and benighted world—May your stars shine through all futurity,—and 
your example yet give freedom to mankind.”1027  Similarly, the decision by the British 
Admiral Lord Exmouth to pay $500 to $1,000 each for captives (on behalf of the King of 
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Sardinia and the King of Naples, respectively) appalled American commentators.1028  One 
naval officer boasted that “with half [Exmouth’s] force, Decatur would emancipate every 
Christian in Barbary,” while another deemed Exmouth’s dealings “a pitiful arrangement.”1029  
In like manner, a Vermont newspaper observed that “with pride and exultation the American 
may rejoice, that, while the nations of Europe are ransoming their prisoners in Algiers at 
enormous prices, and virtually paying homage to the bloody despot, this country is 
commanding justice at the cannon’s mouth.”1030  Another article (published in two states) 
suggested that Britain’s behavior would only promote further Barbary piracy—it will “have a 
tendency to encourage, rather than prevent the practice of enslaving Christian prisoners.”1031  
A public dinner in Boston even included a toast that mocked Britain:  “The Christian 
Captives in Algiers—While England pays the ransom of those captives in gold, and receives 
a stipend for the service, America pays her ransom in powder and balls: her reward is the 
glory of the action.”1032  With justification, Americans gloated over their country’s victory 
and mocked European powers for continuing to pay ransom or tribute.  What further proof 
did Americans need of their country’s exceptionalism? 
Although Democratic-Republicans and Federalists alike heaped praise upon the naval 
officers and seamen, partisan bickering ensued over which party deserved credit for the 
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Mediterranean triumphs.  Both parties vied for the public’s respect and gratitude.  Several 
pro-Democratic-Republican newspapers welcomed a comparison of their party’s Barbary 
policies to their rivals’ and castigated Federalist presidents for paying tribute instead of 
waging war.  For instance, an article printed in seven states featured two columns that listed 
various actions of Federalist and Democratic-Republican presidential administrations.  
Regarding Barbary policy, it noted that Federalists paid Algiers $1 million and gave it a 
frigate, whereas Democratic-Republicans captured Algerine ships and forced the Dey “to 
renounce forever his pretentions to a tribute from the U.S.”1033  Similarly, an article in a New 
York newspaper praised the Madison Administration for “hav[ing] conquered a peace from 
Algiers…and wiped away the disgrace of a shameful tribute, which was paid during the 
whole time the federalists were in power, without any attempt on their part to relieve the 
country of a burthen so humiliating to the pride of freemen.”1034  Another anti-Federalist 
article distorted Jefferson’s record in its eagerness to lionize Democratic-Republican 
leadership.  It vaunted that “during the reign of Mr. Jefferson, we twice humbled the Barbary 
powers and brought them to a sense of their duty....The auspicious termination of the war 
against them confers the highest lustre upon the American character and redounds much to 
the honor of our Republican rulers….republicans have taught them to respect our rights.”1035  
During Jefferson’s presidency the United States hardly “humbled” Tripoli and, as earlier 
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chapters have argued, his policies mostly failed.1036  With justification these articles praised 
Madison’s resolute leadership in the Algerine War, although they notably omitted his and 
other Democratic-Republicans’ opposition to creating a navy in the 1790s.  Instead, 
Democratic-Republican newspaper editors associated their party with naval glory and 
extolled the armed forces as a positive good to an extent that likely would have appalled 
Jefferson. 
Federalist newspapers rejected this Democratic-Republican triumphalist narrative and 
instead tried to turn the Algerine War to their party’s advantage.  Several publications 
reminded readers about Democratic-Republicans’ earlier opposition to a navy and argued 
that the recent triumphs over the Barbary pirates occurred because of astute Federalist 
policies.  An article in a Massachusetts newspaper vaunted that “so short, so profitable and so 
honourable is this war; which was waged in a just cause….the Federalists are fairly entitled 
to the glory which this enterprise may shed on our country’s fame; since it was achieved by 
their ships, under the direction of their commanders.”1037  A New York newspaper heralded 
Decatur’s triumphs over North Africa as “another proof of the wisdom of federal policy.  
Federalists have ever been the advocates of a Navy” and Democratic-Republicans “have been 
compelled to acknowledge the wisdom and necessity of that policy which federalists 
adopted.”1038  An article published in four states reminded readers of Democratic-
Republicans’ prior resistance towards creating a navy and instead credited the Federalist 
Party for America’s naval victories:  “What triumphed over the British on Lake-Erie?  
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Federal policy.  What on Lake-Champlain?  Federal policy.—What on the ocean?  Federal 
policy.  What over the Tripolitans?  Federal policy.  What over the Algerines?  Federal 
policy….What now enables a man, in any part of the world to hold up his head and say—I 
am an American?  Federal policy.  Among the most important victories of the navy, is that 
over the democrats.  They once tried hard to prevent a permanent naval establishment.  But 
let them be forgiven, as they have repented and acknowledged their errors.”1039  Another 
publication was less charitable, urging President Madison to remind Americans “of his 
famous arguments against the original formation of the Navy in 1794.”1040  Federalist 
newspaper editors attempted to use the Algerine War as an opportunity to win back public 
support. They made some legitimate points about how their naval policies enabled the United 
States to defeat foreign foes, yet was it fair for them to take credit for naval victories against 
Britain even though they adamantly opposed the War of 1812?  Regardless, any hopes that 
the Algerine War would generate a resurgence of Federalist popularity never materialized—
the party had been on a steady decline following Thomas Jefferson’s defeat of John Adams 
in 1800 and the recent Hartford Convention crippled efforts to regain national prominence. 
While newspaper editors jostled for partisan points, European observers unanimously 
acclaimed the U.S. Navy’s accomplishments.  American newspapers printed European 
tributes, thereby bolstering American nationalism and pride in the navy as an institution.  For 
instance, several publications reprinted a July 15, 1815 article in William Cobbett’s Political 
Register that castigated European countries for allowing Barbary piracy to exist:  “while all 
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the regular governments of Europe were acknowledging their inferiority, by sending annual 
presents to the Dey of Algiers, the Americans fitted out a squadron to annihilate this Royal 
pirate….the extirpation of the royal nest of African pirates, is an act which will be recorded 
in the page of history to the eternal honor of the American people, while the long endurance 
of this haughty and barbarous race will for ever reflect disgrace on the nations of Europe.”1041  
Similarly, a letter from a Scottish man to his American brother appeared in several 
newspapers and praised “the peppering which the American navy has given the Algerines.”  
It also lamented that Great Britain had not earlier subdued them, observing that the U.S. 
Navy’s triumph “is a kind of reflection to our nation for paying tribute to so detestable a nest 
of pirates, when it has long been in our power to crush them—but, our government have 
political motives for their forbearance.”1042 Additionally, newspapers in nine states printed an 
article from an Italian newspaper (the Gazetta di Messina) that praised Decatur for making 
“the most honorable peace for the GREAT NATION which he represents, and very much to 
the advantage of the commerce of his Country.”1043  Such laudatory words resembled earlier 
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tributes from Pope Pius VII and Lord Nelson during the Tripolitan War.  This time, however, 
such praise was not premature:  the United States had dealt a permanent blow to Barbary 
piracy.  Also, by printing these foreign tributes, newspapers encouraged readers to view the 
Algerine War as an important event in their country’s history. 
Like European commentators and the American public, key American policymakers 
expressed complete satisfaction with the U.S. Navy’s performance and hoped it would 
enhance the United States’ international reputation.  Secretary of State Monroe exulted that 
“Decatur has dictated a peace to Algiers.  This event will raise the reputation of the U States, 
at home & abroad. The European powers will feel themselves dishonor’d by it, in a 
retrospect of their past conduct towards that nest of pirates.”1044  Diplomat John Quincy 
Adams, writing from England, declared that “our Naval campaign in the Mediterranean has 
been perhaps as splendid as anything that has occurred in our annals since our existence as a 
nation.”1045  He also thought that Decatur’s triumphs would “sink deep enough into the 
memory” of European policymakers.  Clearly, Monroe and Adams deemed the Algerine War 
important because its significance extended beyond subduing North Africa.  The United 
States took initiative in resolving a centuries-old problem and repudiated European 
acceptance of Barbary piracy.  
                                                          
York Spectator (New York, NY), November 25, 1815; The Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), November 28, 
1815; THOMAS’S Massachusetts Spy, or Worcester Gazette (Worcester, MA), November 28, 1815; Weekly 
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1044 Monroe to Madison, September 11, 1815, James Madison Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mjm.26_1271_1274/?st=gallery.  
 
1045 John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, November 27, 1815, Worthington Ford, ed., Writings of John 
Quincy Adams, vol. V (New York:  Macmillan, 1915), 453-454. 
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President Madison likewise took immense pride in the Navy’s triumphs over North 
Africa.  His Annual Message of December 5th began with an announcement of “the 
successful termination” of the Algerine War and he praised Decatur for defeating two enemy 
vessels, including “the principal ship, commanded by the Algerine admiral.  The high 
character of the American commander was brilliantly sustained on the occasion which 
brought his own ship into close action with that of his adversary, as was the accustomed 
gallantry of all the officers and men actually engaged.”1046  The president also emphasized 
that the new U.S.-Algiers treaty did not require tribute and he expressed his conviction that 
the Navy had attained “a reasonable prospect of future security for the valuable portion of 
our commerce which passes within reach of the Barbary cruisers.”  Although Madison’s 
message clearly prioritized Barbary affairs by discussing them first, some Federalists 
complained that he did not praise Decatur to a larger extent.  An article published in several 
states criticized the president for not using “still stronger terms of approbation and applause” 
and accused him of not sufficiently appreciating that “Decatur has accomplished in three 
weeks what all the powers of Europe have not been able to atchieve in a century.”1047  
Federalists desired more hero worship since they sought both to take credit for the navy and 
to deflect praise from the (Democratic-Republican) Madison Administration. 
The treaty itself received an overwhelmingly positive reception.  Madison sent it to 
the Senate the day after his Annual Message and it was ratified fifteen days later with nearly 
                                                          
1046 Madison, Seventh Annual Message, December 5, 1815, The American Presidency Project, 
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1047 New York Evening Post (New York, NY), December 8, 1815; Salem Gazette (Salem, MA), December 15, 
1815; Burlington Gazette (Burlington, VT), December 22, 1815; The Western Monitor (Lexington, KY), 
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unanimous support (25 to 1).1048  Newspaper editors waxed enthusiastic about the new treaty 
with Algiers.  An article published by Democratic-Republican newspapers in three states 
declared that “this noble document consummates the brightest event in the history of our 
country.  Search the archives of the Courts of Europe; trace the treaties which have been 
made with Barbary; and where is the compact which can parallel the present for the benefits 
it secures, or the lustre it reflects?”1049  Other newspaper editors felt somewhat embarrassed 
at the advantageous terms, deeming the treaty “humiliating in the extreme to the Algerines” 
and remarking that if they were “civilized men, we should feel some regret that they had 
been so humbled and degraded.”1050  Also, in a rare invocation of religious rhetoric, a 
Philadelphia newspaper vaunted that “never since the days of the Crusades, has the Crescent 
been so humbled by the Cross.—History will record the glorious achievement, as an 
imperishable monument of her glory, that America in her infancy, furnished a bright example 
for the old nations of the Christian World.”1051  Clearly, many newspaper editors deemed the 
treaty concrete proof of their country’s exceptionalism and moral superiority to Europe.  It 
did not matter that Algiers was a relatively weak opponent—what mattered is that the United 
States subdued it before Europe did.  John Hay’s famous designation of the Spanish-
American War as a “splendid little war” is actually more applicable to the Algerine War.  
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The fighting ended much more quickly, it had far fewer casualties, and it featured virtually 
unanimous popular support.1052 
Despite the overwhelmingly positive public response to the end of the Algerine War, 
Decatur’s decision to return the captured frigate and brig to the Dey generated some 
criticism.  A Boston publication considered the commodore’s actions counter-intuitive (why 
allow Algiers to potentially resume its attacks upon commerce?) “and contrary to the dictates 
of that prudence, foresight and valor, which…would have enabled him to secure, not only 
the personal safety of the prisoners, but put an end, completely, to the further depredations of 
a piratical nation, with whom no laws are sacred.”1053  Additionally, a few newspaper editors 
argued that returning the ships stained national honor and hurt the financial prospects of the 
seamen who captured them (since they were unable to sell the ships for prize money).  An 
article that appeared in three states asserted that the ships “were not [Decatur’s] to give away 
as a Commander; one half of them belong to himself, and the squadron; and their consent 
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men on board at the time of surrender [see John Brannan, ed., Lewis Warrington to William Jones, April 29, 
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1053 Boston Gazette (Boston, MA), September 14, 1815. 
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would be necessary to any renunciation of their claims.”1054  Similarly, several newspapers 
asked readers, “if the captured vessels are restored, where are our brave seamen to look for 
their prize money?  Will Congress have to pay them?”1055  What did the government think 
about Decatur’s decision?  President Madison was not upset, observing that “the captured 
vessels were…of little value, and anxiously requested by [the Dey], as necessary to conciliate 
his own people.”1056  He had granted the commissioners flexibility in dealing with the Dey, 
even authorizing them to pay a sum for ransom as long as it was done informally (that is, 
omitted from the official treaty).  Nevertheless, Congress sympathized with the crew 
members who were denied the opportunity to sell the Algerine ships.  In April 1816, it 
authorized $100,000 “to be distributed, among the captors of the Algerine vessels” that had 
been “restored to the dey of Algiers.”1057  Beyond this concern, no opposition to the treaty 
existed.  In sharp contrast to the controversy generated by the Tripolitan War treaty, the 
public overwhelmingly deemed the Algerine War treaty a magnificent accomplishment 
worthy of the highest encomiums. 
The public-at-large showered the end of the Algerine War with praise, viewing it as a 
thrilling coda to the larger war against Britain.  Fourth of July gatherings featured toasts that 
celebrated the naval triumphs of both wars.  A Pennsylvania group, for instance, drank to 
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“Commodore Shaw and the American squadron in the bay of Algiers.  The valor which dared 
to seize the Bull by the horns, could never fear to handle the Tail of a Bashaw.”1058  In 
Vermont, celebrants toasted the “American Navy—It has clipped John Bull of many sprigs of 
laurel, and has paid a thundering tribute to Algiers.”1059  People at a Trenton, New Jersey 
gathering drank to “Tribute—That which our navy carried to Britain and the Barbary 
powers—the only kind Americans will ever consent to pay,” while a New York group 
praised “our land and naval heroes—Humiliation to British arrogance; and terror to the states 
of Barbary.”1060  Clearly, Americans considered the wars against Britain and Algiers as 
intertwined and took special pride in the navy’s performance in both conflicts.  It did not 
matter to them that Algiers was a much weaker enemy than Britain—the public eagerly 
celebrated all victories. 
The public also echoed newspaper editors in viewing the Algerine War as evidence of 
America’s exceptional world leadership.  A New York group drank to “the Sons of 
Columbia” who “first taught the Barbary Powers to respect their flag and release their 
prisoners without tribute.”1061  Another group toasted “‘The Barbary Powers’—They have for 
ages past held the iron rod of despotism over the heads of combined monarchs, with their 
thousand ships—now they haul down their bloody flags to a few for-battle frigates.”1062  
Similarly, attendees at a public dinner attended by Decatur drank to “his deeds of valor at 
Tripoli, and negotiations at Algiers, while they do honor to himself and the country, are a 
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1061 Rutland Vermont Herald (Rutland, VT), July 17, 1816. 
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living monument to all Europe.”1063  Although everyone knew that the Algerine War was a 
much smaller conflict than the recent war against Britain, newspaper editors and the public at 
large celebrated it for transforming America’s relationship to the Barbary pirates. 
Additional Algerine War-themed cultural events emerged in the conflict’s aftermath, 
although not to the same degree as during the Tripolitan War.  Theater groups in New York 
and Boston performed Susanna Rowson’s 1794 play Slaves in Algiers (discussed in chapter 
2),1064 while residents of Washington D.C. could attend a performance of Barbarossa, Tyrant 
of Algiers.1065  Shows that used spectacular technology had been popular during the 
Tripolitan War, but few such shows commemorated the Algerine War.  In August 1815, 
Bostonians could attend the “Grand Gala,” a concert that featured fireworks and myriad 
visual images, including a depiction of “a partial Sea Engagement with Decatur’s command, 
and that of the Algerine frigate, which terminates with the latter becoming prize to our 
gallant squadron.”1066  Despite widespread public enthusiasm for the Algerine War, it did not 
captivate artists’ imagination to the same extent as the Tripolitan War.  Perhaps the ease of 
victory made the Algerine War seem less interesting or less nuanced than the Tripolitan War. 
Bookstores, though, saw some potential for profitability in the Algerine War.  One 
text, entitled the Naval Monument, discussed the naval battles against Britain and Algiers, 
although its twenty-five engravings included just one about the Algerine War:  the “United 
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States squadron returning from the Mediterranean, after concluding peace with Algiers.”1067  
Similarly, another book (entitled The Naval Temple) described naval heroics and included an 
engraving of the “Triumphant return of the American Squadron under Com. Bainbridge from 
the Mediterranean 1815.1068  Oddly, the pictures of the Algerine War in both books 
associated Bainbridge with the conflict even though he lacked the opportunity to accomplish 
anything.  Perhaps these authors sympathized with his bad luck since Decatur had 
overshadowed him in both the Tripolitan War and Algerine War.  A Washington D.C. 
newspaper tried to revive public interest in William Eaton by printing advertisements for The 
Life of the late Gen. William Eaton and reminding readers that the Derne victory “led to the 
treaty of peace between the United States and the regency of Tripoli.”1069   
Some consumer goods associated with the Algerine War were offered for sale as well.  
A New York bookstore advertised “A CHART OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, on a 
small scale, with a plan of the Harbour of ALGIERS.”1070  Surely this map would have 
appealed to navy enthusiasts as well as family and friends of the officers and seamen.  
Owners could display it in their homes and invite viewers to imagine the Mediterranean 
squadron triumphing over the Algerine fleet.  This map implied that the Algerine War was an 
important event worthy of remembrance and conversation.  A very unusual type of item was 
offered for sale in the Washington D.C. area:  a box of 500 smoking pipes that Decatur had 
seized.  The advertisement surmised that “they were intended by the [Algerines] to treat our 
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jolly tars with a whif after capture.”1071  The pipes had to be purchased as a lot (not 
individually) and were offered at an (unspecified) “very cheap” price.  Apparently they sold 
in January 1816, judging by the date of the final advertisement.  Who bought them and what 
he or she do with them?  Were they distributed as gifts to family and friends?  Given to 
museums?  Did people use them and, while smoking, gloat that the pipes now symbolized 
America’s victory over the Barbary pirates?  Or were they treated as collectables and not 
used?  The pipes were supposed to symbolize Algiers’s success in capturing American 
vessels, but Decatur and the U.S. squadron created the opposite scenario. 
 
From the United States’ standpoint the Algerine War had ended (although three ships 
remained in the Mediterranean).  The Dey, however, came to regret offering such liberal 
terms and tried to revoke the treaty.  In summer 1815, he became upset when Spain captured 
the two Algerine ships that the U.S. navy had defeated (and Decatur had returned).  Spain 
restored the frigate in July, but kept the brig until March 1816.1072  For his part, Decatur 
thought that Spain and Algiers needed to resolve this issue on their own.  He insisted to 
Shaler that the United States had “complied fully with our engagement with the Dey— & can 
in no wise be responsible for the Spanish aggressions on the Regency of Algiers.”1073  
Madison concurred, arguing that because “the vessel has been actually received by the Dey, 
no further demand can be made by him….Algiers had lost the right by the capture 
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[which]…was lawful.”1074  Nevertheless, as one naval officer reported, even after the Dey 
reacquired the brig he still insisted that the United States owed him “a vessel or money 
equivalent” to the brig’s value.  Why?  Because the United States had nothing to do with 
Spain restoring it.1075  Moreover, in a letter to Madison, the Dey tried to pressure him to 
abrogate the new Algiers-U.S. treaty and to renew the older one (which had required the 
United States to pay tribute).1076  The Dey apparently feared that his subjects would 
overthrow him on account of the unusually generous terms in the new treaty.  As one naval 
officer discussed, the Dey believed that the Algerine “people were not altogether satisfied” 
with the new treaty.  As “he was but young upon the throne,” he felt that “the restoration of 
the two prizes was absolutely necessary to his popularity.”1077  Madison, however, firmly 
rebuffed the Dey’s requests.  In his reply, the president stressed that Algiers had “made war 
without cause on the United States” and castigated the Dey for “magnifying an incident so 
little important as it affects the interests of Algiers, and so blameless on the part of the United 
States.”1078  The president adamantly refused to pay any money:  the United States “will buy 
peace with none.  It is a principle incorporated into the settled policy of America, that as 
peace is better than war, war is better than tribute.” 
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Meanwhile, Algiers courted the wrath of the British Navy when, in May 1816, 
Algerian forces at the city of Bona massacred two hundred fisherman who were under the 
protection of the British Empire.  In response, Lord Exmouth returned to Algiers in August 
and, together with the Dutch Navy, bombarded Algiers’s capital city and fleet for nine hours.  
As part of Algiers’s surrender terms, the Dey had to release all of his European slaves 
(1,642), pay about $350,000 (the amount that Exmouth, on behalf of the kings of Naples and 
Sardinia, had paid for ransom a few months earlier), and promise to cease enslaving 
Christians.1079  In December, the Dey dropped his grievances against the United States and 
officially reaffirmed his support for the new peace treaty.1080 
In retrospect, Madison’s decision to use overwhelming force against Algiers in 1815 
constituted the initial blow that would permanently end Barbary piracy.1081  Madison fulfilled 
the grand hopes expressed in the futuristic newspaper article from 1788 (discussed in chapter 
2), which was written at a time when Algiers had enslaved several Americans and the United 
States lacked a navy to defend itself.  The article envisioned a future in which, if news 
arrived that Algiers had captured Americans, the president would demand that the Dey free 
them “instantly” or else the U.S. Navy would “lay the town of Algiers in ashes.”1082  It was 
entitled “Anticipation:  1858, Sept. 13th,” yet Madison and Lord Exmouth fulfilled this 
imaginary scenario forty-two years ahead of time. 
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Madison was also a much more effective commander-in-chief during the Algerine 
War than Jefferson had been throughout the Tripolitan War.  Madison made Congress a 
partner from the beginning by requesting (and receiving) a declaration of war.  Also, whereas 
Jefferson dilly-dallied in the Tripolitan War until the Philadelphia loss, Madison pursued 
complete victory against Algiers from the start.  Moreover, Jefferson’s resistance to sending 
more ships to the Mediterranean permitted Federalists to marshal a viable opposition 
movement, but Madison’s resolute leadership drove the final nail into the Federalists’ coffin.  
Altogether, Jefferson was out-of-touch regarding public opinion about the Barbary pirates 
and the navy—Americans wanted to crush them with superior force and loved celebrating the 
heroism of naval officers and seamen.  Jefferson’s deep distrust of the navy as an institution 
was atypical—Americans overwhelmingly deemed it a positive good.  The United States 
triumphed over Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis in 1815 because the Madison Administration and 
the public rejected Jefferson’s feeble North African policies. 
Beyond domestic ramifications, ultimately we should rethink our periodization of the 
War of 1812 by recognizing that it extended beyond the Treaty of Ghent and the Battle of 
New Orleans.  We should end it with Decatur’s June 1815 triumphs in the Mediterranean 
because Americans at the time deemed the Algerine War intertwined with the larger conflict 
against Britain and its Native American allies.  The War of 1812 had a global dimension that, 
unlike the war on the U.S. mainland, ended in an unqualified triumph for the United States. 
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Chapter 8:  The Historical Memory of the Barbary Conflicts 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, American authors contested the importance and 
legacy of the Barbary conflicts in a variety of sources intended for public consumption, such 
as general histories of the United States, naval histories, and schoolbooks.  Authors 
considered them vital to the national narrative, although the quality of accounts greatly 
varies.  Many contain factual errors, while others are simply triumphalist propaganda that 
extol naval victories and ignore the political controversies generated by the Tripolitan War 
and Sidi Soliman Mellimelli’s visit.  Generally, nineteenth-century accounts of the Tripolitan 
War sought to bolster American nationalism and encourage readers to take pride in naval 
victories.  This patriotic purpose accelerated after the Civil War, as authors increasingly 
omitted William Eaton’s role and recast the Tripolitan War as an unambiguous triumph for 
the United States.  General and naval histories sometimes mentioned the Mellimelli mission, 
but they reframed it as a victory for this United States.  They praised Jefferson for refusing to 
pay tribute and argued that the impressiveness of the U.S. navy frightened the Bey of Tunis 
into withdrawing his demands.  Some works discussed the 1815 conflicts, with authors 
uniformly agreeing that they constituted a complete triumph for the United States.  
Altogether, nineteenth-century accounts of the Barbary conflicts contained many dubious or 
outright inaccurate interpretations and sought to produce patriots instead of encouraging 
readers to critically evaluate the past. 
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The Tripolitan War in Naval Histories and General Histories of America 
 
Interpretations of the Tripolitan War varied widely prior to the Civil War.  Authors 
generally agreed that it provided important training for naval officers and featured some 
impressive naval victories.  However, they strongly disagreed about the potential of the coup 
attempt led by William Eaton and Hamet Karamanli and the nature of the peace treaty that 
ended the conflict.  Some deemed the treaty an embarrassment since it required the United 
States to pay ransom money and marked the end of a promising coup attempt.  Other 
commentators held a more positive view, celebrating the treaty as an honorable resolution.  
Such authors contended that the coup attempt never would have succeeded and claimed that 
the United States brokered a better deal than any European country ever had.  At stake was 
whether the Tripolitan War should be heralded as a triumph of gunboat diplomacy or 
lamented as a lost opportunity for national greatness.  
A big shift in the historical memory of the Tripolitan War occurred after the Civil 
War, as accounts became much more positive.  Compared to antebellum authors, post-Civil 
War ones stressed the naval battles to a larger extent and downplayed (or entirely ignored) 
Eaton’s role in the coup attempt.  Why would these authors do so?  By omitting Eaton and 
portraying the expedition as an indigenous uprising, authors could downplay the political 
controversy surrounding the treaty and recast the Tripolitan War as an event that featured 
national unity.  Given the desire to promote reconciliation between white northerners and 
white southerners after the Civil War, it is not surprising that authors reshaped the Tripolitan 
War in order to serve the needs of the present day.1083 
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An early history of the Tripolitan War, published in 1806 by the Federalist newspaper 
the Salem Gazette, was surprisingly dispassionate.  It listed many details about naval events 
and the coup attempt, but offered scant praise or criticism.  The book commended the 
burning of the Philadelphia (“the importance of this bold enterprise to the reputation of 
America must be great”) and proclaimed the coup attempt “a brilliant stroke of policy.”  It 
tacitly sympathized with Eaton since the appendix featured his August 9, 1806 letter to the 
Secretary of the Navy in which he railed against the expedition’s abandonment.  Also 
unusually, the book expressed some goodwill towards the Tripolitans by wishing for “a more 
frequent and general intercourse between the citizens of the United States and the people of 
Barbary.” 1084  Given the heavily politicized character of newspapers at this time and the 
Salem Gazette’s prior criticism of Jefferson’s conduct of the Tripolitan War, the book’s 
objective tone is very unexpected.1085 
In the 1810s, authors of Tripolitan War accounts depicted it in a mostly positive light.  
They stressed American heroism and regretted the abandonment of Eaton’s coup attempt.  
Charles Prentiss wrote a highly celebratory biography of William Eaton (published in 1813) 
that portrayed him as a monumental figure beloved by the public but betrayed by the U.S. 
government.  Unlike other books, it argued that the “daring and dangerous” coup attempt 
constituted the centerpiece of the Tripolitan War, being “much superior in extent and effect 
to any of the late naval victories.”  It vilified Lear and the Jefferson Administration, 
castigating the former for being “so anxious to make a treaty” even though the expedition 
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“had the fairest prospect of” success and condemning the latter for treating Eaton “with great 
duplicity.”  Prentiss lamented the abandonment of the coup attempt and stressed that the 
public appreciated Eaton’s brilliance, believing that he that would “have been master of the 
kingdom of the Tripoli” and made “his own terms of peace.”1086 
Philadelphia printer Mathew Carey, himself the author of A Short History of Algiers 
(discussed in chapter 2), published Thomas Clark’s Sketches of the Naval History of the 
United States (1813) and David Ramsay’s three volume History of the United States 
(published posthumously in 1816 and 1817).  Mordecai Noah, former consul to Tunis, also 
wrote a super-patriotic Travels in England, France, Spain, and the Barbary States, in the 
Years 1813-14 and 15 (1819) that lionized American military and naval heroes.  In the 
preface to the History of the United States, Carey noted that because Ramsay “omitted the 
relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers,” he added this material himself.1087  
Clark and Carey extolled Stephen Decatur as a legendary naval warrior for destroying the 
captured Philadelphia.  Clark described it as “an enterprize of the most daring nature,” while 
Carey proclaimed it “as gallant an enterprize, as was ever recorded to the honour of any hero, 
or the glory of any nation.”1088  For his part, Noah argued that the Tripolitan War served as a 
“school of active warfare” that prepared officers for the War of 1812.1089  Clark believed that 
Commodore Preble deserved special acclaim, attributing the navy’s “brilliant success” to his 
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effective leadership.1090  These authors deemed the Tripolitan War a seminal moment in U.S. 
naval history. 
 Additionally, Clark and Carey emphasized that foreign observers recognized the 
significance of American victories over the Barbary pirates.  By providing quotes from 
distinguished persons, they presented the Tripolitan War as a validation of America’s 
leadership in world affairs.  Clark included Pope Pius VII’s praise (see Chapter 4) and a 
quote from Sir Alexander Ball, the governor of Malta and “a distinguished commander in the 
British navy.”   Ball commended Preble for “set[ting] a distinguished example.  [His] bravery 
and enterprize are worthy [of] a great and rising nation....A few brave men have indeed been 
sacrificed, but they could not have fallen in a better cause.”1091  By incorporating these 
quotes, Clark perhaps sought to reassure the public regarding the ongoing war against 
England:  the U.S. Navy had vanquished the Tripolitans and could now defeat the British.  
Carey similarly celebrated the Tripolitan War for bolstering America’s worldwide reputation, 
but he inadvertently downplayed the impressiveness of naval victories by denigrating the 
Tripolitans as cowardly and incompetent.  He praised the navy for “shed[ding] a lustre on the 
American naval character” and included a lengthier version of the Ball quote.”1092  Yet Carey 
also portrayed the Tripolitans as easy prey, which raises the question of whether the U.S. 
Navy deserves copious praise.  For instance, after losing a battle, “so terrified were the 
Tripolitans…that the sailors abandoned the cruisers…. Crews could not be procured to 
navigate them.”1093 
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Yet despite such triumphalist rhetoric, Clark, Carey, and Noah concurred that the 
Tripolitan War had a disappointing conclusion due to the abandonment of the coup attempt.  
They all believed it would have succeeded had Tobias Lear not made a treaty with the 
bashaw.  Noah portrayed Eaton as an “honourable” hero betrayed by a “cold, calculating and 
timid” Tobias Lear and argued the coup “unquestionably” would have succeeded.1094  Clark 
thought that “Eaton would have forced the bashaw to unconditional submission,” while 
Carey proclaimed that Eaton’s “bold enterprise” resembled “the feats of sir William Wallace 
and his valorous partizans.  The Christians engaged the barbarians in the proportion of tens to 
thousands, and actually put them to flight.”1095  Carey considered Eaton truly great, the 
American equivalent of the medieval Scottish rebel who courageously led a rebellion against 
England in spite of overwhelming odds.  Carey deemed it tragic that the Jefferson 
Administration did not appreciate Eaton’s brilliance, but at least the public admired him:  
Americans unanimously believed that he would, “in all human probability, have penetrated to 
Tripoli; deposed the reigning bashaw; elevated Hamet, the ally of the United States; liberated 
the American captives without a price; and settled an advantageous commercial convention 
with the restored Hamet.”  Lear’s treaty “was to be regretted” since it tarnished national 
honor. 1096  Thus, by recounting the stifled coup attempt, Clark, Carey and Noah tempered 
their overall synopsis of the Tripolitan War.  Although the United States could vaunt about 
naval victories, it agreed to a dishonorable treaty and shamefully abandoned a promising 
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coup.  To Clark, Carey, and Noah, the Tripolitan War contained a mix of triumph and 
tragedy. 
S. Putnam Waldo, writing a biography of Decatur in 1821, outdid Carey in utilizing 
sensationalist rhetoric.  He portrayed the Tripolitan War as a clash between the forces of 
good and evil, labeling the Barbary pirates as “merciless hordes of inhuman wretches,” 
“butcherers of mankind,” and “ferocious sons of Ishmael” who had “a deadly and implacable 
hatred against Christians.”1097  In contrast to contemporaneous descriptions of the conflicts, 
he (falsely) implied that the Tripolitans were primarily motivated by religious animosity.  
Perhaps Waldo’s interpretation reflected the ongoing religious revivals that constituted the 
Second Great Awakening.1098  He also depicted the bashaw as a villain of Shakespearean 
dimensions, comparing him to Richard III and calling him the “devil incarnate.”1099  Waldo 
used equally colorful rhetoric when describing American personnel.  He lionized Decatur as 
the “ardent and chivalrous hero” who “revived the spirit which pervaded the hearts of men in 
the ‘Age of Chivalry’” and praised Eaton’s “daring and romantic project of restoring Hamet 
Caramanli to the throne of Tripoli.”1100  Waldo wanted readers to view Decatur and Eaton as 
larger-than-life figures, modern-day knights who boldly braved danger.  Yet his treatment of 
the coup contained some nuance.  While admiring Eaton’s courage, Waldo considered the 
expedition destined for failure since the “rabble-army” could never have defeated the 
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“20,000 well armed Arabs” that protected the bashaw.1101  He therefore praised Lear’s treaty 
and urged any “dignified and patriotic statesmen” to do the same.1102  One can imagine 
Waldo having ample fun when writing his narrative, as he apparently thought the Tripolitan 
War was best understood by using hyperbole and flashy rhetoric. 
Other authors writing prior to the Civil War held conflicting interpretations of the 
Tripolitan War’s meaning and disagreed about the coup’s potential for success.  Some 
despised the peace treaty and longed for an alternate past, one in which Eaton and Hamet 
fulfilled their mission to overthrow the bashaw.  Other authors defended the treaty, viewing it 
as the best possible deal.  John Milton Niles, writing in 1820, called the treaty “premature” 
and argued that, had the coup attempt not been abandoned, it would have resulted in “more 
favorable” terms or even the bashaw’s “unconditional submission.”1103  Nevertheless, Niles 
believed that the Tripolitan War had a sanguine effect upon the Navy:  it served as “the great 
practical school of most of our naval officers” and had a strong “influence upon their 
character.”1104  Similarly, William Grimshaw’s History of the United States (1821) lamented 
the abandonment of the coup attempt, arguing that it promised “the most glorious and 
beneficial result.”  He praised Eaton’s “distinguished lustre” and “brilliant progress” and 
condemned the treaty as “a sacrifice of honour.”1105  Other pro-Eaton apologists included 
William Allen (in his 1832 An American Biographical and Historical Dictionary) and J.W. 
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Barber (in his 1834 United States Book).  Allen lionized Eaton for defeating the bashaw’s 
superior forces and “open[ing]…the gates of Tripoli” (that is, victory was imminent),1106 
while Barber hailed the military campaign as a “gallant and romantic affair.”1107  John Frost’s 
American Naval Biography (1844) portrayed Lear as a backstabbing villain:  Eaton “came so 
near [to] overturning the government, and humbling the barbarians to our own terms” and 
“was only prevented from doing this by the precipitate treaty of Mr. Lear.”  Like Carey and 
Waldo he waxed poetic about the coup, remarking that “the singularity of this affair—a body 
of Americans allied with Turks, attacking an African town by sea and land and capturing it—
renders it…[a] romantic achievement.”1108  John Blake’s The Beauties of American History 
(1844) portrayed Eaton as a larger-than-life figure who “encountered peril, fatigue, and 
suffering, the description of which would resemble the exaggerations of romance.”  Unlike 
authors who castigated Lear, Blake blamed naval officers for stopping Eaton’s “brilliant and 
successful” enterprise.1109  Jacob Neff’s Thrilling Incidents of the Wars of the United States 
(1848) featured a portrait of Eaton and extolled the coup as a “romantic expedition” and 
“spirited enterprise.” It provided very few details about why it dissolved, simply stating that 
it ran out of “supplies.”1110  The English minister John Hinton, in The History and 
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Topography of the United States (1854) considered Eaton one of the greatest men in 
American history (alongside John Smith and Miles Standish).  He raved that Eaton’s “mind 
was of an epic cast” and that his talents would have been better appreciated “had he lived in 
the days of the crusades.”1111  Henry Watson’s 1854 history book featured a large portrait of 
Eaton as well as a picture of the “Capture of Derna.”1112  Cleary, he wanted readers to be 
awestruck by Eaton’s accomplishments and to consider him a prominent leader of the early 
republic.  Also, Watson plagiarized Carey’s comparison of Eaton to William Wallace and 
concluded that the coup would likely have met “with the most brilliant successes.”1113   
Henry Dawson’s Battles of the United States, by Sea and Land (1858) celebrated the 
coup as one of the “most remarkable” military events in American history and claimed it 
“hastened” the bashaw’s pursuit of peace.1114  Jesse Spencer’s History of the United States 
(1858) praised Eaton’s “unflinching courage and dogged perseverance” and acknowledged 
that “it is not easy to approve of the terms of this peace with Tripoli” since “it seems almost 
certain that better terms might have been obtained.”1115  Charles Peterson’s The American 
Navy (1859) also criticized the treaty, arguing that it “alone prevented the success of this 
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expedition and the dethronement” of the bashaw.1116  That same year, John Denison’s 
military history trumpeted Eaton as a “genius” whose “skill and activity” outshone any 
accomplishments by the navy.1117  He also plagiarized Carey in comparing Eaton to William 
Wallace and in concluding that the coup would have succeeded in “in all human 
probability.”1118  Clearly, Eaton’s admirers loved him and sought to persuade readers that he 
was truly great.  These authors celebrated the use of force to advance American interests, 
perhaps reflecting antebellum interest in what Amy Greenberg has called “martial 
manhood.”1119  As she discusses in Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire, 
this rough and wild masculinity celebrated filibustering in foreign areas with non-white 
populations. 
However, other authors prior to the Civil War challenged this pro-Eaton narrative.  
Many thought that the coup had a dubious chance of succeeding and defended the treaty as a 
good deal.  Charles Goldsborough, in The United States’ Naval Chronicle (1824), 
acknowledged Eaton’s “energy and gallantry” but argued that the coup attempt accomplished 
nothing of value since it did not create “a disposition for peace” in the bashaw.1120  Abiel 
Holmes’s The Annals of America (1829) praised both Eaton and the treaty, proclaiming the 
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latter “more honourable than any peace obtained…with a Barbary regency, at any period 
within a hundred years.”1121  Robert Greenhow’s The History and Present Condition of 
Tripoli (1835) considered Eaton “a remarkable man,” but criticized him for “far exceed[ing] 
the limits of his commission” and listed several reasons why Hamet would have failed as 
bashaw.1122  However, Greenhow despised the treaty, arguing that “there is every reason to 
suppose” that Lear should have insisted upon “terms more honorable” by refusing to pay any 
ransom money.1123  Thomas Harris’s 1837 biography of William Bainbridge offered a 
pessimistic (and Orientalist) interpretation of the coup attempt, calling it “extremely 
problematical” since it depended upon a “tumultuous and undisciplined horde” of Tripolitan 
allies.1124  James Fennimore Cooper’s 1839 naval history acknowledged the controversy over 
the abandonment of the coup attempt, but remained agnostic about its potential success.  
Eaton and Hamet still needed to encounter the bashaw’s 20,000 soldiers, although Cooper 
surmised that, had Barron continued support, perhaps more Tripolitans would have joined the 
rebellion.  At the very least, he thought that the treaty should have included “better terms” in 
the treaty since Hamet still occupied Derne.1125  Richard Hildreth’s The History of the United 
States (1856) commended Eaton as “a person of romantic temper and great enterprise,” but 
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defended Barron’s decision to withhold support—he knew “the exceedingly economical 
spirit of the government” and lacked “faith in Eaton’s project.”1126  James Marshall’s The 
United States Manual of Biography and History (1856) took a neutral view of the treaty, 
remarking that Lear took advantage of “the bravery displayed at Derne” to broker a deal with 
the bashaw.1127  George Tucker’s The History of the United States (1857) deemed both the 
coup’s potential and Eaton’s leadership skills greatly overrated.  Hamet had overestimated 
the amount of followers, lacked “energy or military talent,” and wholly depended upon the 
United States.  As for Eaton, “the merits of his exploits were greatly magnified” and Tucker 
also criticized Federalists for opposing the Jefferson Administration’s support of the 
treaty.1128  Taliaferro Shaffner’s History of the United States of America, published during 
the Civil War, admired Eaton’s resolve but also considered the treaty a good deal:  its “terms 
were far more favourable than any ever before offered by the bashaw.”1129  Altogether, these 
authors tempered the pro-Eaton camp’s notion of a lost cause.  They raised logistical 
concerns about the coup’s viability, although some criticized Lear for not using it as leverage 
to negotiate a better treaty. 
Following the Civil War, depictions of the Tripolitan War changed as authors 
increasingly neglected the coup attempt and more strongly emphasized the naval battles.  
                                                          
1126 Richard Hildreth, The History of the United States of America.  From the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution to the End of the Sixteenth Congress, vol. 2 (New York:  Harper & Brothers, 1856), 558, 561. 
 
1127 James Marshall, The United States Manual of Biography and History:  Comprising Lives of the Presidents 
and Vice Presidents of the United States, and the Cabinet Officers, from the Adoption of the Constitution to the 
Present Day (Philadelphia:  James B. Smith & Co., 1856), 250. 
 
1128 George Tucker, The History of the United States from their Colonization to the End of the Twenty-Sixth 
Congress, in 1841, vol. 2 (Philadelphia:  J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1857), 249-250. 
 
1129 Taliaferro Shaffner, History of the United States of America, from the Earliest Period to the Present Time, 
vol. 2 (London Printing and Publishing Company:  New York, 1864), 238. 
383 
 
Whereas virtually all pre-Civil War accounts of the Tripolitan War discussed Eaton (whether 
celebrating or criticizing him), a significant number of those written after the conflict omitted 
him.  Post-Civil War works instead valorized the naval officers and argued that they levied so 
much pressure on the bashaw that he eventually sued for peace.  The 1890s in particular 
featured a surge in naval-oriented histories of the Tripolitan War, which reflected the strong 
contemporary interest in building a powerful naval fleet that could rival European 
powers’.1130  Alfred Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (1890) 
received a thunderous reception and, later in the decade, the United States engaged in 
overseas wars against Spain in Cuba and the Philippines.1131  By emphasizing the Tripolitan 
War’s naval elements, authors created a useable past that provided inspiration for modern 
policies. 
One school of writers emphasized the naval aspects very strongly and either 
downplayed the importance of the coup attempt or did not mention it at all.  Robert Belford’s 
A History of the United States in Chronological Order (1866) entirely ignored Eaton’s coup 
attempt and instead focused on naval leaders (Dale and Preble).1132  James McCabe’s The 
Centennial History of the United States (1874) also left out Eaton and instead made Stephen 
Decatur the hero of the Tripolitan War.  The book credited the navy with harassing Tripoli 
until the bashaw “asked for peace.”1133  David Porter, a commodore in the U.S. Navy, 
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likewise left out Eaton in his 1875 discussion of the Tripolitan War.  He did, however, 
criticize the treaty, averring that “no doubt, the United States could have made better terms.”  
Oddly (and without providing any evidence), he attributed the sudden end to the conflict to 
public pressure on the government to stop “the sufferings of the prisoners” and to cease 
spending money on the conflict.1134  James Soley’s Operations of the Mediterranean 
Squadron under Commodore Edward Preble (1879) credited the navy for pressuring the 
bashaw to negotiate:  “the Tripolitans had already lowered their terms under the stress of 
Preble’s attacks; and in the presence of a force so much more effective, they might be 
expected to agree to anything.”  In a footnote, though, he conceded that the capture of Derne 
“doubtless had some influence in bringing the Pasha of Tripoli to terms; thought it is difficult 
to see how he could have acted otherwise, if Eaton’s expedition had never been undertaken, 
in view of the overwhelming naval force.”1135  Willis Abbot’s Blue Jackets of ’76 (1888) is 
unique for claiming (quite inaccurately) that the Intrepid explosion of September 1804 
essentially “terminated the war with Tripoli.  Thereafter it was but a series of blockades and 
diplomatic negotiations.”  Still, Abbot despised the treaty:  it “cannot be too harshly 
criticized” since “a native force of insurrectionists, re-enforced by a few Americans, was 
marching upon Tripoli from the rear, and would have soon brought the Bashaw to terms.”  
Although the book did not mention Eaton by name, it condemned the treaty in a manner 
resembling the pro-Eaton camp.1136  Edgar Maclay’s A History of the United States Navy 
                                                          
1134 David Porter, Memoir of Commodore David Porte; of the United States Navy (Albany:  J. Munsell, 1875), 
65-66. 
 
1135 James Soley, Operations of the Mediterranean Squadron under Commodore Edward Preble, in 1803-4 
(Annapolis:  U.S. Naval Academy, 1879), 80. 
 
1136 Willis Abbot, Blue Jackets of ’76:  A History of the Naval Battles of the American Revolution together with 
a Narrative of the War with Tripoli (New York:  Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1888), 300. 
385 
 
From 1775 to 1894 (1895) belittled the expedition as “a rabble of thirty thousand unarmed 
and destitute adventurers” seeking “pillage and plunder.”  While grossly inflating the size of 
Eaton and Hamet’s army, it defended the treaty as “undoubtedly the best that could be 
expected under the circumstances.”1137  Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt’s Hero 
Tales from American History (1895) featured an entire chapter about the destruction of the 
Philadelphia and lamented it being “well-nigh forgotten” by the public.1138  The Tripolitan 
War’s naval heroics constituted a useful past for Roosevelt, who championed a naval 
buildup, served briefly as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and, as president, would send the 
“Great White Fleet” on a world tour.  Hero Tales’s introduction explained the book’s 
purpose:  relating stories about Americans who “knew how to live and how to die…who 
joined to the stern and manly qualities which are essential to the well-being of a masterful 
race the virtues of gentleness, of patriotism, and of lofty adherence to an ideal.”  Roosevelt 
apparently had reevaluated his thoughts on the Tripolitan War; his The Naval War of 1812 
(first published in 1882) dismissed it as consisting of “some obscure skirmishes…none of 
which could possibly attract attention.”1139  Thirteen years later, though, Roosevelt extolled 
Decatur as an embodiment of robust masculinity and bravery. 
James Barnes’s 1897 biography of William Bainbridge credited naval attacks for 
gradually making the bashaw “more inclined to negotiation for peace.”  He mentioned Eaton 
in just one sentence, omitted the capture of Derne, and did not comment on the 
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honorableness of the treaty. 1140  Charles Morris, in The Nation’s Navy (1898), also detailed 
naval battles, left out Eaton, and briefly mentioned an indigenous “insurrection” (which he 
thought pressured the bashaw to make peace).1141  Tom Masson’s The Yankee Navy (1898) 
distorted actual events by claiming that Edward Preble deserved “chief honors” for the 
capture of the city of Tripoli.  In reality, Eaton and Hamet’s forces captured a different city 
(Derne) and Preble was not in the Mediterranean in April 1805—he had returned to the 
United States two months earlier.1142  John Brown’s American Naval Heroes contained a 
chapter about Preble’s actions during the Tripolitan War, but ignored Eaton and the coup 
attempt.1143  A.D. Hall’s Uncle Sam’s Ships (1899) attributed the treaty to the bashaw 
yielding to a superior U.S. naval squadron and “the stress of Preble’s attacks.”   The book 
also plagiarized Soley’s 1879 naval history (discussed above) in discounting the influence of 
the coup attempt:  “it doubtless had a strong additional influence…though it is hard to see 
how [the bashaw] could have acted otherwise in face of the overwhelming naval force.”1144  
John Spears, in History of Our Navy from its Origin to the Present Day (1899), spent three 
chapters trumpeting the naval battles of the Tripolitan War and entirely excluded Eaton.  He 
mentioned the coup in one sentence, portraying it as an indigenous “uprising…with the aid of 
                                                          
1140 James Barnes, Commodore Bainbridge:  From the Gunroom to the Quarter-Deck (New York:  D. Appleton 
and Company, 1897), 143-144, 145, 150. 
 
1141 Charles Morris, The Nation’s Navy:  Our Ships and their Achievements (Philadelphia:  J.B. Lippincott, 
1898), 41. 
 
1142 Tom Masson, The Yankee Navy (New York:  Life Publishing Company, 1898), 42. 
 
1143 John Brown, American Naval Heroes 1775-1812-1861-1898 (Boston:  Brown and Company, 1899), 183-
206. 
 
1144 A.D. Hall, Uncle Sam’s Ships.  Being a History of the American Navy (New York:  Street & Smith, 1899), 
58. 
387 
 
the Americans.”1145  As for the treaty, he contended that it had “more favorable terms” than 
other countries had ever received, but lamented that it nevertheless required a humiliating 
“blackmail tribute.”1146 
As illustrated above, relatively few post-Civil War authors praised Eaton and/or the 
coup attempt.  Among those that did, some criticized the treaty while others approved of it.  
An 1869 book written by Amos Perry (consul to Tunis from 1862 to 1867) lionized Eaton’s 
capture of Derne as “one of the brightest pages in our nation’s history” and accused “jealous” 
naval officers of pressuring Lear to make a treaty.1147  Benson Lossing’s The Story of the 
United States Navy for Boys (1881) argued that the coup attempt would have worked:  Eaton 
and Hamet “were marching on the capital with a promise of full success” when news of 
Lear's treaty reached them.1148  Oddly, Lossing refrained from criticizing the treaty and 
omitted the $60,000 ransom cost.  James Schouler’s History of the United States of America 
under the Constitution (1882) contained a lengthy discussion of Eaton and the coup attempt, 
praising its “spice of romance” and the “gallant capture” of Derne.  Although the treaty “was 
not…wholly gratifying to the American sense of honor,” it still contained the best terms 
made by any “Christian nation within a hundred years.”1149  A history book from 1883 
extolled the coup attempt as “a brilliant example of heroism and wise policy.”1150  Notably 
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missing from this account, though, is the controversy surrounding the $60,000 ransom.  
Eugene Schuyler’s American Diplomacy and the Furtherance of Commerce (1886) 
celebrated the coup as “the most romantic incident of the war” and believed that it might 
have succeeded had Lear not “hastily made a treaty by which we gained none of the 
principles at stake, and simply bought a peace.”1151  Henry Adams, writing in 1891, 
resembled pre-Civil War writers in waxing poetic about Eaton’s accomplishments.  He 
valorized Eaton as “a man of extraordinary energies and genius” with “the courage of 
Alexander the Great”1152   Although Adams considered the payment of ransom money 
“astonishing,” he nevertheless concluded that the Tripolitan War had “a triumphant end.”1153  
He also suggested that youth used to learn about the coup attempt:  “for at least half a century 
every boy in America listened to the story with the same delight with which he read the 
Arabian Nights.”1154  Richard Collum’s History of the United States Marine Corps (1890) 
discussed both naval events and the coup attempt, taking pride in Americans “hoisting [their 
flag]…on a fortress of the Old World.”  Surprisingly, the book ignored the $60,000 
ransom.1155  John McMaster, in A History of the People of the United States (1892), joined 
Perry in blaming envious American officials for sabotaging the coup attempt:  “what could 
not be done by the arms of Jussuf Caramalli was done by the jealously of Commodore 
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Rogers and the hot haste of Tobias Lear.”  The book condemned the treaty as being “most 
shameful to the United States.”1156  In its entry for the Tripolitan War, J. Franklin Jameson’s 
Dictionary of United States History (1897) discussed naval affairs, but the “Derne 
Expedition” entry credited Eaton and Hamet for both the victory and a “highly favorable 
treaty.”1157  Israel Clare’s Library of Universal History mentioned the coup “as properly 
belonging to the history of the Tripolitan War” and praised Eaton’s “energy and courage.”1158  
It offered no commentary regarding the treaty, though. 
Surprisingly, nearly all of the books surveyed above neglected the Tripolitan War 
monument (figure 3).  From 1808-1831, it resided in the Navy Yard (in Washington D.C.) 
before moving near the U.S. Capitol building.  In 1860, it was transferred again, to its current 
home at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.  The memorial was privately 
commissioned, built in Rome, and honors six naval officers who died in 1804 battles.1159  As 
Janet Headley has discussed in “The Monument without a Public:  The Case of the Tripolitan 
Monument,” it has had endured a history of public apathy.  Its classical imagery confused 
spectators (who did not understand the references) and, during its residence outside the 
Capitol, the dense garden area made it difficult for tourists to find.1160 
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Figure 3:  The Tripolitan War Monument, photo taken by the author, summer 2011 
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 Due to a lack of fanfare, the monument faded away in popular memory and most 
authors of Tripolitan War accounts were probably unaware of it.  An 1815 spelling book 
noted its location in Washington, D.C. and its honoring those who died in “a severe battle off 
Tripoli in 1805” (this battle actually occurred in 1804).1161  Lossing’s 1881 naval history 
described the memorial as a “fine monument” and included a large picture of it.1162  
However, it erroneously gave its location as “the western front of the Capitol at 
Washington”—the monument had already moved to Annapolis.  An 1899 history textbook 
contains two errors, claiming that the monument only honors Richard Somers and that it was 
located in Washington D.C.1163  Soley’s 1879 naval history, published by the Naval Academy 
Press, also mentioned the monument and claimed that “not a day passes in which the young 
officers who are in training there, fail to look upon the memorial of their heroism and 
sacrifice.”1164  That may have been true then, but what about today?  I have visited the Naval 
Academy twice (most recently in July 2011) and was saddened to learn that the standard tour 
does not stop at the Tripolitan monument.  Truly, it has become a forgotten memorial. 
 
Schoolbooks and the Tripolitan War 
Nineteenth-century school children regularly learned about the Tripolitan War in 
history and grammar textbooks.  Primary sources for this section primarily come from the 
University of Pittsburgh’s online database “19th Century Schoolbooks” 
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(http://digital.library.pitt.edu/n/nietz/) and Google Books.  Schoolbooks generally presented a 
triumphalist interpretation that stressed the naval battles (especially Decatur’s destruction of 
the Philadelphia).  Further, post-Civil War textbooks not only largely discounted or omitted 
William Eaton’s role, but most of them left out the $60,000 ransom payment.  Instead, 
authors presented the treaty as an unambiguous triumph, a validation of Jefferson’s strategy 
of peace through strength.   
An 1807 history book glorified the “courage and conduct” and “gallant services” of 
military and naval officers and celebrated Lear’s peace treaty since it capitalized upon the 
bashaw’s “fear of being dethroned by his brother.”1165  The author surely was a Democratic-
Republican and sought to inculcate young minds against Federalist criticism of the treaty.  
First Lessons in the History of the United States (1823), written by “Mrs. C.M. Thayer,” 
celebrated Decatur’s “intrepidity and skill” and mentioned the victory at Derne, but excluded 
the treaty’s controversy.1166  Charles Goodrich’s 1825 schoolbook recounted Decatur’s 
destruction of the Philadelphia in two lengthy paragraphs (he clearly considered it valuable 
for young readers) and also praised Eaton and Hamet for braving “incredible toil and 
suffering” on their march to Derne.  Goodrich seemed perplexed over Lear’s decision to 
make the treaty since “he knew of the success of Eaton and Hamet.”1167  The book also 
erroneously stated that “Hamet visited the United States” in 1806—the author evidently 
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confused Hamet with Tunisian Ambassador Sidi Soliman Mellimelli.  A subsequent 
schoolbook written by Goodrich contained an oddly sadistic section about the destruction of 
the Philadelphia:  “Oh! what a scene soon took place!  What carnage was there!  In a few 
minutes, fifty Tripolitans were reeking in blood on the deck.  Not one escaped.  The vessel 
was set on fire, and the flames rose.” 1168  This sensationalism of violence is atypical of 
Tripolitan War accounts.  Further, the book’s claim that no Tripolitans escaped is untrue—
letters by naval officers reported that some jumped into the water (and presumably swam 
away).1169   
Salma Hale’s History of the United States (1835) rhapsodized about the navy’s 
performance in the Tripolitan War, contending that it “evinc[ed] a love of fame and a 
devotion to country unsurpassed in Grecian or Roman story.”  It also praised Eaton’s “bold 
and romantic” coup attempt and claimed that the public despised the treaty.  Hale’s book has 
an unresolved tension:  it simultaneously promotes American exceptionalism (the United 
States had already transcended the military glories of the ancient world), while portraying the 
Tripolitan War as somewhat of a failure since the “brilliant” coup attempt was forsaken.1170  
John Frost’s History of the United States for the Use of Schools and Academies (1836) is 
notable for downplaying the importance of naval battles.  Instead, it argued that the 
Tripolitan War “would have probably effected little” without the coup attempt.  Frost 
despised the treaty, which both ended the conflict “in a most unromantic style” and generated 
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public uproar.1171  An 1839 textbook argued that the Tripolitan War’s “brilliant 
exploits…added great lustre to the military character of the nation,” but criticized Lear for 
making a treaty that stifled the promising coup attempt.  It offered a strikingly pro-Eaton 
narrative, as the footnotes contained ten questions about the coup attempt.  One of them 
sought to make children angry at Lear:  “How did Eaton feel to be thus stopped when he had 
so fair a prospect of placing Hamet on the throne, and having the American prisoners 
released without ransom?  A. No one can describe his grief and indignation.”1172  Benson 
Lossing’s A Pictorial History of the United States, for Schools and Families (1854) 
emphasized naval battles, contained portraits of Bainbridge and Decatur, and omitted the 
details of the treaty.  It credited the coup attempt for “terrif[ying]” the bashaw and, like 
Goodrich’s book, falsely claimed that Hamet visited the United States.1173  G.P. 
Quackenbos’s Illustrated School History of the United States (1857) mostly recounted naval 
events and only briefly mentioned Eaton’s forces.1174  A Child’s History of the United States 
(1858) spent seven pages recounting the naval feats of the Tripolitan War and sympathized 
with Eaton’s disappointment over the treaty—he “returned to America very much disgusted, 
and I don’t wonder at it” 1175 
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As with the general and naval histories, textbook authors’ treatment of the Tripolitan 
War began to change around the time of the Civil War.  Schoolbooks heaped praise upon 
naval officers and generally excluded the controversy surrounding the treaty (especially the 
$60,000 ransom cost).  In doing so, these authors recast the Tripolitan War as a triumphant 
victory, a conflict which exemplified the pinnacle of statecraft and valor. 
An 1870 schoolbook credited both the navy and Eaton for pressuring the bashaw into 
peace, but ignored the controversy surrounding the treaty.1176  Two other history textbooks 
from the early 1870s ignored Eaton, the coup attempt, and the treaty’s controversy, instead 
arguing (incorrectly) that the navy bombarded Tripoli until the bashaw capitulated.1177  David 
Scott’s A School History of the United States (1874) discussed both naval affairs and Eaton’s 
efforts, but left out the treaty controversy and grossly underestimated the size of the coup 
attempt.  It claimed that the expedition consisted of “only 70 seamen and a small body of 
Egyptian soldiers.”1178  A Grammar School History (1876) sympathized with Eaton, 
declaring that Lear’s treaty ended his excursion “in the midst of his successes.”1179  An 1879 
history textbook for Catholic schools left out the coup attempt and the treaty controversy, 
instead crediting the navy for bombarding the bashaw into submission.1180  The coauthored 
New School History of the United States (1880) offered a corrective to works that 
                                                          
1176 L.J. Campbell, A Concise School History of the United States Based on Seavey’s Goodrich’s History (New 
York:  Taintor Brothers, Merrill & Co., 1870), 120. 
 
1177 Joel Steele, A Brief History of the United States for Schools (New York:  A.S. Barnes & Company, 1871), 
157; William Swinton’s First Lessons in Our Country’s History (New York:  Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor, & 
Company, 1872), 142-143. 
 
1178 David Scott, A School History of the United States, from the Discovery of America to the Year 1870 (New 
York:  Harper & Brothers, 1874), 242. 
 
1179 John Anderson, A Grammar School History of the United States (New York:  Clark & Maynard, 1876), 110. 
 
1180 Sadlier’s Excelsior Studies in the History of the United States for Schools (New York:  William Sadlier, 
1879), 257. 
396 
 
overemphasized naval aspects, stressing that naval battles alone did not persuade the bashaw 
to make peace.  It discussed the coup attempt and the $60,000 ransom payment, but 
erroneously claimed that Hamet visited the United States and that Congress “refused to grant 
him anything”—in reality, Congress gave him $2,400.1181  An 1885 history textbook only 
mentioned naval battles and offered a triumphalist interpretation that distorted the reality of 
the conflict:  “Tripoli was so badly punished that the Bashaw was only too glad to sue for 
peace.”1182  Edward Eggelston’s A History of the United States and its People (1888) 
likewise omitted Eaton and the coup attempt, instead recasting the Tripolitan War as “the 
birth of the American navy.”  It proclaimed that American seamen “performed acts of daring 
before Tripoli which have never been forgotten, and which yet serve for an example to their 
successors” and contended that “four years of blockade and war” wore down the “obstinate” 
bashaw.1183  An 1888 history book briefly mentioned the coup attempt (not Eaton, though) 
and offered a patriotic interpretation by omitting the ransom payment and declaring that other 
countries “followed the American example” in relations with the Barbary States.1184  An 
1893 book intended for Catholic schools mentioned the Pope Pius VII quote and coup 
attempt, although it neglected Eaton.  It also contained a misleading summary of the treaty:  
the bashaw “was glad to make peace without being paid for it.”1185  Lee’s Advanced School 
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History of the United States (1896) made Decatur the hero of the Tripolitan War (it included 
a small portrait of him) and excluded Eaton’s expedition and the ransom payment.1186  H.A. 
Guerber’s The Story of the Great Republic (1899) painted a grossly distorted picture of the 
Tripolitan War’s end, claiming that the bashaw ran out of ammunition and that he capitulated 
because of the Intrepid explosion and “some trouble in the city”1187  Another 1899 book 
ignored Eaton and the coup attempt, portraying the treaty as a triumph that increased 
Europe’s respect for the United States.1188 
Most post-Civil War authors recast the Tripolitan War as an unvarnished triumph for 
the United States, one that proved America’s exceptionalism.  By ignoring the ransom 
payment and the controversy surrounding the treaty, school textbooks indoctrinated students 
with patriotism instead of challenging them to think critically about the conflict’s ambiguous 
conclusion.  Further, many of these textbooks downplayed or entirely ignored William 
Eaton’s contribution to the Tripolitan War.  In doing so, authors recast it as a naval affair that 
offered perspective and inspiration for the modern U.S. Navy.  These schoolbooks 
misleadingly suggested that the Tripolitan War united the country against the detested 
Tripolitans. 
 
The Mellimelli Mission 
Many nineteenth-century histories of the United States and naval histories mentioned 
Sidi Soliman Mellimelli’s visit.  Like contemporaneous newspaper articles (discussed in 
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chapter 6), they rarely used his name and usually referred to him as a diplomat from Tunis.  
Notably, very few mentioned that the federal government paid for the trip.  By ignoring the 
controversy that surrounded the mission, authors recast it as a triumph in which Jefferson 
rebuffed tribute demands and the U.S. Navy intimidated the Bey of Tunis.  All of these 
accounts are therefore very inaccurate.  Notably, none of them mention the $10,000 payment 
to Tunis, which attests to the successful cover-up by Jefferson, Madison, and Lear.  Also, 
none of the schoolbooks cited above mention the Mellimelli mission, suggesting that authors 
deemed it unimportant to the national narrative.   
Books that mentioned Mellimelli’s trip used it in a triumphalist manner by stressing 
the government’s refusal to accede to the diplomat’s tribute demands.  Goldsborough’s The 
United States Naval Chronicle (1824) contained several details about negotiations between 
the Tunisian Ambassador and the Jefferson Administration, commended the president for 
“very properly refus[ing]” tribute demands, and alleged that Mellimelli’s reports of the 
United States’ “national strength” helped persuade the Bey to drop his demands.  It offered a 
strikingly pro-Jefferson narrative, viewing the trip as a validation of the president’s 
diplomatic skills.1189  Cooper’s 1839 naval history mentioned the government’s “explicit 
denial” of Mellimelli’s tribute request, celebrated Rodgers for “negotiating under the muzzles 
of his guns,” and claimed that the Bey was intimidated “by the attacks on Tripoli.”1190  
Hildreth’s 1856 book claimed that Barron’s (it was really Rodgers’s) “appearance with his 
whole fleet…soon brought the Bey to terms.”  To his credit, though, Hildreth acknowledged 
that the U.S. government covered the expenses of Mellimelli’s s visit.  The book also 
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portrayed the diplomat as high-maintenance remarking that he demanded “the best house in 
Washington.”1191  Spencer’s History of the United States (1858), mentioned that the Bey of 
Tunis sent an ambassador to Washington D.C. and that his request for tribute “was explicitly 
refused.”1192  Shaffner’s History of the United States (1864) praised the government for 
“emphatically and peremptorily reject[ing] thenceforward and for ever” the demand for 
tribute by the “Tunisian envoy.”  It also claimed that the Bey was scared by the United 
States’ attacks on Tripoli.1193  Schouler’s 1882 book excluded details about Mellimelli’s 
mission, but noted his attendance at Jefferson’s New Year’s reception.  He “conversed in 
Italian” and “wore his silk slippers, turban, and a robe which displayed a scarlet jacket 
beneath, embroidered with buttons of precious stones.”1194  Maclay’s 1895 book claimed that 
Captain Rodgers “literally dictated the terms of peace under the muzzles of his cannon” and 
that European countries marveled that the United States obtained such “‘honorable terms’” 
from Tunis.1195  It also briefly stated that “a Tunisian minister” visited the United States, but 
provided no details.  
Works that mentioned tensions with Tunis but omitted the Mellimelli mission 
featured a unique triumphalist narrative.  They credited the naval fleet for achieving an 
honorable victory over Tunis through overawing the Bey.  Books increasingly neglected 
Mellimelli’s visit in the 1890s, revealing that accounts of U.S.-Tunis relations became 
increasingly inaccurate over time.  The American Navy (1859) claimed that the Bey simply 
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“yielded” to Commodore Rodgers’s “imposing force.”1196  Masson’s 1898 naval history 
grossly distorted actual events by saying that the mere presence of Commodore Rodgers’s 
squadron “compelled the Bey to sue for peace.”1197   
The Nation’s Navy (1898) likewise misled readers by stating that “the guns of the American 
fleet” forced peace upon Tunis.1198  Spears’s 1899 naval history likewise claimed that “terms 
of peace were dictated under the muzzles” of American guns, an accomplishment that 
European countries considered “a matter of wonder.”1199  These late 1890s authors radically 
reinterpreted U.S.-Tunisian relations in order to portray the United States as having a 
longstanding tradition of successful gunboat diplomacy.  Such portrayals could serve to 
encourage readers to support both the ongoing construction of a powerful navy and its use 
abroad in foreign conflicts. 
By default, all of these nineteenth-century accounts of U.S.-Tunis relations were 
inaccurate since peace occurred only through the $10,000 payment.  The most patriotic and 
triumphalist accounts were the least accurate ones, since they suggested (falsely) that the Bey 
succumbed to a raw display of naval force.  Authors recast the Mellimelli mission as a 
victory for the United States by ignoring the political firestorm that it created.  Accounts of 
U.S.-Tunis relations portrayed them as an ideal template for foreign conflicts:  achieving 
peace through formidable strength.  
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The 1815 Conflicts 
The 1815 conflicts against Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli received less attention from 
nineteenth-century authors than did the Tripolitan War even though they resulted in an 
undisputed triumph over the Barbary pirates.  Perhaps authors found the Algerine War less 
interesting because it ended so quickly and only entailed two naval battles.  Authors agreed 
that Decatur achieved outstanding terms for the United States in his treaty with Algiers—it 
did not generate conflicting interpretations or heated debate.  Also, nearly all authors ignored 
Madison’s role in sending a formidable fleet to the Mediterranean.  Instead, they anointed 
Decatur the chief hero. 
Prior to the Civil War, histories that mentioned the 1815 conflicts mostly emphasized 
that they resulted in permanent peace with North Africa, with a few authors lamenting that 
the Algerine War ended too quickly for the U.S. Navy to win many battles.  The Naval 
Temple (1816) devoted a chapter to the Algerine War and praised Decatur for making a 
“highly honourable and advantageous” treaty.  It regretted, though, that “few, perhaps no 
opportunities occurred for a display of the hardy prowess of our sailors,” but rejoiced that the 
United States “humbl[ed] and chastis[ed] a race of lawless pirates.”1200  Niles’s The Life of 
Oliver Hazard Perry (1820) considered the 1815 conflicts less exciting than the Tripolitan 
War, stating that they lacked any “splendid or desperate achievements” and provided “no 
opportunities for the display of the consummate skill and undaunted bravery of our 
seamen.”1201  Still, he praised the U.S. Navy for making “a prompt and satisfactory 
adjustment of all differences” with the Barbary States.  The Life and Character of Stephen 
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Decatur (1821) lavished more praise upon Decatur than did the Perry biography, but 
similarly praised the treaty with Algiers.  Its author, S. Putnam Waldo, deemed it “very 
important” because the United States gained “privileges and immunities never before granted 
by a Barbary State to any Christian power.”1202  Holmes’s The Annals of America (1829) 
applauded Decatur’s diplomacy (he made “an honourable peace” with Algiers), but offered a 
less effusive interpretation.  The book simply cited Madison’s Seventh Annual Message, in 
which he praised the U.S. Navy for gaining “a reasonable prospect of future security” for 
American commerce.1203  The Beauties of American History (1844) and The History and 
Topography of the United States (1854) also relied upon Madison’s quotation in evaluating 
the war.1204  Allen’s 1832 An American Biographical and Historical Dictionary contended 
that the Algerine War had international ramifications—the treaty “shamed the great powers 
of Europe, who had long been tributary to a band of corsairs.”1205  Barber’s United States 
Book of Interesting Events (1834) considered the Algiers treaty “highly honourable and 
advantageous,” while Greenhow’s The History and Present Condition of Tripoli (1835) 
deemed it “highly favorable to the United States.”1206  Harris’s 1837 biography of Bainbridge 
praised the U.S. Navy for ensuring a lasting peace with North Africa, observing that the 
United States currently enjoyed “friendly relations” with them.1207  The American Naval 
Biography (1844) plagiarized Waldo’s 1821 book in praising the Algerine treaty for giving 
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the United States “immunities and privileges never before obtained by a Christian power 
from any Barbary State.”1208  An 1854 History of the United States of America acclaimed 
Decatur for “making every arrangement for the security of American commerce in the 
Mediterranean, and satisfying the demands of the honor and interest of his country.”1209  
Uniquely, Tucker’s 1857 History of the United States credited the Madison Administration 
for dealing forcefully with Algiers—the government sent “a naval force which that power 
would not be able to resist.”  Also unusually, the book mentioned the loss of the Epervier, 
observing that it was “keenly felt” and tempered “patriotic pride” in Decatur’s 
accomplishments.1210  Spencer’s 1858 American history book praised the Mediterranean fleet 
for upholding “the honor and interest of the United States,” while Peterson’s 1859 naval 
history heralded Decatur for being “the first man to win for any civilized nation exemption 
from tribute to the Barbary Powers.”1211  Clearly, a consensus existed that the 1815 conflicts, 
although brief, were significant for permanently resolving America’s longstanding problems 
with North Africa. 
However, several pre-Civil War books on U.S. naval history offered little or no 
interpretation of the Algerine War.  Surprisingly, even though the Naval Monument 
(discussed in chapter 7) included a picture of Bainbridge’s squadron returning from the 
Mediterranean, it overwhelmingly focused on the War of 1812’s naval battles against Britain.  
It spent but two sentences on the Algerine War, saying that it had an “honorable termination” 
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and that “we have room to insert only the following documents relative to it.”1212  Similarly, 
Hildreth’s multi-volume History of the United States of America (1856) contained just one 
paragraph about the conflict.1213  It summarized Decatur’s actions without offering any 
commentary on their significance.  Several works entirely omitted the Algerine War, 
including Cooper’s 1839 two-volume History of the Navy of the United States of America.1214  
Daring Deeds of American Heroes contained dozens of chapters about various naval and 
military exploits, but ignored the Algerine War.1215  Thrilling Incidents of the Wars of the 
United States had sections about the Revolutionary War, Quasi-War, Tripolitan War, War of 
1812, and Mexican-American War, but nothing about the 1815 conflicts.1216    Likewise, the 
two-volume Battles of the United States, by Sea and Land spanned events from the 
Revolutionary War to the Mexican-American War, but omitted the Algerine War.1217  These 
works considered the Algerine War an unimportant sideshow with little, if any, relevance for 
present-day Americans. 
Around the time of the Civil War, a change occurred in the historical memory of the 
1815 conflicts—writers made greater claims for their significance than did antebellum 
authors.  Denison’s A Pictorial History of the Navy (1862) included an entire chapter about 
the 1815 conflicts and offered a hefty dose of patriotism:  “an American may well be proud 
                                                          
1212 Abel Bowen, The Naval Monument (Boston:  George Clark, 1838), 297.  It included various letters and the 
text of the U.S.-Algiers treaty; 297-315. 
 
1213 Hildreth, The History of the United States of America, vol. III, revised ed., (New York:  Harper & Brothers, 
1856), 577-578. 
 
1214 Cooper, History of the Navy of the United States, vol II. (Paris:  A. and W. Galignani, 1839). 
 
1215 Brayman, Daring Deeds of American Heroes (Auburn:  Derby & Miller, 1853). 
 
1216 Neff, Thrilling Incidents of the Wars of the United States (Philadelphia:  Carey & Hart, 1848). 
 
1217 Henry Dawson, Battles of the United States, by Sea and Land, vol. II (New York:  Johnson, Fry, and 
Company), 1858. 
405 
 
when he reflects, that it was reserved for this free republic to bestow upon these enemies of 
mankind the chastisement demanded by their crimes.”1218  Shaffner similarly devoted 
extensive space to discussing the Algerine War in his 1864 History of the United States (even 
mentioning the Epervier loss) and praised Decatur for causing “the fall of a system of 
piratical depredations that had rendered the high seas in that quarter of the world insecure for 
several centuries, and which had been a disgrace to European civilisation” [sic].1219  
McCabe’s Centennial History of the United States (1874) lionized Decatur as well, averring 
that he “settled all the difficulties, and had so humbled the Barbary powers that they never 
again renewed their aggressions upon American commerce.”1220  The Story of the United 
States Navy for Boys (1881) proclaimed the 1815 conflicts “one of the most brilliant chapters 
in the history of the American Navy” and asserted that America’s reputation among 
European countries became “greatly exalted.”1221  Schouler’s History of the United States 
under the Constitution (1882) proudly noted that the government unleashed “the largest 
squadron that had ever sailed from the United States” in order to permanently crush Barbary 
piracy.1222  Lester’s History of the United States (1883) celebrated Decatur’s “brief but 
brilliant cruise,” contending that it provided “immeasurable service to the interests of 
civilization” by defeating “barbaric outrage.”1223  A History of the People of the United States 
(1895) praised Decatur for making the American flag “respected” by both the Barbary States 
                                                          
1218 Denison, 266.  The chapter spans from pages 256 to 269. 
 
1219 Shaffner, vol. II, 415.  The chapter spans from 412-416.  
 
1220 McCabe, 644. 
 
1221 Lossing, The Story of the United States Navy for Boys, 279, 282. 
 
1222 Schouler, 455-456. 
 
1223 Lester, Lester’s History of the United States, vol. II (New York:  P.F. Collier, 1883), 3. 
406 
 
and Europe and wished that his accomplishments were better remembered—the public “soon 
forgot the significance of his victories.”1224  Maclay’s two-volume A History of the United 
States Navy contained twenty pages about the Algerine War but oddly refrained from making 
any grand statements about the conflict (it instead emphasized the Tripolitan War’s 
importance).1225  Similarly, Spears’s multi-volume history of the U.S. Navy featured an entire 
chapter on the 1815 conflicts but lacked any commentary about their significance—it simply 
observed that “from that time to this there has been no war between the United States and the 
Barbary pirates.”1226  Still, these two works clearly suggested that the public needed to 
understand the details.  More positively, Morris’s The Nation’s Navy (1898) argued that the 
United States did more “than any other nation” to end Barbary piracy, while Clare’s 1898 
Library of Universal History declared that Decatur ended that “system of piratical 
depredations…which had been a disgrace to European civilization.”1227  Likewise, Brown’s 
American Naval Heroes (1899) extolled the treaty with Algiers for containing “terms never 
obtained from any of the Barbary powers by any of the great nations of Europe.”1228  
Altogether, post-Civil War authors believed that the 1815 conflicts accomplished more than 
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simply ending the United States’ problems with Barbary piracy—they proved America’s 
exceptionalism by resolving an issue that had plagued Europe for centuries. 
To be sure, not every post-Civil War history book extolled the Algerine War.  
Abbot’s two-volume Naval History of the United States omitted it.1229  Both Schuyler’s 
American Diplomacy and the Furtherance of Commerce (1886) and Windsor’s Narrative 
and Critical History of America (1888) provided few details.  The former concluded that “the 
United States was the first to obtain from the Barbary powers the abolition of presents and 
the proper treatment of its prisoners of war,” while the latter simply observed that since 1815 
“there have been no serious difficulties with the Barbary powers.”1230  Similarly, Uncle 
Sam’s Ships (1899) discussed the Algerine War in a short paragraph and remarked that “from 
that day to this nothing has been heard of the Barbary pirates” and The Yankee Navy (1898) 
remarked that Decatur “practically settled” problems with North Africa.1231  Overall, though, 
post-Civil War treatments of the 1815 conflicts demonstrated more enthusiasm and made 
grander claims about their significance.  Authors (especially those in the late-nineteenth 
century) surely found the 1815 conflicts useful in demonstrating the importance of having a 
strong navy to protect commerce, to ensure national defense, and to impress Europe. 
 
Presidential Speeches & the Barbary Conflicts 
Following the Madison Administration, presidents rarely mentioned North African 
affairs in official speeches.  The Barbary pirates ceased to be threats following the 1815 
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conflicts and presidents apparently did not see much purpose in referencing them.  This 
neglect sharply contrasted the schoolbooks and general and naval histories that portrayed the 
Tripolitan War as a seminal moment in naval history.1232 
In the 1820s and 1830s, presidents John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson 
occasionally mentioned (in State of the Union addresses) that peaceful relations existed 
between the United States and North Africa.  Speaking in December 1825, Adams 
nevertheless advised against complacency and called for “the constant maintenance of a 
small squadron in the Mediterranean” in order to avoid “the humiliating alternative of paying 
tribute for the security of our commerce in that sea.”  He thought that the Barbary pirates 
could revive their predatory behavior if the U.S. did not remain vigilant:  “it were, indeed, a 
vain and dangerous illusion to believe that in the present or probable condition of human 
society a commerce so extensive and so rich as ours could exist and be pursued in safety 
without the continual support of a military marine.”  Adams also addressed concerns that the 
navy presented a threat to the public’s freedom.  In rhetoric redolent of Jefferson’s in the 
1780s, he described the navy as “the only standing military force which can never be 
dangerous to our own liberties at home.”  To Adams (the chief author of the Monroe 
Doctrine), a strong navy was essential to national security.1233 
Andrew Jackson disagreed with Adams on many issues, but he concurred about the 
need for sufficient naval protection in the Mediterranean.  In his First Annual Message, he 
noted that although U.S. relations with the Barbary States were “of the most favorable 
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character,” the country needed to retain “an adequate force” in order to ensure “the 
continuance of this tranquility.”1234  Jackson again referenced North African affairs in his 
December 1834 Annual Message, noting that he had withdrawn the United States’ consul 
from Algiers now that France had colonized that country.  He also remarked upon the 
upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.-Morocco treaty, praising its “just and liberal” 
qualities.1235  Jackson’s final two Annual Messages briefly mentioned peace with the Barbary 
States.1236  Twenty-nine years later, Abraham Lincoln became the last president to mention a 
peaceful state of relations with North Africa in an Annual Message.1237 
On other occasions, presidents sometimes invoked the Barbary conflicts as 
perspective on or precedents for current issues.  They celebrated the Tripolitan War as 
evidence of America’s longstanding commitment to free trade.  Franklin Pierce, in his 
December 1855 Annual Message, condemned Demark for demanding a toll on American 
ships trading in the Baltic Sea and drew a parallel to the early nineteenth-century conflicts 
with North Africa.  He praised government leaders for successfully using force against the 
Barbary pirates in order to liberate “the commerce of the world” and guarantee “the freedom 
of the seas.”  As Pierce saw it, Denmark was emulating the Barbary States by infringing upon 
the United States’ “natural right” of free trade.  He considered the Barbary conflicts very 
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relevant to modern affairs and interpreted them in a triumphalist manner by stressing the 
United States’ role in ending North African piracy.1238   
Franklin Roosevelt invoked the Tripolitan War in a May 1941 radio address that 
discussed the importance of having a strong navy to prevent the Axis Powers from 
conquering the world.  The president argued that “all freedom…depends on freedom of the 
seas” and praised the U.S. Navy for making “commerce safe from the depredations of the 
Barbary pirates” and for defending “the right of all Nations to use the highways of world 
trade.”1239  Roosevelt wanted the public to take pride in American naval triumphs and 
recognize that, without a strong navy to oppose Nazi Germany, Hitler could easily conquer 
areas in the western hemisphere.  Also, at an April 1945 Q&A session, FDR responded to a 
reporter’s question about precedents for arming merchant ships by discussing such 
occurrences in the Quasi-War, the War of 1812, and the Barbary conflicts.1240 
Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman, considered the Barbary conflicts as especially 
pertinent to his vision for the Korean War.  In an April 1951 speech, he lionized Jefferson for 
opposing North African “robbery and human slavery.”  Truman vaunted that the U.S. Navy 
had “won the praise and gratitude of the world,” cited Pope Pius VII’s grateful remarks (see 
chapter 4), and concluded that the conflicts illustrated the fundamental truth that “there are 
times when our country has to fight for law and order.”  Truman portrayed the Soviets as 
modern-day Barbary pirates, determined to “conquer the civilized world” and destroy 
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“democratic nations.”   Truman admonished Americans to “meet this threat just as firmly as 
Jefferson met the threat of the Barbary pirates.”1241  For Truman, such vigilance entailed 
supporting intervention in Korea as necessary to prevent the Soviet Union from conquering 
Japan, the Middle East, Europe, South America, or the United States.  Truman’s analogy is 
strained, however, since the Tripolitan War was primarily a naval affair against a relatively 
weak opponent.  Still, Truman clearly held a triumphalist view of the Barbary conflicts and 
found inspiration in them for his vigorous anticommunism. 
1987 marked the bicentennial of the U.S.-Morocco treaty, an occasion that both 
governments celebrated.  In an April speech, Ronald Reagan acclaimed it as “the longest 
unbroken friendship treaty of the United States” (subsequent generations of commentators 
did not consider the 1803 troubles, discussed in chapter 3, as 
having ruptured the treaty) and praised both nations’ “deep 
commit[ment] to world peace and the principles of democracy, 
liberty, and justice.”1242  The bicentennial also drew notice from 
the U.S. Postal Service, which issued a special stamp (figure 4).1243  
Moreover, King Hassan II of Morocco even offered to fund a 
monument (in Washington D.C.) to commemorate the treaty.1244  
President Reagan endorsed the idea and Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-NY) introduced a bill in 
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February 1986 to find suitable land for it.  Although ninety-seven congressmen and 
congresswoman endorsed the bill and it received a hearing by the Task Force on Libraries 
and Memorials, its momentum stalled and it died in committee.1245  The project received little 
public support and became a target of ridicule.  The Chicago Tribune remarked that 
Washington D.C. was already “so choked with statuary” and satirically suggested that the 
statue depict either Humphrey Bogart’s iconic character in “Casablanca” or Houston socialite 
Joanne Herring (“who has made herself a diplomatic fixture…as Morocco’s honorary consul 
to Houston”).1246  Part of the problem lay in the timing of the idea:  Congress had received a 
plethora of various monument proposals that exceeded the amount of available land.1247 
 
Creating the Naval Documents volumes 
Truly, the most prominent monument to the Barbary conflicts is the six-volume 
compendium of primary sources issued by the United States Government Printing Office 
from 1939 to 1944.1248  The Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the 
Barbary Powers set contains a plethora of primary sources (such as correspondence, diary 
and log book entries, government records, and images) spanning from 1785 to 1807 (but 
mostly devoted to the Tripolitan War).  In recent years, it has been digitized and made free to 
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the public at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000367640.  The impetus behind the 
creation of Naval Documents has not been discussed by scholars of the Barbary conflicts.  
The Dudley Knox Papers at the Library of Congress shed important light on it and reveal that 
President Franklin Roosevelt deemed public knowledge of America’s conflicts with the 
Barbary States essential to understanding the United States’ role in the world and to gaining 
important perspective on modern-day events.  FDR wanted the United States to continue 
defending the freedom of seas. 
Captain Dudley Knox was an inspired choice for heading the project.  A graduate of 
the Naval Academy and veteran of the War of 1898 and World War I, Knox began working 
as an archivist in the Navy Department in the 1920s and wrote several books about naval 
history.1249  Roosevelt and Knox initially envisioned a large project in which government 
archivists would collect and publish primary sources from all of the early republic’s foreign 
conflicts:  the Quasi-War, the Barbary Wars, the War of 1812, and the Mexican-American 
War.  Roosevelt pressured Congress to authorize the project, promising that it would pay for 
itself through selling the volumes at cost to the public.  Knox recalled that one “‘hard-boiled’ 
Budget official cross-examined me for half an hour,” after which “he smiled and said he 
wanted the specific information because he had ‘orders from the White House to give Dudley 
Knox all he asked for.’” 1250  The bulk of the documents came from East Coast libraries and 
personal holdings, with Roosevelt contributing material from his own collection.1251  Once 
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the United States entered World War II, however, Congress ceased funding the project—only 
the Quasi-War and Barbary Wars volumes were completed.  Although the grand scope of the 
project was never realized, Knox still took pride in what was accomplished and appreciated 
Roosevelt’s patronage.  Indeed, he remarked that FDR had “had few if any peers” regarding 
knowledge of naval history.1252 
Why did Roosevelt care so much about naval affairs and the Barbary conflicts more 
specifically?  He had both a professional and personal interest in naval history, having served 
as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913 to 1920 and boasting an impressive collection 
of naval primary sources.  The forward to volume I of Naval Documents, attributed to FDR, 
argues that the Barbary conflicts offered “permanently valuable lessons” to Americans:  they 
illustrated a fierce and honorable commitment to “national independence and just rights of 
the United States, especially on the great neutral highways of the sea.”1253  One senses that 
Roosevelt considered the Barbary Wars very relevant to contemporary debates over the 
extent to which the United States should get involved in world affairs.  Yet Roosevelt did not 
actually write this forward—Knox did on behalf of the president.  Knox sent FDR a draft for 
review in December 1938 and, a few days later, Roosevelt approved it and provided 
instructions for making it official (using the president’s facsimile signature and putting “The 
White House” on the bottom).1254  Understandably, the president would have been occupied 
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with running the country at an especially trying time (the Great Depression and the eve of 
World War II). 
Knox handled logistics and presented plans for Roosevelt’s approval.  In an April 
1934 letter, he sent an “outline plan” for the projected volumes that included titles of various 
series and a list of archives to mine.1255  For his part, Roosevelt’s letters to Knox reveal a 
deep excitement for the endeavor and suggest that it served as a respite from the rigors of the 
presidency.  For instance, the president referred to the overarching project as “peculiarly my 
own child” and “my pet child” in letters.1256  Roosevelt also sensed that undertaking a project 
of this magnitude would only become more difficult with time.  In a February 1935 letter to 
the Director of the Budget, he acknowledged that many documents were “in very fragile 
condition” or were “scattered through the country.”  He wanted to complete the project 
“before it is too late.”1257  FDR saw the government as an essential steward of the nation’s 
past, uniquely able to preserve primary sources for current and future generations to study. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
A brief word is in order about a topic that does not permeate this manuscript:  the role 
of religion in the Barbary conflicts, a topic handled quite differently by modern-day popular 
writers and academics.  The former have often portrayed the Barbary pirates as religious 
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zealots who shared the same goal as modern-day Muslim terrorists:  the destruction of non-
Islamic civilizations and peoples.1258  Is this view correct?  In one sense, the Barbary pirates 
were religiously motivated—they targeted ships from (Christian) Europe and the United 
States.  However, the documentary record as a whole undercuts the religion-based argument.  
Its proponents base their case upon one source:  a March 1786 letter written by John Adams 
and Thomas Jefferson which describes their meeting with the Tripolitan Ambassador to 
Great Britain (a man named Abdurrahman).  The Americans wondered aloud why the 
Barbary Powers “make war upon Nations who had done them no injury.”  The diplomat 
reportedly replied “that it was founded on the Laws of their Prophet, that it was written in 
their Koran, that all Nations who should not have acknowledged their authority were sinners, 
that it was their right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to 
make Slaves of all they could take as Prisoners, and that every Mussulman who should be 
slain in the battle was sure to go to Paradise.”1259  In this instance, the Tripolitan diplomat 
indeed provided an overtly religious rationale for Barbary piracy.  Notably, though, his 
defense of it made no mention of killing enemies (a goal of modern Islamic terrorists).  
Moreover, Abdurrahman provided a non-religious justification of Barbary piracy in another 
meeting:  “Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco, were the Sovereigns of the Mediterranean, 
and that no nation could navigate that Sea, without a Treaty of Peace with them.”1260  In this 
instance, the Tripolitan Ambassador stressed that because the Barbary States claimed 
jurisdiction over the Mediterranean Sea outsiders must pay to travel on it.  According to 
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Abdurrahman’s own explanations, Barbary piracy derived from a combination of religious 
and secular motivations. 
Other North African policymakers did not claim that their countries targeted 
American ships because of Islam.  When Tripoli’s ruler Yusuf Karamanli described his 
frustrations with the United States in letters to John Adams he did not mention religion.  
Instead, he complained about the tardiness of tribute or accused the United States of treating 
other Barbary States better than Tripoli.1261  When Tunisian Ambassador Sidi Soliman 
Mellimelli visited the United States during Jefferson’s second term and interacted with 
policymakers and the general public, he likewise did not list Islam as a cause for Barbary 
piracy.  Instead, he claimed that the United States needed to better respect the sovereignty of 
Tunis.  When Algiers waged war against the United States from 1812 to 1815, it was not 
because of religious differences.  Instead, the government saw an opportunity to profit from 
capturing and selling hostages and the Dey even appealed to “the laws of nations” in a letter 
to Madison.1262  These North African policymakers wanted their countries to be treated like 
reputable nations, not as renegades.  They insisted that the United States emulate the example 
of European nations by paying tribute and they did not use Islam to justify aggressions 
against American ships. 
What about the experiences of American hostages in North Africa—did they consider 
themselves the victims of jihad?  More than four hundred Americans spent time in North 
Africa as captives, and many discussed their experiences in letters and narratives.  They 
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overwhelmingly argued that Barbary piracy was primarily motivated by the prospect of 
economic gain.  Richard O’Brien spent nearly two decades in North Africa as a captive and a 
diplomat; he declared that “money is the God of Algiers & Mahomet their prophet.”1263  
James Cathcart, reflecting upon his captivity in Algiers, blamed European powers for fueling 
the greed of North African rulers.  He accused European governments of “feed[ing] their 
avarice and forg[ing] pretexts for them to commit depredations upon every nation which 
endeavors to share the commerce of the Mediterranean.”1264  To be sure, another captive in 
Algiers in the mid-1790s, John Foss, believed that the Algerines “are taught by the Religion 
of Mahomet (if that can be called a Religion which leads men to the commission of such 
horrid and bloody deeds) to persecute its oppressors.”1265  But what about the treatment of the 
American hostages?  The ordinary seamen had a rough time in North Africa and endured 
hard labor, exposure to disease, and paltry food rations.  Some died from exposure to the 
plague.  Still, American captives in North Africa received much better treatment than did 
prisoners of war held by the (Christian) British during the Revolutionary War.1266  Moreover, 
naval officers captured during the Tripolitan War had a much better captivity experience.  
Some even wrote fondly about their time in Tripoli, remembering good food, comfortable 
lodging, and an exemption from working.  The bashaw abided by European and American 
standards for the treatment of enemy officers—hardly the behavior of a religious terrorist.  
Unlike modern Muslim terrorists, the Barbary pirates’ goal was not to kill people.  Instead, 
they wanted to make money by ransoming captives to their home countries. 
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Additionally, most American officials in North Africa rejected the premise that the 
Barbary pirates were primarily motivated by religious hostility.  William Shaler, a diplomat 
in Algiers in the mid-1810s, declared that he never observed “any thing in the character of 
these people that discovers extraordinary bigotry, fanaticism, or hatred of those who profess 
a different religion.”1267  Commodore Edward Preble, who orchestrated several attacks in the 
Tripolitan War, considered North African rulers driven by greed.  He feared that paying 
tribute “would stimulate the avarice of the other Barbary Powers and probably induce them 
to make War upon us.”1268  William Eaton, the volatile diplomat and leader of a coup attempt 
in Tripoli, thought a little differently.  He considered North African men as motivated by a 
combination of religious zeal and economic opportunity:  “taught by revelation that war with 
the Christians will guarantee the salvation of their souls, and finding so great secular 
advantages in the observance of this religious duty their inducements to desperate fighting 
are very powerful.”1269  In another letter from the same time period, though, Eaton provided 
non-religious reasons for Barbary piracy:  “nothing can be more absurd than to expect by 
presents to satisfy the demands of these marauding and beggarly courts, who have no sense 
of gratitude, no sentiments of honour, no respect for justice, no restraint from fear, and whose 
avarice is as insatiable as death.”1270  Overall, the majority of American policymakers in 
North Africa believed that Barbary piracy stemmed from economic, and not religious, 
motivations. 
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U.S. government officials recognized that Muslims and European Christians had a 
long history of warfare and emphasized to North African policymakers that they did not view 
Muslims with hostility.  During treaty negotiations with Algiers in 1795, Cathcart 
emphasized to the Dey that “in our country we have no religious test, nor enmity against 
those of your religion; you may build Mosques, hoist your flag on the tower, chant the 
symbol of your faith in public, without any person interrupting you, Mussulmen may enjoy 
places of honor or trust under the government, or even become president of the United 
States.”1271  Similarly, article eleven in the 1797 treaty with Tripoli asserted that “as the 
government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian 
Religion,-as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of 
Musselmen,-and as the said States never have entered into any war or act of hostility against 
any Mehomitan nation, it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious 
opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two 
countries.”1272  By ratifying this treaty, the Senate disavowed any religious-based hostility 
against North Africa.  Furthermore, Presidents George Washington, John Adams, Thomas 
Jefferson, and James Madison treated their North African counterparts as peers and not as 
rogue sponsors of terrorism.  They considered the Barbary States reputable countries and, as 
did Europe, sent diplomats to broker treaties and maintain the peace.  The Jefferson 
Administration even treated Tunisian Ambassador Mellimelli better than European diplomats 
by covering all of his trip’s expenses.  Also, during this diplomat’s nearly year-long stay in 
the United States no one accused him of sponsoring jihad.  On the contrary, many Americans 
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liked him—crowds thronged his public appearances and some elites vied to host him at 
parties.  Mellimelli’s critics deemed him racially inferior, but they never claimed that he 
represented a group of religious terrorists. 
In writing this manuscript I examined tens of thousands of primary sources, and the 
overwhelming majority of them make no mention of Islam as a cause of Barbary piracy.  
Instead, Americans viewed North Africans as insatiably greedy.  Altogether, there is little 
evidence that Americans of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries considered 
themselves victims of religious zealotry.  Americans despised North Africa’s predatory 
behavior, but they viewed it as primarily economic in nature and understood that the United 
States could obtain peace by paying ample sums of money.  Those modern authors who 
claim that the Barbary pirates are analogous to twenty-first-century Muslim terrorists commit 
two interpretive errors.  First, they treat the March 1786 letter by Adams and Jefferson as 
representative of North African perspectives.  Secondly, they ignore the overwhelming 
amount of counterevidence. 
 
